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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates hydropower development in the lower Mekong basin. 
Water resources development is promoted and contested by multiple actors at multiple 
scalar levels of analysis. In examining the hydropolitical constellation of the lower 
Mekong theoretical insights from political ecology are utilised, and dominant 
assumptions about transboundary rivers are considered. The hydropolitical constellation 
of the lower Mekong is comprised of a number of different actors with competing water 
resources development agendas, including: the Mekong River Commission, multilateral 
development banks, donors, the private sector, and civil society. The Mekong River 
Commission, as a transboundary river basin organisation, is a key arena for hydropower 
development debates as it is a space where a multitude of actors interact and confront 
each other.     
This thesis argues that a dominant development narrative linking hydropower 
development and poverty reduction has endured since the 1950s. This narrative was the 
initial impetus for transboundary water cooperation between the four lower Mekong 
states. From the 1990s onwards the pace of hydropower development in the lower 
Mekong has increased and is being intensified by new actors. Changing regional 
dynamics and the presence of new actors has altered power relationships, but not 
dominant conceptions of the Mekong and hydropower. 
This thesis argues that actors utilise narratives to legitimise their development 
interventions and silence the concerns of less powerful actors. Situating hydropower 
development at the national scale obscures actors, processes and impacts at other levels 
of analysis which are promoting and contesting hydropower development. Representing 
the Mekong and development in particular ways allows actors to maintain and extend 
their access to resources. However, this is continually challenged by less powerful 
actors. The evidence and representations of less powerful actors have been unable to 
displace those of powerful actors who have shifted the terrain to discussions of trade-
offs. 
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Chapter One: Hydropolitics in the Lower Mekong 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Rivers have played a unique role in human history and development. Water 
management was integral to the development of early civilisations such as 
Mesopotamia, and to the development of modern nation states through the utilisation of 
water for agriculture, industry, and transport (Hassan 2003).  From the 19
th
 Century 
onwards water engineers and politicians became increasingly interested in the concept 
of river basin development including grand plans for irrigation and dams (Molle 2009). 
Water and development have become intrinsically linked in the discourse of engineers, 
planners, and politicians. As water use by society has increased to encompass domestic 
uses, agriculture, industry and power production, competing water demands have 
emerged at the same time as societies are becoming more inter-linked (Hassan 2003). 
As such, rivers have emerged as a field of interest in political science.            
From the 1980s onwards, there has been increasing academic and practical interest 
in the world‘s transboundary rivers, and their conflict and cooperation potential due to 
their interconnected and interdependent nature has been widely debated (Wolf 1998; 
Sadoff and Grey 20002; Phillips et al. 2006). Institutions or cooperative river basin 
organisations have been suggested as a key mechanism to reduce the inter-state tensions 
that result from states sharing a watercourse and foster cooperation between riparian 
states (Lowi 1995). The Mekong River in Southeast Asia has a long-standing and 
resilient history of water cooperation between the four lower riparian states: Lao 
People‘s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam (Wolf 
1998). In 1995 these four states established the Mekong River Commission (MRC). As 
the pace of water resources development in the region has intensified the MRC has 
become the subject of an immense amount of attention from actors who want to 
critique, improve and empower it (Dore and Lazarus 2009). The reasons for this, and for 
the resurrection of plans to develop mainstream hydropower, lie both within and outside 
the sphere of lower Mekong water cooperation.  
This thesis examines how multiple actors promote and contest hydropower 
development in the lower Mekong, and how both the Mekong and development are 
constituted in discourse. The dynamic interplay between actors, narratives and 
representations of development illustrates that hydropolitics in the lower Mekong is 
complex involving both place and non-place based actors, as well as global, regional, 
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national and sub-national discourses on water cooperation and development. This thesis 
challenges the state-centric focus of conventional IR approaches to hydropolitics, and 
utilises political ecology and insights from critical IR approaches to account for the 
complexity of development debates and hydropolitics in the lower Mekong.  
 
2. The Mekong River 
 
The Mekong River is shared by six states: China, Myanmar, Thailand, Lao PDR, 
Cambodia and Vietnam (see Map 1, p.3). It is 4904km long and one of the largest rivers 
in the world (MRC 2010a). It rises in the Tibetan Plateau and flows through Yunnan 
Province in Southwest China before forming the border between China, Myanmar, and 
Lao PDR; the river then forms the border between Thailand and Lao PDR for a 
considerable distance before flowing through Cambodia and dividing into the nine 
branches that form the Vietnamese Delta, and discharging into the South China Sea 
(Phillips et al. 2006; Cronin 2009). The Mekong basin is usually split into two parts, the 
upper Mekong (China and Myanmar) and the lower Mekong (Lao PDR, Thailand, 
Cambodia and Vietnam). This division is for both geopolitical, and hydrological and 
topographical reasons.    
Around 60 million people live in the lower Mekong basin, with 80% living in rural 
areas and sustaining themselves with small-scale primary production (MRC 2010a; 
Phillips et al. 2006). The Mekong River supports one of the world‘s most productive 
and biologically diverse fisheries, which plays an integral role in livelihoods and food 
security (MRC 2010a). One of the key features of the Mekong River system is the 
Tonle Sap River in Cambodia which connects with the Mekong at Phnom Penh and 
reverses its flow depending on the season. During the flood season excess water from 
the Mekong floods into the Tonle Sap River and expands the size of the Tonle Sap Lake 
inundating a large floodplain; as the flood subsides water flows back into the Mekong 
River bringing with it a large quantity of migratory fish and providing part of the 
Mekong Delta with enough water to produce a third rice harvest (Cronin 2009; Sokhem 
and Sunada 2006). As well as important roles in fisheries and agriculture, the Mekong 
River system has a strong potential for hydropower dam development. 
 
  
3 
 
   
 
Map 1: The Mekong River Basin (Phillips et al. 2006: 93) 
 
Since 1957, the four states of the lower Mekong have participated in cooperative 
water arrangements. This cooperation has three distinct phases: one, the Mekong 
Committee (1957-1975), which had a strong focus on regional development plans; two, 
the Interim Mekong Committee (1978-1991) during which Cambodia was absent due to 
internal instability; and three, the Mekong River Commission (1995- to present) which 
combines all four lower Mekong states and is officially orientated towards sustainable 
development of the lower Mekong (Varis et al. 2008a; Chi 1997; Radosevich and Olsen 
1999; Browder 2000). Hydropower development plans have been associated with 
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Mekong water cooperation since 1957, and linked to regional development by the four 
lower Mekong states. The lower Mekong is simultaneously a space for regional water 
cooperation, important for local livelihoods, and a potential resource for development.   
 
3. Hydropower development and water resources governance in the lower 
Mekong 
 
Hydropower development in the lower Mekong since the end of the Cold War has 
attracted attention and criticism from civil society actors and researchers. Global civil 
society actors have challenged projects such as Nam Theun 2, whilst Thai civil society 
actors have campaigned against projects such as Pak Mun dam. Prior to 2006, the 
projects being proposed, planned and contested were located on tributaries (see Map 2, 
p.4) 
 
 
 
Map 2: The Mekong‘s main tributaries (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Srepok_River) 
 
 The MRC was largely absent from debates over these projects, arguing that they 
were outside its purview (Backer 2007). Hydropower dams are controversial because 
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they alter various actors‘ relations to water, introduce new technologies that require 
experts and remove control of water use and access away from local communities 
(Trottier 2003a). Hydropower development is often a politically opaque process where 
local communities, and sometimes individual states, are concerned because it is 
dominated by international experts, consultants, engineering firms, and both public and 
private capital (Bakker 1999). Civil society actors, researchers and academics are 
concerned about the impacts of hydropower, as well as the distribution of costs and 
benefits (e.g. TERRA 2007; Baran and Ratner 2007). 
Plans for hydropower development in the lower Mekong escalated in 2006 with the 
resurrection of plans to dam the mainstream of the lower Mekong River (see Map 3, 
p.6). Traditional donors to the region (such as Denmark), civil society actors and the 
development banks were surprised by the resurrection of these plans. Civil society 
actors expressed concern that these dams were being discussed again when earlier 
studies had demonstrated their potentially significant impacts on fisheries (MRC 
2008a). In 2006, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank argued that 
mainstream hydropower development was unlikely given the size of the potential socio-
environmental impacts (ADB and World Bank 2006).  
Plans for mainstream dam projects intensified the debate about the role and 
relevance of the MRC amongst donors and civil society actors. The MRC has been 
characterised as largely absent, silent or underutilised by Member States in decision-
making and debates about controversial water resources developments, including: 
Chinese plans to dam the upper Mekong; Vietnamese hydropower development of the 
Sesan (a Mekong tributary), which negatively impacted local communities in 
Cambodia; Thai plans for diverting water from the Lower Mekong, and a channel 
improvement programme for the upper reaches of the Mekong involving China, 
Myanmar, Lao PDR and Thailand (Dore and Lazarus 2009). Civil society actors have 
accused the MRC of ―abdicating responsibility‖ by remaining silent regarding Member 
States‘ plans for mainstream hydropower (TERRA 2007). Donors to the MRC, 
including Australia and Germany, urged the MRC to play a strong role in hydropower 
and for Member States to utilise the MRC (Development Partners 2007). However, as 
the debate has continued the MRC has provided one of the few arenas in which civil 
society actors can contest powerful actors‘ plans to dam the mainstream. The MRC has 
also undertaken research into potential impacts, which has been widely disseminated 
(e.g. ICEM 2010).   
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Map 3: Proposed Hydropower Projects on the Mekong mainstream 
(http://www.mrcmekong.org/ish/map.htm)  
 
 
Debates and plans about water resources developments in the lower Mekong have 
largely taken place outside the MRC arena. This disjuncture is mirrored in a large part 
of the academic literature where hydropower development projects in the lower Mekong 
are considered within the field of geography, and water governance at the international 
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and regional levels are considered from conventional IR approaches to hydropolitics. 
Geographers have largely considered individual projects, their scalar properties, and the 
various actors involved (e.g. Usher 1996). In contrast studies on the MRC have largely 
utilised conventional IR hydropolitics approaches, such as regime theory, to consider 
particular aspects of the regime (e.g. Affeltranger 2008).    
Hydropower development in the lower Mekong has attracted increasing 
attention from researchers (largely within the field of geography) since the mid-1990s as 
plans for tributary, and later mainstream dams, have escalated (see Bakker 1999; Hirsch 
2001; Usher 1996; Klopper 2008). This literature has focused on issues of scale, power, 
and various actors (e.g. private companies and the ADB) who operate over various 
scalar levels (see Hirsch 2001; Usher 1996). The politics of hydropower development in 
the lower Mekong has also been emphasised within this research. Klopper (2008) and 
Lebel et al. (2005) have highlighted the scalar strategies that actors utilise in order to 
both promote and contest hydropower development. For example, Thai state actors have 
rescaled their hydropower development strategies to the regional level and are funding 
and promoting hydropower development in Lao PDR in order to meet their predictions 
of rising energy demands and avoid domestic opposition to hydropower (Klopper 2008; 
Lebel et al. 2005). Research has also focused on interactions between different actors 
over various scalar levels. Usher (1996) links the Theun Hinboun hydropower project in 
Lao PDR, with Nordic private companies, Nordic donors to the region, and the local 
impacts of hydropower development.  
The MRC, whilst mentioned in some of this literature, does not feature heavily 
in analyses. Researchers have placed current hydropower plans within their historical 
context noting the links between hydropower plans and Mekong water cooperation (see 
Bakker 1999; Usher 1996). However, it is argued that at the same time as the MRC is 
incorporating social and environmental concerns into its programmes, it is becoming 
marginalised (Bakker 1999). There is a strong focus on state actors, private companies, 
multilateral development banks, and civil society (see Klopper 2008; Lebel et al. 2005; 
Hirsch 2001). This literature illustrates that a wide range of non-state actors operating 
over various scalar levels are important aspects of water resources development. 
However, as hydropower development is being rescaled to the international level 
through plans for mainstream dams, it is important to consider water governance at this 
scale, as well as the overlapping interactions between actors operating over different 
scalar levels, and locate unfolding trends, such as increased involvement of the private 
sector, in their wider political contexts.    
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The MRC has been considered from a number of conventional IR approaches to 
international hydropolitics. Conventional IR approaches focus on the 
conflict/cooperation problematique: transboundary rivers, due to their interconnected 
nature, contain both the potential for conflict and cooperation as development of water 
resources in one part of the basin will impact the other parts (Elhance 1999). Political 
scientists, such as Makim (2002), have argued that whilst none of the Mekong 
Committees plans were ever realised in the period 1957-1994, the value of lower 
Mekong water cooperation lies in its contribution to regional security as it provided a 
space for otherwise hostile riparian states to meet and discuss. Recent research on the 
lower Mekong and the current incarnation of Mekong water cooperation, the MRC, 
have largely utilised a state-centric focus and international relations approaches such as 
regime theory (Backer 2007; Makim 2002; Meninken 2007). A large amount of 
research has been produced focusing on different aspects of Mekong cooperation 
including: the negotiations for the 1995 Mekong Agreement (Browder 2000; Nakayama 
1999); public participation (Chenoweth et al. 2002); links between water cooperation 
and security (Makim 2002); issues surrounding data management and exchange 
(Affeltranger 2008); and MRC effectiveness and Member State commitment (Backer 
2007).  
Case studies of the Mekong River have also been conducted within the context of 
larger debates about the conflict and cooperation potential of transboundary rivers and 
how water cooperation can mediate this conflict potential (Elhance 1999; Phillips et al. 
2006). Within these case studies, hydropower development plans are dealt with briefly 
and related to the river‘s hydropower potential and Member States‘ growing electricity 
demand (e.g. Phillips et al. 2006). However, they do identify hydropower development 
as a threat to the basin‘s future integrity (Phillips et al. 2006).  
This IR-influenced literature focuses on the international level and on cooperation 
between four unified states, therefore the potential impacts of hydropower development 
for local communities are not considered. Situating analysis at the international or 
regional scale masks the ways in which water resources development is experienced by 
actors at other scales, such as local communities. It also obfuscates how multiple state 
actors, such as different ministries, as well as private sector actors are driving 
hydropower development in the lower Mekong outside of the sphere of regional water 
cooperation.    
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4. Actors, narratives and scale: research question and approach 
 
In order to explore the hydropolitical constellation of the lower Mekong and current 
hydropower development debates it is necessary to integrate the concerns of 
hydropower development and water governance; understand the multiple scales over 
which actors operate; challenge conventional IR approaches‘ focus on unified states to 
reveal the various state actors proposing and contesting hydropower development and 
water governance; trace the regional discursive formation, which has shaped 
development thinking in the lower Mekong region; and, consider the discursive 
coalitions which form around hydropower. In doing so this thesis addresses the 
following question: 
 
How can considerations of multiple actors and narratives be integrated into 
approaches to transboundary hydropolitics in order to understand and analyse the 
debates surrounding the MRC and hydropower development in the lower Mekong?  
 
Hydropower development and water governance involves different actors. Utilising 
conventional IR approaches to hydropolitics cannot account for this as these approaches 
do not locate water governance in its wider social, economic, political and development 
contexts. The MRC has been labelled as absent or silent by civil society. Underpinning 
this is the assumption that water resources development decisions should involve the 
MRC and that the MRC operates in certain ways. Donors to the MRC have looked for 
ways to strengthen the institution, including building capacity and increasing 
stakeholder participation (e.g. MRC 2007a). However, these strategies will not 
necessarily work as they are based on analyses which detach the MRC from its wider 
contexts, treating it isolation from other scalar levels and actor relationships in the 
basin.   
Conventional approaches to hydropolitics are informed by the neo-neo 
consensus of neo-realism and neo-liberalism (Du Plessis 2000). These approaches 
largely focus on the conflict/cooperation potential of transboundary rivers (Furlong 
2006). International river basin organisations and other cooperative forms are identified 
as key to mitigating the tensions inherent in transboundary river basins (e.g. Lowi 
1995). Water cooperation has been conceptualised in terms of hegemonic stability 
theory (Lowi 1993), the role of institutions in mitigating the mistrust and compliance 
problem in inter-state relationships (Dinar 2000), and regime theory (Jagerskog 2001). 
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Work within this field is focused on problem-solving. Tools such as Integrated Water 
Resources Management (IWRM) and benefit sharing have been developed and are 
being disseminated via international organisations such as the Global Water Partnership, 
and donor-recipient state relationships (Sadoff and Grey 2002; Phillips et al. 2006; 
Varis et al. 2008a).  
Conventional IR approaches to hydropolitics are incapable of capturing the 
complexity of water resources and governance debates in the lower Mekong as they 
focus on interactions between unified state actors at the inter-state level. Consequently, 
they cannot account for the intra-state and cross-state relationships located over various 
scalar levels, which are driving hydropower development in the lower Mekong basin 
and locating water resources decisions outside of national and regional water 
governance spheres. As mentioned above, Thai state actors have rescaled hydropower 
development to the regional scale and are developing hydropower projects in Lao PDR. 
One of the key Thai state actors involved in this is the Electricity Generating Authority 
of Thailand (EGAT), a state enterprise under the Ministry of Energy. EGAT is 
responsible for determining Thai electricity demand and devising plans to meet this 
demand. EGAT favours hydropower development in Lao PDR. A number of proposed 
hydropower projects in Lao PDR are premised on EGAT purchasing the electricity. 
This relationship between state actors outside of the water governance sphere is 
propelling hydropower development in Lao PDR. Two important dynamics emerge 
from consideration of these types of actor relationships: one, states are not unified 
actors, and two, a range of actors need to be considered when examining hydropower 
development and water governance debates.       
A focus on undifferentiated states and their national interests cannot adequately 
explain international water conflict and cooperation (Selby 2005). The state is a 
multifaceted actor and it is imperative that analysis avoids the territorial trap, whereby 
states are reified as fixed units of sovereign space which contain society (Furlong 2006). 
As well as considering multiple state actors such as EGAT and the Lao and Thai 
Ministries of Energy, it is important to consider sub-state and non-state actors. 
Conventional approaches to hydropolitics sever the domestic and international spheres. 
However, these two scales are interrelated and impact each other in a number of ways. 
States are ―immersed in a complex dynamic process whereby their institutions interact 
with non-state institutions both within and outside the national territory‖ (Trottier 
2003a: 4). These interactions condition water resources outcomes at various scalar 
levels.  
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Actors‘ relationships overlap and condition each other in webs or networks of 
power relationships. By placing debates about water resources development and 
governance within their larger socio-political contexts, interactions between different 
actors operating over various scalar levels become visible. For example, Member State 
government actors, for example the Ministries of Planning or Energy, sign deals with 
private sector companies to investigate hydropower sites. These governments are 
members of the MRC, which entails certain commitments. However, they are also 
complex entities within which, differences concerning hydropower development and 
water resources management exist. Through the MRC, member governments receive 
funding and have relationships with different donors, such as Denmark. These donors 
have their own constituencies to which they have to justify their overseas development 
assistance and who are concerned about the renewed interest in hydropower. 
Hydropower development affects local communities who are championed by global and 
regional civil society because civil society is weak or lacking in some parts of the 
Mekong basin.  
Hydropolitical analysis needs to be multi-scalar in two ways: one, it needs to 
consider the multiple actors who operate over various different scales and how 
relationships between these actors condition each other and outcomes; and two, it needs 
to consider actors‘ scalar strategies, such as the ways in which actors scale interventions 
or ‗jump scale‘. EGAT has scaled hydropower development at the inter-state level in 
response to wide-spread, high profile opposition against hydropower development in 
Thailand. Thai civil society actors have contested a number of domestic hydropower 
projects including Pak Mun. Civil society actors are ‗jumping scale‘ in order to access 
debates about mainstream hydropower development. The majority of these civil society 
actors cannot access debates at the national level due to a lack of space for civil society. 
Instead, actors are scaling up their concerns to the regional level and accessing debates 
through the MRC. As such, the MRC acts as an arena in which conflicting development 
representations can be articulated and hydropower development can be contested by less 
powerful actors.        
The resurrection of plans for mainstream dams and the arguments which underpin 
them, illustrates how a regional discursive formation has shaped development in the 
region, and framed the thinking of powerful actors. A regional discursive formation is 
comprised of ―certain modes of thought, logics, themes, styles of expression, and 
typical metaphors…[which] run through the discursive history of a region, appearing in 
a variety of forms, disappearing occasionally, only to reappear with even greater 
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intensity in new guises‖ (Peet and Watts 1996: 16). Since the 1950s a development 
narrative linking poverty, hydropower development, and poverty reduction has 
dominated water resources development, framing actors‘ thinking and development 
strategies. Current plans for mainstream hydropower are surprisingly similar to the 
mainstream hydropower plans produced and investigated by the Mekong Committee in 
the 1960s and 1970s. These new plans are also justified in similar terms by state 
officials interviewed for this thesis: mainstream hydropower will lead to poverty 
reduction. Analysis of this regional discursive formation and the ways in which it has 
shaped development interventions, framed the thinking of powerful actors, and 
conditioned what can be meaningfully said in development debates has to be integrated 
into examination of the lower Mekong‘s hydropolitical constellation. Development 
debates and the ways in which they are framed are not the result of neutral, technical or 
scientific processes, but are political. The ways in which problems are identified and 
defined, the types of evidence that are gathered, and the ways in which solutions are 
produced and accepted by particular actors are all political processes.     
The dominant regional discursive formation in the lower Mekong frames 
development at the national and regional scales, and as such depoliticises development. 
Hydropower development is represented by state actors as beneficial because it will 
reduce poverty, which is defined in terms of indicators such as Gross National Income. 
This is a state-level justification. Development is represented as a technological or 
scientific good: this masks its normative nature. It is necessary to trace the ways in 
which debates are framed and scaled in order to open up the category of development 
and reveal its contested nature. Hydropower development is presented by state actors as 
the obvious solution to the problem of poverty. However, there is nothing natural, fixed 
or pre-given about the ways in which both poverty and its solution (hydropower) have 
been defined and operationalised. There are a number of potential development options 
for the lower Mekong states, including eco-tourism and community-based development 
initiatives. Consequently, it is necessary to analyse how development debates are 
framed in such a way that hydropower becomes the dominant development option.    
Situating development at the national scale also depoliticises the impacts of 
hydropower development. At this scale of analysis the potential impacts of hydropower 
development, which are largely located at the local community level, are situated in 
such a way that they are an acceptable trade-off for the benefits that hydropower will 
bring at the national level (i.e. increased amounts of electric power which can be 
exported or used in industry, and increased government revenues, which can be used for 
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poverty reduction programmes). Within this, development is the task of the government 
and developing the state, its resources, and people lies within its capabilities and 
purview. ‗The people‘ are represented as an undifferentiated mass, apolitical, lacking 
agency, and waiting to be developed by the government. This representation obscures at 
the regional and international scales of debate and decision-making the ways in which 
local communities utilise the lower Mekong, have developed communal property 
regimes, and depend on the Mekong‘s water and fisheries resources for livelihoods. 
Local community actors possess agency and are active users and developers of their 
local water resources. Consequently, as a first step in ascribing agency to local, non-
state actors, approaches to international hydropolitics need to open up the category of 
development and consider the ways in which it is framed, the impacts particular types of 
interventions will have for local communities, and the spaces for non-state actors to 
contest development interventions.  
Development is not a neutral category: it is highly contested and political. The ways 
in which powerful actors represent development at particular scalar levels of analysis 
legitimises and justifies particular types of development interventions. How particular 
development representations and narratives come to dominate is an important aspect of 
hydropolitical analysis. Development discourse is never complete or closed: it is open 
and contested (Doty 1996). Less powerful actors in the lower Mekong contest and 
challenge the dominant development narrative. They also offer alternative development 
representations, and highlight the potential impacts of hydropower development. Less 
powerful actors, during the period of this study, largely utilised the MRC as a way to 
contest dominant representations and hydropower development plans. However, the 
terms of debate were framed by more powerful actors, who to a certain extent acted to 
co-opt the terrain of less powerful actors as a way to constrain opposition.  
Focusing simply on the international scale, unified state actors, and conceptualising 
development debates and interventions as neutral or technical, cannot capture the 
complexity of water resources development and governance in the lower Mekong. For 
example, a common argument about the relevance of the MRC runs thus: Member State 
commitment is weak because national interests dominate transboundary water interests 
(Backer 2007; Hirsch and Jensen 2006). Whilst this argument may be valid at the 
international scale, understanding the reasons for this involves exploring the intra-state 
and inter-state contexts and the interactions between then as well as a range of sub-state, 
non-state, and state actors. If this type of analysis is not undertaken then research 
findings are not embedded in the wider socio-political contexts, which themselves 
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highly influence and condition water resources and governance outcomes at the regional 
and inter-state levels. This gives the impression that the international and regional scales 
are somehow detached from other scalar levels of analysis.   
In order to integrate multiple actors and narratives into approaches to transboundary 
hydropolitics and explore the debates around hydropower development and the MRC 
this thesis will utilise political ecology as well as insights from critical IR approaches. 
Political ecology is an approach that operates from the assumption that environmental 
change can be the outcome of interactions between human power relationships and the 
environment (Bryant and Bailey 1997). Scale, actors, power relationships, and 
environmental narratives are all important elements of political ecology analyses (Watts 
and Peet 2004). Political ecology has been applied to a wide range of environmental 
issues, including fisheries resources in Thailand and hydropower dam development 
(Tan-Mullins 2007; Baghel and Nusser 2010).  
Within political ecology, representations of nature and how discursive formations 
shape policy and practice are extremely important (Watts and Peet 2004). Sneddon and 
Fox (2006) argue that how representations are framed and become institutionalised is an 
important ‗blind spot‘ in conventional approaches to hydropolitics. The application of 
political ecology to the case of hydropolitics in the lower Mekong tackles this ‗blind-
spot‘ by tracing the origin and history of a particular representation of the lower 
Mekong, and the development narrative it underpins, as well as the ways in which it is 
fundamentally linked to the promotion of hydropower development. Emerging in the 
1950s at the convergence of interests between the United States (US), the newly formed 
United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), 
planners, and water resources management paradigms of the time, the Mekong was 
represented as being unutilised. This representation underpinned a development 
narrative which argued: the people of the Mekong are poor; the Mekong has a huge 
hydropower potential; therefore harnessing the river for hydropower will lead to 
development. This narrative became institutionalised through the work of the Mekong 
Committee and the experts and planners it employed.  
The dominant development narrative of the lower Mekong is resilient and continues 
to underpin and condition the work of state actors in the lower Mekong and other actors, 
such as the development banks, who are promoting hydropower development. However, 
the MRC operates at the intersections of the discourses of a wide range of actors, 
including western donors and the global water community who emphasise paradigms 
such as IWRM, and civil society actors who emphasise the harmful impacts of 
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hydropower. Examining the MRC and the arena it offers for different actors to debate 
development interventions allows other narratives and representation of development to 
become visible.  
Examining development discourse, the ways in which it is framed and constitutes 
particular types of interventions, is a highly important area of hydropolitical analysis. 
Both the work of political ecologists, who have traced the genealogy of particular 
environmental and developmental narratives, and the work of post-structural IR 
theorists who have demonstrated how particular representations justify and enable 
particular types of interventions, as well as technologising and depoliticising issues such 
as famine, are highly relevant in this context (e.g. Bassett and Zueli 2003; Swift 1996; 
Doty 1996; Edkins 2008). Discourse and discursive practices, such as representation, 
narratives and framing are considered in both political ecology and critical IR theories, 
and the use of these different approaches complement each.       
Power-knowledge relations and asymmetric power relations are extremely important 
elements in transboundary hydropolitics. Development discourse is produced under 
unequal conditions of power and power is also exercised through discourse (Escobar 
1995). Post-structural conceptions of power, both in political ecology and in critical IR 
theories, allow discourse to be analysed to open up categories and reveal alternative 
representations and narratives. They also reveal the ways in which power is exercised 
over populations and nature, for example, how statistical measurements categorise 
people in ways which allow intervention. By tracing the genealogy of development 
narratives, political ecologists assert that questions such as ‗who has the power to 
decide for society‘ and ‗who decides the conditions for truth‘ open up avenues for 
challenging hegemonic narratives and transforming unequal power relations (Stott and 
Sullivan 2000). Political ecology as critique seeks to expose flaws in dominant 
approaches to the environment and denaturalise ―certain social and environmental 
conditions, showing them to be the contingent outcomes of power, and not inevitable‖ 
(Robbins 2004: 12). This is extremely important in the study of the lower Mekong‘s 
hydropolitical constellation where dominant representations and narratives are presented 
as natural, neutral and technical, thereby depoliticising the impacts and outcomes of 
development.     
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5. Methodology 
 
Hydropower development debates in the lower Mekong involve a large number of 
actors, asymmetric power relations, representations and narratives. At the official 
decision-making levels, both nationally and regionally, a narrative linking poverty, 
development and hydropower dominates and circulates. This narrative is based on 
representations of the lower Mekong as unutilised and its populations as needing 
development. Less powerful actors contest these representations and promote alternative 
ones. MRC meetings are a key arena in which contending narratives and actors confront 
each other. Less powerful actors also conduct their own scientific research, form 
coalitions and convene their own meetings.  
The ways in which development is written, narrated and spoken constructs the world 
as unruly, requiring management and intervention: this establishes expertise, silences 
alternative voices, and underpins and reproduces asymmetric power relations (Bassett 
and Zueli 2003). Development discourse has a stylised and repetitive form in terms of 
its content, imagery and symbolism, and regional discursive formations run through the 
history of regions (Bassett and Zueli 2003; Peet and Watts 1996). This thesis is 
interested in examining the dominant discursive formation in order to illuminate its 
practical effects, such as legitimising certain actors and interventions.     
Certain narratives circulate within the corridors of power and have practical effects 
(Bassett and Zueli 2003). Alternative narratives, championed by less powerful actors are 
not taken seriously because they do not conform to the discursive frameworks and 
simplifying narratives of more powerful actors, and because they lack institutional 
authority (Bassett and Zueli 2003; Swift 1996). However, discourse is not closed, but 
open: its exterior limits are constituted by other discourses that are themselves open, 
inherently unstable, and in the process of being articulated (Doty 1996). Consequently, 
there is always tension between competing discourses, narratives and representations, 
and the possibility for change.  
Hajer (1995) argues that when examining discourse it is important not only to 
analyse what is said but also to consider the institutional context in which it is said, as 
this ―co-determines what can be said meaningfully‖ (2). Policy and decision-making are 
not cases of finding solutions to pre-defined problems, but involve re-defining social 
phenomena in ways that solutions can be found for them (Hajer 1995). Different actors 
define and frame problems and solution differently. Discourse coalitions form around 
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specific story-lines, but whilst actors may share a storyline, they interpret its meaning 
differently and tell different stories (Hajer 1995).  
In the hydropower development debate in the lower Mekong two loose discourse 
coalitions can be identified: one, which comprises various state officials, private sector 
companies and the development banks, and tells stories about how hydropower will lead 
to poverty reduction; and two, which comprises local, regional and global NGOs, local 
community representatives, and researchers, who tell stories about hydropower‘s 
destructive effects on local water users. In order to analyse water resources development 
and governance debates in the lower Mekong, the wide range of relevant actors and 
these two loose discourse coalitions and their storylines, four methods of data collection 
were used: semi-structured interviews, participant observation, site visits and document 
analysis.  
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 30 participants. Research 
participants fall into the following sub-categories: state officials, MRC representatives, 
donor representatives, development bank representatives, hydropower industry 
representatives, civil society representatives and fisheries experts. The use of key actor 
interviews does not imply that elites‘ opinions are effective and uncontested. This thesis 
is interested in the multiple actors operating over various scalar levels who promote and 
contest hydropower development; the regional discursive formation which has shaped 
the history of development in the region; the dominant narrative of hydropower 
development in the lower Mekong, which has framed policy-makers thinking and 
justified certain types of development interventions; and the alternative narrative which 
challenges it and is advanced by a loose coalition of less powerful actors. Key actor 
interviews are an appropriate method for collecting data on the ways in which different 
actors represent development, tell different stories about it, and frame the problem and 
solution. The variety of views expressed and the nature of the hydropower development 
debate in the lower Mekong challenges the idea that elite views are effective, and 
illustrates instead their highly contested nature. Elites increasingly have to justify their 
plans and engage with the concerns of less powerful actors in order to advance their 
hydropower agendas. State officials, planners, and private sector companies are 
engaging with alternative representations, narratives and the actors who promote them, 
and are adopting strategies such as representing less powerful actors in particular ways. 
This was revealed in a number of the interviews conducted where NGOs were labelled 
as ―bad‖ or ―anti-development‖.    
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Interviews with state officials, donor representatives, and development 
representatives revealed the commonalities of problem and solution framing, which 
elites in the lower Mekong share and offered insights into the dominant development 
narrative in the region. These interviews also provided richer, more nuanced insights 
into hydropower plans, the justifications for particular interventions, and 
official/governmental thinking about development. Interviews with elites such as state 
officials and discussions with private sector representatives also revealed some of the 
ways in which more powerful actors characterise and represent less powerful actors.   
The development narrative of the lower Mekong which dominates at the official 
level is being contested by a wide range of civil society actors. By considering 
alternative representations and the loose coalition of less powerful actors who are 
contesting hydropower development this thesis exposes the highly political nature of the 
debate and sheds light on the agency of less powerful actors. Interviews with civil 
society representatives revealed some of the stories less powerful actors tell about 
development and the ways in which these differ from the dominant representations and 
narratives of more powerful actors. When combined with participation observation at a 
large number of civil society meetings in the region (discussed below) they provided 
insights into how civil society actors frame their arguments differently depending on the 
forum and on their goals and orientations. Taken together the range of key actor 
interviews revealed the complexity of development in the lower Mekong and the role of 
representations and narratives in reducing this complexity for different actors. 
Narratives frame the politics of development for less powerful actors. This includes 
local communities in the lower Mekong. A full consideration of local community actors 
throughout the basin was beyond the scope of this study. Interviews with civil society 
representatives, participation in civil society meetings and analyse of research 
conducted by civil society actors allowed analysis of alternative representations of the 
lower Mekong and the predicted impacts of hydropower on local communities. 
However, as one civil society representative asked at a regional consultation: ―where are 
the local communities? I am part of an NGO. I cannot speak for local communities‖ 
(Observation notes, MRC Meeting 09/08). The interviews conducted for this thesis 
cannot provide reliable information on the opinions, conceptions, narratives and 
knowledges of local communities. There is likely to be a great heterogeneity in local 
communities‘ opinions, representatives, and narratives about the Mekong River itself 
and hydropower development. Whilst the civil society representatives interviewed for 
this thesis provided alternative representations and narratives these cannot be taken as 
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synonymous with local communities‘ views (these issues are discussed further in 
Chapter Eight).  
Interviews for this thesis were limited to participants who had a working knowledge 
of English. Participants were selected based on position, knowledge of the issues 
involved, and their membership of the two loose discourse coalitions. In the majority of 
cases this coincided with the participants having a working knowledge of English for a 
number of reasons: English has been the working language of lower Mekong water 
cooperation since 1957 and a large number of the same state officials have been 
involved throughout its various guises and therefore provide organisational memory; 
government employees operating at the national level in the lower Mekong have to 
possess basic English skills; and, regional, national and provincial NGOs have English 
speaking representatives as a number of NGOs, such as Cambodia‘s Fisheries Action 
Coalition Team, were founded with help from international NGOs.  
Interviewing only English participants had some methodological and analytical 
consequences. It restricted the type of civil society organisations and experts that could 
be included in the research to those who are confident in using English and are visible at 
the national, regional and intergovernmental levels. It also restricted the participation of 
state officials to those operating at the national level as those in the provinces did not 
necessarily speak English. There was also a concern about misunderstandings as 
interviews were conducted in participants‘ second language and therefore there is 
always the possibility that meaning could be misconstrued. Immersion in the MRC‘s 
working environment helped to overcome this as I became familiar with the ways in 
which participants used English and the meanings they attached to particular phrases. In 
order to ensure accuracy in understanding and analysis, interviews were combined with 
participant observation, an internship at the MRC and document analysis as well as site 
visits to some of the locations frequently discussed in interviews.   
Participant observation was conducted at a range of meetings and consultations in 
the lower Mekong region between September 2007 and September 2008. This allowed 
observation of the ways in which competing discourses confront each other, and the 
incomplete and open-ended nature of discourse. I participated and observed meetings 
between civil society and the MRC, civil society and state officials, the MRC and donor 
states, and civil society meetings which included a wide range of environmental and 
water resources NGOs, academics, researchers, and activists. Participant observation 
revealed the ways in which different discourses confront each other, and how actors 
tailor their stories and narratives depending on the context. For example, NGO 
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representatives were more critical of hydropower plans in meetings with other civil 
society organisations than they were in meetings with state officials.  
Participant observation also revealed how powerful actors framed the debates at 
meetings, such as the September 2008 MRC Hydropower Consultation, in terms of 
trade-offs. In order to meaningfully say anything less powerful actors had to engage 
with this framing. Less powerful actors who refused to recast their arguments were 
either ignored at these meetings, or were not invited to participate as they were seen by 
powerful actors as ―too critical‖, or ―anti-development‖. Participant observation at these 
meetings illustrated how discourses confront each other and powerful discourses 
attempt to co-opt weaker ones in particular settings, as such the data collected cannot be 
extrapolated as representative of all discourses about development in the lower Mekong.  
Participant observation was limited to meetings which took place in English, and 
therefore potentially useful meetings such as ones organised by and for Thai civil 
society actors were not attended. Reports from these meetings were critical of 
hydropower plans and state actors, and called for an end to hydropower projects. These 
meetings and their participants are part of the loose discourse coalition which contests 
the dominant narrative of hydropower development in the lower Mekong. As such, they 
are part of a discourse coalition which shares the same storyline. This storyline, that 
hydropower development will have negative consequences for local communities, and 
should therefore either be curtailed or halted, was evidenced in English-language 
meetings and amongst the various civil society actors who attended them. This thesis is 
concerned with the ways in which narratives frame thinking, justify/contest particular 
types of development interventions, and are the outcome of/underpin power relations; 
and, destabilising understandings of development debates as technical to expose the 
highly political and contested nature of development. Participant observation of 
English-language meetings between state officials, MRC representatives and civil 
society allowed data on these concerns to be collected. Due to the transboundary nature 
of the lower Mekong and the wide range of actors involved, a large proportion of 
meetings, aside from local or provincial ones, are conducted in English as a matter of 
routine as it is the common denominator language.      
Access to meetings with a range of actors was facilitated by my position as a MRC 
intern between September 2007 and July 2008. During this time I undertook research 
duties for the International Cooperation and Communication Section, and the Basin 
Development Plan Programme. As well as facilitating access to meetings which were 
otherwise closed to ‗outsiders‘, this internship allowed rapport to be developed with a 
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wide range of interview participants, introductions to actors outside of the MRC sphere, 
and insightful relaxed discussions with numerous people. The dual status of MRC intern 
and PhD researcher was open and acknowledged at all times.  
Interviews and participant observation data were analysed for representations, 
narratives, stories about development, instances of problem and solution framing, and 
relationships with other actors in the lower Mekong‘s hydropower debate. The key 
strategy for analysing data was thematic coding of notes taken during the interviews. A 
large number of themes were identified including, but not limited to: development 
visions, justifications for hydropower development, poverty reduction, the damaging 
role of civil society, the emergence of the private sector, state actors are powerful, state 
actors are weak, hydropower is destructive for local communities, more and better 
research/science is needed, donors are trying to stop Mekong states from developing 
hydropower, the MRC is toothless, the MRC plays a valuable role, the role of the 
development banks is changing, and the development banks are necessary in order to 
ensure ‗good‘ development projects. The incidences of these themes overlapped, for 
example in the following statement from a NGO representative a number of themes can 
be identified:  
 
―there should be sustainable use of natural resources, equitable use of resources, 
encompasses everything really, development shouldn‘t be, we are not anti-
development, but development shouldn‘t be at the cost of some for the benefit of 
others…In the Mekong the obvious issue is the payoff between services river 
provides for poor communities against the industrial benefits- hydropower and 
irrigation- which generally benefit urban areas. Not just a question of who benefits 
and who wins and loses, but who shoulders the proportion of the risk‖ (Interview, 
04/08b).   
 
 This statement contains a vision of development, a reply to the charge by some state 
officials that NGOs are anti-development, an evaluation of how the hydropower debate 
has been framed in terms of costs and benefits, and the idea of trade-offs. The ways in 
which actors assembled different themes depended on the stories they told about 
development and illustrated how different discourses overlap and constitute each other.  
Interviewees appear anonymously in this thesis due to the politically sensitive nature 
of the topic, and the concerns of some interviewees about how participation in previous 
academic research had been easily identified. One interviewee stated that they had been 
able to identify every person who had participated in a previous PhD candidate‘s 
research because they were referenced by job title. In order to try and avoid this 
identification, interviewees appear in this thesis according to their categorisation and the 
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month and year when the interview occurred. Interview categories are as follows: state 
official, donor representative, development bank representative, civil society 
representative, fisheries experts, hydropower industry representatives, and MRC 
representative. For example, an interview conducted with a state official in June 2008 
appears as: State official, interview, 06/08. Participant observation data is referred to 
throughout by type and the month and year in which it was gathered. For example, 
participant observation data collected at a MRC meeting in June 2008 is referenced as: 
observation notes, MRC meeting, 06/08.  
 As this thesis is interested in analysing development narratives and interventions 
document analysis was highly useful and effective as a method of data collection. 
Documentary material includes, amongst others: MRC documents about hydropower, 
fisheries, the Mekong‘s environment and hydrology, and procedures, rules and working 
arrangements; donor strategies; Member State government‘s national development 
strategies; and information produced by civil society actors, researchers, and scientists 
on livelihoods, the impacts of hydropower, and fisheries. Access to a number of 
historical documents, such as Mekong Committee basin plans, scoping studies for 
various hydropower projects, and legal documents, was facilitated by my position as a 
MRC intern as it enabled full-use of and access to the MRC library and programme 
archives.  
In order to contextualise and visualise some of the projects and key areas of 
debate (e.g. the nature of resettlement programmes and the importance of fisheries), site 
visits were conducted to the Nam Theun 2 hydropower project in Southern Lao PDR, 
the Nam Ngum hydropower project in Lao PDR, the Tonle Sap Great Lake in 
Cambodia, and Dong Thap Province in the Vietnamese Delta (see Map 2, p.4). The site 
visit to Nam Theun 2 was facilitated by a Thai engineer who worked on the project and 
this afforded access to a number of Nam Theun Power Company staff who were willing 
to engage in discussions about both the project and the wider lower Mekong context. 
The material obtained from site visits supplemented data collected from the other three 
sources and provided a deeper understanding of the issues involved.  
 This research was conducted in a changing and evolving setting. During the 
period of the research, new dams were proposed, new agreements were signed between 
developers and Member States‘ governments, the MRC increased its engagement in 
hydropower, and actors introduced new initiatives, such as the United States‘ Lower 
Mekong Initiative. New developments and information were incorporated into the thesis 
during the writing process. As the situation is still unfolding further changes are 
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expected. However, new information and developments confirm that an approach which 
considers multiple actors, various scalar levels and development discourse is a highly 
relevant one for analysing the lower Mekong‘s hydropolitical constellation.        
 
6. Outline of the thesis 
 
The data collected during the fieldwork period shaped the outline of this thesis in a 
number of important ways. It allowed the tracing of the regional discursive formation 
which has shaped state actors‘ development strategies in the lower Mekong since the 
1950s, and this material forms the basis of Chapter Three. A wide range of actors, 
relationships and actor types were identified as important in hydropower development 
and water governance debates, which have not necessarily be considered by previous 
research into the lower Mekong‘s hydropolitical constellation (see Chapter Four). Three 
key areas of contestation were distilled from the vast amounts of data collected: one, the 
debate over the role and relevance of the MRC, the wide range of actors involved, and 
how it is conditioned by actor relationships located outside the water governance sphere 
(see Chapter Five); two, civil society actors contest the development bank‘s framing and 
representation of the Nam Theun 2 hydropower project as a ‗good‘ or ‗model‘ 
hydropower project (see Chapter Six); and three, the ways in which powerful actors 
frame the hydropower debate at the national and inter-state scales in terms of trade-offs, 
and how civil society actors, prominent scientific research and other actors are 
contesting this, with fisheries impacts being the key area of contestation (see Chapter 
Seven).  
Chapter Two examines conventional IR approaches to transboundary rivers which 
focus on conflict and cooperation at the inter-state level and challenges their state-
centric focus. In order to account for the complexity of the lower Mekong‘s 
hydropolitical constellation it is necessary to analyse development discourse, narratives, 
discourse coalitions, a wide range of actor types and the overlapping asymmetric power 
relationships in which they are located, and various scalar levels of analysis and actors‘ 
scalar strategies. Combining political ecology with insights from critical IR approaches 
allows these dynamics and elements to be conceptualised and explored, as well as the 
links between them to become visible.  
Chapter Three traces the dominant regional discursive formation from its origins in 
the 1950s to the current water resources development and governance debates. This 
regional discursive formation, which links hydropower development, regional 
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development and poverty reduction, has appeared in a number of guises through the 
different phases of regional water cooperation and at times has appeared to disappear.  
A number of regional changes have also impacted the different phases of water 
cooperation, including: the end of the Cold War and the resumption of peace in 
Cambodia, new regional cooperative schemes such as the ADB‘s Greater Mekong 
Subregion Programme, and the increased involvement of China in the lower Mekong. 
Despite these changing regional dynamics the dominant development narrative has 
continued to shape development thinking and strategies at the governmental level. 
Regional changes have also opened up a number of new avenues that allow powerful 
actors to propose and plan hydropower development.   
Chapter Four considers a number of changing dynamics in actor types and power 
relationships since the early 1990s which are conditioning water development and 
governance debates and outcomes in the lower Mekong‘s hydropolitical constellation. 
These power relationships are multi-scalar. Member State-donor state relationships are 
changing due to both reorientations in donor states overseas development assistance 
strategies, and increased Member State access to funds for hydropower development. 
The involvement of private sector actors in lower Mekong hydropower development has 
increased. The type of private sector actors involved has changed from predominantly 
Western companies and financiers facilitated by the development banks, to Asian 
companies and financiers. Spaces for civil society participation have increased and civil 
society actors are rescaling their opposition to hydropower projects to the regional and 
inter-state levels.     
Chapter Five traces the interconnections between discourses and actors over 
different scalar levels and how they condition outcomes at the transboundary water 
cooperation level. It argues that the debates about the MRC‘s relevance and role in 
hydropower can only be adequately captured if placed within a larger context where 
interactions between different actors are considered. This includes actors who largely 
fall outside the MRC sphere, such as state energy actors, but whose relationship with 
other state agencies, such as water agencies, conditions how water cooperation is 
enacted at the MRC level.  
Chapter Six explores how actors construct problems and solutions in ways which 
privilege their interventions or extend their access to natural resources. New private 
sector actors are threatening the position of the development banks. The ADB and 
World Bank are promoting Nam Theun 2 as a ‗model‘ hydropower project as a strategy 
to legitimise and maintain their role in hydropower development in the lower Mekong. 
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This ‗model‘ has three key elements: public participation, social and environmental 
programmes, and revenues utilised for poverty reduction. Civil society actors have 
contested all three of these elements. This illustrates how representations are never 
complete and closed, but are always open and contested. Despite the development banks 
writing the history of Nam Theun 2 in particular ways, this process is not complete and 
it is still unclear whether the project will become a ‗model‘ for hydropower 
development.  
Chapter Seven explores how, in the face of civil society challenges to the dominant 
narrative of hydropower development, powerful actors have shifted the terms of the 
debate. The material in this chapter is drawn from three moments in the hydropower 
debate at the MRC level, which involved multiple actor types and competing 
representations and narratives of development. These moments are: one, the 
Independent Fisheries Expert Group in September 2008; two, the Regional Multi-
Stakeholder Consultation on the MRC Hydropower Programme in September 2008; and 
three, the MRC Strategic Environmental Assessment, which was published in 2010. 
This chapter illustrates how the interpretive grid of trade-offs came to dominate 
discussions at the regional level. The discussion of trade-offs portrays the negative 
impacts of hydropower development as an acceptable or inevitable cost in light of the 
benefits to be accrued from hydropower. This depoliticises the distribution of costs and 
benefits to different actors and the political nature of water resources development.   
Chapter Eight concludes the thesis by drawing insights into the complexity of water 
politics in the lower Mekong and the ways in which hydropower is contested and 
promoted by multiple actors over multiple scalar levels.      
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Chapter Two: Water, actors, power relations, scale and narrative in 
the Mekong’s hydropolitical constellation 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In order to analyse debates about the MRC and hydropower development in the 
lower Mekong it is necessary to integrate narratives and multiple actors into approaches 
to hydropolitics. Political ecology, with its focuses on the political nature of 
environmental change, environmental narratives, scale and the importance of both 
placed and non-place based actors is an approach, which allows the complexity of 
hydropolitics in the lower Mekong to be analysed and conceptualised. Transboundary 
hydropolitics are constituted in discourse, whilst hydropower development is being 
propelled by a dominant regional discursive formation linking it to poverty reduction. 
As such, insights from critical IR approaches, which have focused on discursive 
practices including representation, discursive formations and depoliticisation are 
combined with the political ecology approach. 
Transboundary rivers have largely been analysed through conventional IR 
approaches to hydropolitics. These approaches are unable to account for debates about 
hydropower development and the MRC as they focus on monolithic states and 
interactions at the transboundary scale. Transboundary hydropolitics are conditioned by 
relationships between multiple actors, both inside and outside of the sphere of 
transboundary water governance, located over various scalar levels. Hydropolitical 
constellations are embedded in wider socio-political contexts, which condition 
outcomes at the transboundary level. These important dynamics are not visible if 
conventional IR approaches are applied.   
Development discourse, narratives and apparatus represent objects of 
development (states, rivers etc.) in particular ways, which justify particular types of 
intervention. They also depoliticises development, obscuring the political effects of 
development interventions, including unintended consequences such as expanding state 
power. However, discourse is not closed, but open and alternative representations and 
narratives do exist. Analysing hydropolitical constellations through development 
discourse, narratives and representation reveals the inherently political nature of water 
resources development and governance debates.  
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2. Transboundary rivers: conflict and cooperation 
 
 Transboundary rivers are shared by two or more states: currently 263 shared 
river basins house 40% of the world‘s population and nearly 60% of global freshwater 
flow (Giordano and Wolf 2003). The end of the Cold War led to an increased interest in 
transboundary rivers (Du Plessis 2000). Environmental resources, including water, 
became conceptualised in terms of security as traditional understandings of security 
were expanded to include non-military aspects (Du Plessis 2000). Transboundary rivers 
have security implications because water resources utilisation or development by one 
state may lead to dispute with the other riparian states (Dinar 2000). Water resources 
management is firmly on the international community‘s global policy agenda because of 
increased awareness of water scarcity (both in terms of quantity and quality) due to 
factors such as population growth and increased per capita use (Phillips et al. 2006; 
Uitto and Duda 2002). Water scarcity and water stress have also become associated with 
security concerns (Phillips et al. 2006).  
Elhance (1999) links a number of the arguments expressed above: water scarcity 
is increasing at a time when water demand is growing in the arid and semi-arid regions 
of the world; most of the remaining water sources that can be developed to meet this 
growing need are in river basins shared by two or more sovereign states; consequently, 
there is potential for conflict or cooperation. The conflict/cooperation potential of 
transboundary rivers is the starting assumption for a large body of academic work. The 
study of conflict and cooperation between states over transboundary rivers has been 
termed hydropolitics (Elhance 1999). The debate over transboundary rivers, which 
commenced at the end of the Cold War, includes a range of positions between these two 
opposing poles: one which argues that water leads to conflict and war (e.g. Starr 1991), 
and its opposite, water leads to cooperation (e.g. Wolf 1998; Jagerskog 2002).        
  Transboundary rivers have been considered by scholars from a wide range of 
disciplines, including law (e.g. Chi 1997), geography (e.g. Giordano and Wolf 2003), 
and international relations (e.g. Lowi 1993). However, despite a range of scholars from 
outside international relations, IR theorising is implicit in a large proportion of the work 
on transboundary rivers (Du Plessis 2000; Furlong 2006). The focus on states, conflict, 
cooperation, hegemons, conditions that induce cooperation, institutions, sovereignty, 
interdependence, and geographic position illustrates the impact of IR theorising 
(Furlong 2006; Du Plessis 2000; Dinar and Dinar 2003). Du Plessis (2000) argues that 
mainstream theorising about water is ―predominately embedded in and representative of 
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mainstream theorising of a positivist, explanatory and problem-solving nature‖ and is 
consistent with neo-realism and neo-liberal institutional approaches (11-12). The 
following paragraphs outline some of the dominant assumptions and arguments in the 
debate about conflict and cooperation over transboundary waters.  
 The state is considered the central actor in transboundary hydropolitics. Elhance 
(1999) has justified privileging the state over other actors because states whatever ―their 
specific nature and constituents…are ultimately responsible for engaging in conflict or 
cooperation with other riparian states, and for entering into negotiations and agreements 
for the control and sharing of transboundary water resources‖; states are also the 
primary actor with which other actors (non-governmental organisations, international 
organisations etc.) interact (14). Dinar (2000) argues that states are conceptualised 
within neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism as sovereign, unitary actors who act 
rationally to advance their security, survival, and interests in an anarchic and uncertain 
world. Consequently, as states seek to secure their survival and operate under the 
principle of self-help, transboundary waters are a potential source of conflict. Elhance 
(1999) argues that states are inherently inclined to unilaterally exploit water resources 
which flow through their territory. This unilateral exploitation can cause conflict 
because it constrains the ability of other riparian states to realise their national goals and 
objectives (Phillips et al. 2006). The focus here is on states as the key actor. This state-
centric focus has limitations, as will be discussed in the following section.  
State sovereignty poses a number of challenges for states sharing a transboundary 
river basin. Elhance (1999) argues that sovereignty has been interpreted as bestowing 
inalienable rights of ownership and utilisation of water resources in a state‘s territory. 
This position is problematic because water is not still: it flows through, beneath and 
between states‘ territory, and upstream uses of water resources will impact downstream 
riparian states. International law positions on state sovereignty and water resources have 
evolved over the course of the twentieth century. Initially extreme positions were 
asserted: absolute territorial sovereignty, also known as the Harmon Doctrine, argued 
that states could do virtually what they wanted with water resources in their territory, 
whilst at the other end of the spectrum, the principle of absolute territorial integrity 
argued that upstream states should do nothing to interfere with the natural flow into the 
downstream states (McCaffrey 1996). Neither principle is recognised as part of 
contemporary international water law (Salman 2007). Contemporary positions advocate 
principles of limited territorial sovereignty whereby each riparian state has a right to use 
transboundary waters but is under a corresponding duty to ensure that their use does not 
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harm other riparian states (Salman 2007). Related to this is the duty not to cause 
significant harm to other riparian states, and the right of each riparian state to reasonable 
and equitable use (Salman 2007). Attempts to codify an international convention 
covering the non-navigational uses of international watercourses resulted in the UN 
General Assembly adopting the Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses in 1997. One of the conventions most controversial 
provisions is the obligation not to do significant harm, and it has yet to be ratified by a 
sufficient number of states (McCaffrey 1998).   
 Within conventional IR approaches to hydropolitics, geography and power 
asymmetries are two important variables which determine whether water leads to 
conflict or cooperation. Geography and hydrology do not respect state boundaries and 
confer different advantages on different states (Elhance 1999). Geography also 
―determines the nature and degree of dependence of each riparian state over the shared 
waters‖ (Dinar 2000: 379). Different states also have different power capabilities. Brute 
military capabilities and the ability of one state to impose its will on other states are 
important in determining whether water leads to conflict or cooperation (Dinar and 
Dinar 2003). The interplay between dependency on the resource, geography and power 
contribute to the conflict or cooperation potential of transboundary rivers. For example, 
the Nile is shared by ten states, of which Egypt is the regional hegemon in terms of 
economic and military power, but it is also the most dependent on the Nile and the most 
downstream riparian (Swain 1997). Egypt has declared that the only issue which could 
take it to war again is access to water (Starr 1991). However, it has also displayed an 
interest in cooperating in certain areas such as technology, trade and water data (Dinar 
2000). Geography, in these analyses, is portrayed as playing an important role in 
determining conflict and cooperation potentialities.  
 Arguments that water leads to cooperation have risen in prominence. Wolf 
(1998) argues that water conflict is rare and that cooperation ranging from treaties to 
institutions is more common. Between 1918 and 1994, according to available data there 
have only been seven armed incidences of water: in contrast 145 treaties were signed in 
the twentieth century concerning non-navigational water use (Wolf 1998). Alam (2002) 
utilises the concept of water rationality, defined as ―any action taken by a state to secure 
its water supply in the long-term, both in quantity and quality‖, to argue that states are 
more likely to maintain relations with each other that are conducive to ensuring long-
term access to shared water resources (347). Arguments linking water and cooperation 
have drawn on a number of IR assumptions. 
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 Water cooperation has been conceptualised in three ways: one, the result of 
hegemonic preference, two, the importance of institutions, and three, regime theory. 
Hegemonic stability theory argues that states cooperate when it serves the interests of 
the dominant power who takes the lead in creating cooperative arrangements which 
enhance the stability of the system (Dinar 2000). Lowi (1993) argues that cooperation is 
only possible if the hegemon accepts it or has been induced to do so by an external 
power. In this case cooperative arrangements are the reflection of underlying power 
asymmetries. A focus on hegemons as determining cooperation has been criticised. 
Furlong (2006) argues that it ignores the potential for shared resources and/or unique 
historical circumstances to affect relationships or outcomes. Actor behaviour changes in 
a given context, and this suggests that transboundary water cooperation is more 
complex than hegemonic stability theory implies (Menniken 2007). In terms of the 
Mekong, Thailand and Vietnam can be identified as the two most powerful states. Their 
preferences have helped to shape the current incarnation of the Mekong water regime, 
the MRC (Nakayama 1999). As will be shown in the following chapter, Vietnam‘s 
preferences concerning mainstream dams have changed over time. This is significant as 
water practitioners interviewed for this thesis assumed that mainstream dams would 
never be realised due to Vietnamese opposition. Vietnam‘s changing preferences in this 
area are conditioned by a number of factors including Mekong water cooperation and 
predictions of energy demand (see Chapter Three).      
Neo-liberal institutionalists argue that cooperation emerges when the 
compliance problem and mistrust between states is mitigated by the assistance of 
institutions (Dinar 2000). Institutions generate information, lower transaction costs, 
increase transparency, and reduce uncertainty (Dinar 2000). As such they help to 
overcome mistrust between states and stabilise assumptions about other states‘ 
behaviour and intentions. As opposed to neo-realist assumptions which argue that 
cooperation is inhibited by states‘ concern with relative gains and mistrust of each 
other, neo-liberal institutionalists argue that states are concerned with absolute power, 
and the main obstacle to cooperation is cheating. Institutions help to overcome this 
problem, as well as contribute to building trust and a culture to solve problems without 
reverting to actions based on narrow self-interest (Dinar 2000; Henwood and Funke 
2002). Interdependence and scarcity can provide incentives for cooperation. 
Interdependence is a condition whereby the actions or decisions of an actor impact on 
another actor: it can be symmetrical (where both sets of actors are affected equally) or 
asymmetric (where actors are affected differently) (Dunne 1997). As interdependence 
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―affects politics and the behaviour of states, new forms of rules, procedures and 
institutions for various activities have been created in order to manage and control 
transnational relations‖ (Jagerskog 2002). Interdependence in transboundary rivers 
provides a rationale and a need for cooperation (Henwood and Funke 2002; Elhance 
1999).  
Wolf (1998) argues that once ―cooperative water regimes are established 
through treaty, they turn out to be tremendously resilient…even between otherwise 
hostile riparians and even as conflict is waged over other issues‖ (260). The Mekong 
water cooperation is an example of resilience as it has endured despite regional 
instability and has provided a forum for the lower basin riparian states to interact 
(Makim 2002). Commentators, such as Browder (2000), have focused on ways in which 
water cooperation can be strengthened and have considered the role that donors and 
outside experts can play in this. Arguments about interdependence have been extended 
by neo-functionalists. Neo-functionalists argue that cooperation in low politics (e.g. 
water) can ‗spill over‘ into areas of high politics (Phillips et al. 2006). The history of the 
Mekong water cooperation is considered in the next chapter against the backdrop of 
development plans for the Mekong.  
 Regime theory has been applied to a number of transboundary river basins, 
including the Jordan (Jagerskog 2002) and the Mekong (Makim 2002; Backer 2007). 
Krasner (1983) defines a regime as ―sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, 
and decision-making procedures around which actors‘ expectations converge in a given 
area of international relations‖ (2). Regimes can be viewed as a means to facilitate 
international agreements and adherence to them, however, they are more than 
agreements, they are social institutions ―in which the behaviour of its actors constitute 
the regime‖ (Jagerskog 2001: 2-3). Regimes are also not static entities, they change over 
time: changes in rules and procedures produce changes in the regime, but changes in 
principles and norms change the regime itself and either result in a new regime or the 
disappearance of the regime (Krasner 1983). Furlong (2006) argues that despite the shift 
from a concern with conflict to that of cooperation, IR theorising has remained, largely 
in the sub-field of international organisations drawing on regime theory to examine 
basin organisations, how they develop and how they are maintained and strengthened 
over time. Mekong water cooperation since 1957 illustrates the importance of norms on 
state behaviour and the development of collective understandings and expectations. The 
lower Mekong states perceive themselves as willing to cooperate. State officials 
interviewed for this thesis argued that: ―the Mekong Spirit is our spirit of cooperation, it 
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means we must respect, must concern ourselves with each other even when it is 
difficult‖ (State official, interview, 05/08b).  
 A focus on how to induce cooperation illustrates the problem-solving nature of a 
large proportion of the literature. Problems include power and geographic asymmetries. 
Haftendorn (2000) argues that water conflicts are asymmetric situations. Therefore, in 
order to reach agreeable solutions they need to be linked to other issues or factors which 
balance out or modify the situation into a more cooperative, symmetrical one, which 
allows for the possibility of trade-offs between economic, environmental, political and 
social benefits (Haftendorn 2000). Sadoff and Grey (2002) have identified four types of 
benefits that can be derived from water cooperation: ecological (benefits to the river), 
economic (e.g. hydropower and flood management), political (e.g. reducing costs 
because of the river, i.e. costs of tense relations), and catalytic (benefits beyond the 
river, e.g. regional integration and cooperation in other areas). Identifying benefits, and 
sharing these as opposed to the water itself, could induce cooperation between states 
(Sadoff and Grey 2002). Discussions of trade-offs and benefits in the lower Mekong‘s 
hydropower debate are detailed in Chapter Seven.  
 
2.1. Questioning a state-centric focus and its application in the Mekong 
 
The Mekong River is a transboundary river, which has been widely examined from 
conventional IR approaches and presented as an example of resilient water cooperation 
(e.g. Backer 2007; Wolf 1998). However, there are some limitations to these state-
centric approaches. Privileging the state as the primary unit of analysis obscures the 
multitude of actors involved in water resources development and management and the 
scalar levels over which they operate and over which impacts are located. Although 
there are limitations, it is important to consider the role of the state and also the ways in 
which transboundary rivers are conceptualised. The assumptions outlined above have 
helped to structure the ways in which state actors in the Mekong conceptualise 
transboundary water cooperation and the possible outcomes of water resources 
development.  
A focus on states as the privileged unit of analysis means that some research can fall 
into what Agnew (1994) has termed the territorial trap. The territorial trap involves 
three linked assumptions: state units have been reified as fixed territorial units of space 
under state control; the severing of domestic and foreign politics; and the state as prior 
to and a container of society (Agnew 1994). The argument of the territorial trap was 
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developed through consideration of the central tenet of the field of international 
relations theory which Agnew (1994) identifies as a synthesis between neo-realism and 
elements of liberalism. Furlong (2006) argues that a large portion of the IR water 
discourse falls into the territorial trap, and that deferring to IR theory can illuminate 
some issues, but risks obfuscating many more. IR assumptions situate the state as the 
controller of water resources within its territory. However, as this thesis will explore 
water resources development can act as a tool for actors to extend their control over 
natural resources. Uitto and Wolf (2002) argue that ―too often, analysts tend to view 
nation-states as political monoliths, ignoring the critical relationship between internal 
dynamics and international relations‖ (291). A focus on monolithic states also obscures 
the ways in which other actors and processes challenge or support the state at multiple 
scales (Sneddon and Fox 2006). Bryant and Bailey (1997) argue that ―state actions are 
conditioned by the relationship of the state to other actors both inside and 
outside…[and] the state itself is often subject to powerful fissiparous tendencies as a 
result of bureaucratic conflict‖ (45). In order to examine the water resources debates in 
the lower Mekong, it is necessary to consider actors other than states, and also the actors 
(such as state agencies and bureaucracies) which constitute the state.  
Approaches focused on states are not necessarily capable of capturing the 
complexity of water politics and resources development at multiple scales or examining 
the multiple actors involved. Sneddon and Fox (2006) have called for a critical 
hydropolitics which goes beyond the focus on the capacity of sovereign states to 
cooperate over shared resources to consider issues such as: how understandings of river 
basins are transformed within transboundary institutional arrangements; the manner in 
which multiple actors in transboundary basins construct geographic scale; and how 
control over water is represented and exercised within governance and management 
institutions. The state-centric focus of hydropolitics has led to conceptual blind spots 
including: how and why development agents have discursively engineered 
transboundary basins into spatially fixed entities; and the complex interaction among 
different scales of conflict within basins‘ socioecological dynamics (Sneddon and Fox 
2006: 183). These blind spots could be rectified by a critical hydropolitics (Sneddon and 
Fox 2006). Sneddon and Fox (2006) argue that cooperation may not be the end-in-itself 
for Third World riparian governments who create transboundary water institutions: 
instead cooperation may be sought as the basis for proceeding with water resources 
development encompassed by basins. Chapter Three of this thesis explores how the 
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Mekong has been represented as an object for development at the basin level, and how 
this was the initial impetus for cooperation between the lower Mekong states.      
However, it is still important to consider the state as an actor, especially in the 
exploration of the Mekong‘s hydropower debate. Large dams contain a number of 
symbolic aspects, including progress and modernity, which are ―closely connected to 
these very arbitrary territorial entities of nation states‖, and the role of the state in the 
construction of dams needs to be considered critically (Baghel and Nusser 2010: 234). 
Water resources management is also commonly viewed as being located at the state 
level. Decision-making at the national level is often justified on the grounds that 
centralised coordination, command and control is needed to ensure supply and fair 
allocation (Lebel et al. 2005). In light of this, it is then argued that state agencies can 
undertake planning and decision-making in the national interest or public good (Lebel et 
al. 2005). However, water resources development and management in the Mekong 
reveal that this is not the case: it is not as simple as a contest between monolithic state 
interests and unified community interests; different state agencies and different actors 
have different interests and may pursue different agendas (Lebel et al. 2005). 
Consequently, it is important to consider a range of different actors, whilst examining 
the ways in which debates about water resources development are represented as being 
located at the state level and thus obscure actors and impacts at other scalar levels of 
analysis.    
 It is important to retain an understanding of conventional IR approaches to 
hydropolitics. State officials and decision-makers interviewed for this thesis 
conceptualised transboundary hydropolitics in terms of their potential for conflict: ―now 
water conflict is coming, now we are planning mainstream hydropower, there will be 
problems because there will be impacts on the downstream countries‖ (State official, 
interview, 05/08a). These arguments utilise unacknowledged conventional IR 
hydropolitical assumptions. This illustrates how water politics practitioners ―select 
those theories about the world that best suit and justify their agendas‖ (Warner and 
Zeitoun 2008: 803). It also illustrates the persuasiveness of conventional IR 
hydropolitical assumptions and how they shape powerful actors framings of 
transboundary hydropolitics. This demonstrates how ―[t]heory is always for someone 
and for some purpose‖ (Cox 1981: 128). However, a focus on conflict and cooperation 
over transboundary water resources at the state level cannot adequately analyse key 
questions such as: which actors are involved in water resources development; where are 
decisions about water resources located and which actors are involved; what strategies 
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do actors use to extend or maintain their control; and which actors benefit from or are 
disadvantaged by water development plans.  
 
2.2 New approaches, critical IR and political ecology 
 
Hydro-hegemony is an emerging framework which draws on critical IR theories to 
open up new avenues for exploring hydropolitics by focusing on power asymmetries, 
hegemonic strategies, and the varying intensities of conflict (Warner and Zeitoun 2008). 
The hydro-hegemony framework challenges conventional IR approaches as it argues 
that conflict and cooperation can co-exist: the existence of a water cooperation treaty 
can institutionalise power asymmetries and does not necessarily signify the absence of 
conflict (Warner and Zeitoun 2008). As such it also challenges the assumption that 
hegemony is beneficial as it results in cooperation. The hydro-hegemony framework 
defines hegemony as legitimate or authorised leadership in situations where the most 
powerful competitor of formerly equal parties maintains its control through a mixture of 
soft and hard power (Warner 2008; Warner and Zeitoun 2008). Power has three 
dimensions: the ability to mobilise capabilities, control the rules of the game and power 
over ideas (Zeitoun and Warner 2006). Hydro-hegemons seek to define the ‗rules of the 
game‘ set the agenda and have their values adopted and internalised by non-hegemons 
(Zeitoun and Warner 2006). Hydro-hegemony can tend towards the negative 
(domination), or positive (all riparians benefits). Assessing levels of hydro-hegemony 
involves examining power position, potential to exploit the resource, and riparian 
position, with power being the prime determinant (Zeitoun and Warner 2006). Riparians 
seek to maximise their objectives with the resource and employ a range of tactics 
including: coercive compliance producing mechanisms (e.g. military threats), utilitarian 
mechanisms (incentives), normative mechanisms (e.g. treaties), and hegemonic 
mechanisms (securitisation, knowledge construction, and sanctioned discourse) 
(Zeitoun and Warner 2006).    
 The hydro-hegemony framework is a welcome addition to IR approaches to 
hydropolitics as it opens up the categories of conflict, cooperation, and hegemony to 
illustrate the various tactics and strategies which actors use. It also opens up space for 
considering discourse. Zeitoun and Warner (2006) argue that ―the benefits of enjoying a 
position of hydro-hegemony extend to determining the political discursive processes in 
each of the basins‖ (453). This also resonates at the global level: due to their greater 
power, more decision-making positions in international organisations are populated by 
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individuals from those states (Zeitoun and Warner 2006). Hegemonic discourses at the 
global level, such as IWRM, are transmitted by donors and international actors, and 
impact on how basin water relations are institutionalised and operationalised (Zeitoun 
and Warner 2006; Warner 2008).  
However, the framework for hydro-hegemony has a number of limitations. It has 
to date largely focused on the international level and privileged the state as the unit of 
analysis. Proponents have recognised that this can be limiting as it can obscure 
important dynamics occurring between non-state actors, across international boundaries 
or at the sub-national scale (Warner and Zeitoun 2008). Warner (2008) has posited a 
multi-layered approach as a means of overcoming this limitation and exploring 
hegemony at the global, regional, basin, and state-society relations levels as 
―interactions at various levels impinge on each other‖ (272). This multi-layered 
approach highlights the role of global capital, global water governance, the role of 
discourse and controlling how the world is represented as a hegemonic strategy, and 
how the state seeks to maintain hegemony within its own territory, as well as reward the 
formations which support it (Warner 2008). This is a welcome extension, but whilst it 
illuminates some of the ways in which actors interact at various levels, it cannot 
necessarily capture the ways in which actors ‗jump scale‘ or re-scale their water 
resources strategies in order to further their development agendas. A more nuanced 
understanding of scale as found in political ecology and other critical geography 
approaches is highly useful in this context.  
Despite opening space for the consideration of discourse, the hydro-hegemony 
framework emphasises material aspects, arguing that material power undergirds the 
hegemon‘s ability to represent the world in particular ways: ideology alone cannot 
sustain control (Warner and Zeitoun 2008; Warner 2008). As such, the framework for 
hydro-hegemony portrays discourse as an actors‘ tactic, and cannot necessarily account 
for the ways in which actors, subjects and objects are constituted in discourse. How 
hydropolitics is represented enables and justifies certain interventions. Environmental 
problems are articulated, defined, interpreted and produced through politics, and 
experienced differently by various actors and social groups (Furlong 2008). Masking 
this reality is an important aspect of an actor‘s power, and one which is not necessarily 
captured by the framework for hydro-hegemony. Hegemonic discourses are not static 
over time, nor do they manifest uniformly across time and space due to their interaction 
with local dynamics (Furlong 2008).  
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In order to overcome the limitations of conventional IR approaches to 
hydropolitics and to account for the dynamics observed during the fieldwork period of 
the research, this thesis will utilise political ecology. However, the inspiration which the 
hydro-hegemony framework draws from critical IR theories, has opened up an avenue 
for utilising a number of critical IR theorists whose work is highly relevant to the 
concerns of this thesis. In these ways multiple actors and narratives can be integrated 
into approaches to transboundary hydropolitics and the complexity of water resources 
debates in the lower Mekong is explored.   
Political ecology argues that environmental change is inherently political: it can 
be the result of interactions between human power relations and the environment 
(Bryant and Bailey 1997). As such, political ecology is concerned with geographic scale 
and nature-society interactions, and tries to understand the ―complex relations between 
Nature and Society through careful analysis of social forms of access and control over 
resources‖ (Zimmerer and Bassett 2003; Watts and Peet 2004: 4). Baghel and Nusser 
(2010) argue that understanding the influence of humans on the environment 
necessitates a consideration of power relations and processes of meaning creation that 
manifest themselves in human-environment interactions. Discursive practices, such as 
narrative construction and representation are extremely important elements of political 
ecology analyses (e.g. Bassett and Zueli 2003).      
Political ecology has been widely articulated with regard to local scales (e.g. 
Grossman 1993). However, whilst political ecology studies have analysed 
environmental change in specific geographic locales, they have done so with a high 
regard for scale, place and non-place based actors, and the articulation of environmental 
and developmental discourses. For example, Bassett and Zueli (2003) is a study of 
desertification in the Ivorian Savannah. However, in order to examine environmental 
change in this specific locale it explores how discursive practices (narrative construction 
and the ways in which donors institutionalise dominant narratives through aid 
practices), non-place based actors (e.g. the World Bank), and scale interact to produce 
particular environmental explanations, interventions and practices. These same 
dynamics are present in hydropolitical constellations. The debates surrounding 
hydropower development and the MRC in the lower Mekong cannot be adequately 
analysed unless an approach which accounts for these dynamics is adopted. As such, 
whilst political ecology is usually utilised to examine local scales, it is a highly relevant 
approach for analysing transboundary hydropolitical constellations.  
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Sensitivity to scale and to sub-state actors, as well as cross and inter-scalar 
relations between actors is missing from conventional IR approaches to hydropolitics. 
Utilising political ecology allows these important dynamics to be conceptualised and 
analysed. Unlike conventional IR approaches, which conceptualise the state as a unified 
actor and consider hydropolitics only at the inter-state level, political ecology 
conceptualises the state as a non-unified actor. The state is comprised of a number of 
different parts, existing in power relationships with both these other parts and with non-
state actors both inside and outside of the state (Bryant and Bailey 1997). 
Transboundary hydropolitical debates and outcomes are conditioned by relations 
between actors operating over various scales, as well as actor relationships located 
outside the sphere of water governance. Conventional IR approaches cannot account for 
these dynamics as they are not visible components of IR analyses of hydropolitics, 
which focus on the inter-state level. However, these dynamics become visible if 
political ecology approaches are utilised. Political ecology, as mentioned above, is 
concerned with geographic scale and nature-society interactions. Consequently, non-
state actors and the politics of scale (the ways in which processes are scaled and the 
scalar strategies that actors utilise to contest and promote environmental change and 
development) are extremely important components of analysis.  
The application of insights from critical IR approaches complements the use of 
political ecology in a number of ways. Critical IR theorists such as Doty (1996) and 
Edkins (2008) have analysed discursive formations and discursive practices. This 
complements the focus in political ecology on tracing the genealogy of environmental 
narratives, and also helps to situate this focus within wider theoretical discussions on 
how actors and resources are constituted through discourse and interpretation. The 
international scale is an important one for the consideration of transboundary 
hydropolitics. Critical IR theorists, such as Doty (1996) are extremely important for 
analysing how discursive practices shape international relations. Combined with 
political ecology sensitivity‘s to scale, this ensures that the ways in which actors and 
discourses interact at the international scale is adequately theorised. Political ecology 
emphasises geographic scale, but some theorists, such as Rangan and Kull (2008), argue 
that political ecologists need to pay closer attention to the issues of how scale is 
produced and used. As well as considering the production of scale literature within the 
field of political geography, this thesis will utilise critical IT theory work. Cox (1987) 
offers a theory of the relations between both different scales and actors operating over 
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various scales, which is highly pertinent to the concerns of this thesis, and strengthens 
the understandings of scale that are utilised in political ecology approaches.  
  
3. The politicised environment and the lower Mekong’s hydropolitical 
constellation  
 
The hydropower development debate in the Mekong is a struggle to define and 
control water resources development. As such, it is situated within a politicised 
environment. The concept of a politicised environment argues that environmental 
problems, changes and practices are not neutral, and therefore cannot be understood in 
isolation from the political, economic, and discursive processes and contexts in which 
they are articulated (Bryant and Bailey 1997). To ―understand the workings of a 
politicised environment is to appreciate…the complex ways in which actors interact at 
the material and discursive levels over environmental questions‖ (Bryant and Bailey 
1997: 47). However, this is a dialectical process as the physical environment also plays 
a role in determining political, economic and discursive processes.  
Swyngedouw (1999) argues that nature and society are deeply intertwined, and 
cannot be separated into two distinct binary categories. Nature does not exist external to 
man, nor are all natural processes subsumed under man‘s control. Natural and social 
processes do not operate separate from each other, but combine in a historical-
geographical production process of social nature (or socionature), whose outcome 
(historical nature) embodies chemical, physical, social, economic, political and cultural 
processes in highly contradictory but inseparable manners (Swyngedouw 1999: 447). 
Subsequently, river basins such as the lower Mekong are part natural and part social. 
This does not mean that river basins and other elements of the physical environment do 
not have a material existence, or that all natural processes are socially constructed. But, 
we cannot separate their material existence from our knowledge of them through social 
and discursive practices (Baghel and Nusser 2010). Consequently, discursive and 
symbolic representations of nature are important aspects of analysis.  
Nusser (2003) in his critical review of the political ecology of large dams 
considers the promotion, construction, and contesting of large dams as taking place in a 
politicised environment, which includes multiple actors with different interests. 
Utilising an actor-orientated approach Nusser (2003) identifies a number of key place 
and non-place based actor types: states and governmental institutions, dam-building 
industry associations and engineering companies, multilateral funding institutions, 
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environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and affected peoples. An actor-
orientated approach ―emphasises the multiple forms of power and knowledge relations‖ 
and the ―asymmetries inherent in these relations‖ (Baghel and Nusser 2010: 234). Key 
actor types in the Mekong‘s hydropolitical constellation are examined in Chapter Four 
and include national governments, donor states, the development banks, civil society 
actors (global, regional and local), the private sector, and experts. These types have 
been selected as a result of empirical analysis, and do not represent an exhaustive list of 
all actor types. 
Baghel and Nusser (2010) argue that political ecology is an analytical 
framework that can be applied to the large dams debate as it is important to look at both 
the effects and causes of large dams. Shifting asymmetries and discursive flows sustain 
and promote dam building over time, consequently, analysis should focus on multiple 
actors, driving forces and underlying power relations (Baghel and Nusser 2010). These 
elements are all present in the Mekong‘s politicised environment and the current 
hydropower dam development debate. Analysis and examination of these elements is a 
key aim of this thesis. Recognising that this debate is taking place within a politicised 
environment reveals its underlying political nature and challenges representations of it 
as a technical or managerial debate.   
A number of different terms have been utilised to describe the lens through 
which water resources and water resources development are viewed. Baghel and Nusser 
(2010) utilise the term technological hydroscape to avoid privileging water as the 
central lens through which to view and analyse large dams. Molle et al. (2009a) apply 
the term waterscapes in the context of the Mekong. A waterscape is a landscape viewed 
through the lens of their water resources: waterscapes are ―an expression of the 
interaction between humans and their environment and encompass all of the social, 
economic and political processes through which water in nature is conceived of and 
manipulated by societies‖ (2). This thesis explores the hydropolitical constellation of 
the Mekong. The term hydropolitical constellation emphasises the importance of 
politics, as well as multiple actors over different scalar levels and the relationships 
between them, and discursive dimensions.  
 
4. Political Ecology 
 
 Political ecology is a developing field of research with a focus of empirical work 
and analysis (Bryant and Bailey 1997; Baghel and Nusser 2010). It has many strands 
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and does not pretend to cement a single or codified theory (Bassett and Zimmerer 
2003). The field of political ecology can be viewed as developing in different phases: 
initially political ecology was influenced by structural explanations before post-
structural themes began to emerge (Forsyth 2003; Bryant 1998). This has led to political 
ecology being defined in a number of ways: definitions have stressed political economy, 
political institutions, environmental change, and environmental narratives (Robbins 
2004). However, a common set of concerns, areas of research and assumptions can be 
derived.  
Political ecology developed in the 1970s in response to apolitical explanations of 
environmental change, which were based on neo-Malthusian assumptions linking 
population growth and increasing scarcity of resources, arguments around the use of 
technology, cultural practices, and poor land-use practices (Robbins 2004; Watts and 
Peet 2004). The coupling of politics and ecology was coined ―as a way of thinking 
about questions of access and control over resources‖ and ―how this was indispensable 
for understanding both the forms and geography of environmental disturbance and 
degradation, and the prospects for green and sustainable alternatives‖ (Watts and Peet 
2004: 6). Political ecology developed from the fields of cultural ecology, radical 
development geography and hazards/natural disasters research (Bryant 1998). This first 
generation of political ecology research was influenced by neo-Marxist theories such as 
dependency theory, world systems theory and relations of production theory, as well as 
peasant studies (Bryant 1998; Watts and Peet 2004). First generation research argued 
that environmental degradation was not apolitical, but was the result of political and 
economic forces. As such, initial work in political ecology was structural in terms of the 
explanations it provided, linking local behaviour and environmental change to political 
and economic forces and structures at different scalar levels of analysis. For example 
rapid deforestation in eastern Amazonia: 
 
―needed to be understood in terms of why those who were clearing tropical 
rainforests did so in the pursuit of economically inefficient and environmental 
destructive cattle ranching, and these social forces- ranchers, peasants, workers, 
transnational companies- were shaped by larger political-economic forces, not 
the least of which was the Brazilian government acting through subsidies, class 
alliances, and the military‖ (Watts and Peet 2004: 7).  
 
Local communities and actors engaged in behaviour, such as deforestation, that led to 
environmental degradation as a response to larger political and economic forces.     
Whilst no ‗classic‘ text of political ecology exists, the work of Blaikie and 
Brookfield on land degradation is taken as exemplary in the field (Watts and Peet 2004). 
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The most widely quoted definition is that of Blaikie and Brookfield which states that 
political ecology ―combines the concerns of ecology and a broadly defined political 
economy‖ (quoted in Robbins 2004; Baghel and Nusser 2010). A broadly defined 
political economy is concerned with the effects on people, as well as their productive 
activities, of on-going changes within society at the local and global levels (Watts and 
Peet 2004). Blaikie and Brookfield‘s structural explanation for land degradation utilised 
a chain of explanation, which linked local land-use practices to social and economic 
processes at other levels of analysis, from the state up to the international political 
economy (Bryant 1998). The work of Blaikie and Brookfield can be viewed as initiating 
the start of a second wave of political ecology research, which has seen a diversification 
in approaches (Bryant 1998).      
 From the 1990s onwards, political ecology developed in a number of ways, and 
this second generation has been influenced by post-structural approaches (Baghel and 
Nusser 2010). Second generation political ecology seeks to understand how unequal 
power relations and the knowledge that mediates human-environmental interactions are 
reproduced as environmental change at all scales (Baghel and Nusser 2010). There has 
been an increasing focus on discourse and narratives. For example, Leach and Mearns 
(1996) explore the role of environmental narratives and discourse in environmental 
change, and how environmental narratives are simultaneously the outcome of politics 
and power relations, and also play a political role and underpin particular sets of power 
relations. Political ecology has ―opened the possibility of a serious discussion of how 
Nature and environmental problems were represented and how discursive formations 
shaped policy and practice‖ (Watts and Peet 2004: 10). The social construction of 
environmental problems facilitates the control of peoples and environments by powerful 
actors: as such ―conflicts are…as much struggles over meaning as they are battles over 
material practices‖ (Bryant 1998: 87). This argument is extremely important for this 
thesis as the ways in which the Mekong and its development are represented are sites of 
struggle which legitimise the development interventions of powerful actors and de-
legitimise the concerns of less powerful actors.  
 Developments in political ecology also include feminist political ecology 
(exploring the ways in which environmental concerns are traced through gender roles, 
knowledges and practices); a focus on new social movements and social justice; 
environmental history; a deepening theorisation and appreciation of scale; and the role 
of knowledge, including indigenous and local knowledges (Watts and Peet 2004; Bryant 
1998). Developments in political ecology represent for Watts and Peet (2004) the 
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possibility of a ―more robust political ecology which integrates politics more centrally, 
[and] draws upon aspects of discourse theory which demand that the politics of meaning 
and the construction of knowledge be taken seriously, and engages with the wide 
ranging critique of development and modernity‖ (5-6). This illustrates the expansion of 
political ecology from a focus on political-economic structures to include insights from 
post-structuralism.      
First generation political ecology emphasised material relations, nature existing 
external to man, a relatively stable nature/society dualism, and searched for structural 
solutions to environmental problems (Baghel and Nusser 2010; Mustafa 2005). In 
contrast, second generation political ecology shifted away from searching for structural 
explanations, causes and solutions. The move between the two generations did not 
simply shift the focus from material forces to discursive ones, but involved engaging 
with epistemological debates such as constructivism and anti-essentialism, and also a 
politicisation of environmental explanation (Baghel and Nusser 2010; Forsyth 2003). As 
such the composition of the environmental problem is different for the two generations.  
 In first generation political ecology work on environmental problems, such as 
land degradation or deforestation, it is accepted that the environmental problem exists, it 
is a problem and that it has structural and material causes (e.g. Bryant and Bailey 1997). 
Second generation political ecology rejects the idea of nature existing external to man, 
arguing that we cannot separate the material existence of nature from our knowledge of 
it. Therefore, environmental explanation is highly political: discourses construct the 
‗reality‘ of nature. Whether land degradation is accepted as taking place, is 
conceptualised as a problem, and what types of solution are proposed, are all the result 
of interactions between different social actors, their knowledges, and their power 
relationships. Actors co-construct environmental discourses and narratives about 
environmental change, and in doing so construct its meaning. This does not mean that 
environmental change does not exist, but that whether it comes to be conceptualised as a 
problem requiring a certain solution is a result of how it is constituted in environmental 
discourse. For example, a leaking oil tanker is a physical event: it only becomes an 
environmental disaster if it is constituted as such in environmental discourse (Hajer 
1995). How the environmental problem is constituted by social actors justifies and 
enables particular types of interventions. 
The field of political ecology has developed extensively since the 1970s. 
However, there are a number of common elements and points of departure that can be 
distilled. Political ecology is concerned with issues of access and control of natural 
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resources (Watts and Peet 2004). Resource use can be regulated through controlling 
access, and spaces can become arenas of conflict that result in distinctive patterns of 
resource use and management (Zimmerer and Bassett 2003). Ideas about ecological 
processes and the environment are also delimited and directed through political process 
(Robbins 2004). Consequently, both asymmetric power relations and asymmetric 
knowledge relations are important.  
Bryant (1998) argues that political ecology research seeks ―primarily to 
understand the political dynamics surrounding…struggles over the environment in the 
third world‖ (89). Investigations into the processes of knowledge construction and 
underlying discourses need to be integrated into understandings of environmental 
change as ―human-environmental interactions are mediated by knowledge‖ (Baghel and 
Nusser 2010: 242-3). Political ecology is something that people do: it both critical 
examines dominant accounts of environmental change, and explore alternatives, 
adaptations, and creative human action in the face of mismanagement and exploitation 
(Robbins 2004: 12). Robbins (2004) terms these the hatchet and the seed: the hatchet of 
political ecology ―works to ‗denaturalize‘ certain social and environmental conditions, 
showing them to be the contingent outcomes of power‖, and focuses on the stories, 
methods and policies that create social and environmental outcomes (12).   
Forsyth (2003) argues for a critical political ecology which considers science, 
and its social and political framings, as the basis through which environmental change is 
understood. Environmental explanations have a political basis as political factors 
underlie the formulation, dissemination and institutionalisation of scientific knowledge 
and networks (Forsyth 2003). Consequently, it is important to view the evolution of 
environmental facts and knowledge as part of the political debate, rather than a pre-
prepared basis for commencing debate (Forsyth 2003). This is important in the context 
of the lower Mekong as technical and scientific studies conducted by external experts in 
the 1950s provided the impetus for lower Mekong inter-state water cooperation and 
produced a particular representation of the Mekong which has endured (see Chapter 
Three). In his overview of the field of political ecology Forsyth (2003) recognises that 
an important challenge is to ―integrate the structural focus on state, society and industry, 
and the poststructuralist attention to how interactions between such actors co-construct 
environmental discourses and narratives about the environmental change‖ (9). This 
thesis seeks to integrate these two focuses in its analysis of the lower Mekong‘s 
hydropolitical constellation. Power relations, multiple actors, economic factors, 
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discourse, narratives and scale are all important elements which need to be integrated in 
approaches to hydropolitics.   
 
4.1. Power 
 
The role of power and asymmetric power relations between different actors has 
been emphasised in a large amount of political ecology work (e.g. Bryant and Bailey 
1997; Tans-Mullins 2007). This includes both structural and post-structural conceptions. 
Structural conceptions of power have largely focused on the ability of actors to control 
access to resources, usually through material means. Tan-Mullins (2007) argues that 
power is conceptualised ―by the differential ability to control access to valued 
environmental resources, the main objective of which is to control and/or access the 
economic benefits ensuing from resource exploitation‖ (348). As such assessing power 
relations between actors provides a way to ―explain the uneven distribution of access to 
environmental resources‖ (348). Bryant and Bailey (1997) attempted to integrate power-
knowledge relations into their understanding of power, arguing that it is necessary to 
adopt an inclusive understanding of power ―that encompasses…non-material 
considerations as well as the apparent fluidity of power itself‖ (39).  
However, Bryant and Bailey (1997) still conceptualise power in terms of 
controlling the environment of others. This has a number of dimensions: controlling 
access to environmental resources; influencing or determining the location of activities; 
allocating financial and human resources to intervene in particular types of human-
environment interaction; and, discursive means and attempts to regulate ideas. This 
conceptualisation of power seeks to illuminate how no single actor has complete control 
over a resource, and how power relations are not fixed, but fluid and complex: ―the 
ability of an actor to control or resist other actors is never permanent or fixed but always 
in flux‖ (Bryant and Bailey 1997: 46). Powerful actors stake claims to environmental 
resources both materially and discursively, whilst weaker actors resist this in a number 
of ways: there is continual tension and power is multi-dimensional and multi-centred 
(Bryant and Bailey 1997). Bryant and Bailey (1997) argue that environmental change 
results in costs and benefits which are distributed unequally and as such ―reinforces or 
reduces existing social and economic inequalities‖, which has ―political implications in 
terms of the altered power of actors in relation to other actors‖ (Bryant and Bailey 1997: 
28-29).  
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Bryant and Bailey‘s (1997) largely structural understanding of power is useful in 
the case of the lower Mekong to certain extent. The ability to allocate funds for 
development is a key element of the relationships between state energy actors and 
private sector companies in the lower Mekong, whilst the distribution of costs and 
benefits is an extremely important issue in the hydropower development debate. 
However, discourse is presented by Bryant and Bailey (1997) as one aspect of an actor‘s 
power, suggesting that it is something external to actors which they consciously control 
and deploy against other actors. Bryant and Bailey (1997) argue that actors seek to 
control the public transcript: the ‗socially accepted‘ version of events ―represented in 
public documents, legal political ideologies, popular music and theatre, and so on‖ (42). 
By controlling the public transcript actors seek to represent the triumph of their partisan 
interests as ‗natural‘ (Bryant and Bailey 1997). Whilst actors may behave in such a way, 
this limited conception of discourse and power-knowledge relations cannot adequately 
capture the ways in which knowledge mediates human-environment interactions. Actors 
both co-construct environmental narratives and discourses and are shaped by them: as 
knowledge mediates interactions, discourse and processes of knowledge construction 
need to be integrated into hydropolitical analyses.   
Mustafa (2002) argues that whilst political ecology holds power relations to be 
central in determining resource management, power is largely under-theorised. Political 
ecologists have utilised surrogate concepts such as mode of production, political 
economy or social discourses to apprehend the role of power (Mustafa 2002). Whilst 
these surrogate concepts have enhanced the understanding of resource geographies, ―the 
fundamental issue of power is…obfuscated…because the question of its sources and 
impacts is addressed indirectly‖ (Mustafa 2002: 737). Mustafa (2002) seeks to 
overcome this by utilising a structural conception of power to analyse access to 
irrigation water and vulnerability to flood hazard in Pakistan. This structural conception 
of power emphasises the connection between property ownership and social power 
(Mustafa 2002). Social power is the capacity to act possessed by social actors: as 
opposed to focusing on asymmetric relationships and the question of who has power 
over who, the focus is on what do actors have the power to do in their capacity as 
socially situated role-bearers (Mustafa 2002). Social power has its origins ―in specific 
social structures, which differentially empower social actors‖, and as such ―power 
differentials tend to have concrete geographical outcomes‖ (Mustafa 2002: 739). 
Property holds a central role in defining the structural modes of power, as property is 
one of the main building blocks of the social identities of actors (Mustafa 2002). Power 
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relations vary in the four villages studied by Mustafa (2002) according to the varying 
types of property ownership. Mustafa (2002) identifies three modes of power: feudal, 
bourgeoisie, and communal which respectively rely on force, socialisation and control 
over economic resources to ensure compliance. This structural conception of power is 
useful as it illustrates how geographical and environmental outcomes differ according to 
differing types of power relations between actors, which stem from particular sources, 
such as property.    
Post-structural conceptions of power have been influential in both political 
ecology and critical IR approaches. Foucault‘s notions of governmentality and 
biopolitics are of particular importance. Within political ecology Goldman (2004) has 
analysed the eco-governmentality of the World Bank and its role in producing 
environmental knowledge. In critical IR Campbell (2005) uses biopolitics to 
reconceptualise the relationship between oil and security, whilst Dillon and Lubo-
Guerrero (2008) explore the biopolitics of security contrasting it with traditional 
geopolitical discourses of security. 
Foucault (1991) identifies three types of society or power (sovereign, discipline, 
and government), and traces the shift in the problematic of government from the Middle 
Ages onwards. Each of these types has a different end: sovereignty is concerned with 
control over territory, discipline with the practices of power over individuals (including 
normalisation and institutionalisation), and government with the problem of population 
(Foucault 1991). Governmentality refers to the tendency which has led to this type of 
power, government, becoming pre-eminent over the other types (Foucault 1991). 
However, it is not a case of one type of society/power replacing the others in a linear 
progression, but rather that there is a ―triangle of sovereignty-discipline-government, 
which has as its target population‖ (102). Population is the ultimate end of government: 
the purpose of government is the ―welfare of the population, the improvement of its 
condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, etc‖ (Foucault 1991: 100). As 
such, the government acts either directly on the population through large-scale 
campaigns, or indirectly through tactics that stimulate birth rates, or direct the flow of 
the population into particular activities or regions (Foucault 1991: 100). 
Governmentality signifies the ―ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, 
analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very 
specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its 
principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means 
apparatuses of security‖ (Foucault 1991: 102).  
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The concern with the population as a specific problem for government can be 
termed bio-politics. Foucault (2003a) defined bio-politics as the ―endeavour, begun in 
the eighteenth century, to rationalize the problems presented to governmental practice 
by the phenomena characteristic of a group of living human beings constituted as a 
population: health, sanitation, birthrate, longevity, race‖ (201). Within this statistical 
techniques are extremely important as biopolitics is the means by which the group of 
living beings understood as a population are measured in order to be governed (Elden 
2007). Statistics reveal that the population has its own regularities and economic effects 
(e.g. birth rates, cycles of scarcity, epidemics, spirals of labour and wealth), and make it 
possible to quantify specific phenomena of population (Foucault 1991: 99). The purpose 
of statistical mechanisms is not ―to modify any given phenomena as such, or to modify 
any given individual in so far as he is an individual, but, essentially, to intervene at the 
level of their generality‖ (Foucault 2003a: 246). Consequently, power is situated and 
exercised at the level of population and biopolitics is a complex array of changing 
mechanisms, which seek to regulate the contingent economy of species life (Rainbow 
and Rose 2003; Dillon and Lubo-Guerrero 2008). 
As bio-politics is concerned with matters such as birth rates, health and the 
optimisation of the life of a population, it must also be concerned with ―the social, 
cultural, environmental, economics and geographic conditions under which humans, 
live, procreate, become ill, maintain healthy or become healthy, and die (Mitchell 1999: 
99). Therefore bio-politics is concerned with ―the family, with housing, living and 
working conditions, with what we call ‗lifestyle‘, with public health issues, patterns of 
migration, levels of economic growth and the standards of living…[and] the bio-sphere 
in which humans dwell‖ (Mitchell 1999: 99). In order to optimise a state of life security 
mechanisms have to be installed around the random element inherent in a population of 
living beings (Foucault 2003a). Consequently, bio-politics involves surveillance, 
intervention and modification of the population. A population is ―a cohort of biological 
individuals‖ and the epistemologies associated with biopolitics seek to establish 
patterns, profiles and probabilities (Dillon and Lubo-Guerrero 2008). In this context, 
bio-power refers to the ways in which characteristics of populations (such as race, 
fertility, gender etc.) can be shaped, managed, and selected in order to achieve political 
ends (Rainbow and Rose 2003).  
Development in the lower Mekong involves surveillance and measurement of 
the population, in order to facilitate intervention. Statistical measures, such as Gross 
National Income, the national poverty line and indicators including literacy and life 
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expectancy, classify populations in the lower Mekong as undeveloped and in need of 
development. These measures privilege particular ways of knowing and provide the 
rationale for government interventions to modify the population. Hydropower dam 
development is justified in terms of the peoples‘ need for development and improving 
the population (see Chapter Three). Government-led development of water resources 
also seeks to steer the population into particular activities, such as industry and away 
from other types of activities, whilst also incorporating outlying communities into the 
government‘s networks of power in particular ways.   
Post-structuralist political ecology, with its focus on narratives, discourse, 
meaning and power is highly relevant to this thesis. For example, Chapter Three of this 
thesis traces the history of the dominant development narrative of the lower Mekong 
and the types of interventions it has promoted. Although narratives are considered in 
section five of this chapter, it is necessary to make a few remarks here concerning 
power. Stott and Sullivan (2000) argue that contemporary political ecology is concerned 
with ―tracing the genealogy of narratives concerning ‗the environment‘, with identifying 
power relationships supported by such narratives, and with asserting the consequences 
of hegemony over, and within, these narratives for economic and social development, 
and particularly for constraining possibilities for self-determination‖ (2). Subsequently, 
questions such as ‗who has the power to decide for society‘, and ‗who decides the 
conditions of truth‘ become important questions that can lead to contestation and 
struggle as they make explicit the need to transform unequal power relations (Stott and 
Sullivan 2000: 2). Escobar (1995) has illustrated how ―discourse results in concrete 
practices of thinking and acting through which the Third World is produced‖ (11). 
Discourse is produced under conditions of unequal power, and power is also exercised 
through discourse (Escobar 1995). Ferguson (1994), following Foucault, argues that 
discourse is a practice, it is structured and it has real effects. The thoughts, utterances, 
and plans of development officials are shaped by the structures of knowledge which 
they inhabit (Ferguson 1994). Power and discourse are therefore inseparable, and 
analysing power-knowledge relations is integral to the study of development. Discourse 
is not something external, but something which has real effects and includes particular 
practices that have different consequences for different actors. Ideas about the 
environment and development are underpinned by politics and by power, which is why 
it is necessary to trace the evolution of these ideas.               
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4.2. Scale 
  
 Scale is extremely important to political ecology analyses (Zimmerer and 
Bassett 2003). Three different meanings of scale can be differentiated in the literature: 
one, scale as a physical measure of space or nested territorial containers (local, river 
basin, nation etc.); two, scalar differentiation is mobilised to extend the analysis of 
dynamics perceived as pertaining to a definite scale to illustrate how power, discourse 
and knowledge circulate through channels that traverse rather than match conventional 
scales; and three, scale as social and political constructs utilised by different actors to 
frame a particular problem in a particular way in order to favour particular courses of 
action (Molle 2007). Zimmerer and Bassett (2003) argue that it is important to go 
beyond viewing scale as a set of hierarchical, pre-given spatial containers to examine 
how scale is socio-environmentally produced and how political-ecological processes 
incorporate and generate scaled spaces of interaction and distinctive political ecologies.  
Marston (2000) argues that scale is not an ontologically given category or a pre-
ordained hierarchical framework for ordering the world, but is socially constructed and 
helps to produce geographic realities (220). Scale has three facets: size, level and 
relation (Marston 2000). In her review of current geographic theorising about scale 
Marston (2000) identifies three central tenets: one, scale is not an external fact but a 
way of framing conceptions of reality (there is nothing natural about divisions such as 
local, urban, river basin, and region); two, the outcomes of these framings have tangible 
and material consequences; and three, framings of scale are often contradictory and not 
necessarily enduring (there is always the potential for change).  
Scale is produced through social relations of uneven power, which create a 
hierarchy of differentiated spatial units. The majority of theorisations on the production 
of scale have focused on the role of capitalist production and have explored the massive 
restructurings of space that have accompanied globalisation (Marston 2000). For 
example, Brenner (1997) has examined how the state in the Federal Republic of 
Germany used regional and urban planning as a spatial tactic to regulate, produce and 
reproduce configurations of social space adequate to the continued accumulation of 
capital (280). However, Marston (2000) argues that the overwhelming focus on the 
capitalist relations of production means that the important roles that the processes of 
social reproduction and consumption play in the production of scale are under-
theorised.  
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  Marston (2000) examines the ways in which American urban middle-class 
women reconstituted and reclaimed the social geography of daily life, negotiating new 
and existing cultural ideas of their ‗proper‘ place in society. The household was a key 
scale in this struggle for empowerment as it the scale at which relations of production, 
social reproduction and consumption intersect shaping access to social power and 
resources (Marston 2000). The women‘s movement and popular domestic practices 
revolved around social reproduction and consumption processes and came to redefine 
the gender content of the public and the private and embodied an important 
transformation in women‘s identities (Marston 2000). The modern US state was 
―remade with new responsibilities and transformed roles in direct response to the 
prolonged political activism of urban women organized around a discourse of 
domesticity and maternalism‖ (Marston and Smith 2001: 617). The transformation of 
the household scale provided a scale basis from which women‘s movements contributed 
to the restructuring of other scales and dramatically altered the prevailing scalar 
configuration in the US (Marston 2000).  
 Brenner (2001) identifies two meanings of the politics of scale: singular and 
plural. The singular usage of the politics of scale denotes the ―production, 
reconfiguration or contestation of some aspect of sociospatial organization within a 
relatively bounded geographical arena‖, with the word ‗of‘ signifying a relatively 
differentiated and self-enclosed unit, and understanding scale as a boundary separating 
units from each other (Brenner 2001: 599). Within this the relational aspects of scale are 
not considered (Brenner 2001). Brenner (2001) argues that Marston‘s (2000) work 
utilises this singular usage to analyse the politics of scale within households. However, 
Marston (2000) does discuss the relational aspects of the household scale and illustrates 
how changes at this scale impacted other scales. Scales are constituted and transformed 
in response to socio-spatial dynamics, and scale-making is an embodied process which 
is undertaken by social agents, who are shaped by gender, class, race, and geography, 
and operate in particular historical contexts (Marston and Smith 2001: 617).  
The plural usage of the politics of scale, which is defined by Brenner (2001) as 
denoting the production, reconfiguration and contestation of particular differentials, 
orderings and hierarchies among geographic scale, is highly relevant to the concerns of 
this thesis. The politics of scale refers to the production of differentiated spatial units 
and their embeddedness and position in relation to other spatial units in a multi-tiered, 
hierarchically configured geographic scaffolding (Brenner 2001: 600). Consequently, 
the process of scaling is highly important: how multiple spatial units are established, 
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differentiated and hierarchized, and then how they are re-jigged, re-organised and 
recalibrated in relation to one another (Brenner 2001: 600). It is important to explore the 
changing positionalities and shifting relationships between a range of intertwined 
geographic scales, and the ramifications this has for the representations, meanings, 
function and organisational structures of each of those scales (Brenner 2001: 600). 
The politics of scale as a concept signifies that geographic scales and scalar 
configurations are socially produced, relational, contingent and politically contested 
through social struggle: they are not pre-given or fixed (Brenner 2001; Neumann 2009). 
Entrenched scalar configurations are continually junked and remade through intense 
socio-spatial struggles (Brenner 2001).  Scale is critically important to actors‘ strategies: 
actors are geographically diverse and project across their own geographies into the 
geographies of other (Brenner 2001). The multiplicity of scale involved in the socio-
spatial organisation of processes such as capitalism enables multiple opportunities for 
resistance and to create linkages across scales: the territorial requirements of capitalism 
articulate extensions of power at the same time that these manifold scales provide 
openings to resist that power (Marston 2000: 228). Sneddon (2003) argues that actors 
employ scalar narratives to ―assert their positions and, in effect, their representations of 
means and ends‖ (2233). Within these narratives scale is a frame of understanding and 
an expression of power: ―talking in terms of the ‗local‘ or ‗global‘ should be understood 
as a political strategy, as a way of representing the goals and desires of different actors‖ 
(Sneddon 2003: 2233-2234).   
Actors‘ choices about scale can operate as a means of inclusion or exclusion as 
actors ―can change power and authority by working at different spatial levels‖ and ―can 
alter access to resources, and the decision-making processes with respect to those 
resources‖ (Lebel et al. 2005).  Defining a problem at a particular scale allows actors to 
justify access, and extend or maintain control over resources (Bassett and Zueli 2003). 
Actors can ‗scale-up‘ problems to analytical levels which legitimise their intervention. 
Bassett and Zueli (2003) illustrate how the World Bank has legitimised its intervention 
in the Ivorian Savannah and the problem of desertification by defining it as a problem 
that is continental in scope and therefore within its remit. Sneddon and Fox (2006) 
argue that the World Bank scaled its support for the Pak Mun Dam project in Thailand 
at the national scale. This represented the project as necessary for national development 
and therefore, prioritised the national scale over the claims and concerns of local 
communities and activists (Sneddon and Fox 2006). Lebel et al. (2005) argue that the 
ability to shift across levels and scales is often important to social movements, but the 
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capacity to make use of scale varies amongst stakeholders. These studies illustrate that 
scale is dynamic, that power flows between and within scales, and that actors can also 
‗jump‘ scales and engage in relationships with actors at other scales. Actors in the lower 
Mekong‘s hydropolitical constellation display these types of behaviour (framing 
interventions at certain scales and ‗jumping‘ scales) as will be demonstrated throughout 
this thesis.      
It is important to consider the relations between different scales, actors operating 
over various scales, how change occurs, and the ways in which scalar hierarchies are 
established. Cox (1987) considers a number of these issues from the vantage point of 
modes of social relations of production. As mentioned above, social relations of 
production have been the key focus of the majority of geographical theorising on the 
production of scale (Marston 2000). Cox (1987), however, provides a critical IR 
perspective on the relations between the scales of production, society, state, and world 
order. Cox (1987) argues that ―production creates the material basis for all forms of 
social existence, and the ways in which human efforts are combined in productive 
processes affect all other aspects of social life, including the polity‖ (1). Production 
generates the capacity to exercise power, but is also determined by power (Cox 1987: 
1). Examining the social relations of production focuses attention on the pattern or 
configuration of social groups engaged in production processes (Cox 1987). Social 
relations of production contain relations of dominance and subordination: in each mode 
a dominant group controls production, whilst a subordinate group works for the 
dominant group (Cox 1987).  
Cox (1987) identifies twelve modes of social relations of production, including 
subsistence, household and central planning. Each mode contains a structure of social 
power (determines what and how of production), a form of organising the production 
process (the division of labour and the relationship of authority within production) and a 
form of distributing the rewards of production (Cox 1987). There is also a 
corresponding inter-subjective content (common ideas shared by the people in a mode 
about the relationships and purposes in which they are involved) and a typical 
institutional complex (which plays a role in legitimating the structure of relations within 
each mode) (Cox 1987). Modes are not fixed, pre-given or natural: they originated 
within different development processes (i.e. capitalist and redistributive), and then 
subsequently evolved (Cox 1987). For example, discontent over the distribution of the 
rewards of production can lead to the subordinate group struggling for greater control of 
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the production process, which can result in a change in the structure of social power 
within the mode (Cox 1987).  
Modes do not exist in isolation, but in relationships with each other and in a 
society regulated by a state, and with links to the world economy (Cox 1987). By 
consecrating one of these modes as the dominant mode of production, the state 
structures the relationships between the different modes and therefore structures power 
within society (Cox 1987). The hierarchy of modes constitutes a structure of 
accumulation in which the extraction of surplus flows from weaker, subordinate levels 
of production to the dominant and stronger levels (Cox 1987). The pattern and structure 
of the social relations of production within a society gives the basis of its class structure, 
and in turn the nature of the state is also defined by the class structure on which it rests 
(Cox 1987). Consequently, state action is constrained by the knowledge of what the 
class structure makes possible and what it does not (Cox 1987).  
Social formations are determined by the patterns of social relations of 
production (Cox 1987). But, they also shape and are shaped by world order, mediated 
by the state (Cox 1987). Differences between ―one structure of world order and its 
successor are shaped by the forms of state and of production, and stabilized structures of 
world order in turn provide a framework conducive to certain forms of state and 
production‖ (Cox 1987: 7). In hegemonic world orders cross and inter-scalar linkages 
form and rescaling takes places, for example production in particular countries becomes 
connected through the world economy and linked into world systems of production, the 
social classes of the dominant class find allies in the classes of other countries, and 
states become internationalised as their mechanisms and policies adjust to the rhythms 
of world order (Cox 1987:7). These tendencies are reversed in periods of non-
hegemonic world order. Within these scalar hierarchies there is the potential for change 
at all levels (production relations, class relations, the emergence of new historic blocs 
and alternative forms of state, and in the structure of world order). As the forces for 
system maintenance are strong where change does it occur it will be through mutually 
sustaining relationships at all levels (Cox 1987).                 
 
5. Environmental narratives, development, policy-making and persistence   
 
 Political ecology research has a strong focus on environmental narratives (Stott 
and Sullivan 2000). Narratives help to produce particular types of environmental change 
as they legitimise and de-legitimise certain actors and their strategies; they also play a 
55 
 
role in policy-making (Leach and Mearns 1996). By demonstrating that the environment 
can be approached in particular ways political ecology research has opened up the 
category of the environment itself and explored its multiform representations (Watts and 
Peet 2004). As such knowledge of the environment and key questions, including  why 
do particular forms of knowledge predominate, circulate and how, are examined (Watts 
and Peet 2004: 19).  
A development narrative can be seen as a story or an argument as it ―has a 
beginning, middle, and end (or premises and conclusions, when cast in the form of an 
argument) and revolves around a sequence of events or positions in which something 
happens or from which something follows‖ (Roe 1991: 288).  Environmental narratives 
have been cast as received wisdom by Leach and Mearns (1996): received wisdom is an 
―idea or set of ideas held to be ‗correct‘ by social consensus or ‗the establishment‘‖ and 
commonly represented in the form of a narrative (6). This is then translated into 
particular forms of policy and interventions which have practical consequences on the 
ground (Leach and Mearns 1996). Crisis narratives, such as those about encroaching 
deserts, are the ―primary means whereby development experts and the institutions for 
which they work claim rights to stewardship over land and resources they do not own‖ 
(Roe 1995: 1066). As narratives suggest potential solutions and 
development/environmental interventions, they allow actors to make claims to 
resources. Chapter Six of this thesis illustrates how the development banks have 
engaged in this type of positioning in order to maintain their role in Mekong 
hydropower development in light of competition from new actors.   
The aim of development policy is to ―shape the world and generate change‖ and 
in doing so, ―policy constructs versions of how the world is and how it should be‖ 
(Friend and Blake 2009: 15). Issues concerning the environment and development are 
complex. In order to deal with complexity policy-makers, decision-makers, practitioners 
and other actors tell stories about them, which reduce the complexity and uncertainty 
and suggest possible solutions. Narratives appeal to policy-makers and practitioners 
because they make stabilising assumptions, which describe both the problem and its 
solution, consequently, they can become institutionalised and resistant to change (Leach 
and Mearns 1996). Contained within this is the idea that problems exist, that solutions 
are needed and that policy-making can make a difference. As narratives suggest 
solutions and become institutionalised, they can box-in policy-makers and reduce the 
range of policies that can be selected (Leach and Mearns 1996). Roe (1991) argues that 
―the pressure to generate narratives about development is directly proportional to the 
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ambiguity decision makers experience over the development process‖ (288). The ―more 
uncertain things seem at the microlevel, the greater the tendency to see the scale of 
uncertainty at the macrolevel to be so enormous as to require broad explanatory 
narratives that can be operationalized into standard approaches with widespread 
application‖ (Roe 1991: 288). Development narratives can become so persuasive that 
the assumptions and arguments on which they are based are rarely questioned (Friend 
and Blake 2009). This is evidenced in the lower Mekong where a dominant narrative 
linking hydropower and poverty reduction has framed powerful actors‘ thinking since 
the 1950s (see Chapter Three).  
 Hajer (1995) argues that policy-making can be analysed as the creation of 
problems as it requires the definition of social phenomena in such a way that solutions 
can be devised. Policy-making ―can be analysed as a set of practices that are meant to 
process fragmented and contradictory statements to be able to create the sort of 
problems that institutions can handle and for which solutions can be found‖ (Hajer 
1995: 15). In light of this political analysis should ―illuminate the places, moments, and 
institutions where certain perceptions of environmental change and social development 
emerge and are reproduced, and should reconstruct the…struggle that determines which 
perceptions at some point start to dominate the course of affairs in environmental 
politics‖ (Hajer 1995: 19). This thesis situates its analysis in this way by tracing how a 
particular regional discursive formation came to dominate in the lower Mekong as well 
as examining how the discussion of trade-offs has emerged.  
The study of discourse illuminates how a diversity of actors actively try to 
influence the definition of the problem and exercise power by trying to impose a 
particular frame or discourse onto a discussion (Hajer and Versteeg 2005). Actors 
actively utilise discursive means to position themselves and others (Hajer and Versteeg 
2005). Hajer (2005) defines discourse as ―an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and 
categories through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and 
which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices‖ (300). 
Discourse coalitions form around particular storylines and generate political effects 
once they gain enough socio-political resonance (Hajer 1995). Coalitions comprise 
different actors who may not have met and who do not follow a carefully laid out 
strategy, yet, they sustain a particular way of talking and thinking about environmental 
politics (Hajer 1995). The political power of coalitions is derived from the fact that they 
group around a particular storyline. For example, a loose discourse coalition exists 
around the storyline of the destruction of the rainforest, but a number of different stories 
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are told (e.g. deforestation, role of the rainforest in equations modelling the world as a 
biosphere, and the importance of the rainforests for indigenous cultures) as actors in a 
coalition have different social and cognitive commitments (Hajer 1995). Sustainable 
development is another example of a storyline: many different definitions of the concept 
exist which call for different things but, the coalition can only be kept together by being 
vague (Hajer 1995). Two discourse coalitions can be identified in the lower Mekong: 
one, powerful actors promoting hydropower on the basis of its contribution to poverty 
reduction, and two, less powerful actors who contest hydropower on the basis on its 
potential negative impacts (see Chapter Seven). 
Doty (1996) argues that international relations are ―inextricably bound up with 
discursive practices‖ (5). Representations of entities such as the global South and North, 
which frame policy makers thinking, underlie the production of knowledge and make 
certain policies and practices possible: alternative representations exist but they are 
marginalised or silenced (Doty 1996). Representation is a discursive practice, and refers 
not to the ‗truth‘ and ‗knowledge‘ but to the ways in which regimes of ‗truth‘ and 
‗knowledge‘ have been produced (Doty 1996). Examining representational practices is 
important because it calls attention to the binary oppositions that regularly frame our 
thinking, for example developed/undeveloped, first world/third world: there is ―nothing 
natural, inevitable, or arguably even useful about these divisions, they remain widely 
circulated and accepted as legitimate ways to categorize regions and peoples of the 
world‖ (Doty 1996: 2-3). The constructed and political nature of these oppositions have 
enabled and justified certain practices and policies (Doty 1996). For example, Doty 
(1996) examines imperial encounters between the Anglo-European world and the 
imperialised countries. These were asymmetric encounters in which the Anglo-
European world constructed ―realities‖ about the imperialised countries that were taken 
seriously and provided a basis for action. Consequently, it is important to examine how 
meanings are produced and attached to social subjects and objects, thus constituting 
particular representations that create certain possibilities and preclude others (Doty 
1996).    
Discourse has a material and performative character:  material objects and 
subjects are constituted within discourse (Doty 1996). Representations produce 
meaning: what is ‗really‘ going on in any situation is ―inextricably linked to the 
discourse in which it is located‖ (Doty 1996: 5). Focusing on discursive practices allows 
examination of ―how the processes that produce ―truth‖ and ―knowledge‖ work and how 
they are articulated with the exercise of political, military and economic power‖ (Doty 
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1996: 5-6). Discourse is a structured, relational totality which delineates the terms of 
intelligibility whereby a particular ―reality‖ can be known and acted upon (Doty 1996). 
However, this does not mean that it is fixed, closed or stable. Discourse is inherently 
open-ended and incomplete: its exterior limits are constituted by other discourses that 
are themselves, open, inherently unstable and always in the process of being articulated 
(Doty 1996). Consequently, any ―fixing of a discourse and the identities that are 
constructed by it…can only ever be of a partial nature…the overflowing and incomplete 
nature of discourses…opens up spaces for change, discontinuity, and variation‖ (Doty 
1996: 6). That particular meanings and identities are taken as fixed illustrates the 
inextricable link between power and knowledge (Doty 1996).  
A focus on discourse does not imply that the discursive is privileged over the 
non-discursive: the world exists independently of language, but its‘ existence is literally 
inconceivable outside of language and our traditions of interpretation (Campbell 1998). 
As such social and political life comprises a set of practices in which things are 
constituted in the process of interpretation (Campbell 1998). Understanding ―involves 
rendering the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar‖, so there is always an ―ineluctable 
debt to interpretation such that there is nothing outside of discourse‖ (Campbell 1998: 
4). Campbell (1998) introduces the concept of a discursive economy, whereby 
―discourse (the representation and constitution of the ―real‖) is a managed space in 
which some statements and depictions come to have greater value than others‖ (6-7). In 
a discursive economy investments have been made in certain interpretations and 
dividends can be drawn by participants (Campbell 1998). Representations are taxed 
when they confront new and ambiguous circumstances (Campbell 1998). Participation 
in the discursive economy is through social relations that embody an unequal 
distribution of power (Campbell 1998).  In the context of the lower Mekong certain 
representations of the river, its people, and its development dominate. Investments have 
been made in these interpretations and powerful actors have drawn dividends in terms 
of seeing their representations dominate and produce meaningful action. However, the 
existence of alternative representations and narratives as promoted by a wide discourse 
coalition of less powerful actors in the lower Mekong are taxing the representations that 
dominate at the official level. The open-ended and incomplete nature of discourse 
means that there is always tension between dominant and non-dominant representations 
and narratives.     
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5.1 The importance and persistence of narratives 
 
Dominant narratives get their hearers to believe or do something: they are problem-
solving and action-orientated (Roe 1991). As described above narratives play an 
important role in policy-making by making stabilising assumptions, reducing 
complexity, framing thinking, and suggesting possible solutions. The role of narratives 
in policy-making illustrates how narratives can have social, economic, developmental 
and geographic consequences on the ground. For example, the government of Lao PDR 
are promoting hydropower development as their key development strategy. Interviews 
conducted for this thesis illustrated how a dominant development narrative which 
conceptualises the problem as a lack of development and the solution as hydropower 
has framed the thinking of policy-makers and provided the underlying stabilising 
assumptions that have reduced the complexity of the problem:  
 
―Where the minority people live, need very much to improve their lives. They do 
not have electricity. They need development. That‘s why development there is of the 
highest priority. That‘s why we need hydropower development‖ (State Official, 
interview, 06/08b).  
 
The narrative linking poverty, development and hydropower is one that formulates both 
a problem and a solution. It is action-orientated and has led to the formulation and 
implementation of hydropower plans and projects, which are changing the social, 
economic, developmental and political geographies of Lao PDR.  
Dominant narratives can render some actors or practices invisible at the national and 
regional levels of decision-making, or blame certain actors for environmental 
degradation in order to justify intervention by the state. Chapters Three and Seven of 
this thesis examine how the dominant development narrative of the Mekong positions 
development at the regional and national scales thereby rendering invisible at the 
policy-making level the myriad ways in which local communities and groups utilise the 
Mekong‘s water resources. This thesis challenges this rendering by examining how 
dominant narratives are contested by less powerful actors, and illuminating how 
alternative representations and narratives do exist and challenge the dominant ones (see 
Chapter Seven). Critical IR theorists such as Weber (2006), and Blaney and N. 
Inayatullah (2010) have adopted approaches whereby dominant and alternative 
representations or interpretations are read side-by-side to challenge dominant 
representations/interpretations, thus opening them up for debate. By examining 
alternative representations and narratives in the lower Mekong hydropower debate, this 
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thesis seeks to illustrate how the official development discourse is contested, and is not 
a closed, technical discourse, but highly political. It also casts light on the multiple, 
local users of the Mekong‘s resources, who are not necessarily considered in official 
discourses at the policy-making level.  
Political ecologists have illustrated how dominant narratives can also blame 
indigenous people for land degradation, stigmatising their land-use practices as part of 
the problem, and therefore de-legitimise these practices and local level actors (Bassett 
and Zueli 2003; Swift 1996). Narratives serve the interests of certain actors and can 
facilitate the extension of an actor‘s power over a certain territory or resource: they can 
provide the raison d‘etre for certain state agencies, legitimise intervention on the part of 
certain actors and stigmatise others, and allow actors to present themselves as 
possessing the solution to a particular problem (Leach and Mearns 1996; Bassett and 
Zueli 2003). Therefore, when discussing narratives we are inherently discussing power 
relations and issues of access to and control over resources.      
Bassett and Zueli‘s 2003 study of the Ivorian Savannah illustrates the role that 
environmental narratives can play as well as how scale is central to an actor‘s analysis 
and intervention. Narratives are utilised as framing devices by developers to justify their 
subsequent interventions:  actors such as the state and international aid donors ―seek to 
simplify the social and ecological worlds of their subjects in ways that make the 
complex and unwieldy both ‗legible‘ and more accessible to their modes of 
intervention‖ (Bassett and Zueli 2003: 18). In the case of the Ivorian Savannah the 
World Bank defined the problem in such a way as to present itself as having the 
solution, and therefore the expertise and projects to intervene (Bassett and Zueli 2003). 
Environmental narratives empower actors to intervene in different locales, extending 
their control over a resource or territory. Contained within the dominant narrative of 
desertification is the idea that local peoples‘ land-use practices are to blame, this is used 
to justify land privatisation, thereby allowing other agencies and the state to extend their 
control and power over the area (Bassett and Zueli 2003). Alternative narratives or 
voices are not really heard because they do not conform to the ―discursive frameworks 
and simplifying narratives of donor agencies‖, which circulate in the networks of power 
and because ―they do not have the requisite institutional authority and thus the ability to 
attract funds that will empower government ministries‖ (Bassett and Zueli 2003: 132; 
133). In this way the concerns of less powerful actors can become obfuscated.  
Narratives can persist despite evidence to the contrary. Swift (1996) has traced the 
history of the concept and dominant narrative of desertification to illustrate the 
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‗stickiness‘ of ideas and how this has implications for policy. The dominant narrative of 
desertification emerged in a situation of scientific uncertainty and has endured over time 
despite evidence challenging its various assumptions or premises (Swift 1996). Experts 
play an important role in the development of narratives and in transferring ideas about 
the environment which originate in one locale to other locales (Swift 1996). The 
received wisdom on desertification stems from the work of British and French scientists 
in Saharan Africa in the 1930s and 1940s: the leading British scientist, Stebbing, had 
previously worked for the Indian Forest Service (Swift 1996). Ideas generated at this 
time have subsequently been exported to geographies as diverse as South-west Asia and 
South America through mechanisms such as international conferences and donor 
programs (Swift 1996). Swift (1996) argues that the dominant narrative has endured 
because it meets a need and provides a ―convenient point of convergence for the 
interests of three main constituencies‖ of government, donors including the UN, and 
some groups of scientists (86). There are winners and losers in narratives, in terms of 
narratives favouring some groups and their interests over others: for example, the 
dominant desertification narrative confers legitimacy on certain actors designating them 
as the ones with the capacity and knowledge to make decisions (Swift 1996).  
Leach and Mearns (1996) argue that the answers to why narratives are persistent can 
be found in ―the broader historical, political, and institutional context for science and 
policy‖ (4). Narratives can become institutionalised over time due to certain dynamics, 
which see them being reproduced (Leach and Mearns 1996). This can be seen in 
government documents which conform to dominant narratives and in the documents of 
NGOs and other actors dependent on external donors for funding, who reproduce the 
narratives as a way to align themselves with donor agendas in order to access funds 
(Bassett and Zueli 2003; Leach and Mearns 1996). Donors also spread environmental 
narratives through capacity building, institution building and attaching environmental 
criteria to funding; whilst experts and consultations help to reproduce narratives in 
different locales through their work (Leach and Mearns 1996). As such, narratives are 
produced and institutionalised by a wide range of interacting factors, including: political 
and institutional contexts, science, epistemic communities, and the intended and 
unintended actions of a wide range of actors operating over various scales.             
Narratives are embedded in the wider global environmental and development 
discourse. A number of narratives, such as desertification, have become enforced 
through international conventions and donor funding, and these ―conventions, supported 
by meta-narratives legitimised by a western analytical science, act to constrain certain 
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development activities‖ (Stott and Sullivan 2000: 8). A range of concepts have also 
emerged from the global environmental discourse, including sustainability, biodiversity 
and desertification, which have ―assumed something of a totemic significance in 
international donor and policy discourse‖ and help to shape development processes and 
opportunities (Stott and Sullivan 2000: 3). As will be shown in Chapter Four changes in 
the global water discourse have implications at the regional and national level.  
Narratives are displaced by counter-narratives, not by counter-evidence. One of the 
most famous development narratives is the Tragedy of the Commons (Roe 1991). This 
narrative argues population growth leads to the over-exploitation of common resources 
(Hardin 1968). The solution is for the state to restrict and control access to common 
resources through a variety of mechanisms (Hardin 1968). Despite negative evidence to 
the contrary this narrative has persisted because it stabilises and underwrites the 
assumptions necessary for decision-making (Roe 1991). Contrary evidence is 
troublesome as it generates uncertainty and can undermine the assumptions of decision-
making, leaving decision-makers without the means to make the transition from the 
discredited narrative to whatever is to replace it (Roe 1991: 290). However, narratives 
are not static: there is continual tension, as will be shown in Chapter Seven.  
Science and politics are intertwined and help to construct narratives. Alatout (2008) 
has demonstrated how the dominant narrative of Israeli water scarcity replaced an 
earlier narrative of water abundance. Prior to the 1950s a narrative of abundance existed 
that was displaced by that of scarcity through a process of contestation (Alatout 2008). 
Alatout (2008) examines the actors, circumstances and effects involved in this 
displacement of the narrative of abundance. The construction and stabilisation of the 
scarcity narrative had a number of technical and political effects on the Israeli style of 
government and on water resources and their management (Alatout 2008). The shift to 
water scarcity is often seen as a result of better science, in terms of theories, methods, 
and equipments, however, water scarcity was produced in a technopolitical process and 
is a ―technopolitical achievement, a negotiated framework that was settled not only in 
the field of science, but also in politics‖ (Alatout 2008: 965). Scarcity emerged out of a 
struggle between water experts and institutions with different visions about water 
availability, different theoretical frameworks, different mandates, and different political 
affiliations, as well as scientific and technical arguments (Alatout 2008). The ways in 
which science and politics are intertwined in the Mekong‘s hydropower debate are 
considered in Chapter Seven. 
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Narratives and discursive practices such as representation can have technologisation 
and depoliticisation effects. Edkins (1999; 2008) argues that responses to famines 
exhibit processes of technologisation. Governments and aid agencies external to the 
crisis area ―do not take account of the political processes that are under way, of which 
the crisis is a symptom…[but] rely on interventions derived from an abstract, technical 
analysis of the situation, one that looks for ―causes‖, not political reasons or 
motivations‖ (Edkins 1999: 10). Famines are framed as technical problems and are 
represented as failures of development and modernisation that can be overcome by more 
development and more advanced technology (Edkins 2008). Both the problem of 
famine and its solutions are framed within the same discourse: famines are natural 
disasters with scientific causes and linked to narratives of scarcity that emphasise a 
separation between man and nature where the maintenance of life depends on a battle 
with nature for limited resources and allows the growth of human populations to be 
contrasted with the increase in their ‗natural‘ means of subsistence (Edkins 2008).  
Famines are framed and analysed in terms of population growth, crop yields, 
population movements, difficulties in the agricultural system, and technical solutions 
which can rectify these problems are advanced based on modernity‘s professed ability 
to identify and resolve problems through abstract analysis and the formation of general 
principles (Edkins 2008). However, such solutions ―are inevitably inadequate to the 
problem, which is not a technical one but one that accompanies specific forms of social 
and political organization or the emergence of new arrangements‖ (Edkins 2008: xvi). 
As such technical solutions ―merely reinstate and reproduce one of the precise forms of 
politics- modern politics- that produce famine in the first place‖ (Edkins 2008: xvi). 
Challenges or criticism of humanitarian aid relief efforts, policies and agencies does not 
prevent further technologisation as debates about humanitarianism are self-reinforcing 
(Edkins 2008). Humanitarianism is located within discourses of modernity and to 
question the effectiveness of humanitarian interventions is to participate in this 
discourse as such questions have to be located within the same framework (Edkins 
2008). As such the power of discursive practices ―is that the entities they bring into 
being seem to be products of nature rather than discourse- and hence beyond question‖ 
(Edkins 2008: xvii-xviii). This is evident in current development debates in the lower 
Mekong. Participants at official national and regional consultations and meetings I 
participated in as part of the fieldwork research for this thesis largely framed their 
questions in terms of the impacts of hydropower projects, rather than whether 
hydropower development was needed. National development was also framed as a 
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technical problem, which has a technical solution. This technologises and depoliticises 
development, and thereby removes questions of power (see Chapter Seven  
Visual representations are also extremely important and post-structural IR 
theorists such as Weber (2006) and Campbell (2007) have explored questions such as: 
what do images do, how do they function and the impact of their operation, as well as 
questions of identity and how representations construct the self and the other. Weber 
(2006) examines US cinema as an important site of the debate about what it meant to be 
a moral America and American identity, which took place in the immediate aftermath of 
9/11. Post-9/11 cinema offered a number of different possibilities for US identity, and 
illustrates how US-ness was being constructed at the intersections of cinema, foreign 
policy and national trauma (Weber 2006). Theatres of culture are political as the 
administration engaged with or ignored films depending on whether they supported the 
administration‘s foreign policy decisions or not (Weber 2006). Campbell (2007) has 
illustrated how visual representations produce, reinforce and maintain oppositions such 
as self/other, civilised/barbaric, developed/undeveloped, and North/South: as such 
visual representations do not simply reflect geopolitics, but are themselves geopolitical. 
Contemporary visual representations of Africa through reportage on the Darfur conflict 
―reduces the plurality and hybridity of…[Africa]…and its people to a single entity 
marked by an iconography of despair, disaster and disease‖ (Campbell 2007: 359). This 
helps to render places as objects of colonialism, imperialism, military intervention and 
humanitarianism (Campbell 2007). Practices of representation are extremely important 
in enabling and justifying interventions in the geography of others, as will be 
demonstrated throughout this thesis.    
 
6. Development   
 
 Actors in the lower Mekong‘s hydropolitical constellation promote and contest 
different development visions, which are used to legitimise or challenge particular 
development interventions. Subsequently, this thesis is interested in development as 
something that actors ‗do‘: in development as a social entity (Ferguson 1994a). 
Arguments for and against hydropower development in the Mekong are located in 
different development visions, different development institutions and actors, narratives 
and over different scalar levels. 
Ferguson (1994a) argues that development is a central organising concept and as 
such ―presupposes a central, unquestioned value, with respect to which the different 
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legitimate positions may be arrayed, and in terms of which, different worldviews may 
be articulated‖ (xiii). Escobar (2007) locates different positions and camps of literature 
within the three main moments in the field of development studies. The first two 
moments were modernisation theory, which focused on the beneficial effects of capital, 
science and technology; and dependency theory, which argued that the roots of 
underdevelopment were located in the connection between external dependency and 
internal exploitation, not in an alleged lack of capital, technology or Western values 
(Escobar 2007). The third moment is critical approaches to development as a cultural 
discourse, which emerged in the second half of the 1980s and questioned the very idea 
of development (Escobar 2007). These three moments have different theoretical roots: 
liberal, Marxist, and poststructuralist (Escobar 2007). Poststructuralist critiques of 
development, such as Ferguson (1994a), Rist (2002) and Escobar (1995) are particularly 
pertinent to this thesis because they focus on discourse and power. 
Poststructuralist critiques illustrate the ways in which ―development is a 
discourse of Western origin that has operated as a powerful mechanism for the cultural, 
social, and economic production of the Third World‖ (Escobar 2007:18-19). As such, 
poststructuralist critiques do not propose another version of ‗development‘ but question 
―why, through what historical processes, and with what consequences did Asia, Africa 
and Latin America come to be ―invented‖ as ―the Third World‖ through discourses and 
practices of development?‖ Escobar 2007: 19). Escobar (1995) locates ‗development‘ as 
the result of a specific historical conjuncture at the end of the Second World War. The 
particular history and culture within which ‗development‘ was constructed includes:  
decolonisation, the start of the Cold War and the establishment of the Bretton Woods 
financial and trading regime (which was designed to permit national governments to 
manage their economies so as to maximise growth and employment) (Rist 2002; Leys 
1996).  
Both Rist (2002) and Escobar (1995) identify ‗Point Four‘ of US President 
Truman‘s Inaugural Address in January 1949 as initiating the ‗development era‘. This 
address labelled over half the world as underdeveloped, argued that developed societies 
should help undeveloped ones to develop, and identified key tools for development 
(capital, technology, science, natural resources, industrialisation and increased 
production) (Truman [1949] 1964). As such it ushered in a new way of conceptualising 
world relations and a new way of thinking about people, constituting the Third World 
and its peoples in a particular way. Rist (2002) argues that Truman‘s ‗Point Four‘ 
should be seen as the opening act of a new era because it is a form of discourse which 
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expresses more accurately than others a reality in the making, and because it illustrates 
that ―power does not necessarily involve changing reality , but, rather, inserting it into a 
different problematic‖ (78). The ‗developed‘ and ‗underdeveloped‘ dichotomy altered 
the way North-South relations were conceptualised/organised, and replaced earlier 
organisations based on coloniser/colonised (Rist 2002).  
‗Development‘ in this context had a transitive meaning: an act performed by one 
agent on another with the possibility of bringing about change (Rist 2002). The term 
‗underdeveloped‘ placed developed and underdeveloped states in a relationship 
whereby the latter were not the opposite of the former, but rather an embryonic form: 
therefore, the acceleration of growth was the only way to bridge the gap between the 
two (Rist 2002). ‗Development‘ theories and practices emerged in response to this new 
problematique with the goal of transforming ‗traditional/undeveloped‘ states into 
‗modern/developed‘ ones. ‗Modern‘ states were generally taken as Western, industrial 
states, and theories such as modernisation theory outlined stages of growth which would 
lead to ‗traditional‘ (i.e. low in productivity and unindustrialised) states becoming 
‗modern‘ (i.e. high in productivity and industrialised) (Rist 2002). Growth, and by 
extension ‗development‘, were measured by the indicator of Gross National Product 
(GNP), a new economic instrument developed in the 1940s. GNP was favoured by the 
US as national statistics had an aura of objectivity that offered an acceptable basis for 
comparison (Rist 2002). The use of economic indicators to measure growth and 
‗development‘ has continued. For example, the World Bank classifies and rank states 
according to measure Gross National Income (GNI) (World Bank 2010). According to 
this measurement states with a high GNI are developed and states with a low GNI are 
less developed.            
Escobar (1995) argues that reality has been colonised by the development 
discourse: it has become a dominant representation which shapes the ways in which 
reality is imagined and acted upon, and results in ―concrete practices of thinking and 
acting through which the Third World is produced‖ (Escobar 1995: 11). Development is 
a historically produced discourse ―that has created an extremely efficient apparatus for 
producing knowledge about, and the exercise of power over, the Third World‖ (Escobar 
1995: 9). Since 1945 the development apparatus has continued to produce ―new 
arrangements of knowledge and power, new practices, theories, strategies‖ etc. which 
have ―successfully deployed a regime of government over the Third World, a ―space for 
‗subject peoples‖ that ensures certain control over it‖ (Escobar 1995: 9).     
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The development discourse conceptualises the Third World as existing ‗out 
there‘, as something that can be acted upon, and universalises and homogenises Third 
World peoples and cultures in an ahistorical manner (Escobar 1995). The Third World 
and its peoples are constructed as poor, powerless, ignorant, and lacking in agency 
(Escobar 1995). As such, they can be acted upon by ‗development‘ and the West. 
Consequently, the same problems and solutions are perceived, regardless of whether 
‗development‘ is being pursued in Africa, Asia or Latin America. Ferguson‘s (1994) 
study of the Thaba-Tseka rural development project is a study about the operation of the 
international ‗development‘ apparatus in a particular setting, Lesotho. However, he 
argues that throughout the Third World ―one seems to find closely analogous or even 
identical ‗development‘ institutions, and along with them often a common discourse and 
the same way of defining ‗problems‘, a common pool of ‗experts‘ and a common stock 
of expertise‖ (8).    
The development discourse has been deployed through the professionalization of 
development knowledge, and the institutionalisation of development practices as these 
two mechanisms ―made it possible to systematically link knowledge and practice 
through particular projects and interventions‖ (Escobar 2007: 20). The dominance of 
expert knowledge and practices has excluded the knowledges, voices and concerns of 
the people ‗development‘ is meant to serve (Escobar 2007). The development apparatus 
includes international conferences such as the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development in 1992; national agencies such as the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID); international agencies such as the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP); multilateral development banks such as 
the World Bank, as well as a wide range of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
(Rist 2002). These institutions all employ a wide range of experts and produce certain 
forms of knowledge on the Third World and development, as well as engaging in a wide 
range of development practices, designing and implementing strategies, programmes 
and projects.   
‗Development‘ has entailed large-scale, systemic interventions in Third World 
societies. Contained within critical approaches to development are the ideas that 
development has largely failed and has been harmful to the Third World (Ziai 2007). 
However, practitioners and politicians never decide to ‗do away‘ with ‗development‘. 
Ferguson (1994a) argues that despite the continual failure of rural development projects 
in Lesotho there is always an actor ready to try again with a different project. Instead of 
questioning ‗development‘ itself, the focus is on how to ‗do‘ development better: failure 
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is the result of ‗bad‘ development projects according to development agencies and 
actors, and this can be rectified with ‗good‘ development projects (Ferguson 1994a). 
Escobar (1995) argues that this is because development has achieved such a certainty in 
the social imaginary that it seems impossible to conceptualise social reality in any other 
way (5).   
 Ferguson‘s (1994a) study of the ‗development‘ apparatus in Lesotho, and in 
particular the Thaba-Tseka rural development project is highly relevant to the concerns 
of this thesis because it demonstrates how the ‗development‘ apparatus constructs 
Lesotho in particular ways in order to justify the intervention of certain actors. Similar 
processes have occurred in the lower Mekong (see Chapter Three). Ferguson (1994a) 
argues that ‗development‘ ―is a social entity in its own right: the set of ‗development‘ 
institutions, agencies, and ideologies peculiar to our own age‖ (Ferguson 1994a: 9). As 
such, it is important to examine what it is that ‗development‘ does; what happens 
because of it that would not have happened anyway; and how ideas about 
‗development‘ are generated and what are their effects (Ferguson 1994a).  
The ‗development‘ apparatus generates a particular form of discourse about 
Lesotho and then organises interventions based on this structure of knowledge 
(Ferguson 1994a). In order to ‗move the money‘ ‗development‘ agencies prefer to opt 
for standardised packages: ―It thus suits the agencies to portray developing countries in 
terms that make them suitable targets for such packages‖ (Ferguson 1994b: 176). As 
such, it is not surprising that the country profiles and other documents on which 
interventions are based often bear little or no relation to economic and social realities 
(Ferguson 1994a). In the case of Lesotho, the World Bank constructed Lesotho in 
particular ways: a peasant, subsistence society, isolated from the cash economy, whose 
people respond to declines in agriculture by acting as migrant labour in South Africa 
(Ferguson 1994a). This representation of Lesotho obscures certain economic and social 
realities, including the long-standing economic relationship between Lesotho and South 
Africa, where Lesotho acts as a labour reserve for the South African mining industry 
(Ferguson 1994b). However, acknowledging these realities would not provide a 
convincing justification for institutions such as the World Bank to intervene in Lesotho, 
and to provide ‗development‘ packages based on agriculture and incorporation into 
markets: political and economic realities that are inaccessible to ‗development‘ planners 
are ignored (Ferguson 1994b).  
The ‗development‘ discourse on Lesotho removes politics from ‗development‘ 
(Ferguson 1994a). The country‘s economy and society are presented as lying within the 
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control of an effective, unitary, neutral government, and therefore it will be responsive 
to planners‘ blueprints: whether Gross Domestic Product (GDP) goes up or down is, 
therefore, the result of whether the government and ‗development‘ agencies correctly 
implement plans (Ferguson 1994a). This presents development as a technical, neutral 
and managerial process. ‗Development‘ plans and analyses exclude issues such as the 
political nature of the state, no mention is made of political parties, the state is 
represented as having no interest other than ‗development‘, and there is no mention of 
uncomfortable issues such as corruption, or the political role played by ‗development‘ 
agencies; the ‗people‘ are also treated as an undifferentiated mass upon which the 
‗development‘ process works (Ferguson 1994b). This is not exclusive to Lesotho. As 
will be demonstrated in this thesis ‗development‘ plans for the Mekong display a similar 
kind of apolitical nature.  
Most importantly for the concerns of this thesis, Ferguson (1994a) illustrates 
how the ‗development‘ apparatus is an anti-politics machine, depoliticising everything it 
touches. The majority of ‗development‘ projects in Lesotho have failed. However, 
whilst interventions fail on their own terms, they do have regular side effects, including 
the expansion and entrenchment of state power (Ferguson 1994a). Consequently, it is 
important to go beyond simply looking at actors‘ interests in order to consider how ―the 
outcomes of planned social interventions can end up coming together into powerful 
constellations of control that were never intended and in some cases never even 
recognized‖ (Ferguson 1994a: 19). Planned interventions ―may produce unintended 
outcomes that end up…incorporated into anonymous constellations of control‖ 
(Ferguson 1994a: 20). In the case of Lesotho, whilst the Thaba-Tseka rural development 
project failed, it had a number of side effects that resulted in increasing bureaucratic 
state power: as such outcomes which appear as side effects become ―legible in another 
perspective as unintended yet instrumental elements in a resultant constellation that has 
the effect of expanding the exercise of a particular sort of state power while 
simultaneously exerting a powerful depoliticizing effect‖ (Ferguson 1994a: 21). The 
combination of a representation of economic and social life which denies politics, and 
the regular side effects of ‗development‘ project comprises the anti-politics machine 
(Ferguson 1994a). Politics is denied as the ‗development‘ apparatus in Lesotho 
depoliticizes everything it touches, whisks political realities out of sight whilst 
―performing, almost unnoticed, its own pre-eminently political operation of expanding 
bureaucratic state power‖ (Ferguson 1994a: xv). The depoliticisation effects of the 
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‗development‘ apparatus are extremely important in the case of hydropower 
development of the Mekong (see Chapter Seven).   
Poststructuralist critiques of development led some theorists to suggest the idea of 
post-development, not as a historical period, but as the possibility of creating different 
discourses and representations that were not so mediated by the construct of 
development: development would no longer be the central organising principle of social 
life (Escobar 2007). Post-development argues that reality can be defined in terms other 
than those of development, and subsequently, people/social groups can act differently 
on the basis of those different definitions (Escobar 2007: 21). Post-development thought 
seeks to multiply the centres and agents of knowledge production and in particular ―give 
salience to the forms of knowledge produced by those who are supposed to be the 
‗objects‘ of development so that they can become subjects of their own right‖ (Escobar 
2007: 21). This is achieved by focusing on adaptions, subversions and resistance local 
people effect in relation to development projects, and by highlighting the alternative 
strategies produced by social movements as they encounter development projects 
(Escobar 2007: 21). Post-development argues that the traditional concept of 
development is Eurocentric (European or Western society is seen as the ideal norm, 
with the Third World being an imperfect deviation), and that it has authoritarian or 
technocratic implications, which have harmed and disempowered Third World peoples 
(Ziai 2007). As such, Nakano (2007) argues that post-development problematizes the 
foundational myth of international development as the heritage of Western civilisation, 
and proposes the institution of new social orders in which excluded existences can enjoy 
their autonomy: within this is the central concern of how a new social order can be 
grounded in a possibility that is absent in the imaginary of development (64).  
Critiques of development and work within post-development seek to imagine or 
provide spaces for alternatives. Prior to poststructuralist critiques of development, 
criticism of/opposition to ‗development‘, or the articulation of alternative approaches 
were all formulated within the limits of the development discourse (Ferguson 1994a; 
Escobar 2007). Post-colonial and critical IR scholars, such as Nandy (1983), 
Chakrabarty (2000), and Inayatullah and Blaney (2004) argue that in order to move 
beyond or transcend these categories it is necessary to render them ‗exotic‘ or 
‗provincial‘, exposing their historical and cultural roots, as well as their links to specific 
social practices and thereby denaturalise them and destabilise their universalist claims.  
Critical IR and post-colonial scholars have demonstrated how Western categories, 
concepts and representations of the Third World have come to be seen as universal and 
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have particular effects. Chakrabarty (2000) argues that it is impossible to think of 
political modernity without certain categories and concepts (the state, civil society, 
scientific rationality etc.) whose genealogies lie in the intellectual and theological 
traditions of Europe (4). These concepts are largely treated by social scientists as though 
they have transcended their European origins (Chakrabarty 2000). Consequently, it is 
important to trace their European genealogies, provincialising concepts and categories 
in order to provide space for alternative normative and theoretical thought enshrined in 
other existing life practices and their archives (Chakrabarty 2000). Inayatullah and 
Blaney (2004) argue that IR itself needs to be provincialised to reveal how its spatial 
and temporal demarcations came to be seen as self-evident. IR is itself part of the legacy 
of colonialism: the origins of the political imaginary which informs contemporary IR lie 
in the late medieval to early modern period of European history and its experience of 
the problem of difference (Inayatullah and Blaney 2004). As such, in its conventional 
neo-liberal/neo-realist approaches IR is unable to speak about the situation of the Third 
World, culture, difference, or confront colonialism/post-colonialism and needs to be re-
imagined as the study of difference (Inayatullah and Blaney 2004).    
Categories and the hierarchies within them were extremely important in British 
colonialism in India, which was organised discursively (Nandy 1983). Hierarchies in the 
categories of age and gender were mapped onto the British and Indian selves, such that 
British selves were masculine and mature while the Indian other was effeminate, 
infantile, or old: subsequently, the British self was conceptualised as superior to the 
Indian other within the British worldview (Nandy 1983). Nandy (1983) does not talk of 
post-colonialism, instead he argues that there is a second colonialism, which has 
survived the demise of Empires and is independent of its roots. This modern 
colonialism has generalised the concept of the modern West from a geographical and 
spatial category to a psychological one: the ―West is now everywhere, within the West 
and outside; in structures and minds‖ (xii). Westernization produces not only models of 
conformity, but models of dissent: when in opposition there are ways to be anti-colonial 
that are considered ‗proper‘, ‗sane‘ and ‗rational‘, such that even when in opposition, 
dissent remains predictable and controlled (Nandy 1983).  
By tracing the origins of concepts, categories, modes of thought and academic 
approaches space is created for debate and other claims and voices become visible. 
Blaney and Inayatullah‘s (2010) critical work on International Political Economy (IPE) 
and its origins destabilises the assumption that capitalism is the solution to poverty and 
backwardness. They argue that IPE‘s roots lie within European classical political 
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economy and its thinkers, who were influenced by and contributed to a European 
understanding of time and history that was universal and conceptualised others 
elsewhere as temporally prior and backward (Blaney and Inayatullah 2010). Capitalism 
and modernity are presented by these thinkers as the solution to this backwardness, 
however, Blaney and Inayatullah (2010) argue that capitalism has left wounds in 
modern society, and this raises the possibility that poverty may be intrinsic to capitalist 
development. If this is the case then poverty cannot be merely ascribed to a pre-modern 
or non-modern age untouched by modern abundance, and modern capitalist societies 
―are forced to account for poverty not as an archaic characteristic of an external other, 
but as internal to the contemporary self‖ (Blaney and Inayatullah 2010: 3). Recognising 
that modern capitalism may not be the ―exclusive and final solution to the human 
condition‖ admits the possibility that other forms of life may have valuable insights, and 
as such opens spaces where even the dominant may recognise that alternative modes of 
living have a claim on life (Blaney and Inayatullah 2010: 3).    
The work of post-colonial and critical IR scholars, as well as the aim of post-
development to liberate the discursive field, are important to the concerns of this thesis 
because they illustrate how debates about ‗development‘ are constrained by the 
dominant discourse, and the categories and concepts which support it and purport to be 
universal. As will be shown through the following chapters representations and 
narratives have their origins within particular discourses and institutional and political 
contexts. The development discourse in the lower Mekong frames debates in particular 
ways and in order to participate civil society actors have to frame their opposition 
within the terms of this discourse.  Ideas of modernity, capitalism, and progress frame 
the development agenda of dominant actors in the lower Mekong and justify particular 
types of development interventions. By opening up the category of development, this 
thesis provides space for alternative representations.  
 
6.1. Water resources development  
 
The exploitation of nature has been identified as one of the means to develop 
‗modern‘ states (Rist 2002). The development of water resources through irrigation and 
infrastructure has a long history. Specific concepts and ideas about water development 
have had enormous influence in a wide range of basins in diverse geographic settings. 
These concepts, which always originate from somewhere, are often presented as best-
practice, neutral and transferable, and are related to a wider global water discourse, 
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which has real effects on the ground. It is hard to separate these different levels as they 
are entwined and affect each other. Trottier (2003b) argues that ‗water development‘ is 
a hegemonic concept and includes assumptions that freshwater is abundant but needs to 
be redistributed so that it is in the right place at the right time. In terms of hegemonic 
concepts, or dominant narratives it is important to consider questions of where the 
concept and its assumptions originated from and which actors are promoting or 
benefiting from it (Trottier 2003b). This challenges the supposed neutral nature of water 
resources development. 
State-led water development increased during the twentieth century and has 
incorporated a number of ideas including controlling nature, modernisation, 
infrastructure development, and progress (Wester et al. 2009; Swyngedouw 1999). 
Science and technology were conceptualised as tools to master nature and marshal it for 
man‘s purposes. A conception of nature as an enemy to be subdued or mastered by man 
has been operationalised in geographies as the USA, China and Brazil (Molle 2008b; 
2009). State-led water development has emerged as a sometimes intentional political 
strategy for controlling people, space, and water (Wester et al. 2009). The hydraulic 
mission has its roots in utopian ideas of the 19
th
 century and usually involves state-
dominated large-scale infrastructure development (Molle 2009). Contained within this 
are the ideas that nature can be controlled and water resources harnessed for economic 
development. Allan (2003) locates the hydraulic mission in water management 
paradigms associated with industrial modernity, arguing that the global South is deeply 
committed to the hydraulic mission in order to make up economic development ground. 
A zero-sum conception of economic development that ―views farming, fishing and 
other traditional livelihoods as incompatible with industrialization and urbanization‖ is 
related to this ‗man over nature‘ mentality (Cronin and Hamlin 2010: 14). These 
dynamics are found in the lower Mekong and are explored in Chapter Three.   
 The hydraulic mission is not a neutral project: it serves political and social 
purposes. Swyngedouw‘s (1999) work on Spain has illustrated how water engineering 
and politics played a central role in Spain‘s modernisation process. The hydraulic 
mission emerged at the turn of the nineteenth century as a response to the loss of 
Spain‘s empire, a mounting economic crisis, and internal tensions due to a growing 
bourgeois in the North, and an antiquated feudal system in the South: Spanish elites 
needed a way to regenerate the nation‘s social and economic base (Swyngedouw 1999). 
Regeneration would launch Spain on the path of modernisation, allow it to ‗catch-up‘ to 
its European rivals, and provide a way to contain and work through internal tensions 
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without a revolutionary transformation in the system of power (Swyngedouw 1999). As 
such, the hydraulic mission was a discursive vehicle around which unlikely groups and 
partners coalesced (including previously excluded social groups). It included ideas that 
nature needed to be reworked as soil was poor and water was being lost to the sea: the 
solution was water infrastructure development, including dams and irrigation channels, 
undertaken by the central public authorities (Swyngedouw 1999). Consequently, 
Spain‘s hydraulic mission involved ‗scaling-up‘ water resources development to the 
national scale (Swyngedouw 1999).   
Water infrastructure and engineering are important components of the hydraulic 
mission. Dams are political and value laden: a shifting and contingent discourse of dam 
building has led to them being associated with modernity and development (Baghel and 
Nusser 2010). The era of large dam-building began in the inter-war period, with the 
formation of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) acting as a turning point in the 
history of large dams (Baghel and Nusser 2010). The TVA model of large-scale river 
planning, involved regulating the entire river basin through a series of multipurpose 
dams for agricultural and industrial benefits (Baghel and Nusser 2010). Established in 
1933 the TVA drew on assumptions about river development and progress that had their 
origins in the 19
th
 century, and was exported as a model to places such as Mexico, India 
and the lower Mekong, where it influenced river basin planning (Molle 2009). The 
move from individual dams to river basin planning is by no means intuitive and 
illustrates the contingent and socio-political nature of dams (Baghel and Nusser 2010). 
Whilst water resources development paradigms are represented as technical, neutral and 
scientific they are conditioned by social and political processes.  
Dams can be analysed as nodes in the intersection of flows of capital, ideologies, 
politics, technologies, knowledge and water (Baghel and Nusser 2010). Advocates and 
opponents of large dams form coalitions in order to strengthen their position and 
influence in the planning and implementation phases: these positions are derived ―not 
only from their political and economic interests, but also from the symbolic and cultural 
aspects of both rivers and dams‖ (Baghel and Nusser 2010: 234). Within water 
resources development generally project planning can and tends to ―acquire a life of its 
own, overriding criteria of hydrologic or economic relevance‖ (Molle 2008b: 217-218). 
A convergence of interests of all influential actors is the most obvious driver of water 
resources development, and five actor types are particularly important: the state, state 
line agencies, local politicians, private construction companies and development banks 
(Molle 2008b). These actors all have different interests in particular projects but 
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together they form powerful coalitions that are rarely challenged or defeated (Molle 
2008b).  
Garb (2004) argues that creating a sense of inevitability is a key dimension of any 
large infrastructure project. This has four discursive-political dimensions: one, shaping 
and proliferating a problem definition that points to the proposed project as the solution; 
two, rewriting and telling the project‘s history as the timely unfolding and gathering 
momentum of a long-established plan; three, limiting debate to issues contained within 
the project; and four, attempts to blur the boundaries between past, present and future 
by presenting a project that is still under consideration as an accomplished fact (Garb 
2004). These create a sense of inevitability by narrowing the space of possibilities 
towards a single outcome (Garb 2004). Creating inevitability has been extremely 
important in the development banks promotion of the NT2 project in Southern Lao 
PDR, considered in Chapter Six of this thesis.   
Within state-led water resources development there has been a large focus on 
engineering and technical solutions. The range of choice concept, developed within the 
pragmatic tradition of water resources geography, is extremely relevant to the concerns 
of this thesis as it illuminates how practitioners and policy-makers can perceive a 
limited range of water resources management options that helps to perpetuate a reliance 
on technological solutions (e.g. Wescoat 1987; Platt 1986; Mustafa 2005). This concept 
emerged from the work of Gilbert White, who extremely influential in the work of the 
Mekong Committee
1
. White (1945) argued for a new approach to flood hazards: as 
opposed to focusing solely on structural responses (e.g. levees and dams) a new 
approach which ―considers all possible alternatives for reducing or preventing flood 
losses‖ was needed (34). The range of choice was described by White as one of six key 
elements in water resources decision-making, with unwise decisions often resulting 
from misperception or unawareness of potential alternatives (Wescoat 1987). The 
theoretical range of choice is ―the number of adjustments and uses that have been 
practiced in any similar environment, plus a possible innovation‖ (White 1961: 26).  
However, in practice the theoretical range of choice is never available to managers 
and decision-makers (White 1961). The range of choice is ―always influenced by 
practical judgements about feasibility in various contexts, about the knowledge that is 
                                                             
1 The 1962 report ‗Economic and Social Aspects of Lower Mekong Development‘ argued that 
mainstream dams should only be built when lessons about the economic and social aspects of basin 
development had been learnt from tributary projects (White et al. 1962). This report broadened the scope 
of the Mekong Committee beyond purely technical and engineering aspects and delayed construction of 
mainstream projects: plans for the big dams on the Mekong were voluntarily put on hold to gain 
experience from tributary development (Jacobs 1995). 
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relevant to any given problem, and about the relationships between awareness and 
technical assessment‖ (Wescoat 1987: 45). These constraints, and others such as, 
professional training and competence, limits to organisational authority, and difficulties 
in undertaking truly comprehensive analysis because of the many sectors that effective 
water management encompasses ―impede the balanced formation of all potential 
solutions and options‖ (White 1998: 25).  
Perception is extremely important in the range of choice. Theoretically the range of 
choice is limitless, however, in practice only a particular number of choices or solutions 
are perceived to be practical. Different actors perceive a different range of choice. 
Mustafa‘s (2005) analysis of the Lai Nullah hazardscape in Pakistan reveals that local 
community flood victims perceive a greater range of choice in dealing with floods than 
policy-makers do. Factors which limited the practical range of choice in the Lai Nullah 
include: poor scientific understanding; the power/knowledge dynamic between policy 
and popular epistemologies which prevents development of a more democratic 
hazardscape view; and the lack of popular input into flood management; and, the 
modernist technocratic engagement of state agents with the Lai Nullah hazardscape 
(Mustafa 2005). Mustafa (2005) argues that the practical range of choice could be 
expanded if policy discourse drew on the lived experience of the Lai Nullah 
hazardscape as well as modern engineering knowledge.  
Wescoat (1987; 1992) argues that scientific inquiry and democratic debate can 
expand the practical range of choice. However, this involves navigating a wide range of 
issues. Platt (1986) provides an overview of flood control and protection in the US 
which examines national policy from the 1930s to the 1980s. During this period flood 
protection and management expanded from purely structural responses (engineering 
solutions), to include non-structural responses (e.g. insurance, floodplain management, 
and relocation) in a policy shift from flood control to floodplain management (Platt 
1986). The implementation of non-structural responses involves a wide range of 
political, organisational, economic, and cultural issues including the role of 
communities, formulation of regulation, coordination between different agencies and 
actors (Platt 1986). However, structural responses continue to be authorised in the US as 
part of a unified national approach, and in other basins, such as the Indus, where policy 
makers stress engineering solutions (Platt 1986; Mustafa 2005). This illustrates how 
technological solutions have an enduring appeal. Examining the range of choice in a 
basin, and how actors perceive a different range of choice can reveal why certain actors, 
such as state officials, are strong proponents of technological solutions. This is 
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particularly pertinent in the lower Mekong where hydropower dams dominate as the 
proposed solution to the problem of national development, despite a range of other 
possible options (including eco-tourism), and wide-spread opposition to mainstream 
dams.   
  
7. Conclusion 
 
Conventional IR approaches to hydropolitics are unable to capture the complexity of 
the lower Mekong‘s hydropolitical constellation as they focus on the transboundary 
scale in isolation from its wider context and conceptualise states as unified actors. In 
order to integrate narratives and multiple actors into approaches to hydropolitics 
political ecology combined with insights from critical IR approaches will be used. 
These approaches complement each other. There are three key dimensions or pillars of 
hydropolitical constellations: actors, scale, and discourse. Political ecology with its 
sensitivity to scale and place and non-place based actors, as well a focus of tracing the 
genealogy of environmental narratives offers the theoretical tools to analyse these three 
pillars. Critical IR approaches, which have examined representational practices and how 
they frame international relations, as well as ways in which subjects and objects are 
constituted in discourse allows the analysis of how the lower Mekong‘s hydropolitical 
constellation and its international relations are represented, framed, and constituted.     
Critical work on development discourse, as well as work on environmental 
narratives, and how policy making involves the framing of problems in particular ways 
provide extremely important tools for analysing hydropolitical constellations. 
Development policy seeks to shape and change the world. Narratives play an important 
role in policy-making as they offer stabilising assumptions for policy-makers and shape 
problems into the type that the state can provide solutions for. Discourse coalitions form 
around particular narratives and storylines, which maintain or contest the dominant 
narrative. Actors also utilise narratives to extend or maintain their access to natural 
resources, representing themselves and others in particular ways. Development 
narratives are persistent because of the role they play in policy-making and in providing 
solutions to problems. However, there is continual tension as less powerful actors seek 
to destabilise dominant narratives.   
Analysing discursive formations illustrates how development discourse, narratives, 
and representations depoliticise development interventions, strategies and debates by 
framing them as technical, scientific processes which disguise their inherently political 
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nature. The ways in which development is scaled by powerful actors also depoliticises 
development as it obscures the impacts of development for actors situated at alternative 
scales of analysis. Constructing a sense of inevitability around water resources projects 
also seeks to depoliticise development as it shapes the problem definition in ways that 
point towards the proposed project as the solution, obscuring impacts and the concerns 
of actors at different scales. Water resources development interventions are justified by 
narratives and involve the convergence of interests of a set of actors. However, they also 
have unintended consequences as they are embedded in and constructed in particular 
geographic locales.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
79 
 
Chapter Three: The lower Mekong, hydropower development and 
socio-economic development: the formation and endurance of a 
development narrative 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The lower Mekong‘s dominant regional discursive formation centres on an 
enduring narrative linking hydropower development of the Mekong River and socio-
economic development. Conforming to Roe‘s (1991) definition it argues that: 
- The people of the Mekong are poor; 
- The potential of the Mekong River for development is huge; 
- Developing the Mekong River will lead to socio-economic development. 
This narrative emerged in the 1950s as the result of a convergence of interest between 
the geopolitical concerns of the US, contemporary water management paradigms, which 
focused on exploitation and domination of nature, and the role of outside experts and 
agencies such as ECAFE. This narrative permeates technical and scientific studies and 
plans for the development of the hydropower potential of the Mekong. Peet and Watts 
(1996) argue that regional discursive formations at times appear to disappear only to 
return with greater intensity in new guises. As social and environmental impacts of 
hydropower projects gained more salience at the international level, the Mekong‘s 
dominant regional discursive formation appeared to disappear. However, it returned 
with greater intensity after 2006 as plans for mainstream hydropower dams were 
resurrected by state actors. The problem, poverty, and the solution, hydropower have 
remained constant. But, a new dimension has been added to the problem definition: 
there is a lack of electricity for growth and development; the solution is hydropower.     
 Underpinning this narrative is a representation of the Mekong as unutilised and 
unharnessed. Despite growing awareness of social and environmental concerns, 
including the importance of fisheries, this representation has endured to the present day. 
This representation and the development narrative it underpins both inform policy and 
decision-making at the national level, as well as the strategies of actors such as the 
Asian Development Bank. Whilst it appears technical and neutral, this dominant 
narrative and representation are highly political, scaling development at the national and 
regional level, and obscuring impacts and actors at other levels of analysis.   
 The chapter traces the evolution of this dominant narrative from the 1950s and 
places it in its geopolitical context. Early development studies of the Mekong and the 
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formation of the Mekong Committee are considered before the chapter turns to 
changing regional dynamics after 1991. New regionalisms and the role of China are 
outlined, as are changes in the Mekong cooperation and the formation of the MRC. The 
chapter then explores current development strategies of the four lower Mekong states 
and arguments surrounding increased electricity demand.  
 
2. The Mekong as an ‘object’ to be developed: hydropower and socio-economic 
development 
 
The current debate over planned and proposed hydropower development of the 
Mekong River‘s mainstream and tributaries has its roots in the 1950s and a particular 
set of ideas about development, which have endured and shaped national and regional 
policies and strategies to the present day. Since the mid-1950s a number of technical 
studies and investigations have been conducted into the development potential of the 
Mekong. These studies were largely conducted by experts from outside the region and 
funded by donors but administered or facilitated by the Mekong Committee (later the 
MRC). The Mekong was conceived of as a ‗sleeping giant…a source of tremendous 
potentialities for power production, irrigation, navigation and flood control, a source 
virtually unutilised‖ (Schaaf 1968). This representation of the Mekong River has been 
both transmitted through and informed technical and planning studies to the present day.  
Representing the Mekong as unutilised and possessing huge hydropower potential is 
one of the constituent parts of the development narrative described above. When 
combined with the premise that the people of the Mekong are poor it became apparent 
to planners and decision-makers that developing the Mekong for hydropower would 
solve the problem of poverty. Jacobs (1995) in his history of the Mekong Committee 
argues it was hoped ―that the Mekong project would lift mainland South East Asia out 
of poverty by initiating socio-economic development through hydro-power, irrigation, 
and flood control projects‖ (139). This ‗hope‘ born in the 1950s from the combination 
of experts and technical studies, as well as geopolitical dynamics has endured to the 
present day. It has become the dominant development narrative of the Mekong River, 
embodying a set of ideas about development, which are still translated into the same 
development policies and interventions as they were in the 1950s. The dominant 
development narrative has become institutionalised in state agencies and development 
institutions amongst others, and shapes the thoughts and actions of powerful actors.  
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 This dominant development narrative and representation of the Mekong 
emerged at the convergence of interests between a particular set of actors and 
development paradigms: the US, the UN, the states of the lower Mekong, and 
paradigms concerning modernity and water resources development. As will be shown in 
later sections of this chapter and throughout the thesis, this narrative still operates at the 
convergence of actors‘ interests, but the actors have diversified and relationships 
between them have changed. Conceptualising the Mekong as unutilised and a 
mechanism for socio-economic development is located at the state and basin levels of 
analysis. This ‗scales up‘ the appropriate level of intervention to that of the state and the 
basin and obscures other uses of the Mekong River such as fishing, subsistence 
agriculture and domestic uses. Within this the people of the Mekong are conceptualised 
as poor and appropriate subjects of development.     
  
2.1. The Mekong prior to 1955 
 
The Mekong River featured in a number of treaties and agreements prior to 1955 
between France and Siam (modern day Thailand), including the 1856 Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation and the 1893 Treaty for Regulating the Position 
of the Kingdom of Cambodia. Navigation was the key focus of these treaties and others 
which followed in 1926, 1937 and 1950. Amongst other aspects these treaties 
established the thalweg
2
 of the Mekong as the border between Thailand and Laos, 
which is still the border between the two today. Freedom of navigation was an 
important priority of the French colonial authority in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, as it 
initially believed that the Mekong River represented a passage into China, which would 
allow the French to access China‘s vast wealth and also provide a buffer to British 
colonial expansion through Burma (Osborne 2006b). Although navigation into China 
proved impossible, the main strategic French interest in the Mekong remained freedom 
of navigation, and the agreements signed between France, its colonial states, and 
Thailand, did not really touch upon development issues. The 1950 Pan Convention 
between France and Indochina granted the riparian countries the right to use the waters 
flowing in their territory for any purpose, including irrigation and hydropower, 
providing it did not interfere with the legitimate interests of the other countries, or 
navigation (Chi 1997). This focus on navigational uses of the Mekong mirrors the 
general phenomenon of the period: rules governing navigational uses emerged at the 
                                                             
2 The thalweg is a line drawn to join the deepest points of a river bed. 
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beginning of the nineteenth century, but non-navigational uses were largely 
unconsidered (Salman 2007). Non-navigational uses of watercourses grew in 
prominence in the late nineteenth century, becoming particularly important after the end 
of the Second World War (Salman 2007). Actors‘ interests in the Mekong River have 
followed this general trend with the river becoming an important object for 
development after 1945.   
 
2.2. Geopolitics, ECAFE and the formation of the Mekong Committee: 1955- 1970 
 
The Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) was established 
in 1947 by the UN. Its mission was to ―make or sponsor…investigations and studies of 
economic and technical problems and developments within Asia and the Far East‖ (Chi 
1997: 222). The organisation was inspired by the TVA model and dominant water 
resources development paradigms of the time congruent with the hydraulic mission. In 
1955, ECAFE produced a manual on river basin planning which stated that ―[t]he basic 
principle of a water resource policy should be to make the river an increasingly 
constructive contributor to the well-being of the people‖ (UN 1955). Involvement in the 
Mekong is the first example of the UN‘s direct involvement in international river basin 
planning and development (Jacobs 1995). Involvement in studies in the Mekong River 
offered ECAFE, a relatively new organisation with a particular water resources agenda, 
an opportunity to further its stated mission and establish itself relative to other actors.   
The threat of communism and the US strategy of containment motivated 
increased US involvement in Southeast Asia after the Second World War. The Second 
Indo-China War between North and South Vietnam (1959-1975) saw US combat troops 
being deployed to Vietnam in 1965. Prior to this the US had, amongst other things, 
provided military advisors and equipment to the anti-communist forces of South 
Vietnam. Development of the lower Mekong River Basin was one element of the US 
strategy to combat the spread of communism in the region, restrain the ambitions of 
China, and utilise the moral dimensions of US foreign policy (Chi 1997). A 1956 report 
of the US National Security Council recommended: 
 
―In order to promote increased cooperation in the area and to deny the general 
area of the Mekong River Basin to Communist influence or domination, assist as 
feasible in the development of the Mekong River Basin as a nucleus for regional 
cooperation and mutual aid‖ (quoted in Osborne 2006b: 177) 
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Hydropower development was a key part of this strategy. A 1968 cover of National 
Geographic magazine featured the Mekong as a river of hope (dams) and terror 
(communism). This conveyed the message that dams ―were seen as the hope to pull the 
region out of poverty and hence tug the remote areas out of the sway of subversive 
ideology preying on poverty and hopelessness‖ (Hirsch 2006b: 107). The strategic 
concerns of the US connected hydropower development with poverty reduction and the 
rejection of communism in a causal relationship. The US attempted to capture the 
process of studying the Mekong, begun by ECAFE in 1955, and secured agreement 
from the four states to conduct a further investigation into the Mekong basin (Chi 1997). 
This study conducted by the US Bureau of Reclamation in 1955 suggested a number of 
possible sites for hydropower, reflecting the US view that the Mekong could be 
developed along the lines of the TVA (Osborne 2006b). The US Bureau of Reclamation 
played a central role in studies in the lower Mekong until 1975 (especially with regard 
to the proposed Pa Mong dam in Thailand), and also trained engineers from the region 
(Biggs 2006).    
In 1957 ECAFE released its report Development of Water Resources in the 
Lower Mekong.
3
 This report was based on the premise that the construction of large 
dams was required in order to exploit the Mekong‘s resources: this reflected the 
consensus in both developed and developing states at the time, where dams were 
viewed as symbols of modernity and progress (Osborne 2006b). ECAFE recommended 
development of the Mekong River through multipurpose projects for flood control, 
irrigation and hydropower (UN 1957). The 1957 report also recommended an 
‗international approach‘ whereby the four states cooperated closely in data collection 
and planning because proposed projects could have transboundary effects (UN 1957). 
To this end the report recommended an institutional mechanism be devised to obtain the 
resources, both technical and financial, that would be needed to conduct the studies into 
the development of the Mekong‘s potential, and also for the projects that would be later 
developed (UN 1957). Although the US attempted to convince the four states to 
formulate their Mekong development plans under its auspices the four states choose to 
follow ECAFE‘s recommendations (this was partly for geopolitical reasons, e.g. 
Cambodia was concerned that US involvement would threaten its neutrality in the 
region) (Chi 1997). However, the US continued to play a strong role in the development 
                                                             
3 Both ECAFE and the US Bureau of Reclamation‘s studies focused on the area below the Burma-Laos-
Thailand border for geopolitical reasons. China was not a member of the UN and therefore was not a 
member of ECAFE. US studies focused on the lower Mekong basin because of strategic concerns 
surrounding China and the spread of communism. This framing of the lower Mekong basin as the area 
below the Burma-Laos-Thailand border has endured and it is presented as a ‗natural‘ unit of management.     
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of the Mekong River through its support for the Mekong Committee, motivated by its 
strategic geopolitical concerns.
4
         
The Mekong Committee for the Coordination of the Investigations of the Lower 
Mekong Basin was established by Statute on 17
th
 September 1957 (hereafter the 
Mekong Committee). ECAFE drafted the Committee‘s terms of reference (TOR) and its 
composition, whilst the UN drafted the Statute. This pattern of extensive involvement of 
external actors continues to this day, although, ECAFE and the UN have been replaced 
by other actors. The Mekong Committee comprised Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam 
and Thailand and the four states were keen to participate because of the development 
potential of the river (Chi 1997).  Between 1957 and 1970 a number of studies were 
conducted for the Mekong Committee by experts and external teams from donor states 
including the US, Japan, France and Australia. These studies focused on data collection 
and technical aspects. ECAFE had recommended that in the first instance a database of 
information was needed for the whole basin including tributaries (Chi 1997). This was 
supported by the 1957 Wheeler Report, a US report, which placed a great emphasis on 
the collection of technical data before dam construction could go ahead (Osborne 
2006b). However, dam sites were also identified and proposed in the reports. By 1970 
17 mainstream projects and 87 tributary projects had been identified. Feasibility studies 
for some projects, including the Pa Mong (located on the mainstream between Thailand 
and Laos), had also been conducted.  
 
2.3. The emergence of an ‘unutilised’ Mekong River 
 
Representing the Mekong River as utilised and an object which should be 
harnessed for socio-economic development reflect both the interests of actors such as 
ECAFE and the US, but also dominant water resources development paradigms of the 
period. It underwrites the dominant development narrative of the lower Mekong and is 
an integral part of the regional discursive formation running through the history of water 
resources development in the region. This particular representation of the Mekong and 
plans to develop hydropower for socio-economic development were widely supported 
in the academic literature of the period. Early Mekong studies were conducted at a time 
when water resources were conceptualised as a resource for development: sentiments at 
                                                             
4 The US was the largest financial contributor to the Mekong Committee until its withdrawal in 1975. The 
US also played a key role in the operations of the Mekong Committee: C. Hart Schaaf, an American, was 
Executive Agent of the Mekong Committee between 1959 to 1969, and US teams conducted a number of 
important technical studies, including the Wheeler Report of 1957, conducted by Raymond Wheeler who 
had previously been a senior officer in the US Army Corps of Engineers (Jacobs 2000).  
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the time were pre-disposed to the ―construction of large, if not grandiose, schemes to 
harness the forces of nature for the benefit of mankind‖ (Chi 1997: 239).   
Planners conceptualised the Mekong River as unutilised ―with the paucity of 
hydrologic and climatic data and its low level of water development…[it] presented a 
'clean slate' for basin development‖ (Jacobs 1995: 139). Studies in the 1950s found that 
the Mekong River was vastly under-utilised (Hudson-Rodd and Shaw 2003). The term 
unutilised was used by planners and those conducting the studies in a particular way: it 
signified a lack of control structures, such as dams or bridges spanning the Mekong. 
Utilisation is linked with engineering and infrastructure. This way of viewing utilisation 
is very narrow and does not include other important uses of the Mekong‘s water 
resources which occur at other scalar levels of analysis, such as fisheries and livelihood 
uses. It also contributes to casting poverty and development as technical problems at the 
state, basin, and regional scales, which require expertise and planning solutions. 
Circular arguments are contained within this framework: the Mekong River is an 
unutilised river with a huge hydropower potential, which can be developed because it is 
not being utilised. Development planning occurs in politically loaded contexts 
(Ferguson 1994a). Casting utilisation, poverty and development in purely technical 
terms obfuscates the political context in which these early studies took place and the 
formulation of this representation of the Mekong.  
 Representing the Mekong in particular ways (unutilised, unharnessed) justifies 
particular kinds of interventions (infrastructure). It also provides a platform for actors 
(such as the newly formed ECAFE and the US) to extend their access in a particular 
area. By casting development of the Mekong, a transboundary river, at the state and 
lower basin scales it became intelligible to planners and decision-makers that an inter-
government institution would be needed to coordinate and facilitate studies and 
investigations. This can be understood as a mechanism for the newly independently 
states of Southeast Asia to appropriate the terrain of development and stewardship over 
water resources in the region.   
 Representations of nature and the environment reinforce each other and signify 
particular types of intervention. Running throughout this discourse on developing the 
Mekong‘s hydropower potential is a conception of the Mekong‘s annual flood as 
destructive, and the idea that a river untamed by man is dangerous. After the 1966 
floods, the executive secretary of ECAFE stated at the February 1967 meeting of the 
Mekong Committee that the flood‘s devastation had ―deepened the determination of all 
of us engaged in the Mekong effort to convert the wasted and destructive powers of the 
86 
 
Mekong untamed, into a giant tamed and harnessed to the uses of mankind‖ (U Nyun 
1967: 19). Flood control provided the initial impetus for the 1957 ECAFE lower 
Mekong study and led to plans for multipurpose projects, which would have flood 
control impacts. However, the ―annual flood and drought cycles are essential for the 
sustainable production of food along the river‘s flood plains‖ (Hudson-Rodd and Shaw 
2003: 268). They are also extremely important for fisheries migration and reproduction. 
As such, regulating the flood cycle through hydropower development could have 
disastrous livelihood consequences. Conceptualising the flood cycle as destructive and 
needing to be tamed justifies particular kinds of interventions, and obfuscates the links 
between it and livelihoods. This conceptualisation of the Mekong flood as destructive 
and harmful would later be used by China to partially justify its dam development of the 
upper Mekong mainstream as these dams will regulate flow and therefore lessen flood 
impacts (e.g. Wain 2004). 
Commentators and academic literature from the early period of the Mekong 
Committee offered wholehearted support to what was termed the ‗Mekong Project‘: the 
Mekong scheme is a ―major potential instrument for human betterment‖ (Ingersoll 
1968: 157). Jenkins (1968) argued that hydropower schemes would ―greatly improve 
the lives of the 20 million people‖ living in the basin (464). Academic literature from 
the 1960s and early 1970s is replete with references to harnessing the Mekong (e.g. 
Ingerskoll 1968), and the abundant water resources of the Mekong which are currently 
unutilised (Wheeler 1970), and are ―one of the promising means of supporting 
economic growth‖ (White 1963: 414). Academic literature from the 1960s and 1970s 
conceptualises the Mekong River as an object to be developed for the benefit of the 
region‘s people as it is an almost virgin river, unharnessed by man (Wheeler 1970; 
Ingersoll 1968; Sain 1966). This lack of water resources development is identified as 
providing a unique opportunity for the four states to cooperate in co-ordinated planning 
and development for mutual benefit, which could usher in an economic revolution 
(Wheeler 1970; Menon 1971). Within academic literature during this period there was a 
real sense that development of the mainstream and fulfilment of these grand schemes 
was about to be realised and an uncritical acceptance of this grand Mekong Project as 
‗good‘ and ‗desirable‘. 
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2.4. Basin Development Plans: 1970- 1994 
 
After its formation in 1957 the Mekong Committee conducted a large number of 
studies. A range of development projects were identified including hydropower dams, 
irrigation schemes, opportunities for the development of reservoir fisheries, electricity 
generation for industrial development, and model farms to further agricultural 
development. Mainstream hydropower projects such as Pa Mong (Thailand) and 
Sambor (Cambodia) were proposed and studied. Three basin development plans were 
also produced: the 1970 Indicative Basin Plan (IBP), the 1987 Perspectives for Mekong 
Development, and the 1994 Mekong Mainstream Run-of-River Hydropower. All three 
studies proposed grand hydropower plans for the Mekong, which would harness the 
river and contribute to socio-economic development. These development plans were 
premised on the development narrative that hydropower development of the Mekong 
would lead to socio-economic development.  
The 1970 IBP represented a major amplification of the skeletal plan contained in the 
1957 ECAFE Report (Mekong Secretariat 1970). The IBP was completed with the 
assistance of the Governments of the Netherlands and the US and is a sectoral plan for 
the development of water and related resources (Mekong Secretariat 1970). The plan 
identified the needs of the basin between 1971 and 2000, and then identified 
development plans capable of meeting those needs. Those needs were largely framed in 
terms of infrastructure development, industry and electricity, in ways congruent with 
dominant water resources development paradigms. The IBP argues that water resources 
development will ―provide the infrastructure and services…which are essential for the 
over-all economic growth and social improvement‖ in the lower Mekong states 
(Mekong Secretariat 1970: I-11). The report states that the four lower Mekong states are 
―intent upon the expansion and diversification of industrial and agricultural production, 
and the improvement of services, in order to raise the levels of living and welfare of 
their population‖ (Mekong Secretariat 1970: I-4-5) Hydropower will make ―specific 
contributions…to these objectives‖ as it will provide an indigenous supply of energy to 
fuel industrialisation (Mekong Secretariat 1970: I-4-5). The IBP envisaged 
multipurpose projects and integrated development, so that hydropower projects would 
also provide flood control and agricultural benefits. 
 The IBP contained a short-term plan (1971-1980) which looked at individual 
projects within specific countries, and a long-term plan (up to 2000) comprised of a 
cascade of seven mainstream dams, of which Pa Mong and Stung Treng were 
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considered key. It was this cascade of mainstream projects that were viewed as capable 
of comprehensively uplifting the region (Molle et al. 2009a). Fifteen mainstream 
hydropower sites were studied before the Mekong Committee decided on the following 
seven, the first five of which are in Laos and the last two in Cambodia: Luang Prabang, 
Sayabouri, Pa Mong, Upper Thakhek, Ban Koum, Stung Treng and Sambor. The 
original list of fifteen included, amongst others, two more projects in Laos, Pak Beng 
and Khone Falls/Don Sahong. Aside from Upper Thakhek, these mainstream projects 
are the same ones being proposed, planned and debated in the present day (see Map 3, 
p.6). The long-term plan also included the Nam Theun 2 (NT2) dam as a project of 
international interest (NT2 is analysed in Chapter Six of this thesis).  
The IBP was produced in a regional political context of increasing instability. 
Regional geopolitical dynamics lead to the suspension of the Mekong Committee in 
1975 and its reformulation as the Interim Committee for Coordination of Investigations 
of the Lower Mekong Basin, hereafter the Interim Mekong Committee (IMC) in 1978. 
Aside from Thailand, the political composition of the Mekong Committee Member 
States changed in the 1970s. In 1975, the Royal Kingdom of Laos became the Lao 
People‘s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), a communist state. Following the fall of 
South Vietnam in the Second Indochina War the two parts of Vietnam were reunited 
under the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1975. The Royal Kingdom of Cambodia fell 
under the control of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge entering a period of domestic 
instability and international political isolation which lasted from 1975-1991. The IMC 
was comprised of Lao PDR, Thailand and Vietnam on the understanding that the 
Mekong Committee would be reactivated once Cambodia requested re-admittance (Chi 
1997). Funding for the IMC dropped drastically during this period: the UN and US, two 
of the Mekong Committee‘s biggest donors, withdrew support and riparian 
contributions decreased (Chi 1997). However, whilst the absence of Cambodia limited 
the possibilities of developing the Mekong mainstream and occasioned the IMC to 
focus more on national and tributary projects, this ―did not entail that the vision of 
comprehensive development of the mainstream had vanished‖ (Molle et al. 2009a: 9). 
The IMC began work on revising the IBP in 1980 and in 1988 the revised report was 
published as Perspectives for Mekong Development.   
The Perspectives for Mekong Development was formulated from the basis of the 
dominant development narrative. The Mekong River was characterised as a ―huge, 
underused resource‖, that could through ―irrigation, fisheries and hydropower feed and 
otherwise support‖ the basin‘s population and people outside the Mekong basin‘s 
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catchment (Mekong Secretariat 1988). The report argues that it ―is clear there is indeed 
a will to harness the Mekong‖, and that growth in the demand for electric power and 
rice will dominate ―the scope and pace of basin development‖ (Mekong Secretariat 
1988). Changes were made to the proposed Mekong cascade of mainstream dams. As 
opposed to the IBP proposed cascade, which had an estimated generating capacity of 
23,000 megawatts (MW), the one proposed in the 1988 report would have a smaller 
storage capacity but still be capable of generating an estimated 23,000MW of electricity 
(Mekong Secretariat 1970; Mekong Secretariat 1988). The key difference in the two 
plans is that the 1988 report revised the Pa Mong hydropower project in order to reduce 
the amount of resettlement needed. In light of the growing salience of social and 
environmental concerns of large infrastructure projects at the international level (see 
Chapter Four, this thesis) the 1988 report recognised that the resettlement of 250,000 
people was too high, and instead suggested that two dams be built: Low Pa Mong, and 
Upper Chiang Khan. According to the report changes to the Pa Mong project would 
decrease the flood control potential of the project (Mekong Secretariat 1988). However, 
this 1988 report saw hydropower as the key benefit of mainstream, and other concerns, 
such as irrigation and flood control, were insignificant in economic terms (Molle et al. 
2009a). The report also focused on project development in the three member states, and 
proposed a number of tributary projects, including NT2.             
Following the 1988 report the IMC continued to investigate mainstream 
hydropower. Whilst its future was unclear after 1991, the Mekong Committee continued 
to investigate and plan for mainstream hydropower development. The 1994 Mekong 
Mainstream Run-of-River Hydropower report proposed a revised version of the 
mainstream cascade of dams and stated that the mainstream had always been studied 
with ―the perspective that one day they might be harnessed to provide enormous 
benefits‖ (CNR and Acres International Ltd 1994: I-1). The Mekong was again 
represented as a ―bountiful but not a tame natural resource‖ (CNR and Acres 
International Ltd 1994: I-1). The Report suggested a new approach to the Mekong 
Cascade: ‗run-of-river‘ dams, which would not have storage reservoirs. The Secretariat 
argued that projects with large storage reservoirs were now seen as socially and 
environmentally unacceptable due to the large numbers of people displaced and the 
large areas inundated (CNR and Acres International Ltd 1994). Candidate projects were 
ranked according to social impacts, defined in terms of how many people would be 
displaced, and categories of economic performance (CNR and Acres International Ltd 
1994). This 1994 report presented a different version of the cascade, but the 
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representation of the Mekong and the narrative of developing hydropower for national 
development remained. This illustrates how counter claims (such as negative social 
impacts) can be incorporated by planners and decision-makers without changing 
dominant development narratives.   
The 1994 report made changes to some of the project locations. For example, the 
Sayabouri project was moved 50km downstream of its earlier studied location. As 
opposed to earlier versions of the cascade which would displace around 250,000 people 
and generate 23,000 MW, the proposed ‗run-of-river‘ cascade would displace 57,000 
people and generate just over 13,000 MW of electricity. The proposed mainstream 
projects, Don Sahong, Ban Koum, Sayabouri, and Pak Beng (all in Lao PDR), were 
ranked as first priority category projects, with Sambor (Cambodia) ranked as a second 
category project, and Pak Lay (Lao PDR) as a third. As mentioned earlier, whilst these 
Mekong Committee plans for the Mekong never came to fruition, these six mainstream 
dam sites are being investigated once again. Don Sahong is particularly controversial 
and contentious in the current hydropower development debate.        
The investigations and studies into the development potential of the Mekong River 
largely centred on engineering and technical aspects. The social impacts were given 
only small amounts of attention in the first phase of the Mekong Committee. However, 
they gained more prominence in the 1980s and 1990s. The Mekong Committee came to 
view projects such as Pa Mong, which would involve large resettlement programs, as 
unacceptable (Mekong Secretariat 1994). Ingersoll (1968) argues that Member State‘s 
prioritised engineering and technical studies because of their immediate concern with 
physical construction. Consequently, by the end of the 1960s no social research had 
been conducted relating the basin population to their changing environment and 
technology (Ingersoll 1968). The importance of fisheries in the basin was noted 
(Wheeler 1970; Jenkins 1968). But they did not have the same level of prominence in 
terms of academic and technical studies that they currently possess. Commentators in 
the 1960s noted that mainstream dams would act as a barrier to fisheries migration but 
they assumed this was a technical problem which could be solved with engineering: by 
installing ―costly fish ladders at the mainstream dams, so that economically important 
species…will not be trapped at different reaches of the river‖ (Jenkins 1968: 463). This 
statement illustrates an anthropocentric valuation of fisheries, which conceptualises 
resources in terms of their economic value and usefulness. The assumption that fisheries 
impacts could be easily mitigated was questioned by the IMC in the 1994 Mekong 
Mainstream Run-of-River Hydropower report. This report argued that ―fisheries 
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questions be given priority attention in preparation for further consideration of possible 
projects on the mainstream‖ (CNR and Acres International Ltd 1994: 19). The Mekong 
Secretariat recommended that further studies on fisheries impacts be conducted before 
any mainstream projects went ahead. However, these studies were never conducted: 
―this was partially because the politics of the region changed. But, also no-one thought 
these mainstream projects would go ahead. Thought they were too contentious‖ (MRC 
representative, interview, 07/08b). As discussed in Chapter Seven, actors are once again 
calling for studies into fisheries impacts, as they are the key issue in current mainstream 
dam debates.       
 
2.5. The role of Mekong Water Cooperation 
 
The Mekong Committee produced a number of plans and studies between 1957 
and 1991. However, its output in terms of completed projects was minimal in 
comparison to its ‗grand plans‘ for development. By the 1980s only 16 out of 180 
projects proposed in the 1970 IBP had been implemented (Molle et al. 2009a). Despite 
its small number of completed projects, in both articles published prior to 1991 and 
institutional histories published after, the Mekong cooperation is regarded as playing a 
unique international relations role between the four lower Mekong states. Academic 
assessments of the Mekong Committee and the IMC in the 1960s and 1970s focused on 
its role as a cooperative institution against a regional backdrop of conflict and 
instability. The Mekong Committee is represented as a ‗heartening example‘, which 
managed to foster a spirit of cooperation in a geopolitical situation where tensions and 
animosities abounded (Wheeler 1970; Jenkins 1968). From the early 1960s onwards 
there were no diplomatic relations between Thailand and Cambodia.
5
  However, both 
states continued to send representatives to the Mekong Committee and to communicate 
through the Committee until 1975. The Mekong Committee was the only cooperative 
scheme in which the four states worked together, and it continued its work through the 
1970s and 1980s. 
Mekong water cooperation is also utilised to illustrate a number of claims made by 
conventional IR approaches to hydropolitics about water cooperation and regimes. The 
Mekong Committee itself partially conceptualised its role in terms of international 
                                                             
5 The breakdown in diplomatic relations was partially due to the dispute between the two states over 
ownership of the Preah Vihear temple. Whilst the International Court awarded ownership to Cambodia in 
1963, this dispute continues to resurface in relations between the two states, for example as recently as 
2008.  
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relations. For example, the 1970 IBP stated that it was following an ―international 
approach of harmony and understanding in its work; the Committee is convinced that 
continued and even broadened international cooperation is essential for the integrated 
development of the Lower Mekong Basin, and that Mekong development represents in 
itself a powerful instrument in strengthening cooperation in southeast Asia‖ (Mekong 
Secretariat 1970: ii.). By providing a neutral forum for discussion, the Mekong 
Committee allowed riparian states to steadily build ―a foundation for resolving 
differences and disputes‖ (Jacobs 2002: 360). Ideas of functionalism, whereby 
cooperation over water ‗spills over‘ into other areas, are implicit in these statements.  
Mekong water cooperation has been categorised as a ―remarkable example of 
institutional resilience through the turmoil of war and tectonic shifts in the region‘s 
political economy‖ (Ratner 2003: 65). This resilience was evidenced by the three other 
member states (including the newly reunited state of Vietnam) renegotiating the terms 
of their cooperation and reformulating as the IMC after Cambodia withdrew in 1975 
(Giordano and Wolf 2003). Mekong water cooperation has been conceptualised as a 
regime that made an ―invaluable contribution to the maintenance of the Mekong 
neighbourhood and thus to developing sustained subregional association‖, despite its 
limited practical output (Makim 2002: 42). Browder and Ortolano (2000) argue that the 
Mekong water regime has evolved through three distinct phrases (the Mekong 
Committee, the IMC and the Mekong River Commission) and provides insights on how 
to build water management regimes. This reflects the problem solving nature of a large 
portion of the hydropolitics literature influenced by conventional IR approaches.     
Norms are important in international relations and this is observable in the Mekong 
region. The ‗Mekong Spirit‘ is offered by a number of commentators and practitioners 
as the explanation for why the four states have been able to avoid dispute despite 
tensions in other areas of their international relations, and continued to cooperate over 
water. U Nyun, executive secretary of ECAFE (1959-1973), defined the Mekong Spirit 
as ―the great goodwill, the friendly spirit of collaboration, the abundant enthusiasm 
which animates Mekong work‖ (U Nyun 1963: 47).  The ‗Mekong Spirit‘ has also 
involved developing trust between the riparian states based on a common goal of 
developing the Mekong River, and through negotiations over the principles governing 
its development and utilisation (Le Huu and Nguyen-Duc 2003). During the current 
debate over mainstream hydropower development, state representatives interviewed for 
this thesis referred to the ‗Mekong Spirit‘ as the mechanism which will carry the 
cooperation through this difficult debate: ―The Mekong Spirit means we like to talk, we 
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want to cooperate and develop the Mekong, make it a link for peaceful relations and 
development. The Mekong Spirit is still here, even though the politics change‖ (State 
official, interview, 06/08b). This illustrates that perceptions, norms and actors‘ shared 
understandings are important.    
However, commentators argue that as the pace of development (i.e. dams and 
infrastructure construction) intensifies, strains upon the cooperative framework will 
increase. Ratner (2003: 61) argues that ―until recently there have also been few tests to 
theories of cooperation and conflict over the Mekong, since most of the projects existed 
only in the minds of planners and in tomes of engineering studies‖. Changing regional 
dynamics, as discussed below, offer opportunities for the realisation of these long-held 
plans and have intensified debates about the role of Mekong water cooperation (see 
Chapter Five).  
 
3. Changing regional dynamics 1991 onwards: the Asian Development Bank, 
China and the Mekong River Commission 
 
The end of the Cold War and resumption of peace in the region in 1991 following 
the negotiation of the Paris Peace Accords has resulted in an influx of new actors and 
new regional schemes in the Mekong. In 1992, Cambodia requested re-admittance to 
the Mekong Committee. However, the changing regional and geopolitical context meant 
that the incentives for cooperation had changed, and new terms of cooperation had to be 
negotiated between the four lower Mekong states. This process took place in a context 
where regional schemes were multiplying at the same time as non-state actors gained 
more prominence in hydropower, and Chinese use of the Mekong and involvement in 
the region increased. However, the dominant narrative linking the development of the 
Mekong‘s hydropower potential with economic growth and poverty reduction endured 
despite these transformations. It is important to note that increased regionalism after 
1991 has been followed by an expansion of private sector actors from the region active 
in hydropower development of the lower Mekong (see Chapter Four).    
Growing awareness of environmental and social issues has affected water 
management paradigms, with an apparent shift away from infrastructure heavy, 
economic orientated management, to IWRM (discussed in Chapter Five). Consequently, 
debates have opened concerning the importance of Mekong fisheries (e.g. Baran and 
Ratner 2007; MRC 2008b), public participation in development (e.g. Sneddon & Fox 
2007), and most recently, controversy has raged about the proposed construction of 
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mainstream dams (e.g. TERRA 2007). However, the conception of the Mekong outlined 
above, as an object to be developed and harnessed for socio-economic development is 
still operational within the Mekong‘s development. Sneddon and Fox (2006: 185) state 
that the aims of Mekong cooperation were, and ―arguably remain‖, hydroelectricity for  
industrial development, storage of water for expanding irrigation and control of the 
annual flood: the resumption of peace in the region in 1991, meant that governments 
―once again contemplated the Mekong‘s resources as a source of rapid economic 
development‖ (187).  
Hydropower plays an important role in current development discourse due to its 
depiction as ―the only resource capable of generating large amounts of foreign exchange 
critical for development and economic stability‖, and producing energy for domestic 
consumption (Bakker 1999: 210). Within this discourse the Mekong is conceptualised 
as a ―naturalised river, underutilised and unproductively variable‖ (Bakker 1999: 219). 
A 1999 Australian Mekong Research Centre study in the Nam Ngum watershed in Lao 
PDR highlighted that a focus on hydropower development as a source of foreign 
exchange and national income ―potentially places industrial and export sectors at odds 
with the subsistence needs and livelihood security interests of the region‘s poorest 
people‖ (AMRC 1999).  
 
3.1. Increased Regionalism: the Asian Development Bank and the Greater Mekong 
Subregion Programme 
 
Increased regionalism since 1991 has attracted a lot of attention from academic 
commentators. Dore (2003) states that regional ―forums and processes have been 
growing in the Mekong region‖ and that actors in ―old and new regionalisms are 
learning how to co-exist, compete or combat with each other‖ (408). New regional 
schemes include quadrilateral discussions between China, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand 
commencing in 1994 to consider trade and international commercial navigation. This 
resulted in a controversial channel improvement scheme for the Upper Mekong to 
increase commercial navigation. Following an agreement between the states in 2001 
rapids and shoals were removed by blasting to improve commercial navigation between 
southern China and Lao PDR. Other regional initiatives include Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations‘ (ASEAN) Mekong Basin Development Cooperation, 
launched in 1995 after Lao PDR, Cambodia and Vietnam became members of ASEAN. 
The Lower Mekong Initiative between the US and MRC was created in 2009 and has 
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four pillars: environment, health, education and infrastructure. However, it is unclear 
what the substance of the infrastructure component will be, and the funding for the 
initiative is quite small (Cronin and Hamlin 2010). In the light of increasing Chinese 
involvement in the lower Mekong and concerns over Chinese mainstream hydropower 
dams, US re-engagement in the region is being promoted as a mechanism to counter-
point Chinese influence and a possible vehicle to discuss water rights (Cronin 2009; Lee 
2010). This illustrates how the Mekong and its development is still conceptualised in 
geopolitical and strategic terms by some actors.   
Economic cooperation has increased between the six states of the Mekong basin, 
with the most prominent regional scheme being the ADB‘s Greater Mekong Subregion 
Programme (GMS). Commentators such as Bakker (1999) have identified the ADB as 
the most important regional actor. The GMS programme was launched in 1992 and sub-
regional projects fall into nine priority areas: transport, energy, telecommunications, 
tourism, environment, human resource development, agriculture, trade facilitation, and 
private investment.  The aim of the GMS programme is to ―foster economic growth and 
reduce poverty through increased connectivity, improved competitiveness, and a greater 
sense of community‖ (ADB 2008a: 3). The GMS has identified certain activities to 
fulfil each of these three goals. In terms of connectivity key activities are transport 
corridors, power systems and telecommunications. Huge financial resources have been 
mobilised by GMS. Between 1994 and 2007, the ADB provided 3.4 billion united states 
dollars (US$) in loans/grants, and mobilized another US$3.5 billion in co-financing and 
US$3.0 billion from GMS governments for 34 sub-regional development projects 
costing around US$9.9 billion: a further US$165 million was also provided by the ADB 
and other partners as technical assistance (ADB 2008b). Due to its ability to channel 
huge economic resources for development the GMS has superseded the Mekong 
Committee as the ―most important forum for channelling economic development 
assistance for regional projects‖ (Ratner 2003). However, unlike the Mekong 
Committee and its successor the MRC, GMS does not have a water component.     
The GMS has a strong infrastructure and hydropower focus, and is involved in a 
number of individual hydropower projects such as Theun Hinboun in Lao PDR. One of 
the cornerstones of the GMS programme is the proposed regional power grid. The 
Mekong Power Grid is a proposal for energy integration and trade: the hydropower 
potential of China‘s Yunnan Province, Burma and Lao PDR would be developed 
through hydropower dams, and the electricity produced would be transmitted through 
the regional power grid, a series of transmission lines linking the six Mekong states to 
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‗electricity hungry‘ cities in Thailand and Vietnam (International Rivers 2006). In 2002, 
at the first GMS Summit the six states signed the ‗Intergovernmental Agreement on 
Regional Power Trade‘ which committed them to establishing a regional power market. 
However, it is unclear if the Mekong Power Grid will be implemented. Concerns about 
the plan included the reluctance of the region‘s energy utilities to commit to 
privatisation, and technical and environmental concerns (Middleton et al. 2009). The 
position of the ADB and GMS in hydropower development in the Mekong is also being 
challenged by new actors (see Chapter Six).    
New schemes for regional cooperation, such as the GMS, operate from the same 
representation of the Mekong and the same development narrative as the earlier Mekong 
Committee did. Makim (2002) argues that ― the new Mekong multilateral arrangements 
have been created largely in support of investment potential in which the Mekong‘s 
considerable and underutilised resources are concerned‖ (36). Whilst the development 
paradigms which protagonists refer to have changed ―from growth and modernisation to 
sustainable energy security, poverty reduction and geopolitical issues‖, the goal remains 
the same: hydropower development (Klopper 2008: 339). The representation of the 
Mekong as an object to be developed is still flourishing despite changes in regional and 
political dynamics.  
Representations of the Mekong River as unutilised and a suitable object for 
development have gained a new dimension since the end of the Cold War. Actors, such 
as the ADB have talked about capitalising on the ‗peace dividends‘, whilst the Thai 
Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan coined the phrase ‗battlefield into marketplace‘ 
to describe the change in the region (Diokno and Chinh 2006). In the current dam 
building debate in the Mekong, the river is represented as a ―symbol of a new era in 
Southeast Asia, an era of peace, economic growth and development‖ (Bakker 1999: 
209). Evidence of this is found in the GMS Programme. In 1993 the ADB identified a 
number of common interests in the sub-region, including that the six states are resource 
rich and that the Mekong River is a ―central feature of the economy of the subregion, 
playing a key role in the agriculture, forestry, fishing and energy sectors‖ (Krongkaew 
2004: 980). The GMS‘s image of the Mekong is a ―huge land area, a resource with vast 
potential, a huge development site‖ (Diokno and Chinh 2006: 12).  
The Mekong is represented as a ‗natural‘ subregion or economic area by the 
ADB (ADB 1996). However, this representation serves political purposes: it expands 
the role of the ADB in the region. Rendering it natural depoliticises these purposes. This 
is similar to the ways in which the Mekong Committee presented the lower Mekong as a 
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‗natural‘ unit of water management despite the geopolitical concerns, which demarcated 
the boundary of the lower basin as the border with China. Diokno and Nguyen (2006) 
argue that defining the Mekong as a region should be critically analysed, asking 
whether the Mekong states share a distinct cultural identity, or whether the term refers 
to the territories which are bound by the river, or the countries who share the benefits 
from it. Bakker (1999) argues that within this conception of the Mekong as a ‗natural‘ 
subregion, the river basin ―is both naturalising and naturalised, simultaneously an 
imperative for development and a ‗virgin‘ object to be developed, a potential source of 
hydro-electricity that will fuel the region‘s predicted rising energy needs‖ (210). In this 
way, ―the Mekong is the resource that defines the boundaries of a region that will in 
turn exploit its potential‖ (Bakker 1999: 219).  Sneddon and Fox (2006) argue that the 
combination of the ADB‘s ambitious program and China‘s interest in hydropower 
development result in the ―conversion of the river‘s significant flows into energy for 
human consumption and industrial processes‖ becoming ―the dominant geopolitical and 
development goal in the region‖ (187). Within the regional plans of actors such as the 
ADB, the Mekong is still represented in similar ways to those of the 1950s and the 
dominant development narrative linking hydropower, growth and development still 
informs and underpins actor‘s representations and plans for the Mekong.  
 
3.2. China’s increased involvement in the region and development of the Mekong 
 
China‘s involvement in the development of the Mekong has increased 
dramatically since the 1990s. Prior to this the lower Mekong region did not have 
visibility or importance in Chinese foreign policy (Hirsch and Jensen 2006). The upper 
Mekong River or Lancang as it is called in China was also, prior to the 1990s, not a 
priority for development as it flows through an area of low population density and low 
economic importance (Hirsch and Jensen 2006). However, China‘s importance in 
development of the Mekong has grown considerably. China has followed a three-
pronged approach: development of the Lancang, increasing bilateral relationships with 
the lower Mekong states, and encouraging Chinese companies to become actively 
involved in hydropower development in the lower Mekong.   
China began construction of an eight hydropower dam cascade on the upper 
Mekong in 1988 with the first dam, Manowan, completed in 1996. As of 2010 four 
dams have been completed. The rationale behind developing the Lancang cascade is to 
develop the poor and remote Southwest region of China and provide electricity for 
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China‘s rapidly growing coastal cities (Cronin and Hamlin 2010). Whilst China is active 
in the GMS, commentators and scholars argue that China has not joined the MRC 
because it does not want to submit its dam construction plans for consideration by its 
downstream neighbours, and because it has ―no desire for cooperation of Mekong 
resources to be subsumed in a Southeast Asia-dominated political framework‖ (Hirsch 
and Jensen 2006; Bakker 1999: 224). The governments of the four lower Mekong states 
were initially extremely quiet regarding China‘s dam building. Reasons for this include 
the lower Mekong states have their own hydropower plans; Thailand has an agreement 
with China to purchase 3,000MW of electricity from China commencing in 2015; and 
parts of the downstream governments share China dam-building paradigm (Dore 2003). 
Concerns are starting to be expressed that the commercial viability of several of the 
planned lower Mekong mainstream dams will be dependent on water releases from 
China‘s Lancang cascade: ―this dependent relationship between the downstream 
countries and China will create an inherent and unhealthy geostrategic advantage for 
Beijing‖ (Cronin and Hamlin 2010: 3). China‘s dam development of the Mekong has a 
number of dimensions for the lower Mekong including both livelihood impacts and 
geostrategic issues.   
Criticism of China‘s Lancang dam cascade increased sharply in early 2010. 
Uncommonly low levels of the Mekong mainstream were experienced in the lower 
Mekong basin in 2010, which impacted fisheries and local livelihoods (Storey 2010). 
Environmentalists and civil society actors blamed Chinese dams for the low water 
levels (MacLeod 2010). Lower Mekong state officials usually reticent to criticise China 
have raised their concerns with Chinese counterparts, for example, the Thai Prime 
Minister told the visiting Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister that Thailand expected 
Chinese cooperation in dealing with the problem (Storey 2010). Chinese representatives 
have blamed low levels on the ―worst drought in decades‖ in southern China 
(Mingzhong 2010). However, China agreed to share increased volumes of hydrological 
data with the MRC and sent high level representation to the 2010 MRC Summit in 
Thailand.  
China has embarked on a policy of ‗good neighbourliness‘ with the lower 
Mekong states. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao has defined China‘s interests in Southeast 
Asia as ―friendly neighbours, stable nations and wealthy neighbours‖ (Diokno and 
Chinh 2006: 10).  This has involved increasing both cultural and economic ties. In terms 
of cultural ties, China has given ‗gifts‘ such as the construction of a Culture Hall in 
Vientiane, Lao PDR where artistic and dance events can be held. These gifts seek to 
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cement ties between the countries of the region and demonstrate Chinese commitment 
to being a good neighbour. China has also funded infrastructure developments in its 
neighbours, such as highway, bridge and sewer construction in Cambodia, as well as 
providing interest free loans so Cambodia could rebuild its National Assembly and 
Senate buildings (Bolton 2002). Osborne (2006a) argues that China‘s donor relationship 
with its neighbours has led to it becoming the paramount regional power. China is 
increasingly building bilateral relationships with its downstream neighbours. 
China‘s official policy of ‗Opening the South Gate‘ aims to increase economic 
links with its mainland Southeast Asian neighbours. China also has a state-level 
research group on planning development cooperation with the other states in the region. 
The goals of Chinese investment in Southeast Asia are securing regional peace and 
stability, and facilitating cross-border trade (International Rivers 2008b). In terms of 
hydropower China, and its companies, have become a global leader in dam construction 
and have filled the financial gap left by the World Bank and other actors (International 
Rivers 2008b). China is seeking to secure access to natural resources in order to 
guarantee its future economic development and has encouraged its companies to ‗Go 
Out‘ from China and become active in natural resources development globally 
(International Rivers 2008b; Rutherford et al. 2008). In terms of the Mekong, by 2010 
fifteen of the planned seventy-five hydropower projects in Lao PDR involved Chinese 
companies (Department of Energy Promotion and Development 2010). The role of 
Chinese companies is further outlined in Chapter Four.  
 
3.3. The Mekong River Commission and changing regional dynamics  
 
In 1991, Cambodia requested re-admittance to the Mekong Committee. Vietnam 
argued that the Committee should be reactivated immediately. Thailand, however, 
argued that the terms of cooperation needed to be renegotiated. Experts interviewed for 
this thesis argued that Thailand‘s position was due to perceived limitations on its water 
resources development plans: 
 
―Thailand said we need to renegotiate because they felt that there were parts of 
the two previous arrangements that were not in their favour. The concept of 
water balance had been distorted to act as a limitation on the right of any 
riparian to use the water, and of course Thailand blamed Vietnam, saying its 
your fault because you need so much water to come down to combat salinity in 
the Delta‖ (Expert, interview, 06/08).  
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This resulted in four years of negotiation facilitated by UNDP. In 1995, the lower 
Mekong states signed the ‗Agreement On the Cooperation for the Sustainable 
Development of the Mekong River Basin‘ (hereafter the Mekong Agreement) in Chiang 
Rai, Thailand. The Mekong Agreement committed its signatories to cooperate in all 
fields of sustainable development including hydropower, and to develop rules for water 
utilisation, including on the maintenance of minimum flow (MRC 1995). The 
Agreement also recognised the importance of the Tonle Sap and maintaining the flow of 
the mainstream to allow for the reverse flood pulse in the wet season (MRC 1995).  
Thailand and Vietnam‘s reactions to Cambodia‘s request for re-admittance and 
state positions adopted during the four years of negotiation illustrate the changing 
political and economic landscape in the region and changes in the availability of 
funding for water resources development. The regional geopolitical situation in the late 
1970s and 1980s meant that the IMC postponed work on mainstream projects and 
shifted its focus to data collection and training for projects within a single state 
(Browder and Ortolano 2000). As such the IMC began to ―slip into irrelevance‖ as 
Thailand and Vietnam pushed ahead with their own water development plans (Browder 
and Ortolano 2000). One of the most controversial of Thailand‘s plans was the Kong 
Chi Mun water diversion project, which would utilise water from the Mekong 
mainstream for agriculture in the arid Northeast region of Thailand.
6
 Vietnam was 
concerned about this project as diversions from the mainstream could result in reduced 
mainstream flows and increased salinity in the Mekong Delta (Nakayama 1999). The 
Mekong Delta is the key rice growing region of Vietnam and produces rice for both 
domestic consumption and export. The 1975 Declaration of Principles, if reactivated, 
would in effect give the other riparians a ‗veto‘ over Thailand‘s water development 
plans (Nakayama 1999). Consequently, Thailand favoured a renegotiation of the terms 
of Mekong cooperation.  
1991, as described above, heralded a number of changes in the regional 
geopolitical situation. Changes in the broader political and economic context have 
―shifted the incentives for states to cooperate‖ (Ratner 2003: 62). An increase in 
regional schemes and alternative sources of funding have decreased the importance of 
Mekong water cooperation for the Member States as it no longer the focal point for 
donor assistance to the region (Nakayama 1999). Economic growth in Thailand in the 
                                                             
6 The Kong Chi Mun diversion project did not go ahead. However, like a large number of projects for the 
Mekong River it was resurrected in a different guise in 2008. In 2008 the Thai Prime Minister Samak 
Sundaravej outlined plans to divert water from the Nam Ngum basin in Lao PDR and transport it under 
the Mekong mainstream to Thailand. The plan is now subject to an agreement between the Thai and Lao 
governments, which was negotiated outside the MRC framework (see Hongthong 2008) 
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1980s created a socio-economic disparity between Thailand and its neighbours 
(Nakayama 1999). It also meant that Thailand could finance its own water resources 
development projects.  
The interests of the four lower Mekong states in Mekong water cooperation are 
presented as neat and constant through time. Backer (2007), Das Gupta (2005) and 
Phillips et al. (2006) have all presented the interests of the lower Mekong states in 
similar terms, which are summarised in table 1. The lower Mekong riparian states also 
have interests in hydropower development (see table 1). Possible tensions exist between 
a state‘s interest in Mekong water cooperation, and its interest in hydropower 
development. Mainstream hydropower development of the Mekong prior to 2006 was 
largely considered unlikely by actors interviewed for this thesis:  
 
―We wrongly assumed that Cambodia and Vietnam would always object to 
mainstream dams because of their interest in maintaining the flow of the 
mainstream. Subsequently, we assumed that a stalemate situation existed, which 
was self-regulating‖ (MRC representative, interview, 07/08b).   
 
However, state interests in developing the Mekong mainstream have been revived and 
this stalemate is being undermined.  
 
Table 1: State Interests in water cooperation and hydropower development 
 
State Interest in Mekong water cooperation 
 
Interest in hydropower development 
Cambodia Protection of the Tonle Sap and the 
reverse flood pulse. Protection of 
fisheries. 
 
Secure access to cheap electricity for 
Cambodia‘s expanding economy. 
Lao PDR Hydropower development  Increased government revenues and 
foreign exchanges by exporting 
electricity to neighbours. Becoming 
the ‗battery of Southeast Asia‘. 
Thailand ‗Greening Isaan‘: water for irrigation 
and development of its Northeast 
region. 
Financing and supporting hydropower 
development of its neighbours in order 
to access cheap electricity to met 
growing domestic demand.  
Vietnam Protection of Mekong Delta (the ‗rice 
bowl‘ of Vietnam) from salinity. 
Interested in maintenance of 
mainstream flow.  
Hydropower development of the Sesan 
and Srepok Rivers (important Mekong 
tributaries) to meet growing electricity 
demand. 
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Proposals for mainstream hydropower plans have received little public official comment 
(Osborne 2009). Vietnam has adjusted its position on mainstream dams partially 
because of its dual position as a downstream state on the lower Mekong, and an 
upstream state on the Sesan (see Map 2, p.4). The Yali Falls dam on the Sesan was 
commissioned in 2000 and has been a controversial Vietnamese hydropower project as 
it has severe impacts on Cambodian communities living downstream (Middleton et al. 
2009). Whilst Vietnam is not planning any mainstream dams in its territory, a 
Vietnamese company, PertoVietnam Power Corporation is financing and developing the 
proposed Luang Prabang mainstream hydropower project in Lao PDR (Cronin and 
Hamlin 2010). Cambodia also has its own plans for hydropower development, including 
two mainstream dams, Sambor and Stung Treng. Development of Cambodian 
hydropower is largely being investigated by Chinese companies. For example, China 
Southern Power Grid Company signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with 
the Cambodian government in October 2006 to conduct a feasibility study for the 
proposed mainstream Sambor hydropower project (International Rivers and RCC 2008).   
 
4. Lower Mekong Government development strategies, electricity demand and a 
changing problem definition 
 
All four of the lower Mekong states are planning hydropower dams either on the 
Mekong‘s mainstream or its tributaries. Lang (2006) argues that hydropower 
development ―has become the top priority in the national development agenda in all 
Mekong states‖ (588). Despite changing regional dynamics and a diversification of 
actors in the Mekong‘s hydropower sector, the representation of the Mekong as 
unutilised and the dominant development narrative linking the Mekong, hydropower 
and socio-economic development has endured. This section will briefly review some 
current development strategies of the four lower Mekong states and demonstrate the 
continuity in development representations and narratives. It also explores how 
government strategies continue to position development of the Mekong and socio-
economic development generally, at the state level. A new problem definition 
underpinning the development narrative linking hydropower, growth and poverty 
reduction has emerged. As opposed to arguments in the 1950s whereby hydropower 
development would lead to growth, part of the rationale behind current hydropower 
development plans is that growth has taken place, and hydroelectricity is needed to 
ensure more growth.   
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4.1. Lower Mekong Government development strategies 
 
  Poverty reduction is the state-level rationale for development of the lower 
Mekong. Hirsch (2006b) argues that it is not surprising that ―development dominates all 
else‖ when three of the lower Mekong economies (Lao PDR, Cambodia and Vietnam) 
―are still amongst the poorest in the world when measured on a per capita income basis‖ 
(107). Lao PDR, Cambodia and Vietnam are classified as low-income countries by the 
World Bank as they have a GNI of $935 or less per capita (World Bank 2010). Nearly 
40% of the people of Cambodia and Lao PDR living within the basin are living below 
the poverty line (MRC 2006). The situation of Thailand is slightly different to those of 
the other lower Mekong countries as it enjoyed a period of industrialisation and high 
economic growth, and is classified as a lower to middle income country by the World 
Bank (World Bank 2010). However, poverty rates are also high within the Thai part of 
the Mekong basin (MRC 2006). Poverty has been identified as one of the key 
challenges in the basin in the MRC‘s Strategic Plan 2006-2010 (MRC 2006).  
It is important to note that poverty is defined and measured by the governments 
and other actors, such as the World Bank, in terms of traditional indicators such as 
income per capita. Defining and measuring poverty in such ways can obscure the ways 
in which development of natural resources can result in some communities and other 
groups dependent on those resources for their livelihoods becoming poorer. A recent 
International Rivers report Power Surge characterised the development strategies of  
Lao PDR as ―focused on transforming a largely traditional, subsistence-orientated rural 
economy into a modernized, market-orientated, agribusiness system‖ (International 
Rivers 2008c). Within this people are represented as poor because they have subsistence 
livelihoods and therefore creating a ‗modern‘ economy will reduce poverty, in part by 
providing jobs. However, these transformations will fundamentally change the 
relationship between local communities and their environment and may lead to 
increased poverty (see Chapter Seven).   
 Representations of the Mekong as unutilised and arguments linking the 
Mekong‘s hydropower potential and poverty reduction have appeared in debates with 
even greater intensity than before. In 2008, the MRC‘s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
argued that the four states of the lower Mekong ―regard the development of their 
hydropower potential as an integral component of their policies to continue…economic 
growth and so gradually eliminate poverty that is still all too prevalent within the Lower 
Mekong Basin‖ (Bird 2008c). This statement links hydropower, economic growth and 
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poverty reduction, and echoes earlier statements made by the Mekong Committee. The 
MRC‘s Strategic Plan 2006-2010 identifies achieving higher levels of economic and 
social development as its Member States ―most pressing priority‖ and that the ―proper 
use and development of water and related resources will be a key driver‖ for achieving 
this growth (MRC 2006: iii). In the national development plans and strategies of the 
lower Mekong states development of water and related resources feature prominently 
and there is a strong focus on infrastructure development, including hydropower dams 
and water diversions. Hydropower development plays a particularly strong role in the 
government of Lao PDR‘s 2003 National Growth and Poverty Eradication Strategy 
(NGPES). However, all four lower Mekong states are interested in the development of 
the Mekong‘s hydropower potential.  
Representations of nature endure as do development narratives. Two statements 
from the Lao government illustrate this point succinctly: 
 
―The Mekong has considerable economic and human potentialities…These 
tributaries…have incomparable potentialities for the development of hydro-
electric power, which might be put to use for the development of many types of 
production‖ (Phanareth 1966: iv-v).    
 
 ―[Lao PDR‘s] hydropower potential is very considerable and its development 
offers extensive benefits for the country…development of the country‘s hydro-
electrical potential…is thus integral to the national development framework‖ 
(Lao PDR 2003: 103). 
 
The first statement is from a 1966 message from the Lao Mekong Committee member 
included in a special edition of the Indian Journal of Power and River Valley 
Development. The second appears in the 2003 Lao PDR‘s NGPES. Whilst these two 
documents were released nearly forty years apart they both subscribe to the same 
representation of the Mekong as an object to be developed for hydropower, which will 
lead to economic growth. The representation of the Mekong as unutilised or 
unharnessed is prevalent throughout Lao PDR‘s NGPES. Increased hydropower 
development is conceptualised as key to national development because out of a 
hydropower potential of 18,000MW only 623MW had been developed by 2003 (Lao 
PDR 2003). Development of the hydropower potential will lead to increased 
government revenues which can be spent on poverty reduction (Lao PDR 2003). These 
arguments operate from the same stabilising assumptions as those found in earlier 
Mekong Committee ‗grand plans‘ for hydropower development.   
 Relevant national development strategies and plans include Lao PDR‘s NGPES, 
Cambodia‘s 2006 National Strategic Development Plan 2006-2010 (NSDP), and 
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Vietnam‘s 2003 Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (CPRGS) 
which details objectives and targets up to 2005 and 2010. These national development 
strategies and plans privilege economic development and infrastructure. They are top-
down strategies: operating from the assumption that economic benefits from 
development will trickle down to the basin‘s population. For example, the Lao PDR 
NGPES (2003) argues that without increased revenues the government will be unable to 
provide the services essential for enhancing social development and livelihoods. The 
Cambodian, Lao and Vietnamese development strategies argue that whilst growth was 
achieved in the 1990s and poverty rates declined, poverty still remains a challenge and 
there is a lot of work still to be done: poverty reduction is the overriding objective.  
Strategies for poverty reduction include industrialisation, increasing private 
sector investment in various sectors including hydropower and rural development, and 
ensuring GDP growth of between 6 and 7% per year. The Lao government‘s strategy for 
industrialisation gives priority to development of the energy sector. Industrialisation is 
seen as markedly contributing to economic growth, and in turn economic growth is ―a 
pre-condition for sustainable and comprehensive poverty eradication‖ (Lao PDR 2003: 
102). All three states place a high value on industrialisation: Vietnam aims to increase 
the percentage of the labour force involved in industry and increase industry‘s share of 
GDP, as industry makes a significant contribution to economic growth; whilst 
Cambodia aims for significant industrial growth and sees the private sector as the 
engine of growth (The Socialist Republic of Vietnam 2003; Royal Government of 
Cambodia 2006). In this regard similarities can be drawn with the Mekong Committee‘s 
1970 ‗Indicative Basin Plan‘, which is replete with references to industrialisation, for 
example arguing that is an ―essential part of the development process‖ (Mekong 
Secretariat 1970).   
Within the development strategies of the lower Mekong states, the state plays a 
key role in development. The state is responsible for providing a legal framework to 
support development and business, undertaking government and administrative reform, 
protecting the poor, and increasing and attracting foreign investment as a way to fuel 
development. There is also a concern with developing physical and rural infrastructure, 
such as roads, clean water, and bridges etc. Within this the three states want to increase 
rural electrification. Agriculture and fisheries feature heavily in the development 
strategies of Vietnam and Cambodia. Both states want to diversify and increase 
agricultural production. Vietnam‘s CPRGS states that agriculture is the foundations of 
the state‘s socio-economic stability (The Socialist Republic of Vietnam 2003). 
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Cambodia‘s NSDP argues that fisheries play a central role in the life of millions of 
Cambodians and therefore the government aims to ensure sustainable access of the poor 
in fisheries (Royal Government of Cambodia 2006). The state is represented as playing 
a key role in all sectors of development.   
National development strategies are full of references to sustainable use of 
natural resources (Lao PDR 2003), pro-poor growth (Royal Government of Cambodia 
2006), and safe-guarding and preserving the environment (The Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam 2003). However, the pressing and primary concern is how to increase 
economic growth. Natural resources are conceptualised as contributing to this goal. For 
example, Lao PDR‘s NGPES discusses developing the natural resource base for 
economic development. This development strategy links development of natural 
resources to economic growth, which in turns leads to both revenue growth and poverty 
reduction (Lao PDR 2003). References are made in national development strategies to 
the Mekong. For example, Vietnam‘s CPRGS highlights the Central Highlands and the 
Mekong Delta as two of the poorest parts of the state.
7
 Cambodia‘s NSDP highlights the 
importance of the Tonle Sap and water resources to the rural population, and their status 
as a ―crucial component of the nation‘s environment and natural resources base‖ (Royal 
Government of Cambodia 2006: 22). The importance of the Mekong to Lao PDR is 
evident in the NGPES, which is full of references to the Mekong in relation to 
agriculture, navigation, tourism, and regional integration (Lao PDR 2003).   
 
4.2. Electricity demand and changing problem definition 
 
Within current arguments for hydropower development of the Mekong a new 
justification has emerged. This justification defines the problem as a lack of electricity 
for growth, and the solution to this is the development of the Mekong‘s hydropower 
potential. As opposed to the 1950s where hydropower would lead to growth, 
hydropower is currently being presented as necessary because electricity is needed for 
continued economic growth. This change in the problem definition illustrates how 
regional discursive formations return with greater intensity in new guises (Peet and 
Watts 1996). It is also underpinned by the dominant development narrative linking 
hydropower and development and represents the Mekong as unutilised and unharnessed.   
                                                             
7 One of the reasons offered by Viet Nam‘s CPRGS for the Mekong Delta being one of the poorest parts 
of the state, is it vulnerability to sudden events, such as floods, which make living and producing 
conditions difficult. This can be seen as part of the larger discourse on the Mekong‘s annual flood as 
harmful.  
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Arguments by the development banks and the MRC emphasise the hydropower 
potential of the lower Mekong and present it as unharnessed. The MRC has estimated 
that the hydropower potential of the Mekong mainstream and its tributaries is 
30‘000MW, of which only 5% has been developed (World Bank 2004). The ADB and 
World Bank‘s Mekong Water Resources Assistance Strategy (MWRAS) argues that 
scenario work conducted by the MRC has provided evidence that there remains 
considerable development potential in the Mekong and that development of this can 
bring widespread benefits (ADB and World Bank 2006). In this way, evidence of 
potential is in itself treated as a reason for development of that potential. King et al. 
(2007) argue that the ―unharnessed hydropower potential of the region stands high on 
the options list [to meet electricity demand] and is therefore earmarked in national 
strategies to contribute an important share of the prospective demand‖ (iii). The 
MWRAS also identifies electricity demand with a demand for development: 
 
―The region has a strong, pent-up demand for development. Demand for electric 
power, for instance, grows at 10-20% per year, depending on the locality. The 
development and management of the Mekong water can play a critical role in 
supporting this development‖ (ADB and World Bank 2006: 17).  
 
In the above statement development, demand for electricity and utilisation of the 
Mekong‘s water resources are connected. This echoes earlier statements linking 
utilisation of the Mekong and development.  
 Commentators argue that electricity demand in the region is growing because of 
population increases and economic growth (King et al. 2007). Projections of growing 
energy demand include 16% per year for Vietnam, and a doubling of electricity demand 
in Thailand by 2021 (Middleton et al. 2009; Lee and Scurrah 2009). Cambodia‘s peak 
electricity demand is predicted to increase by five times by 2020, and therefore 
Cambodia wants to develop its hydropower potential to meet this demand (International 
Rivers and RCC 2008). It is important to note that predictions of electricity demand are 
contested, especially in Thailand, by civil society actors who argue that future estimates 
of energy demand are unrealistic and that they downplay the potential role of energy 
efficiency measures and renewable energy (Lee and Scurrah 2009; Middleton 2008a). 
However, despite these concerns predicted electricity demand is part of the current 
rationale for hydropower development. 
Development of hydropower is a strategy to meet this demand and has also been 
viewed as an opportunity by Lao PDR to further socio-economic development. Lao 
PDR, specifically, has expressed a desire to become the ―battery of south-east Asia‖, 
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providing hydro-electricity for its neighbours (International River 2008b). Hydropower 
is Lao PDR‘s most ―saleable commodity‖ and there are many references to Lao PDR 
becoming the Kuwait of Asia (Usher 1996: 85). Thailand intends to meet growing 
energy demand through importing electricity from dams in Burma, China and Lao PDR; 
Vietnam will meet demand through developing its own hydropower potential and 
through imports from Cambodia, China and Lao PDR (Klopper 2008; Middleton 
2008b). Thailand is interested in developing dams in Lao PDR because it has already 
developed most of it domestic dam sites and because domestic opposition to 
hydropower dams is high: developing dams in Lao PDR allows Thailand to export the 
social and environmental costs (Klopper 2008; Middleton et al. 2009). Four of the 
proposed lower Mekong mainstreams dams (Sayabouri, Pak Chom, Ban Khoum, and 
Lat Sua) are being promoted or developed by Thai companies (Cronin and Hamlin 
2010).  
In 2009, impacts of the global financial crisis began to be felt in the realm of 
energy planning and hydropower development. The Government of Thailand reduced 
the amount of electricity it planned to import from roughly 13,000MW to 5,000MW and 
consequently, some tributary projects in Lao PDR such as Nam Theun 1 are being 
delayed (MRC 2009a). However, actors such as the Thai Minister for Natural Resources 
and the Environment have interpreted this as a ―short breathing space before demand 
picks up again‖, and not an end to hydropower development plans for the Mekong 
(MRC 2009a). Hydropower projects in Lao PDR are premised on demand in Thailand, 
and illustrate the interconnections between actors and scales in the arguments for 
developing the Mekong‘s hydropower potential. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
A dominant development narrative formulated in the 1950s at the convergence of 
interests of a number of actors and technical paradigms of the period has endured to the 
present day. This narrative linking hydropower development and poverty reduction 
makes stabilising assumptions which shape policy, underpin power relations and appear 
apolitical. A representation of the Mekong as unutilised and unharnessed was developed 
by planners in the 1950s who located development of the Mekong at the basin scale and 
defined utilisation in terms of infrastructure. Outside actors, including the US and UN 
agencies were key in the development of the dominant narrative. US involvement in the 
lower Mekong was motivated by concerns about the spread of communism in the 
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region, whilst the lower Mekong offered ECAFE, a new agency, the opportunity to 
establish a role for itself. Both ECAFE, and the US actors involved in studies of the 
Mekong, operated from the same water resources development assumptions: water 
should be harnessed and utilised for the purposes of mankind through infrastructure 
development; and hydropower development is inextricably linked to socio-economic 
development. Studies by ECAFE and the US Bureau of Reclamation provided the 
impetus for the formation of the Mekong Committee in 1957. The lower Mekong states 
were interested in water cooperation because of the predicted economic benefits. The 
dominant development narrative locates responsibility for development and its benefits 
at the state and basin level.     
The Mekong Committee developed grand water resources development plans. These 
plans were premised on the stabilising assumptions of the dominant narrative. As such, 
the narrative was transmitted through the scientific and technical studies undertaken in 
the region. However, due to regional geopolitics these plans were never implemented. 
Changing regional dynamics ushered in by the end of the Cold War and resumption of 
peace in the region conditioned the negotiations between the four lower Mekong states, 
which culminated in the 1995 Mekong Agreement. New regionalisms and actors in the 
lower Mekong, such as the ADB‘s GMS Programme and the increasing involvement of 
China in Mekong hydropolitics have impacted upon water resources development 
dynamics in the region. However, the dominant development narrative of the Mekong 
has endured. Both the GMS Programme and Chinese involvement have a strong natural 
resources and infrastructure focus.  
 During the Mekong Committee era the water and hydropower interests of the lower 
Mekong states were both captured by the Committee. However, changes in the political 
and economic context in the lower Mekong shifted the incentives for water cooperation 
and resulted in the Mekong River Commission. The lower Mekong states have both 
water cooperation and hydropower interests, and there is the possibility of conflict 
between the two. Hydropower development is firmly on the water resources 
development agenda of the lower Mekong states. Underpinning this agenda is the 
dominant development narrative linking hydropower and development. Lower Mekong 
states such as Lao PDR conceptualise hydropower as integral to national development. 
Poverty and development are measured in terms of economic indicators such as GDP. 
Development is still located at the national scale and is conceptualised as state-led. 
Vietnam and Thailand are playing increasingly important roles in the investigations and 
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development of hydropower in their Mekong neighbours, including in the sphere of 
mainstream hydropower.  
Arguments surrounding energy demand in the lower Mekong states have been added 
to the problem definition utilised by powerful actors in the basin. Meeting energy 
demand is represented as a key development ingredient, without it the lower Mekong 
can not develop, and the people will remain poor. This assumption is interlinked with 
those surrounding poverty and hydropower and reinforces existing assumptions, which 
have endured since the 1950s. In the current hydropower debate the Mekong is 
represented as an object for development, the harnessing of which will accrue massive 
economic benefits to the lower Mekong states, and in a state-led process will lead to 
poverty reduction. This dominant narrative is utilised by actors to justify hydropower 
development plans and locates development at a particular scale. Whilst this appears 
technical and neutral it is a highly political process, with political effects.   
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Chapter Four: Actors in the Mekong’s hydro-political constellation 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The dominant and enduring narrative, outlined in Chapter Three, has been both 
framed the thinking of and been promoted by a number of powerful actors since the 
1950s. The recent expansion of hydropower plans especially for the lower Mekong 
mainstream has accelerated and expanded debate over the development direction of the 
Mekong‘s water resources. The interviews conducted during the fieldwork period 
identified a number of key changing dynamics in the lower Mekong since the early 
1990s: increased regionalism and the rise of China (see Chapter Three); changing 
donor-state relationships; an explosion of private sector involvement; and the expansion 
of global and regional civil society active in the Mekong. Interview respondents 
reported that these dynamics are impacting and diversifying the debate over the 
development of the basin, and plans for its development. 
The types of actors involved in water resources development in the lower 
Mekong are changing as are the relationships between them. Key actor types in the 
lower Mekong‘s hydropolitical constellation include: state actors, old and new donors to 
the region, private sector companies, and global and regional civil society actors. Actor 
types have been selected for a combination of reasons including, visibility, access 
during the fieldwork period, interview respondents identifying them as important, and 
relevancy to the aims of this study. Each of these actors has their own goals, interests 
and visions for the Mekong, and differing relationships with each other. The MRC and 
debates about its role and relevancy are considered in Chapter Five.  
The types of actors involved in Mekong hydropower development have 
diversified since 1991. As shown in Chapter Three, hydropower development of the 
lower Mekong was initially conceptualised and executed by the Mekong Committee, 
the development banks and bilateral donors. However, new actors, such as private 
sector companies from China, are now playing key roles in the investigation of 
mainstream hydropower possibilities. These new actors entail new power relationships 
and also impact existing ones, such as those between the lower Mekong governments 
and the development banks. In response actors, such as the development banks, are 
trying to reinvent their role in the basin (Middleton et al. 2009). Changes in actor types 
and power relationships illustrate that power is fluid, multi-dimensional and multi-
centred.     
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The relationships between actor types in the lower Mekong‘s hydropolitical 
constellation are multi-scalar, they are not simply located over the inter-state level, and 
are impacted by relationships at other scales. For example, lower Mekong governments 
are signing MOUs with private companies to investigate mainstream hydropower sites, 
whilst simultaneously being members of the MRC. The lower Mekong states are also 
complex entities, and differences exist between state agencies concerning hydropower 
and water resources management. Member States have both bilateral relationships with 
donors and multilateral ones through the MRC. MRC donors, such as Finland and 
Sweden, provide overseas development assistance (ODA). New donors to the region are 
emerging who are keen to fund infrastructure development. Hydropower development 
affects local communities, and global and regional civil society actors are highlighting 
these. Scalar considerations are also important in terms of the justifications and 
rationales actors utilise when discussing hydropower development. For example, 
government representatives argue from a vantage point of national development, which 
overrides the concerns of local communities. In contrast civil society actors prioritise 
impacts on local communities and the costs of hydropower development. Scaling 
processes are integral to actors‘ strategies in the hydropower development debate.    
 
2. State actors  
 
National governments‘ official positions on hydropower development, including its 
role in poverty reduction, and their interests in Mekong water cooperation were outlined 
in Chapter Three. As illustrated in Chapter Three, the lower Mekong states have both 
hydropower interests and different interests in transboundary water cooperation. 
Focusing on the state as a unified actor in water resources development disguises the 
fragmentation of water resources and hydropower development planning and decision-
making in the lower Mekong. It also positions natural resources as state resources, 
which can obscure how water resources development is sometimes a mechanism to 
extend state power over its territory. The political regimes in the lower Mekong vary. 
Thailand and Cambodia are democracies with constitutional monarchies, whilst 
Vietnam and Lao PDR are communist one-party states. Lao PDR and Vietnam have 
been moving towards market economies following economic reforms initiated in the 
late 1980s (Molle et al. 2009a). This has coincided with an expansion of actors 
operating in hydropower development in the region.  
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2.1. State actors, the MRC and sub-state processes 
 
States are not unitary and unified actors: they are comprised of a number of different 
agencies, ministries and bodies etc. The state level actors who engage in the MRC are 
not necessarily the actors responsible for hydropower development decision-making. 
For example, in Lao PDR the Lao National Mekong Committee (LNMC) is part of the 
Water Resources and Environment Agency (WREA) which is headed by the Minister 
for Water Resources who represents Lao PDR on the MRC Council. However, the 
Ministry of Energy and Mines, and the Ministry of Planning and Investment are 
responsible for hydropower development and conduct negotiations with project 
developers.  
Both civil society actors and MRC representatives interviewed for this thesis 
expressed concerns about the separation of water and energy actors, the role water 
actors play in hydropower decision-making, and whether energy actors are engaged in 
the work of the MRC (see Chapter Five, Section Six). The NMCs are isolated from 
hydropower planning and implementation. For example, the Cambodian National 
Mekong Committee (CNMC) has been informed that it will not play a role in relation to 
the proposed Sambor dam on the Mekong mainstream: discussions between Cambodia 
and the developers, China Southern Power Grid, are conducted by the Ministry of 
Industry, Energy and Mines (Osborne 2009). As such, hydropower development is 
largely located outside the sphere of operation of water agencies in the lower Mekong. 
State representatives have utilised unacknowledged conventional IR hydropolitical 
assumptions to contextualise possible outcomes of national hydropower development in 
a transboundary context:  
 
―water conflict may be coming. Don Sahong dam will have many fisheries impacts 
for Cambodia. But Don Sahong will provide development for Laos‖ (State Official, 
interview 05/08a). 
 
―now we have the potential for conflict on the transboundary issue. Can see now 
with China and also in Laos have some plan for mainstream, so it may impact flow 
regime of river, in both terms, quantity and quality…If we have some dam on 
mainstream they cause a cumulative impact for my country. Issue is whether 
Member Countries will have good will to do, to work together, or if they base only 
on their own benefit, not care to other country, it will create some potential 
conflicts‖ (State Official, interview 06/08b).  
 
Hydropower development will have negative impacts in terms of fisheries and 
livelihoods: these impacts will be transboundary due to the nature of fisheries migration 
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in the Mekong (ICEM 2010). For example, the proposed Don Sahong dam at the Khone 
Falls near the Lao PDR-Cambodia border will have disastrous fisheries impacts (see 
map 3, p.6). The Khone Falls is a ‗bottleneck‘ for fisheries migration in the basin (fish 
migrate upstream to breed, and downstream to feed); and the Hoo Sahong channel (the 
proposed dam location) is particularly important as it is the only channel fish can 
effectively use to migrate up the Khone Falls in the low water season (Baran and Ratner 
2007). The transboundary impacts of Don Sahong, whereby a dam built in Lao PDR 
will have impacts in Cambodia, was identified by a number of interview participants as 
containing the potential for transboundary water conflict.  
As schemes for harnessing the Mekong move forward competing Member States‘ 
interests pose a challenge (Ratner 2003). As discussed in Chapter Two, IR approaches 
to transboundary hydropolitics argue that water regimes or cooperative institutions can 
negate conflict potential. The four lower Mekong states are members of the MRC, and 
are committed through the 1995 Mekong Agreement to coordinate in all fields of 
sustainable development, produce a joint basin development plan, and make every effort 
to avoid, minimise and mitigate harmful effects which may result from the development 
of the Mekong (MRC 1995). However, there are debates over the role and relevancy of 
the MRC generally, and in relation to hydropower development particularly (see 
Chapter Five). The MRC‘s involvement in Don Sahong has been limited. Assumptions 
about the role of cooperative water institutions need to be considered through a lens 
which also sees domestic politics, and competition between bureaucratic state agencies 
as important. 
The proposed Don Sahong hydropower dam is being developed by Mega First 
Corporation, a Malaysian company. Mega First signed a MOU with the Lao 
government in March 2006 to conduct a feasibility study, which was followed in 
February 2008 by a Project Development Agreement (PDA) (Osborne 2009). Plans for 
the Don Sahong project have largely taken place in isolation from the MRC and the 
project was not in the public sphere prior to 2007. In May 2007, a group of 34 scientists 
sent an open letter to the government and international agencies responsible for 
managing and developing the Mekong River (AMRC 2007a). This letter was 
coordinated by the Australian Mekong Resource Centre (AMRC) at the University of 
Sydney, and expressed severe concern about the negative fisheries impacts on 
livelihoods in all four of the lower Mekong states (AMRC 2007a). In late 2007, the 
MRC produced a review of the initial draft Mega First Environmental Impact 
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Assessment (EIA). This report is widely believed to be critical of the project, but has 
never been publicly released (Osborne 2009).  
Donor representatives interviewed for this thesis allege that the Lao government 
asked the MRC to review the feasibility at the behest of outside actors: 
 
―there‘s no demand for the advice from MRC. Like in the Don Sahong, yes MRC 
asked to review the EIA, but it didn‘t come by itself, there was a dialogue, it was 
probably said to the Lao government well you better, why don‘t you, they didn‘t 
come running to the MRC office ‗please help us‘. (Donor representative, interview, 
05/08b) 
 
The National Mekong Committees have also not played an overt role in the discussions 
and plans for Don Sahong. A 2007, letter from the CNMC to the LNMC contesting Don 
Sahong received no reply, and in March 2008 the CNMC were instructed not to engage 
in public criticism of the project (Osborne 2009). This constraining of the role of the 
NMCs should be viewed in light of Cambodia‘s own plans for mainstream hydropower, 
which involve state agencies such as the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mines. 
Hirsch and Jensen (2006) argue that national interests have dominated 
transboundary interests in the context of the lower Mekong. This argument is valid to a 
certain extent, but, it is important to consider how a particular set of interests held by 
particular actors have dominated at the national level and subsequently, been 
represented at the transboundary level as the national interest. Differences over water 
resources development exist within the state agencies that comprise the state apparatus.   
State officials interviewed for this thesis justified hydropower projects on the basis 
of their contribution to poverty reduction, for example: ―Cambodia and Laos we need  
development, we would like to develop the hydropower potential of the river, our 
people are very poor (State Official, interview, 06/08a). However, despite this official 
justification which links hydropower projects, national development, and the national 
interests, some sections of the Lao government are concerned about the impacts of 
hydropower development. Civil society interview participants reported that they had 
discussed Don Sahong with some officials who were concerned about the project. But,  
 
―these officials are generally located at the Director-General level or below and 
operate in a political culture whereby policy and senior politicians are not 
questioned‖ (Civil Society representative, interview, 06/08a).  
 
For example, the Lao National Tourism Authority, a ministry-level government agency, 
is concerned about the Don Sahong because it may undermine the potential for eco-
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tourism (Fawthrop 2009). Ecotourism is another possible development strategy for Lao 
PDR, and the lower Mekong basin generally (Phillips et al. 2006). However, the Lao 
National Tourism Authority is unlikely to see its interests dominate the state agenda as 
it is less powerful than the Ministry of Energy and Mines.  
Sub-state processes also affect hydropower development in the Mekong. For 
example, the proposed Lao mainstream dam, Don Sahong is linked to the interests of 
powerful ministries and families. Osborne (2009) argues that the dam is ―very much 
linked to the interests of the Siphandone family for whom southern Laos is a virtually 
fief‖ (vi). Don Sahong is planned for Champasak province, close to the Lao-Cambodia 
border. The Governor of Champasak is the son of a former Lao PDR prime minister, 
whilst his sister ―supports the Ministry of Finance‖ (Civil society representative, 
Interview, 06/08a). Osborne (2009) links the plans for Don Sahong dam to a 1990s plan, 
also supported and promoted by the Siphadone family, to create a resort with casinos 
and an airport in the Khone Falls area. In this context, civil society actors have 
questioned whether Don Sahong is really part of a comprehensive plan for poverty 
reduction, or is it part of a narrow plan to develop a resort (Cronin and Hamlin 2010).  
Experts working within the Lao hydropower sector argue that the proposed Don 
Sahong dam raises questions about decentralisation in Lao energy planning: 
 
―First of all you have decentralisation in Laos so the governors are really powerful. 
In that province there is no other place to put a dam…The boss of the electricity 
department in Laos has just put out a document saying that the allocation of 
concessions has gotten out of step with the planning process because they are all 
allocated from regional governors. So, the government you know can just not handle 
development at this pace‖ (Expert, interview, 05/08) 
 
These concerns are linked to concerns about corruption in the Lower Mekong. The 2009 
Transparency International annual report ranked Lao PDR one of the most corrupt states 
in the world, placing it 158 out of 180 states assessed (Transparency International 
2010). A number of forms of corruption in Lao PDR have been identified, including 
bribes to disregard environmental regulations or ignore illegal trade, and colluding with 
officials to under-report trade and therefore avoid tariffs and duties (Stuart-Fox 2006). 
Processes such as these help to condition state actions in particular areas and caution 
against considering states as unified actors with unified interests.  
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2.2. State actors, scalar processes and territorialisation  
 
The state is comprised of a number of actors who participate differently in 
hydropower development in the lower Mekong. This includes both water and energy 
agencies within states, and sub-state processes such as corruption. The interactions 
between these actors and processes condition water resources outcomes. The 
involvement of certain state agencies, such as, the Electricity Generating Authority of 
Thailand (EGAT), illustrates how different actors interact to produce development 
outcomes in particular locales. The example of EGAT and its role in hydropower 
development in Lao PDR demonstrates how hydropower development is a process 
which involves a variety of actors deploying strategies over various scalar levels. 
Hydropower development allows actors to extend their control over resources and 
locate them in regular patterns of extraction.   
State agencies with particular hydropower water resources agendas are 
promoting and driving hydropower development in the lower Mekong basin. Thai state 
agencies and power companies are playing a strong role in hydropower development of 
the Mekong, backed by the Thai government and financiers (Middleton et al. 2009). 
This includes state enterprises such as EGAT, and construction and power companies 
such as GMS Power. EGAT was established in 1969: the US and the World Bank were 
heavily involved providing financing and technical assistance (Middleton et al. 2009). 
EGAT is a state enterprise under the Ministry of Energy and a key player in both 
Thailand‘s energy sector and hydropower development. It builds, owns and operates 
power plants, purchases electricity from foreign states and independent power producers 
(IPPs), and owns and is responsible for the Thai transmission system. EGAT has strong 
links with IPPs such as the Electricity Generating Public Company, which was formed 
in 1992 from an EGAT subsidiary (Middleton et al. 2009). Power Development Plans 
are devised by EGAT‘s Systems Planning Division and include plans to import 
electricity from neighbouring Mekong states, including 4,000MW from Lao PDR by 
2015 (EGAT 2008). EGAT‘s role in determining Thai energy demands and the means 
to meet them promotes hydropower development of the lower Mekong.   
Thai plans to import electricity from neighbouring states are both an economic 
and a scalar strategy. Thailand has rescaled development strategies to the regional level 
in response to the success of Thai environmental movements and continuing economic 
growth in Thailand (Lebel et al. 2005). Thai actors are interested in Mekong 
hydropower development in neighbouring states because of the strong domestic 
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opposition to new dam projects: investing in and constructing projects in other Mekong 
states allows Thai actors to externalise social and environmental costs to states where 
public opposition is stifled and laws are less stringent (Middleton et al. 2009; Klopper 
2008). The Thai strategy of promoting and financing hydropower dams in Lao PDR has 
created a relationship whereby Lao hydropower development is sensitive to predictions 
of energy demand in Thailand. For example, the global financial crisis (which began to 
be seen in the region in 2008) has impacted projected Thai energy demands and 
electricity import plans (Lee and Scurrah 2009; MRC 2009a). Decreases in estimates of 
Thai demand have resulted in delays to Lao PDR hydropower projects including Nam 
Ngum 3 and Nam Theun 1 (MRC 2009a). The relationship between Thai actors and Lao 
hydropower development, and the Thai civil society protest, which has contributed to 
conditioning this outcome, illustrates the multiple actor and scalar nature of hydropower 
development. 
The hydropower development relationship between Thailand and Lao PDR has 
been the subject of a World Bank facilitated forum in 2007. The High-Level Forum on 
Lao-Thai Sustainable Hydropower Development is another example of separation 
between state water and energy actors. The Forum was hosted by the Lao Minister of 
Energy and Mines, and the Thai Minister of Energy. Participants included 
representatives from the Lao Ministry of Energy and Mines, and the Lao Ministry of 
Finance, Thai representatives from the Ministry of Energy and EGAT, the development 
banks, project developers, and NGOs (World Bank 2007b). The MRC, NMCs and state 
water agencies were not invited.  
World Bank representatives interviewed for this thesis identified the Lao-Thai 
hydropower development as one of the key issues in hydropower development in the 
Lower Mekong, and argued that it is a relationship fraught with tensions. 
 
―The World Bank and the Lao government are continually discussing 
hydropower and there are concerns over the quality of plans and the investments 
considering the immense interest of companies and others in developing 
hydropower projects in Lao. But, Thai actors are probably the most active in 
Laos at the moment and there are many projects planned‖ (Development bank 
representative, interview, 03/08).  
 
―There are a lot of tensions in the Lao-Thai relationship because EGAT and 
project developers want to get the lowest price possible for the electricity, 
whereas the Lao government argue that if the tariff is too low there will not be 
enough money for poverty reduction programmes‖ (Development bank 
representative, interview, 04/08).   
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Interviews for this thesis indicate that both Thai and Lao actors justify tariff and price 
discussions in terms of development concerns. EGAT argues that low tariffs are needed 
to supply the levels of energy needed for Thailand‘s continuing economic development, 
whilst Lao government representatives argue that high tariffs are needed so there is 
sufficient funds for poverty reduction. For example, in discussions with Lao state 
officials references were continually made to the ―need for development‖ and ―using 
hydropower revenues for poverty reduction‖. The position of the Lao government 
illustrates how narratives are utilised by governments. Hydropower development is 
linked with poverty reduction: this obscures other motivations for promoting 
hydropower, and instead presents it in ways which are hard to challenge.  
Water resources development, including hydropower, represents one mechanism 
through which the state can extend its control over resources and territory. For example, 
Thailand has formulated plans for diverting water from the Mekong to its arid north-east 
region since the 1970s. The north-east is one of the poorest regions of Thailand and 
successive governments and planners have dreamed of ‗greening Issan‘: turning the 
Northeast into a agricultural powerhouse, which will simultaneously generate 
agricultural production, reduce poverty and reduce the burden on Bangkok and other 
Thai cities from seasonal migration during the dry season (Molle and Floch 2007). 
Hydropower development in the Mekong will extend state control into remote areas, 
integrating them into the wider territory through linking them into transport networks 
and markets. For example, the Nam Theun 2 project in Lao PDR has made the Nakai 
Plateau more accessible by developing new roads (Observation notes, site visit, 03/08). 
As such the project will incorporate a remote area into the processes of the state 
(Observation notes, site visit, 03/08). This ‗side-effect‘ of a project designed to aid 
poverty reduction in Lao PDR, can be viewed as congruent with the ‗side-effects‘ of aid 
projects in Lesotho identified by Ferguson (1994), that extend particular forms of state 
power.  
 
3. Development Banks 
 
Interviews with donor and civil society representatives in the lower Mekong 
identified the changing role of the development banks in hydropower development as a 
key unfolding dynamic in the region. Interviewees argue that the rise of a multitude of 
private sector actors have undermined the importance of the development banks. These 
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issues are considered further in Section Five. The following paragraphs outline the role 
of the development banks in the lower Mekong region.  
The World Bank and the ADB are extremely high profile players in Mekong 
development. The ADB is a multilateral development finance institution founded in 
1966 and owned and financed by its 67 members of which 48 are from the region (ADB 
2010). ADB‘s vision is an Asia-Pacific free of poverty and under its ‗Strategy 2020‘ it 
has three strategic agendas: inclusive growth, environmentally sustainable growth, and 
regional integration (ADB 2010). The ADB‘s water policy identifies water as a key 
ingredient of development, which needs careful management (ADB 2003). All lower 
Mekong states were founding members of the ADB in 1966. Bank operations in 
Cambodia, and Vietnam were suspended in the 1970s and 1980s due to political 
instability. Initial bank operations in these two states post-1992 focused on 
rehabilitation but later expanded into rural development, agricultural development, and 
infrastructure amongst others. In addition to these areas, ADB activities in Cambodia 
and Lao PDR have focused on social development and the environment. This includes 
strengthening IWRM capacity and establishing community fisheries in the Tonle Sap 
area of Cambodia. Assistance is provided to Cambodia, Lao PDR and Vietnam in the 
form of loans, credits and Technical Assistance (TA). Thailand receives mainly TA and 
knowledge sharing from the ADB. A large amount of assistance is channelled through 
the GMS program (see Chapter Three). Infrastructure development is a key focus of the 
GMS revolving mainly around hydropower and road development. ADB argues that its 
infrastructure projects in Vietnam especially, improvements to roads and highways have 
―helped generate employment and significantly reduce poverty‖ (ADB 2009b: 2). This 
justification once again links infrastructure and poverty reduction.                  
The World Bank was established in 1944 and comprises two development 
organisations: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and 
the International Development Association (IDA). The IBRD serves middle-income 
countries through capital investment and advisory services (World Bank 2006). 
Established in 1960 the IDA serves the world‘s poorest states and is committed to 
reducing poverty through grants, and interest-free credits for poverty reduction, 
economic and social programs (World Bank 2006). In the lower Mekong region 
Cambodia, Lao PDR and Vietnam are eligible for funds under IDA (although Vietnam 
is now starting to make applications to IRBD also). Like the ADB, the World Bank‘s 
operations in the region have been affected by geopolitics and instability. The World 
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Bank is active in the four states of the lower Mekong in areas such as rural 
development, agriculture, infrastructure, social development and the environment.       
Hydropower forms a large part of the World Bank‘s strategy in Lao PDR, with 
Nam Theun 2 playing a central role in the bank‘s strategy, as it is a ―development 
project which will help to reduce poverty‖ (Development bank representative, 
interview, 03/08). This statement illustrates how the development banks are informed 
by and support the dominant development narrative of the Mekong, linking hydropower 
and development. The development banks have promoted NT2 as a ‗model‘ 
hydropower project which can be applied elsewhere (Lawrence 2009). A number of 
dynamics underpin this promotion, but two of the most important are the discursive 
struggle in the Mekong region over the promotion and expansion of hydropower, and 
the banks‘ struggle to maintain their position, access, and role in hydropower 
development vis-à-vis other actors (discussed further in Chapter Six). The development 
banks have facilitated a number of hydropower projects in the region, including 
guaranteeing loans and lending the states the necessary capital to purchase their shares 
of projects (Middleton et al. 2009). Civil society representatives interviewed for this 
thesis argue that the availability of finance from the multitude of new private sector 
actors and financiers has challenged the position of the banks (see Section Five, this 
chapter). In light of this, the development banks are attempting to reinvent themselves 
in order to maintain their position (see Chapter Six).    
The ADB and the World Bank complement each other in a number of ways in 
the lower Mekong. The World Bank supports the ADB‘s GMS Programme and plans 
for regional power trade. In 2007, the World Bank made two grants, one to Cambodia 
and one to Lao PDR, to extend cross-border transmission lines between the two states 
and Vietnam: assistance was provided as part of the World Bank‘s support for the GMS 
Programme (World Bank 2007a). The development banks have also developed a joint 
strategy on water resources, the Mekong Water Resources Assistance Strategy 
(MWRAS). The MWRAS also argues that trade-offs are necessary in the Mekong as 
development increases: cross-border cooperation is needed to manage trade-offs (ADB 
and World Bank 2006). The MWRAS identifies three sub-areas of the Mekong Basin 
where win-win solutions can be sought: the Mekong area shared by Northern Thailand 
and Lao PDR, the Sekong, Sesan and Srepok (the 3S) sub-basins shared by Cambodia, 
Lao PDR, and Vietnam, and the Mekong Delta shared by Vietnam and Cambodia. Since 
2006, the ADB and World Bank have concentrated activities in these areas. 
Development bank representatives argue that the: 
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―MWRAS represents a way for us to expand our role in water resources 
management at a time when water infrastructure loans are not worth as much as 
they used to be‖ (Development bank representative, interview, 04/08).  
 
As such the MWRAS represents a strategy through which the development banks can 
extend their visibility and access in water resources management and development, at a 
time when development relationships in the basin are shifting.  
 
4. Changing donors 
 
During the fieldwork period for this thesis it quickly became apparent that there are 
three loose groups of donors in the lower Mekong region: one, old donors (active in the 
Mekong Committee or the region both prior to and since 1991, who are promoting 
regional cooperation and initiatives); two, new donors (emerged after 1991 and engaged 
in focused bilateral agreements with the lower Mekong states); and three, the 
multilateral development banks (discussed above). These three groups of donors have 
different interests, different areas of focus, and support different states. These are 
summarised in Table 2 (p.141). 
Old donors generally have both a bilateral and multilateral relationships with the 
lower Mekong states as they also support the MRC. Old donors are predominately 
Western and largely European, although Australia and Japan are high profile donors to 
the region and the MRC. Elhance (1999) argues that the Mekong ―stands out as a 
glaring example of the most extensive involvement by the international community in 
the efforts to develop an international river basin‖ (216). This has contributed to the 
notion among some actors that the MRC is donor-driven. Questions about support to the 
MRC have been expressed in the civil society of many donor countries and are explored 
in Chapter Five.   
As opposed to new donors, who are facilitating unilateral water resources 
development, old donors are advocating regional cooperation and cautioning against 
rapid hydropower development. This has created some tensions in donor-Member State 
relationships: 
 
―We had a meeting with the LNMC where I had to repeat we don‘t have any 
personal relationships with hydropower, it‘s a source of energy that‘s well known, 
renewable source, we have it in Norway and Sweden and we have it all over the 
world, we don‘t have any passionate views on it. We think it can be a healthy source 
and a sustainable source, provided etc, etc. I had to repeat that many times. Body 
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language was like this, closed, and they went slowly like that, open‖ (Donor 
representative, interview, 05/08b). 
  
At a meeting about basin planning between representatives from the four Member 
States and three old donors in May 2008 differences in the positions of the two groups 
became apparent. Member States representatives made references to the need for 
development: 
 
―We all joined the MRC to develop the Mekong: this includes its hydropower 
potential‖ (State official, observation notes, MRC meeting, 05/08).  
 
―We need support as we want to build up the hydropower capacity for poverty 
reduction‖ (State official, observation notes, MRC meeting, 05/08).  
 
In contrast to a loosely unified approach offered by Member State representatives about 
the need to develop, donor state representatives argued that there were concerns in the 
Member State governments about hydropower and that caution is needed: 
 
―In the countries we have visited the NMCs have asked for a consultation on 
Don Sahong, and is disappointing to hear that this may not be possible at a 
regional level, when it may have transboundary impacts‖ (Donor representative, 
observation notes, meeting, 05/08).  
 
―We are not being negative about hydropower, the point is to do it in an orderly 
manner, and look at the trade-offs it involves‖ (Donor representative, 
observation notes, meeting, 05/08).   
 
In interviews and in meetings observed for this thesis donor representatives were keen 
to stress that there are not anti-hydropower. Member State officials‘ utilisation of ―need 
for development‖ arguments is potentially a strategy to deflect criticism of plans, whilst 
they simultaneously argued in interviews that donor states have already developed and 
therefore should not stop them from developing.    
 Table 2 illustrates that old donors provide both bilateral ODA and support to the 
MRC. However, bilateral ODA is targeted at particular lower Mekong states and in a 
number of cases is being phased out by old donors. For example, Finland only provides 
bilateral assistance to Vietnam, whilst Sweden provides bilateral assistance to Vietnam 
and Lao PDR. Donor interests and areas of support include environmental protection, 
human rights, scientific cooperation, and sustainable development (Sweden), 
infrastructure, integration and climate change (Australia). The majority of old donors 
including Finland, Sweden and Denmark are exploring options for phasing out bilateral 
assistance to Lao PDR and Vietnam in the near future. Trends in ODA from old donors 
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include shifting focus from Asia to Africa, and from bilateral assistance towards 
regional support (Donor representative, interview, 04/08; Donor representative, 
interview, 05/08b).  As such, they are promoting the MRC as a mechanism for 
information sharing between the Member States, and a forum through which Member 
States can conduct their development debates (Donor representative, interview, 04/08; 
Donor representative, interview, 05/08b). As bilateral assistance is phased out, regional 
initiatives such as the MRC are one arena in which the relationship between Member 
States and old donors are conducted. This dynamic is explored in Chapter Five.     
Old donors such as Australia also work in partnership with other regional and 
multilateral actors. Australia‘s 2007-2011 Greater Mekong Subregion Strategy 
identifies the GMS as a continuing area of priority for Australia and its objective is to 
―enable sustainable broad-based economic growth levels for the subregion through 
greater connectivity and cooperation‖ (AusAID 2007: 2). Activities such as improving 
infrastructure and improving water resources management are delivered through 
partnerships and collective co-financing with partners such as the development banks 
(AusAID 2007). Old donors to the MRC, in-line with global developments such as the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, are seeking to harmonize their contributions to 
the MRC and to coordinate their approach.  
Concurrently, new donors, such as China, are emerging and are strengthening 
bilateral relationships, and are constructing relationships outside of regional forums and 
partnerships. Relatively little is known about this second loose group of donors, such as 
Kuwait and Qatar, who are providing funds for infrastructure developments in the form 
of ‗soft‘ loans with low or no interest rates. For example, Kuwait is providing US$546 
million in ‗soft‘ loans to Cambodia for infrastructure projects including irrigation, 
hydropower and roads (Sambeth 2008). Qatar is investing in Cambodia‘s agricultural 
and irrigation sector as a mechanism to secure access to food supplies in a context of 
growing global food prices (Bowman 2008). These loans are negotiated bilaterally and 
few details are publicly available about Cambodia‘s relationships with Kuwait and 
Qatar. Civil society actors and opposition politicians in Cambodia are concerned that 
these deals may involve land concession to Kuwait and Qatar and disadvantage local 
communities (Ferrie 2009). There is some regional press coverage of these loans, but it 
was not possible to interview or meet with representatives from these donors. China is 
the most high profile and established of the new donors. As outlined in Chapter Three, 
dams are only one part of China‘s strategy in the region as it increases bilateral aid, 
trade, and investment.  
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There is no dialogue between old and new donors, and old donors are ‗a bit unsure 
what to do‘ (Dore 2008). The availability of financial resources from new donors 
challenges the prominence of old donors. Nakayama (1999) argues that as alternative 
sources of funding became available the relative importance of the Mekong Committee 
for its members decreased. Changes in donors and the types of financing available for 
infrastructure have similar effects on the MRC, which is committed to sustainable and 
coordinated development in a context where the availability of alternative sources of 
financing are an incentive for unilateral state development of shared water resources.    
 
5. The changing role of the private sector 
 
The private sector has always played a role in hydropower development in the 
Mekong. However, the nature of the private sector and the companies involved has 
changed over time. Western project developers and financiers initially dominated the 
development of hydropower projects in the Mekong region (Middleton 2008a). The 
current hydropower drive is being spearheaded by Asian developers and financiers: this 
includes private companies from China, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam backed by 
export credit agencies and commercial financiers who are ―able to move quickly‖ and 
are ―fast displacing the Western corporations and multilateral development banks that 
previously dominated the region‖ (Middleton 2008a: 13). Experts interviewed for this 
thesis suggested that Western companies had similar motivations to the current Thai 
project developers: 
 
―Western companies had to come out of Europe, they had exhausted the dam sites 
and the public were becoming opposed to dams. Thailand, now, has the same 
problems, they can‘t do dams at home because the civil society is getting stronger, 
and all the good dam sites are gone‖ (Hydropower industry representative, 
interview, 06/08).    
 
This suggests that hydropower development has its own momentum, as well as 
highlighting the controversial nature of hydropower development in the lower Mekong, 
which is contested by a range of civil society actors.  
 
5.1 The development banks, Western companies and tributary hydropower 
     
Tributary hydropower projects developed since the end of the Cold War, such as 
Pak Mun (Thailand), Theun Hinboun (Lao PDR), and Nam Theun 2 (Lao PDR) (see 
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Map 2, p.4), have largely involved the multilateral development banks, Western 
companies and Western donors. For example, the Theun Hinboun dam built and 
operated by the Theun Hinboun Power Company (THPC) was completed in 1998 and 
exports 95% of its electricity to Thailand (FIVAS 2007). THPC is a consortium of three 
bodies: the Lao state utility Electricte du Laos (EdL), a Thai company GMS Power, and 
Nordic Hydropower AB (owned by Norwegian power utility Statkraft). Project 
financing came from ADB loans, the Nordic Development Fund (a multilateral 
development financing institution comprising the five Nordic countries), and the 
Swedish and Norwegian governments through government guaranteed loans from 
Nordic financing institutions (FIVAS 2007).  
The links between the Theun Hinbon project and Norwegian government 
development institutions are controversial because they benefitted Nordic companies: 
the project‘s EIA and Technical design were financed by the Norwegian Agency for 
Development Cooperation and conducted by Norwegian company, Norconsult (FIVAS 
2007). The project was monitored by civil society organisations, including International 
Rivers and FIVAS. The Theun Hinboun hydropower project has resulted in negative 
social and environmental impacts including: erosion and flooding of the riverbank 
resulting in loss of land and riverbank gardens; a decline in fisheries; and increased 
flooding which has led to farmers abandoning their rice fields (International Rivers 
2009a). Monitoring of hydropower projects in the lower Mekong is an important 
strategy for international civil society actors in the region, as they seek to highlight the 
negative impacts of hydropower projects and ensure that promises are met (see Chapter 
Six). 
The Theun Hinboun project followed the Independent Power Producer (IPP) model. 
Under the IPP model private companies or entities own and operate facilities for power 
generation and sell power to state utilities and end users. These are usually developed as 
Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) schemes. Under a BOOT scheme a group of 
investors finance and construct the dam, and then operate it for a set number of years, 
selling the electricity and taking an agreed share of the revenue (Usher 1996). When the 
concession period is up, the investors either renegotiate terms or transfer the dam to the 
national government (Usher 1996). The BOOT concept has been endorsed by the World 
Bank in the name of increased efficiency (Usher 1996).  
Hydropower industry and civil society representatives interviewed for this thesis 
suggested that the development banks endorsement of the IPP model was motivated by 
a desire to continue funding hydropower projects: 
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―the IPP model was devised by someone at the bank because they had all these 
NGOs on their back and for a period they couldn‘t lend money as the ADB or the 
World Bank, but they could guarantee loans to private power producers. So, that 
was their way of getting around the hydropower ban that they slapped on themselves 
for a while‖ (Hydropower industry representative, interview, 04/08).   
 
During the World Commission on Dams process, which culminated with a report in 
2000, the World Bank placed a moratorium on dam funding until the commission had 
finished its work. However, as will be shown in Chapter Six, the World Bank continued 
to investigate support for the Nam Theun 2 hydropower project in Lao PDR.  
 
5.2 The evolving private sector  
 
Key changes in the nature of the private sector include the rise of new actors, and 
reduced government reliance of the development banks for facilitating hydropower 
projects. Private sector companies and consortiums developing hydropower projects as 
BOOTs raises questions about who should be developing hydropower, the private or 
public sphere, and what the impacts are on the states involved:  
 
―The private sector is driving hydropower development in the region and this is 
rapidly eroding the sovereignty of the countries in terms of control of development‖ 
(Civil society representative, interview, 03/08).  
 
―Right now there is no integrated development, no long term power development 
strategy, you‘ve got IPP‘s who come in and want to make money from generating 
power from turbines and that‘s it. So, if the public sector were doing it they would 
be looking at irrigation, at fisheries, at integrated plans. But, the Lao government 
don‘t have the capacity, or the resources, so when developers turn up and say we 
want to give you so much money to develop a project, they go along with it‖ 
(Hydropower industry representative, interview, 06/08).   
 
Lower Mekong states, such as Lao PDR, lack the financial resources and capacity to 
develop hydropower themselves: to expand hydropower development they require the 
involvement of foreign private companies, foreign donors, and foreign financiers. 
Bakker (1999) argues that Lao PDR ―best exemplifies the increasing involvement of 
private capital and private lending agencies in hydrodevelopment‖ and whilst public 
financed development would allow the government of Lao PDR to retain full control 
over projects it does not have the resources to do so (224). This dynamic underpins the 
relationship between states and the private sector. The asymmetric nature of this 
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relationship is also impacted by various factors, including: the weakness of relevant 
institutions in states such as Lao PDR, a lack of domestic technical capacity, and an 
absence of personnel who read and understand English to a very high standard (Usher 
1996). The increasing involvement of the private sector may also impact on cooperative 
water management: the availability of alternative funding may act as a disincentive to 
cooperate, and lead to a different prioritisation of projects as the private sector operates 
from different assumptions to cooperative ventures such as the MRC (Bakker 1999). 
These dynamics are currently unfolding in the Mekong and the outcomes of them are 
still undetermined.     
The nature of the private sector in the lower Mekong has changed in recent years. 
Commentators and civil society actors have expressed a diverse range of opinions on 
this change:  
 
―the private sector has always been involved, but the nature of the private sector is 
changing. In Laos projects exist at the moment, often backed by the ADB, the UN, 
but at the same time a lot of them are under public-private partnerships. Situation 
now, see a lot of companies coming from newly industrialised economies, financing 
coming from non-western sources- China, Thailand, international debt market, bond 
market, Thai stock market, equity, there‘s a lot of money here‖ (Civil society 
representative, interview, 04/08b) 
 
―From 2007 until this day, I mean the whole transformation in the region in terms of 
private sector involvement has ballooned‖ (Civil society representative, interview, 
06/08a).  
 
―The argument that the government is weak vis-à-vis the private sector is too 
simplistic. Its not that the government is weak, its that it does not care. Hydropower 
offers a way to make a lot of money‖ (Hydropower industry representative, 
interview, 06/08).  
 
 
The private sector and the governments in the lower Mekong have shared interests: the 
development of hydropower sites and the generation of revenue. However, the private 
sector is motivated by business and capital concerns, whilst lower Mekong governments 
rationalise hydropower development in terms of economic growth and poverty 
reduction.   
 The shift from predominately Western companies and financiers to 
predominately regional companies and financiers has decreased the importance of the 
development banks. Unlike earlier hydropower developers, the new companies and 
financiers are not facilitated by the development banks. Donors to the Mekong region, 
interviewed for this thesis, stated that ―we assumed that private sector hydropower 
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development in the region would always be facilitated by the development banks. We 
were wrong‖ (Donor representative, interview, 05/08b). The new private sector actors in 
the Mekong do not need the development banks as they have their own financiers, 
including China‘s EXIM Bank, and Thai credit export agencies (Middleton 2008a).  
The development banks have responded by trying to reposition themselves and promote 
the NT2 project as a model hydropower initiative in order to maintain their access, role 
and importance in this arena (see Chapter Six).  
As identified by a number of participants interviewed for this thesis, one of the 
biggest changes is Chinese private sector involvement in the development of the lower 
Mekong. Under the Chinese government‘s ‗Going Out‘ Strategy, Chinese companies 
such as Sinohydro (China‘s biggest dam builder) are being encouraged to build 
infrastructure projects in developing countries largely financed by China‘s export credit 
agency, the China Exim Bank (International Rivers 2008b; Rutherford et al. 2008). The 
rationale behind the strategy is to secure natural resources abroad: 
 
―to guarantee China‘s future economic development. Trade and investment 
agreements with resource-rich countries, which often include infrastructure projects 
such as large dams, allow China to access such raw materials‖ (International Rivers 
2008b: 5).   
 
Sinohydro is currently building three Mekong tributary dams in Lao PDR and 
conducting a feasibility study for the Lao PDR mainstream dam Pak Lay (see Map 3, 
p.6). The involvement of Chinese companies illustrates the rich connections between 
state actors, the private sector, government policy and international relations.  
Lower Mekong companies became increasing active and visible in hydropower 
development in the region from the late 1990s onwards. Thai and Vietnamese 
companies and creditors are involved in a number of projects. For example, the Nam 
Ngum 2 hydropower project, Lao PDR, was financed and developed largely by Thai 
actors:  the construction company Ch. Karnchang, Ratchaburi Electricity Generating 
Holding (a company who generate and sell electricity), Thai commercial banks, and the 
Lao government share held by EdL was obtained through a bond issue guaranteed by 
Thailand‘s Export-Import Bank (Middleton 2008a). Five of the proposed mainstream 
hydropower projects in Lao PDR are also being investigated and facilitated by Thai and 
Vietnamese actors (Cronin and Hamlin 2010). This trend marks a change from previous 
hydropower projects in the Mekong, which combined either solely foreign companies 
and developers, or a mix of foreign ones and Thai companies.  
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Regional companies and financers are in a position, both in terms of finance and 
access, to develop hydropower projects without the involvement of companies from 
outside of Asia, or the development banks. It has been alleged that Mekong 
governments have welcomed the new financers and developers because the 
governments ―increasingly view the social and environmental policies associated with 
Western aid as burdensome, time consuming and costly‖ (Middleton 2008a: 13). 
However, there is little public information about the relationships and negotiations 
between the lower Mekong states. Plans and agreements for new projects are announced 
in local media, such as the Lao PDR Vientiane Times, but few details are included (e.g. 
Thammavongsa 2008). Researchers and NGOs, including International Rivers, have 
been trying to identify and locate the new actors. International Rivers have released 
reports on China‘s role in dam development globally as well as the new financiers in 
hydropower (International Rivers 2008b; Middleton 2008a). In 2008, the Heinrich Boell 
Foundation (HBF), the World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF), and the International 
Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) conducted a study into China‘s role in the 
lower Mekong, specifically Cambodia, Lao PDR and Vietnam. One of the study‘s key 
findings is that Chinese state-owned enterprises are becoming major investors in the 
region, fuelling natural resource extraction (Rutherford et al. 2008).  
The changing nature of the private sector has impacted the debate over hydropower 
development in the Mekong. Questions concerning financing and the relations between 
states and private companies are related to issues surrounding the location of 
development activities and the assumption that states have complete control over their 
territory and resources. As mentioned above, Lao PDR and Cambodia lack the financial 
resources to develop their hydropower potential. Consequently, they favour the BOOT 
model, whereby private developers construct and operate the project, with the state as 
one of a consortium of shareholders who receive revenues from the project. A financial 
asymmetry underscores the relationship between state and private sector actors. 
Tensions exist within these relationships whereby private companies expend resources 
to conduct studies on proposed projects sites under agreement with the government. If 
these studies are deemed satisfactory then a Concession Agreement is signed. In the 
case of Mega First, the company developing the proposed Don Sahong in Lao PDR, the 
company are keen to see the studies be accepted as they have already spent a large 
amount of money on investigating the project: 
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―I talk to the manager of Megafirst and he worry that we can pass or not when they 
explain, if our government say ok not reasonable explanation. They spend a number 
of money already, they don‘t want to lose this money‖ (State official, interview, 
06/08a). 
 
The relationship between state governments and private companies in terms of 
hydropower development is complicated and illustrates that water development and 
management is not located simply at the state level.  
 
6. Global civil society and evolving regional civil society 
 
Civil society actors are challenging dominant representations of the Mekong and the 
plans of powerful actors for dam development. Critiques of hydropower plans bring 
together a number of concerns including: hydropower plans are moving ahead without 
genuine consultation with stakeholders and local stakeholders; planning processes at the 
national and regional level are weak; and  challenges to Thailand‘s and Vietnam‘s 
power predictions and claims that energy efficiency could meet most of the projected 
demand (Middleton 2008a). In the Mekong region both global civil society actors and 
an emerging regional civil society are working to highlight the impacts of existing and 
proposed hydropower dams. Whilst a large number of actors can be grouped under the 
heading of civil society there are differences between them in terms of vision for the 
Mekong, purpose, relationships with other actors and strategies they employ to achieve 
their goals. For example, WWF is concerned about impacts on biodiversity and is 
working with the MRC and ADB to develop environmental sustainability criteria for 
hydropower development (ESCHD), whilst International Rivers is highlighting 
livelihood impacts and monitoring particular projects such as NT2 and engaging in 
advocacy to protect rivers and communities from destructive development.   
Civil society actors have different development visions for the Mekong:  
 
―Sustainable use of natural resources, equitable use of resources, encompasses 
everything really, development shouldn‘t…be at the cost of some for the benefit 
of others...Vision would be that projects which have minimal cost and maximum 
benefit should be developed, where there are alternatives that are more equitable 
but provide better distribution or more efficient development benefit, then those 
projects should go ahead instead of large hydropower‖ (Civil society 
representative, interview, 04/08b).  
 
―We need to keep the key functions and the integrity from an ecological 
perspective. We need to sustain the population and the wildlife. The Mekong is 
very important for the people and the culture and it is still a relatively free 
132 
 
flowing river. It is not yet developed so there is an opportunity to do something 
different here‖ (Civil Society representative, interview, 04/08a).  
 
The Save the Mekong coalition, which brings together NGOs from inside and outside 
the region (including International Rivers, Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional 
Alliance (TERRA), and the NGO Forum on Cambodia), academics, researchers, 
journalists and concerned people emphasises the importance of fisheries in the basin, 
and the impacts of mainstream dams, arguing for a natural flow of the Mekong 
mainstream (Save the Mekong 2010).  
There are complementarities between the visions of civil society actors including 
concerns with livelihoods, fisheries, and sustainability which allow them to work 
together in coalitions such as Save the Mekong and in forums, meetings and research. 
However, there are differences in how they approach issues and their relationships with 
other actors. For example, WWF works in partnership with the MRC and the ADB, 
whilst other NGOs prefer a strategy of non-engagement. Certain NGOs are privileged in 
terms of access. For example, WWF and IUCN have MOUs with the MRC and attend 
its annual governance meetings. Regional meetings such as the 2008 MRC Stakeholder 
Consultation on MRC‘s Basin Development Plan Phase 2 (BDP 2) and its Inception 
Report included international, regional and local civil society actors, such as the 
Mekong Program on Water, Environment and Resilience (MPOWER), and the NGO 
Forum on Cambodia (MRC 2008a). However, MRC Member States are concerned 
about the participation of some NGOs (Observation notes, MRC meeting, 02/08). At a 
MRC meeting involving old donors and Member States representatives, the latter 
expressed concerns about the motivations of some NGOs: 
 
―Not all the NGOs want to help, some they only want to criticise. We should not 
invite all NGOs to participate, as they are not all helpful (State official, observation 
notes, MRC meeting 02/08).   
 
This suggests there are tensions between civil society and government actors, and whilst 
there are spaces for civil society participation these are framed by more powerful actors.   
 
6.1. Civil society in the lower Mekong basin 
 
Civil society in some parts of the basin is weak. There is ―limited political space 
within most countries of the Mekong Region to articulate concerns over projects and 
other aspects of development that threaten social and environmental sustainability‖ 
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(Hirsch 2001: 245). For example, civil society in Lao PDR is largely organised through 
mass organisations such as the Lao Women‘s Union. International civil society 
organisations argue that they have a vital role to play in monitoring hydropower 
development because ―of a lack of civil society and free media. There is also an issue 
about the effective implementation of projects, will developers and the government do 
what they say they are going to do as there is no independent monitor, no free press, no 
local civil society, so there aren‘t checks and balances‖ (Civil society representative, 
interview, 04/08b).  
However, a strong environmental movement does exist in Thailand. Thai 
environmental and civil society groups such as TERRA have followed Mekong 
developments closely and have successfully challenged dam development in Thailand 
including the Pak Mun dam, resulting in a government announcement in 1995 that no 
more hydro-electric dams would be built within Thailand. Pak Mun dam, located on the 
Mun River 5km from its confluence with the Mekong (see Map 2, p.4), had been 
planned since the 1960s, but construction did not begin until 1991, funded by a World 
Bank loan (Foran and Manorom 2009). A coalition of Thai civil society groups 
including representatives of affected communities, domestic NGOs and Thai academics 
and researchers formed to contest the dam. This coalition began as a grassroots 
movement with affected villagers organising petitions and protests, including a protest 
village at the dam site (Foran and Manorom 2009). The coalition was supported by 
international NGOs such as International Rivers (Foran and Manorom 2009). In 1999, 
5000 people occupied the dam site and the coalition called for the dam to be 
decommissioned (Foran and Manorom 2009). In 2001, the coalition secured 
concessions from the Thai government that the dam gates would be open for four 
months of the year to allow fisheries migration, and more studies would be conducted 
into fisheries impacts, Thailand‘s energy supply, and social impacts (Foran and 
Manorom 2009). Concessions secured from the government are contested and there is 
ongoing tension between the Thai government and the coalition concerning whether the 
dam gates will be opened annually (Foran and Manorom 2009). The activities of the 
Pak Mun coalition ―constitute a powerful counter-narrative to the dominant geopolitical 
narrative of the Mekong as an exemplar of cooperative river basin development‖ 
(Sneddon and Fox 2006: 198). Examining individual projects illustrates how 
hydropower is highly contested at the sub-national scale. This is not necessarily visible 
if hydropolitics are only analysed at the transboundary scale.  
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The success of Thai civil society in combating dam development in Thailand has 
had consequences for its neighbours, Lao PDR and Burma. Thai dam developers have 
exported dam development to their neighbours as a strategy to avoid the types of civil 
society protest which have surrounding projects such as Pak Mun (Klopper 2008).Thai 
dam developers including Italian-Thai Development (ITD), and EGAT, are developing 
or supporting the development of dams in Lao PDR and Burma where civil society is 
weak, protest is constrained, and developers do not necessarily have to comply with 
international standards (Klopper 2008). The externalising of environmental and social 
costs associated with dam development from Thailand to its neighbours is a worrying 
trend as affected local communities are unable to protest.  
Environmental and civil society groups are also growing in Cambodia in relation to 
water resources developments and plans. The Yali Falls dam in Vietnam, referred to 
earlier, has had negative impacts on Cambodian fisheries and livelihoods. In response to 
this and with the help of Oxfam Australia, the 3S Protection Network was formed to 
assist dam affected communities living along the SeSan River. It has since extended its 
activities to cover the Srepok and Sekong Rivers (see mao Two, p.3), which together 
make up the 3S river basin (these rivers are also major tributaries of the Mekong with a 
large hydropower potential and a number of planned dams). Other active Cambodian 
civil society actors include: the Cambodian Centre for Study and Development in 
Agriculture which focuses on agricultural research and training; the NGO Forum on 
Cambodia which brings together international and local NGOs; and the Fisheries Action 
Coalition Team which also combines international and local NGOs and works on 
fisheries and livelihood issues in the Tonle Sap area and Mekong provinces of 
Cambodia.    
Media coverage of dam development plans reflects the differences in the robustness 
of civil society in the lower Mekong states. English language media in Lao PDR and 
Vietnam largely report planned or proposed projects in simple details. For example, the 
Lao PDR‘s Vientiane Times covers announcements of projects, signings of MOUs, and 
reports from the developers, with comments from government officials about how the 
projects will benefit poverty eradication: no mention of adverse impacts are made (e.g. 
Thammavongsa 2008). In contrast, English language newspapers in Thailand and 
Cambodia provide some analysis and critique of plans, including interviews with 
individuals from affected communities, NGO representatives and academics. For 
example, Cambodia‘s The Phnom Penh Post has carried articles critiquing Lao PDR‘s 
proposed mainstream hydropower dams, especially the Don Sahong dam, and has also 
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criticised the MRC as well as seeking comments from both NGO representatives and 
the CNMC (e.g. Strangio and Rith 2008). It is important to note that whilst English 
language newspapers in Thailand and Cambodia are carrying more critical articles on 
possible hydropower development of the Mekong, this is not necessarily representative 
of media published in Thai and Khmer. Although it does suggest a larger space for 
debate and discussion than exists in Lao PDR and Vietnam as academics, NGO 
representatives and local people feel able to speak to journalists and to express opinions 
that run counter to official development discourse. Foreign media are also following 
events in the Mekong and critiquing proposed hydropower plans for the Mekong, for 
example the UK‘s The Guardian (Fawthrop 2009), and Finland‘s Helsingin Sanomat 
(Käkönen and Selin 2007).  
 
6.2. Civil society strategies  
 
Civil society actors are employing a number of strategies to challenge the 
dominant development narrative. Molle et al. (2009c) identified five pathways to 
improved water governance: knowledge production, negotiation and debating 
alternatives, promoting standards, advocacy, and efforts at improving transboundary 
water governance. Civil society actors are utilising these five pathways in a number of 
ways to contest hydropower development plans.  
Reports by NGOs and researchers seek to contest the representations of the 
Mekong and the dominant development discourse and plans of powerful actors. This 
includes work documenting the impacts of hydropower projects, such as Theun 
Hinboun (FIVAS 2007); a review of current hydropower development and its impacts 
in Lao PDR (International Rivers 2008c); and offering alternative views on hydropower 
plans, for example, the 2007 WorldFish Centre Scientific Brief The Don Sahong Dam 
and Mekong Fisheries, which offered an independent scientific opinion on likely 
fisheries impacts (Baran and Ratner 2007). Civil society actors, such as International 
Rivers and MPOWER are investigating hydropower standards such as the International 
Hydropower Association‘s Sustainability Protocol and the Equator Principles. 
Information is being disseminated via the internet through groups such as LAOFAB, 
which also has an online document repository. Civil society actors are also convening 
their own forums in which to disseminate information and to allow alternative voices to 
be heard, such as the Mekong Mainstream Dams: People‘s Voices Across Borders 
Conference in November 2008. Forums such as this also bring together a range of actors 
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and allow civil society groups to question actors such as the MRC and debate planned 
dam development.  
Civil society actors are engaging in both meetings with more powerful actors, 
and advocacy. Meetings such as the MRC‘s 2008 Regional Multi-stakeholder 
Consultation on the MRC Hydropower Programme offered an opportunity for civil 
society actors to engage with state representatives, and hydropower developers 
(Observation notes, MRC meeting, 09/08). This offers civil society actors access to 
decision-makers in a region where civil society is constrained in places. However, 
presence does not necessarily correlate with impact. Engagement with the MRC allows 
civil society actors to contribute to improving transboundary water governance because 
it enables alternative perspectives to be heard at the regional level.  
As plans for hydropower dams on the Mekong mainstream have intensified, 
civil society actors have coalesced into a loose coalition of opposition. The Save the 
Mekong coalition brings together foreign and national NGOs as well as researchers, 
academics, and local people. The coalition has engaged in advocacy work and run 
campaigns such as a postcard petition sent to the Thai Prime Minister (PM) in June 
2009. This was followed by a meeting between representatives from the coalition and 
the Thai PM. The Thai PM committed to raising the issue of mainstream dam 
construction in bilateral and multilateral meetings with the other lower Mekong states, 
but stated that the Thai government  ―alone cannot make a decision to agree or disagree 
with the construction of any particular dam on the Mekong River as the Mekong is an 
international river‖ (Stimson 2009). This suggests that Thailand will seek cooperative 
not unilateral development of the Mekong River. Some commentators have interpreted 
this as a shift in Thailand‘s hydropower position (Stimson 2009). However, this is not 
necessarily the case as in 2010 a MOU was approved by Thailand‘s National Energy 
Policy Committee to start tariff negotiations with Lao PDR over the electricity 
generated by the Sayabouri mainstream dam (Save the Mekong 2010). This is despite 
the EIA for the project and the MRC‘s Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) not 
being completed (Save the Mekong 2010). This illustrates that relationships between 
civil society and more powerful actors are embedded in wider political and 
developmental contexts. 
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7. The role of experts and consultants  
 
In the lower Mekong region, experts and consultants play an important role. They 
are employed by Member State governments, the MRC, the development banks and the 
private sector, to conduct studies, write EIA reports, conduct training programs, 
facilitate meetings and conduct reviews of projects. Experts and consultants are 
extensively utilised by actors in both water resources management and hydropower. 
Due to the technical and complex process that constitutes hydropower development, it is 
a field which is dominated by international consultants and is an expert-led process 
(Bakker 1999). The presence and utilisation of experts and consultants raises questions 
about knowledge generation and how knowledge is utilised. Experts and consultants are 
selected to conduct particular studies for particular purposes. Scientific discourse is 
socially and politically constructed (Forsyth 2003). These issues are not unique to the 
Mekong. 
Leach and Mearns (1996) argue that the independent expert‘s influence over the 
shape of development policies, projects and programmes is now indisputable: they also 
play a unique role in the reproduction of environmental narratives due to the nature of 
their work. Consultants and experts are accountable not only to the beneficiaries of their 
work but also the agencies who employ them, they work on pre-set TOR, within a 
specified (usually short) time-frame, and may be concerned with being employed again 
in the future (Leach and Mearns 1996). Consequently they can contribute to the fixing 
of certain environmental narratives and analyses, without questioning the underlying 
premises (Leach and Mearns 1996). These dynamics are at play in the Mekong:  
 
―One of the fundamental problems is the developer contracts the EIA consultant so 
they‘re not really an independent party. They are paid for by the developers and it‘s 
in the developers‘ interest to look over the consultant‘s shoulder…EIA‘s are a series 
of judgments that a consultant makes about possible or likely impacts, if there is 
something that looks like it might be expensive for the developer, they ask the 
consultant to write it in a different way‖ (Hydropower industry representative, 
interview, 07/08).   
 
EIAs are then utilised by project developers and state agencies to justify and promote 
the project as necessary and ‗good‘ in terms of environmental and social impacts, and to 
combat counter-claims from civil society. This raises questions about the impartiality of 
EIAs and their role in legitimising hydropower projects. Issues surrounding knowledge 
generation and utilisation are explored in Chapter Seven.  
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8. Conclusion 
 
The lower Mekong‘s hydropolitical constellation comprises a wide range of actor 
types with different interests in hydropower development. Actors interact in a number 
of different ways in relationships located over various scalar levels. Key actor types 
include: state actors, the development banks, donors, the private sector, civil society and 
experts. The individual actors comprising each actor type have changed since 1991. For 
example, private sector companies from China are replacing western companies in 
hydropower development. Actor relationships overlap and condition each other. Thai 
state actors, such as EGAT, have rescaled their electricity development plans to focus 
on hydropower development in Lao PDR, partially in response to Thai civil society 
protests over domestic hydropower. This illustrates that actor relationships do not exist 
in isolation and have to be examined from a perspective that considers their 
embeddedness in wider scalar relationships. Different actors have different interests, 
goals and visions for the development of the Mekong. Water resources debates in the 
lower Mekong reveal the struggle between different actors to determine the direction 
and type of development, as well as to legitimise certain actors and their plans. 
Each of the lower Mekong states is comprised of a number of different agencies, 
ministries and bureaucracies. There are power relationships between different state 
actors who have different interests. Water and energy actors in the lower Mekong states, 
such as the NMCs and the energy ministries, are largely isolated from each other. 
Proposed and planned hydropower projects, such as the Don Sahong, illustrate that 
hydropower development is conducted outside of the sphere of transboundary water 
cooperation. Hydropower development is also a mechanism by which states can extend 
their power and reach in remote areas. National level justifications, such as poverty 
reduction, can mask this reality, and also obscure the nature of processes, such as 
corruption, which condition development outcomes.  
New actors challenge the status of traditional actors, which results in the former 
engaging in strategies to maintain or extend their access to resources. The ADB and the 
World Bank are extremely involved in hydropower development in the lower Mekong. 
However, the emergence of new private sectors actors means that the lower Mekong 
states no longer need the development banks to facilitate hydropower development. The 
development banks have responded by promoting Nam Theun 2 in Lao PDR as a 
‗model‘ development project (see Chapter Six), and developing the MWRAS as a 
vehicle to increase their access and visibility in Mekong water management.     
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The development of hydropower by the lower Mekong states is located in a wider 
context of donor relations. Traditional donors to the lower Mekong states and to the 
MRC have concentrated their support in a number of areas, including: rural 
development, water resources management and climate change. In contrast, new donors 
are providing soft loans and other types of financing for infrastructure development. 
This support from states like China and Qatar has to be contextualised within the aims 
of those states to secure access to resources such as energy and food. Relationships 
between traditional and new donors overlap and condition each other in the sense that 
new donors offer alternative avenues for infrastructure funding at a time when 
traditional donors are urging caution, the use of the MRC, or shifting support to Africa.  
New private sector actors have increased in importance in the lower Mekong‘s 
hydropolitical constellation and hydropower development. Plans for mainstream 
hydropower in Lao PDR are increasingly involving Thai and Vietnamese private sector 
companies and financiers. This is in contrast to earlier hydropower projects, which were 
largely facilitated by the development banks and financed and constructed by Western 
companies (and sometimes including Western government development agencies). 
China‘s bilateral relationships with the lower Mekong states have increased since the 
1990s (see Chapter Three). The expansion of Chinese private sector involvement in the 
development of both mainstream and tributary hydropower is intertwined with Chinese 
state policy. Chinese companies have been encouraged to ‗go out‘ from China in order 
to secure access to natural resources. 
Civil society actors are challenging both hydropower plans and the dominant 
representations and narratives, which are utilised to justify and promote them. Different 
civil society actors have different agendas, interests and development visions for the 
Mekong. Global, regional, and domestic civil society actors are participating in the 
hydropower debate in the Mekong. There is limited space for domestic civil society to 
express opinions and question development interventions in the lower Mekong. 
However, Thailand does have a strong environmental movement who have challenged 
domestic dam development, such as the Pak Mun dam. Civil society actors have 
adopted a number of strategies to challenge the dominant hydropower narrative. These 
include: conveying their own meetings; establishing links and coalitions between 
domestic, regional and global civil society; producing counter-evidence; targeting the 
MRC; and promoting hydropower standards.  
Interactions and power relations between the various actor types, described in this 
chapter, are integral in promoting and contesting hydropower development over various 
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scalar levels in the lower Mekong. The rich interconnections between actors, narratives 
and power relationships over different scales condition the key water resources debates 
in the lower Mekong, and illustrate the complexity of its hydropolitics.  
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Table 2: Traditional and new donors in the lower Mekong hydropolitical constellation 
 
Donor Donor Type Strategy Donor interest and area of 
support 
Recipient Donor to MRC/ MRC 
programmes 
ADB Multilateral 
Development 
Bank 
1.Greater Mekong Subregion 
Programme 
2.Mekong Water Resources 
Assistance Strategy 
1. Increased interconnectivity. 
Infrastructure. Development of 
economic corridors. 
2. ‗Balanced development‘. 
Three key areas: 3S basin, 
Mekong Delta and Mekong 
subregion shared by Lao PDR 
and Thailand. 
1.Six Mekong states 
2.MRC, Cambodia, Lao PDR, 
Vietnam 
ADB also provides various types 
of assistance for individual 
hydropower projects in the 
region. 
MOU with MRC. 
Flood Management and 
Mitigation Programme. 
Two actors liaising on ADB‘s 
work on 3S basin.  
Australia Old 1.Greater Mekong Subregion: 
Australia‘s Strategy to Promote 
Integration and Cooperation 
2007-2011 
2. Mekong Water Resources 
Strategy 
1. Greater cooperation and 
connectivity. Infrastructure 
(including roads), energy, health, 
education, HIV/AIDS and 
Climate Change. 
2. Regional cooperation, 
sustainable development and 
improving water management.  
1. Cambodia, Lao PDR, Vietnam 
2. MRC is designated a key 
partner.  
ADB and World Bank also 
identified as partners in 1 and 2. 
Basin Development Plan, 
Environment Programme, 
Integrated Capacity Building 
Programme, Navigation 
China New 1.Opening the South Gate: 
cultural gifts and ‗soft‘ loans 
2.Going Out 
1.Increasing economic ties and 
bilateral relations. Increasing 
trade. 
2.Chinese private companies 
encouraged to build 
infrastructure projects abroad. 
Secure access to natural 
resources.  
1.Cambodia and Lao PDR have 
received gifts and loans.  
2.Cambodia and Lao PDR, but 
strategy is global and seen 
increased Chinese involvement 
in Africa and Asia.  
No. Dialogue partner. Attends 
yearly meeting. Shares water 
level data in wet season to assist 
MRC flood forecasting.  
Denmark Old A World for All: Priorities of the 
Danish Government for Danish 
Development Assistance 2008-
2012 
Climate Change, environment 
and poverty reduction. Favours a 
partnership approach  
Cambodia and Vietnam. Special 
Environmental Assistance has 
also been provided to Cambodia, 
Thailand and Vietnam. 
Basin Development Plan, 
Environment Programme, 
Fisheries Programme, 
Institutional Support 
142 
 
Finland Old Ex-ante Evaluation of Finish 
Development Cooperation in the 
Mekong Region. Strategy covers 
till 2010. 
Regional Cooperation. Focus on 
water and environment sectors as 
resources for ‗turning poverty 
into prosperity‘. Three strategic 
areas: Governance, Livelihoods, 
and Transport and 
Communication 
Vietnam Hydropower Programme, 
Information and Knowledge 
Management Programme, 
Integrated Capacity Building 
Programme 
India New Bilateral assistance Bilateral assistance includes IT 
training, capacity building, 
funding for irrigation projects 
Irrigation projects in Cambodia. 
IT training and capacity building 
Lao PDR and Cambodia. 
No 
Japan Old Official Development Assistance 
White Paper 2006 
Capacity building, agriculture 
and forestry, rural development, 
environmental resources 
management  
Cambodia, Lao PDR, Vietnam Support to Hydropower 
programme formulation through 
ASEAN. Technical support. 
Agriculture, Irrigation and 
Forestry Programme. 
Kuwait New  ‗Soft‘ loans to Cambodia. 
No official strategy. 
Infrastructure projects: irrigation, 
hydropower and roads 
Cambodia No 
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Qatar New ‗Soft‘ loans to Cambodia. 
No official strategy.  
Agriculture. Investing in 
Cambodia‘s agriculture sector, 
including irrigation for rice 
farming, in order to secure access 
to crops.   
Cambodia No 
Sweden Old Strategy for development 
cooperation with parts of 
Southeast Asia 2005-2009 
Environmental protection, 
democracy and human rights, 
HIV/AIDS, and scientific 
cooperation. Regional 
cooperation designed to 
supplement bilateral priorities. 
Lao PDR, Vietnam Basin Development Plan, 
Environment Programme, 
Fisheries Programme 
United 
States 
Returning Lower Mekong Initiative Building capacity to manage 
natural resources. Four areas of 
support: Environment, health, 
infrastructure and education. 
Partnership approach. 
MRC: sister-river partnership 
with Mississippi. 
Cambodia: forestry and land 
management training  
Vietnam and Thailand: clean 
energy development. 
USAID facilitates a program of 
dispute prevention and 
management activities across the 
MRC.  
World 
Bank 
Multilateral 
Development 
Bank 
1.Country Assistance Strategies 
for Cambodia, Lao PDR and 
Vietnam 
2.Mekong Water Resources 
Assistance Strategy 
1. Poverty reduction. Sectors 
including rural development, 
agriculture, and healthcare. 
2. Balanced development‘. Three 
key areas: 3S basin, Mekong 
Delta and Mekong subregion 
shared by Lao PDR and 
Thailand. 
1.Cambodia, Lao PDR 
2. MRC, Cambodia, Lao PDR, 
Vietnam  
World Bank also provides 
different types of assistance for 
individual hydropower projects 
in the region. 
Water Utilisation Programme. 
Modelling work of this 
programme used in MWRAS. 
Mekong IWRM Support 
Programme. 
MOU with MRC 
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Chapter Five: The MRC at the intersection of actor relationships and 
discourses 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The MRC operates at the intersection of competing actor relationships and 
discourse. The reorientation of Mekong water cooperation in 1995 with the signing of 
the Mekong Agreement reflects and is situated in changes at the global water discourse 
level. The MRC is also at the intersection of discourses surrounding water resources 
cooperation, and water resources development. The global hydropower debate has 
included the incorporation of civil society concerns into processes such as the World 
Commission on Dams. Whilst spaces now exist, globally and regionally, to oppose and 
challenge hydropower plans, hydropower development is still viewed as a key 
development option.  
Since 1995 concerns about the role and relevance of the MRC have been 
growing: these intensified with public awareness in 2007 of the resurrection of plans for 
lower Mekong mainstream dams. Civil society actors have accused the MRC of 
abdicating responsibility for the lower Mekong (TERRA 2007), whilst old donors have 
urged Member States to use the MRC more (Development Partners 2007). The debates 
about the relevancy of the MRC and the wider debates concerning IWRM and 
sustainable development in the Mekong illustrate how different actors conceptualise the 
space for transboundary water governance differently, and as such have differing ideas 
about the role of the MRC. The MRC and transboundary water governance are 
embedded within wider actor relationships and socio-political contexts, which condition 
its role and relevance. Actor relationships, both inside and outside of the water 
governance sphere, impact outcomes at the transboundary scale. Analysing this 
complexity is necessary in order to adequately consider key questions in the debate 
about the role and relevance of the MRC, such as the role of information and knowledge 
in decision-making.   
 Interview participants identified three key sets of relationships or dynamics, 
which are producing debates about, and conditioning the role and relevance of the MRC 
in current hydropower development debates. These are: one, interactions between state 
water and energy actors; two, interactions between old donors and Member States 
(which, in turn are partially conditioned by global discourses concerning water 
development and governance, and the concerns of civil society in donor states); and 
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three, civil society actors ‗scaling up‘ their opposition to hydropower to the 
transboundary scale as the MRC is one arena in which alternative representations can be 
articulated. 
   
2. Water and development debates at the global level 
 
Water resources management and development have featured prominently in global 
development discourse since 1945. During this time water resources management 
paradigms have developed from a focus on harnessing water resources for mankind, to 
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), which integrates economic, 
environmental and social concerns into water management. The global consensus about 
hydropower development has also shifted during this time period as social and 
environmental concerns have gained visibility and resonance at the international scale. 
This culminated in the World Commission on Dams process in 2000. However, 
hydropower has not disappeared as a development option, but has been repackaged as a 
debate about standards.  
 
2.1. The global water resources agenda and Integrated Water Resources Management  
 
Environmental issues have slowly risen in prominence on the international agenda 
since the 1960s. Initially concerns centred on particular environmental problems 
including acid rain, nuclear testing and sea pollution (Greene 1997). But in the 1970s 
international environmental conferences and new actors emerged, including the 1972 
UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, and the UN Environmental 
Program. International treaties in the 1970s and 1980s were problem specific and 
focused on problems such as protecting the Ozone layer, and halting the trade of 
endangered species. In the late 1980s the focus shifted from specific problems, to the 
twin considerations of environment and development.  
The 1987 Bruntland Report of the UN World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED) gave birth to the concept of sustainable development. 
Sustainable development was defined as ―development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" 
(WCED 1987: 43). However, the report did not define needs. Despite this, sustainable 
development has been promoted by the international community and transmitted 
through international conferences and agreements. The 1992 UN Conference on 
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Environment and Development in Rio resulted in Agenda 21, a comprehensive blueprint 
for sustainable development covering a wide range of issues including social and 
economic dimensions, conserving and managing resources for development, and 
strengthening the role of major groups (e.g. women, youth and NGOs). In 2001, eight 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) were adopted by the UN and its‘ members. The 
MDG were derived from the 2000 United Nations Millennium Declaration. Goal 7 is to 
ensure environmental sustainability. This includes a target to halve, by 2015, the 
proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic 
sanitation (UN 2007). The World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 in 
Johannesburg confirmed a full commitment to implementing Agenda 21 and achieving 
the MDGs.   
Water management and development became increasingly visible on the 
international agenda from the 1970s onwards. At first water was considered in a narrow 
and unproblematique fashion. For example, at the 1977 UN Conference on Water the 
focus was largely on water supply and sanitation, whilst the Brundtland Report only 
mentioned water in relation to pollution and water supply (Savenije and Van der Zaag 
2008). However, in the 1980s and 1990s members of the water profession began to 
conceptualise water problems as multi-dimensional, multi-sectoral and multi-regional 
and filled with multi-interests (Biswas 2004). At the 1994 International Conference on 
Water and Environment in Dublin the four principles which underpin IWRM were 
defined (GWP 2000). Briefly the principles are: one, water is a finite and vulnerable 
resource that is essential to sustain life, development and the environment; two, water 
development and management should be based on a participatory approach; three, 
women play a central role; and four, water has an economic value and should be 
recognised as an economic good (GWP 2000). According to the Global Water 
Partnership (GWP) these principles have gained universal support in the international 
community (GWP 2000). The development and definition of IWRM has been an expert-
led process (Varis et al. 2008a). The Dublin Principles informed the 1992 Rio 
Conference and the discussion of Chapter 18 of Agenda 21, which focused on water. 
Following these two conferences the GWP was established in 1996 by the UNDP and 
the World Bank, with a secretariat in the Swedish International Development Agency 
(SIDA) in Stockholm (GWP 2006a). GWP activities include developing a conceptual 
framework for IWRM, contributing to its implementation and developing Country 
Water Partnerships with states around the globe (GWP 2006a). The definition of IWRM 
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developed by the GWP is widely utilised, including in the lower Mekong states, the 
ADB and the MRC.     
IWRM has been presented as a paradigm shift in water resources: a shift from 
exploiting water resources to integrated management (Savenije and Van der Zaag 2008). 
As an approach IWRM draws on the principles of efficiency, equity and environmental 
sustainability, and argues that ―waters should be used to provide economic well-being to 
the people, without compromising social equity and environmental sustainability‖ 
(Varis et al. 2008b: 146). IWRM, like sustainable development, seeks to integrate these 
three goals within the same framework. This differs from previous ideas about 
development, which suggest an ‗either/or‘ picture: a choice between economic 
development on the one hand and the environment/social concerns on the other.  
However, civil society representatives interviewed for this thesis argued that in the 
lower Mekong states officials and developers still conceptualise development in 
‗either/or‘ terms:   
 
―A large part of our work is to dispel the myth believed by state officials and 
communities that wildlife conservation is counter to development, that you have to 
choose between people and animals, it is possible to have both‖ (Civil society 
representative, interview, 06/08b).   
 
―The discussion that the government needs to have, which is not happening now, is 
hydropower the most appropriate development option for Laos given that most Lao 
communities are dependent on natural resources. Hydropower increases GDP but it 
undermines the natural resource base. The government is focused on hydropower, 
on electricity, they are happy to sacrifice the environment and local communities‘ 
livelihoods‖ (Civil society representative, interview, 07/08b).  
 
IWRM features in lower Mekong government strategies but there are concerns about 
how to implement it and how to integrate economic, social, and environmental concerns 
(discussed further below). This integration is also widely debated in the academic 
literature as it is unclear how to balance these three goals, which may be antagonistic 
(Molle 2008a).  
IWRM is widely accepted at the international level: it features in conferences and 
statements of action such as the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development; and 
it is promoted by international actors such as the World Bank, the United Nations and 
GWP. It has also been adopted into national water laws and plans, including the 2007 
Cambodian Water Law. The spread and dissemination of IWRM is often presented as 
natural, technical and unproblematic. For example, the GWP (2006a) argues that IWRM 
emerged out of a growing awareness of the problems of past water practices. This 
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suggests that once policy and decision-makers recognised there was a problem, a 
solution was devised. This obscures the social and political processes surrounding the 
development of IWRM. 
IWRM, despite its popularity, is still a contested concept. Concerns have been 
expressed that adoption of IWRM allows actors to repackage old projects, to continue 
business-as-usual under a new label, and to use this to gain access to new funds or more 
international legitimacy (Biswas 2004; Molle 2008a). The paradigm reformulations 
which paved the way for IWRM are compatible with both large-scale infrastructure 
solutions and state centralisation of water control (Trottier 2008). Biswas (2004) argues 
that IWRM is a vague concept and actors‘ ideas of what it means vary widely. This 
ambiguity in meaning partially explains the popularity of IWRM (AMRC 2007b: 3). 
Sustainable development is also ambiguous: Brundtland‘s broad definition is at the root 
of a number of controversies, and scholars are unclear how to operationalise and 
measure sustainable development (Banerjee 2003). However, states and organisations, 
including those in the lower Mekong and the MRC, have made commitments to IWRM 
and sustainable development. Within these commitments and the work to operationalise 
them, both concepts are treated as technical and unproblematic.        
 
2.2. Hydropower debates and the World Commission on Dams 
 
Changes in water resources and environment paradigms at the global level were 
debated in a context of growing civil society and local community concerns about 
hydropower dams. Civil society groups, environmental activists and communities 
coalesced into loose alliances around particular dams and campaigned to gain space on 
the international agenda. Controversial projects included the Narmada Project in India 
(a series of 3200 dams in the Narmada River basin), the Ilisu Dam in Turkey, and the 
Belo Monte Hydro-electric complex in Brazil. Movements included the Brazilian 
Movement of Dam Affected People, formed in the 1980s in response to big dam 
projects in Brazil, and the Assembly of the Poor, in Northeast Thailand. Civil society 
groups and movements focused a large amount of attention on the World Bank and the 
hydropower dams it had funded (Imhof et al. 2002). In 1994, over 2000 organisations 
signed the Manibeli declaration calling for the World Bank to establish a review of all 
Bank-funded large dams (Imhof et al. 2002). The first conference of dam affected 
people was held in Curitiba, Brazil and called for a moratorium on dams and a 
comprehensive and independent review.  Following a meeting of diverse dam-related 
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stakeholders convened by the World Bank and the International Union for Conservation 
of Nature (IUCN) in 1997, the World Commission on Dams (WCD) was established in 
1998 in response to growing opposition to large dams, which included protests at dam 
sites around the world (Dubash et al. 2001; Imhof et al. 2002).  
The WCD mandate was to review the development effectiveness of dams and 
develop criteria, guidelines, and standards for the future of dams. It consisted of 12 
commissioners and a Forum with 68 members. The work of the WCD included: brief 
reviews of 125 dams in 56 countries; in-depth case studies of 8 dams; papers reviewing 
the overall dam-building record of China, Russia and India; 17 thematic reviews; four 
public hearings; and 950 submissions by individuals, groups and institutions (Imhof et 
al. 2002). The 2000 WCD report argued that whilst dams had made a significant 
contribution to human development, in too many cases, an unacceptable price in terms 
of displacement of people and social and environmental costs had been paid to secure 
those benefits (WCD 2000). The report proposed seven strategic priorities to guide 
future dam decision-making, and 26 guidelines of good practice for complying with the 
strategic priorities. However, the World Bank endorsed the principles of the WCD but 
not the framework. Civil society actors in the lower Mekong are concerned that the 
development banks and the dam-building industry are unwilling to commit to the WCD-
recommended minimum set of guidelines, which they feel are necessary to develop a 
hydropower project ―that would truly allocate costs and benefits to all involved in a 
democratised process‖ (Civil society representative, interview, 04/08b).   
Dam development is still extremely controversial and contested by civil society 
actors. Nam Theun 2 in Lao PDR was the first World Bank supported dam after the 
WCD process and was the subject of an intense and divisive global debate (Lawrence 
2009). Civil society actors have been pressurising donors and the hydropower industry 
to apply the WCD strategic priorities and guidelines. However, some parts of the 
hydropower industry have responded by formulating their own standards. For example, 
the International Hydropower Association (IHA) has generated its own set of 
guidelines, the IHA‘s Sustainability Protocol. The IHA is an industry association 
formed by the UN‘s Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization in 1995 to 
disseminate good practice and knowledge, and advance the role of hydropower in 
meeting energy needs (IHA 2006). The IHA‘s Sustainability Protocol guidelines mirror 
those of the WCD as a tool for decision-makers and were piloted between 2008 and 
2010 through the Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Forum. This Forum included 
representatives from developing and developed countries, NGOs, researchers, banks and 
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hydropower companies. The Forum held meetings at various strategic locations, 
including the Yangtze River in China, did quick audits of projects, and held public 
consultations. Civil society actors in the Mekong, such as MPOWER, a network of 
researchers and organisations whose coordination unit is based at Chiang Mai 
University, Thailand, engaged with the IHA process.  
 
3. The impact of global water resources debates in the lower Mekong 
 
Changes in orientation in the global debates on water management, development 
and hydropower have been mirrored in the Mekong region illustrating the links between 
the global, regional and national levels of environmental discourse. Implementation of 
global ideas in regional and national contexts is difficult and in some cases has proved 
controversial. Sustainable development and IWRM have been, officially and 
rhetorically, adopted by the four states of the lower Mekong both individually and 
collectively through their cooperative arrangements in the MRC and collaborative work 
with the development banks. However, this is not as straightforward as it sounds. Both 
sustainable development and IWRM are contested concepts. Rhetorical adoption of 
them can allow for business-as-usual.   
 
3.1. Sustainable development and the Mekong River Commission 
 
 The signing of the 1995 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable 
Development of the Mekong River committed the four lower Mekong states to cooperate 
in all fields of sustainable development. The MRC is committed to sustainable 
development as defined under Agenda 21 (MRC 2005), and its vision for the basin is an 
―economically prosperous, socially equitable, and environmentally sound Mekong 
River Basin‖ (MRC 2006), which mirrors the 3E principles incorporated in IWRM.  
The stated overall goal of the MRC Strategic Plan 2006-2010  is to support the Member 
states for ―More effective use of the Mekong‘s water and related resources to alleviate 
poverty while protecting the environment‖ (MRC 2006: 24). This is supported by four 
goals which relate to the role of the MRC: one, ―promote and support coordinated, 
sustainable and pro-poor development‖; two ―enhance effective regional cooperation‖; 
three, ―strengthen basin-wide environmental monitoring and impact assessment‖; and 
four, strengthen the IWRM ―capacity and knowledge base of the MRC bodies, NMCs, 
Line Agencies, and other stakeholders‖ (MRC 2006: 24). Strengthening the IWRM 
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knowledge base involves providing training for various MRC actors. Training is 
conducted by outside experts. The vision and goals of the MRC are in line with the 
global level environmental discourse as they emphasise elements such as cooperation 
and balancing the needs of economy, society and the environment, as well as placing 
sustainable development centre stage. 
As opposed to the earlier Mekong Committee, which developed Basin 
Development Plans for mainstream and tributary hydropower and identified/studied a 
range of project sites, the sustainable development-orientated MRC talks of helping 
countries to identify the development space, trade-offs, environmental concerns and the 
ecological balance of the River (e.g. MRC 2006). The language of sustainable 
development is operationalised by both the MRC and government representatives in 
private meetings and public forums. For example, at the 2008 MRC‘s Regional Multi-
Stakeholder Consultation on the MRC Hydropower Programme, the Lao government 
representative gave a presentation on state hydropower plans, which utilised the 
assumptions of the dominant narrative (see Chapter Three) to link socio-economic 
development and sustainable development:  
 
―hydropower development in Laos will help the development of the people. It is 
important that we work together to ensure accountability and transparency of 
environmental and social impacts and thereby achieve sustainable development 
(Lao state official, observation notes, MRC meeting, 09/08).  
 
Within this statement hydropower, with consideration for its social and environmental 
aspects, is a tool for achieving sustainable development. Civil society representatives 
present at the meeting questioned the links made between hydropower and sustainable 
development:  
  
―Hydropower to date has been unsustainable. Hydropower exacerbates poverty, 
it does not reduce it. It cuts communities off from natural resources that they 
need‖ (Civil society representative, observation notes, MRC meeting, 09/08).  
 
―you have to sacrifice fish and forests to build dams. How do you compensate 
for that? Studies show it can‘t be mitigated‖ (Civil Society representative, 
observation notes, MRC meeting, 09/08).  
 
The above statements illustrate that state officials and civil society representatives 
understand and define sustainable development in different ways. They also place 
emphasis on different elements. State officials emphasise the potential economic 
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benefits, whilst civil society actors emphasise its negative social and environmental 
impacts.   
Sustainable development is a contested concept. Banerjee (2003) argues that, 
despite claims of a paradigm shift, sustainable development is based on an economic 
not an ecological rationality and that its imposition on developing countries is 
problematic. In terms of the Mekong, Lang (2006) argues that for Member States the 
1995 Mekong Agreement represents ―an ambitious management plan for the Mekong 
River‖ that they were ―calling sustainable development‖ and entailed both mainstream 
and tributary dams as tapping the energy potential of the Mekong in the most profitable 
way was high on the agenda (552). This illustrates how incorporation of new concepts 
can be viewed as a discursive devise to re-package projects and goals under a new label. 
This allows for the promotion of a certain development agenda, and does not 
necessarily represent a change in how powerful actors conceptualise development.  
 
3.2. IWRM in the lower Mekong 
 
  In order to achieve its vision the MRC has adopted IWRM. In the 2005 Strategic 
Directions for IWRM in the Lower Mekong Basin the MRC identified eight strategic 
priorities including economic development and poverty alleviation, environment 
protection, integration through basin planning, and regional cooperation. The MRC‘s 
current strategic plan which runs to 2010 states that the MRC will focus its efforts on 
basin-wide projects and plans, transboundary projects and national projects with 
significant/cumulative basin-wide implications (MRC 2006: iv). As part of the work of 
the Basin Development Plan (BDP) programme, an IWRM Based Basin Strategy is 
currently being developed. This strategy will guide implementation of IWRM at the 
various levels and provide a planning framework and directions to guide the long-term 
sustainable development of the lower Mekong. The IWRM Based Basin Strategy is one 
of the three elements that will constitute the Rolling IWRM Basin Development Plan 
that is currently being produced by the MRC (the other two elements are a Project 
Portfolio and Development Scenarios). 
 At the national level the four riparian states have made commitments to IWRM, 
for example to the World Summit on Sustainable Development 2002 Plan of 
Implementation, which committed states to developing IWRM and water efficiency 
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plans by 2005.
8
 New water laws have been drafted in the four lower Mekong states to 
reflect IWRM principles, for example in 2005 in Lao PDR and 2007 in Cambodia. 
These new laws have draft status in Thailand and Vietnam and include provisions for 
the establishment of river basin organisations. Similarities in national water policies can 
be partially explained by the fact they have been guided by mainstream thinking and by 
measures prescribed by development agencies and banks (IWMI 2006). For example, 
Apex bodies have been promoted by the ADB as best practice in water management 
(IWMI 2006). Apex bodies, such as the WREA in Lao PDR have been established. The 
pursuit of IWRM in the national context has largely centred on legal aspects and civil 
society actors are concerned that there has only been limited application of IWRM to 
date (Turner et al. 2009).  
Mekong state officials at MRC meetings have expressed concerns about their 
capacity to implement IWRM, and expressed confusion over what IWRM means: 
 
―There is not a clear definition of IWRM. What does it mean? Somethings can‘t 
be implemented because touch on our different national contexts‖ (State official, 
observation notes, MRC meeting, 05/08). 
 
―We don‘t have the capacity to apply IWRM. The Minister always says to me, 
―you are always on about IWRM, but how?‖‖ (State official, observation notes, 
MRC meeting, 06/08). 
 
The implementation of IWRM in the lower Mekong is further complicated by the fact 
that the four states are committed to both national and regional IWRM. How to balance 
the three goals of IWRM in a regional context where state actors are emphasising 
infrastructure development as a way to meet growing energy needs and contribute to 
poverty reduction and socio-economic development is highly debated. Organisations, 
such as the MRC, have suggested trade-offs as a potential solution. These issues are 
considered in Chapter Seven.  
 
4. Hydropower development in the lower Mekong: an intensifying debate  
 
 Concepts such as sustainable development and IWRM are utilised by a range of 
actors in the current debate over the development future of the basin. These concepts 
demonstrate the interplay between the environmental discourse at the global level and in 
                                                             
8
 Implementation of this target has been complicated. A Global Water Partnership survey, conducted at 
the end of 2005, found that of 95 states surveyed 21% had made good progress, 53% some progress and 
26% were in the initial stages (GWP 2006b). 
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specific regions and locales. Whilst a range of actors with different interests and goals 
debate and use these concepts they are usually proffering competing visions for the 
Mekong and emphasising different issues. The adoption and utilisation of these 
concepts by more powerful actors is not necessarily a co-option of the terrain of actors 
who contest Mekong hydropower development, but it does have a number of possible 
effects. One, it creates an environment whereby all actors are speaking the same 
language, albeit meaning different things; two, it allows powerful actors to incorporate 
the concerns of less powerful actors into their discourse and thereby extend their power; 
and three, it can allow powerful actors to re-dress old projects as new ones.  
For example, the Nam Theun 2 hydro-electric project in Lao PDR was originally 
conceived by the French colonial authority in 1927. It has gone through various 
incarnations, but after the WCD and the incorporation of other concerns into 
development projects and plans, it has been recast as a social development project, 
which includes a number of elements not necessarily directly related to building a 
hydro-electric dam: livelihood components and elephant conservation. As such NT2 has 
been repackaged (although it is still justified in terms of the dominant regional 
discursive formation):  
 
―In NT2 we are developing not just a hydropower project. We support it because 
it will help to reduce poverty. This is an attractive project for Laos and 
hydropower is one main driver of growth. We are working with the government 
to track all revenue and it is then allocated for poverty reduction‖ (Development 
bank representative, interview, 03/08).  
  
Consequently, the scope of the debate changed. Proponents of hydropower projects 
incorporated NGOs‘ concerns (i.e. resettlement, conservation, and environmental 
concerns) into their justifications for projects. This affects the nature and terms of the 
discursive struggle between actors to determine the development vision and direction 
for the Mekong (see Chapter Seven).      
Questions and concerns about hydropower development in the lower Mekong have 
slowly built from the 1970s. Rudimentary social and environmental concerns appeared 
in the grand development plans of the Mekong Committee, such as the 1988 
Perspectives for Mekong Development. Nodes of resistance and struggles have formed 
around particular dams. High profile examples include the Pak Mun dam in Thailand, 
and the Nam Theun 2 dam in Lao PDR (see Chapter Four). The constellation of actors 
involved in these hydropower projects includes local actors, global civil society actors, 
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development banks, and donors. This illustrates that water resources development 
transcend scalar levels and involve a wide range of disparate actors.  
Hydropower has been promoted as a development option for the Mekong since the 
1950s (see Chapter Three). Whilst hydropower was proposed for the Mekong 
mainstream none of the grand plans ever came to fruition. Tributary hydropower was 
developed in a number of places, including Nam Ngum in Lao PDR. Powerful actors, 
such as the ABD and World Bank, argued that the majority of the Mekong‘s remaining 
hydropower was in the tributaries, and that the development of mainstream hydropower 
was unlikely:  
 
―even a run-of-the-river dam would inundate a comparatively large area and would 
have major impacts on fish migration in that stretch of the river. Such development 
would pose serious ecological, social and economic risks that could outweigh the 
potential benefits from power generation‖ (ADB and World Bank 2006: 15).  
 
Civil society actors considered plans for mainstream hydropower dams to be ―things of 
the past‖. At meetings observed for this thesis civil society representatives repeatedly 
referred to these dams as ―old dams‖ and ―1960s dams‖ (Civil Society Representative, 
observation notes, MRC meeting 03/08; Civil Society Representative, observation 
notes, MRC meeting 09/08). Prior to 2007 actors, such as the development banks and 
civil society organisations, focused on tributary projects. 
 In 2007, interest in damming the mainstream of the Mekong erupted in the public 
arena. Official announcements were made about MOUs signed between the 
governments of Lao PDR and Cambodia and a number of private sector companies, 
including the Malaysian company Megafirst, to conduct feasibility studies into 
mainstream dam locations (see Map 3, p.6). Initially, civil society groups were aware of 
six projects (TERRA 2007). By 2008, this figure had grown to eleven. These 
mainstream dam projects are the latest incarnation of the original dams proposed and 
studied by the Mekong Committee (see Chapter Three). Civil society actors were 
largely unaware of the plans to resurrect these proposed dams, and expressed surprise 
that these ―old dams‖ are being considered again:  
 
―in this last iteration, I feel like it only came back in the last year…nobody 
mentioned it…in 2006. It was not on the agenda, the mainstream dams, I mean 
nobody was talking about it…I mean it was like 2007. But then I mean that‘s the 
thing if the government was talking about this we wouldn‘t even know…because 
how would we know‖ (Civil society representative, interview, 06/08a).       
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―A lot has changed in the last few months. I‘m surprised to see we are still talking 
about these issues. Assessments in the 1960s showed that these dams would have 
massive consequences for fisheries and they were not built. But, now in the past 
twelve months the pace of development has accelerated and we are talking about 
these dams again‖ (Civil society representatives, observation notes, MRC meeting, 
03/08).  
 
Interest and debate over proposals for mainstream dams is rife both within the region 
and globally. Civil society actors based in the Mekong as well as media and civil 
society from outside are actively engaging in the debate. Key focuses of the debate 
include local livelihoods, fisheries, mitigation of fisheries impacts, the role of the MRC 
in mainstream dams, and to a lesser extent whether these dams are needed.  
The renewal of interest in mainstream hydropower has intensified the debate about 
how to develop the water resources of the Mekong. State officials, both in interviews 
for this thesis and public meetings, thesis located hydropower within a narrative linking 
it to poverty reduction and development. Meanwhile, other actors accused state officials 
of ―1960s thinking‖: 
 
―Our region is endowed with natural resources. Hydropower can help poverty 
alleviation and provide mutual benefits‖ (State official, observation notes, MRC 
meeting 09/08). 
 
 ―The people need development. Hydropower is a top priority. We need more 
electricity to develop. Development means the people will not be so poor‖ (State 
official, interview, 06/08c). 
 
―in other places the precautionary principle would be applied. But the way in the 
Mekong is that developers will do what they want unless someone proves to them 
otherwise, in that way, in the Mekong, development is still being done in the 
1960s/1970s way‖ (Expert, interview, 05/08).  
 
State officials‘ rationales for hydropower are located at the national scale. In contrast, 
civil society actors are arguing from the basis of communities, and focus on the 
livelihood and fisheries impacts of hydropower development.  Consequently, the claims, 
arguments, and justifications are located over different scalar levels of analysis.   
 
5. Debates about the role and relevance of the MRC 
 
 One of the key ways in which the challenges to the dominant regional discursive 
formation have been articulated is through the relevancy debate surrounding the MRC. 
Civil society groups have targeted the MRC as a mechanism to express concerns over 
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proposed hydropower plans, and to access development debates in a region where civil 
society is largely weak and lacks links to state agencies (see Chapter Four). The MRC 
has participation processes, such as inviting NGOs to regional meetings, which allow 
certain civil society actors to engage with state representatives. Donors and civil society 
organisations have expressed concerns about the role of the MRC (Hirsch and Jensen 
2006). However, the proposed mainstream dams have intensified the debate and ―signal 
an especially critical time for MRC…[as how]…MRC addresses key concerns and 
balances different interests in the basin will have significant bearing on MRC‘s 
perceived relevance to its member states, donors and the people of the basin‖. (Lee and 
Scurrah 2009: 6). As outlined below, a number of interview participants echoed this 
view, arguing that this is a crucial moment in the history of Mekong water cooperation.  
 
5.1. Background to the relevancy debate 
 
Against a backdrop of regional conflict and instability the signing of the 1995 
Mekong Agreement was heralded as a landmark step forward in Mekong cooperation 
(e.g. Jacobs 2002). Old donors to the MRC welcomed the Mekong Agreement as ―a 
constructive state-of-the-art development framework with a primary concern for the 
environment and the peoples whose livelihoods depend on the river‖ (Hirsch and Jensen 
2006: iii). Consequently, from its beginnings in the mid-1990s the MRC was the object 
of a large amount of goodwill from different actors. State officials, as well as donor 
representatives have interpreted the Mekong Agreement as a development agreement, 
albeit with caveats. However, civil society actors interpret the 1995 Mekong Agreement 
as primarily an environmental and social agreement, which does not allow hydropower 
development: 
 
―We share the need to develop, and the agreement will help us to do that. It will help 
us with room to compromise based on the real need for development‖ (State official, 
interview, 06/08b). 
 
―the agreement has a huge development flavour. It‘s a development plan almost for 
the river, with environmental and livelihood concerns integrated into it‖ (Donor 
representative, interview, 05/08b). 
 
―The Mekong Agreement was meant to signal a move towards sustainable 
development, environmental protection and river management. Large dams 
represent an outdated development model and the MRC is failing to ensure 
compliance with the 1995 Agreement (Civil Society representative, observation 
notes, regional civil society meeting, 02/08). 
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As outlined above, as opposed to the Mekong Committee, which focused on 
infrastructure development, the MRC is officially and rhetorically committed to 
sustainable development. To a certain extent the MRC is an organisation with a 
bifurcated mandate: the Mekong Agreement commits the four lower Mekong states to 
coordinate in all fields of sustainable development (including hydropower), and develop 
a Basin Development Plan, simultaneously the organisation is committed to protecting 
the ecological balance of the basin (MRC 1995). Different actors with different 
development representations of the lower Mekong have emphasised one or the other of 
these aspects.       
Water resources developments in the basin resulted in actors questioning the role of 
the MRC. These developments included Chinese dam development on the Upper 
Mekong, the Nam Theun 2 hydroelectric project, the Chinese-led navigation channel 
improvement scheme (which involved Myanmar, Thailand and Lao PDR), and the 
social and environmental impacts of the Vietnamese Yali Falls dam on Cambodian 
communities living downstream (Dore and Lazarus 2009). The MRC was either not 
involved or became involved in these incidents at a later stage or to a minimal degree. 
For example, the MRC first alleged that it did not have a mandate to intervene in the Se 
San/Yali Falls Dam, in contrast to other actors who alleged it did have a mandate to 
intervene (Dore and Lazarus 2009). The MRC Secretariat became involved after 
impacts had been reported, organising a taskforce to visit the area and convening a 
meeting between the Cambodian and Vietnamese NMCs.      
The above issues cultivated a growing perception, amongst donors and civil society 
actors, of an organisation absent from the important decisions and debates in the 
Mekong: 
 
―people have been saying for years that…MRC is not involved in the big decisions 
of the Mekong…[and] there‘s been this question of where, where is the MRC‖ 
(Civil Society representative, interview, 06/08). 
 
―the long development of the problems which are related to the MRC are not new, 
we have been discussing these things are lot. The organisation needs to become 
stronger. The MRC has been passive. They need to increase their role, their 
visibility‖ (Donor representative, interview, 05/08c). 
 
Both civil society actors and donors interviewed for this thesis were concerned that the 
MRC was not involved in important debates, decisions, and projects. This illustrates 
how questions about the role and relevance of the MRC originated both within and 
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outside of the MRC. By 2006, donors to the MRC and some civil society actors 
perceived the MRC as at an impasse, and that it was ‗crunch time‘ for the organisation 
(Hirsch and Jensen 2006). 
The ‗Independent Organisational, Financial and Institutional Review of the 
Mekong River Commission Secretariat and the National Mekong Committees‘, 
(hereafter Organisational Review), was initiated in 2006. It was conducted by a team of 
eight experts (four international, and one from each Member State). Its report argued 
that the review was ―initiated by the MRC member countries and the MRC donors in 
order to help MRC meet the organisational and strategic challenges that the institution 
will be facing in the future‖ (MRC 2007a). The review issued 35 recommendations for 
the organisation, including riparianisation and increased Member State financial 
contributions (MRC 2007a). MRC donors were heavily involved in initiating the 
Organisational Review: 
 
―in donor side they allocate money but not get anything from it, did not see any 
development in the organisation. They think that the Member Countries ignore 
the MRC. So they wanted a review‖ (State official, interview, 05/08b) 
 
―When we talk with the donor community they were always concerned with 
ownership, want countries to take more ownership. So they want to come up 
with recommendations for this‖ (State official, interview, 06/08b).  
 
―This external review was financed by the donors: we have been waiting for a 
while to see some change‖ (Donor representative, interview, 04/08).  
 
During the same time period, a joint research project on the MRC was conducted by the 
Danish International Development Assistance (DANIDA) and the University of 
Sydney. The impetus behind this research project was a ―perception that donor 
assistance to the MRC‘s capacity development was not taking the MRC forward as an 
engaged river basin organisation‖ (Hirsch and Jensen 2006: xv). An international 
conference on the MRC was also held in Hanoi in 2007, bringing together the MRC, 
and development partners such as donors and the development banks to discuss how to 
―strengthen the MRC as a politically and technically important intergovernmental 
mechanism for the sustainable development of the Mekong Basin‖ (MRC 2007b).  
These three activities, which took place almost simultaneously, illustrate how a 
number of actors were expressing concerns about the MRC. A number of key messages 
can be extracted from these activities, including: the NMCs do not have a high profile in 
Member States; the MRC should work closely with the development banks; 
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stakeholders should be more involved in the MRC and there should be more stakeholder 
participation and communication; and, donor involvement is important. The 
involvement of donors and the development banks in these activities demonstrates how 
different actors represent water cooperation in different ways and have conceptualised 
the MRC in particular ways. An underlying theme in these three activities is that the 
MRC is weak and needs to be strengthened. This is an interpretive grid which involves 
representing the problem and the solution in particular ways.   
Problem and solution framing are integral ways in which actors position themselves 
in development. The ADB and World Bank‘s MWRAS strategy illustrates how the 
development banks have formulated the problem and solution of transboundary water 
resources governance in ways which justify their increased involvement. The MWRAS 
argues that the MRC is a key regional institution (ADB and World Bank 2006). But, it 
has ―substantial flaws and weaknesses‖, which mean that Member States are beginning 
to view it as a hindrance rather than a help: perceiving it ―as a regulatory agency 
imposing rules instead of helping to solve problems‖ (ABD and World Bank 2006: 5-6). 
The development banks express the concern that if the MRC fails to live up to its 
members‘ expectations ―that it should grow into an organization capable of supporting 
the countries in making wise decisions for balanced investment and integrated 
management of the water resources, the current, growing level of trust in regional 
cooperation will be undermined‖ (ADB and World Bank 2006: 5).  
In this context, the MWRAS argues, development partners have a responsibility to 
foster cooperation and play a strong role because of their skills and experiences. The 
argument running through the MWRAS constructs the problem in a particular way (the 
weakness of the MRC threatens gains made in regional cooperation), and also provides 
a solution (the involvement of the development banks). The development banks‘ 
solution to this problem involves pursuing a number of key activities over a 5 to 7 year 
period that will contribute to building the capacity of the MRC, as well as strengthening 
IWRM capacity at multiple levels, and helping the countries to manage and develop the 
shared sub-basins of the Mekong (ADB and World Bank 2006). As such, the 
development banks present themselves as the solution to the MRC‘s weakness, 
justifying extension of their involvement in transboundary water governance.                  
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5.2. The MRC, hydropower and contested roles 
 
Increasing awareness of plans for lower mainstream dams amongst civil society 
actors intensified questions surrounding the role of the MRC. Civil society actors 
interviewed for this thesis expressed concerns that the MRC was failing to the respond 
to the renewed hydropower push: ―where, where is the MRC?‖ (Civil Society 
representative, interview, 06/08a). MRC donors have also expressed concerns about the 
role of the MRC in the region‘s hydropower debate and development:  
 
―the MRC has been in a limbo in terms of its involvement in development in the 
region. Now development will bring changes to the basin and the MRC needs to be 
involved, they can do it, they have the capacity, but will they do it?‖ (Donor 
representative, interview, 05/08b).  
   
However, donors have largely chosen to express their concerns through MRC forums 
and private meetings. In contrast civil society actors have utilised the media to target the 
MRC and access debates.  
Civil society concerns gained visibility and resonance at the MRC level in 
November 2007 when Thai NGO, TERRA held a press conference in Bangkok. This 
was to publicise a letter sent by TERRA to the MRC to coincide with the MRC‘s annual 
governance meetings. TERRA charged the MRC with ―an extraordinary abdication of 
responsibility‖ as it had remained ―notably silent‖ on the proposed mainstream dams 
(TERRA 2007). TERRA argued that the MRC should fulfil its mandate, as derived from 
the 1995 Mekong Agreement, and also urged donors to review and reconsider funding 
to the organisation (TERRA 2007). Donors at the MRC‘s 2007 Donor Consultative 
Group Meeting issued a statement urging the MRC to show leadership in the assessment 
of development initiatives (Development Partners 2007). The statement also expressed 
concern that stakeholders are not being consulted and the impacts of dams on fisheries 
and livelihoods are not receiving adequate attention (Development Partners 2007). 
Comments were also expressed at the meeting that donors were also unclear about the 
MRC‘s role in relation to the proposed mainstream dams (Observation note, MRC 
meeting, 11/07). Concern about the impacts of dams on livelihoods and fisheries is a 
recurring theme in donor comments at MRC meetings (e.g. MRC 2008a; MRC 2008b). 
This is explored further in Chapter Seven.    
The MRC‘s initial response to the concerns of civil society, as expressed in 
TERRA‘s November 2007 letter, was that the MRC was an intergovernmental 
organisation which served the needs of its Member States (Bird 2008a). TERRA 
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deemed this as a failure to respond and a contradiction of the MRC‘s ‗Strategic Plan‘ 
(TERRA 2008). In March 2008, TERRA sent a second letter to coincide with the 
appointment of a new MRC CEO. In this TERRA argued that the ―need for a credible 
and effective river basin management organisation in the Mekong Region has never 
been more apparent, yet for the MRC a crisis of legitimacy and relevancy is looming‖ 
(TERRA 2008). The letter asked for clarification of the MRC‘s Procedures for 
Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement (PNPCA). The PNPCA were approved 
in 2003.The procedures cover both tributary and mainstream uses of the Mekong and 
Member States‘ commitments to provide information and notice to the MRC about 
development projects. TERRA also called for the public disclosure of documents and 
research, including a MRC review of the EIA for the proposed Don Sahong dam in 
southern Lao PDR (TERRA 2008). Civil society actors have continually called for the 
Don Sahong EIA to be released. For example at the 2008 MRC Hydropower 
Consultation regional NGO representatives asked for the EIA to be made public (Civil 
society representative, observation notes, MRC meeting 09/08). The MRC argues that it 
cannot release this review as it was commissioned by the Government of Lao, who have 
not authorised the MRC to release it (Bird 2008a). This response utilises the MRC‘s 
status as an intergovernmental organisation as its justification.   
The MRC operates at the intersection of discourses and actors surrounding 
development of the Mekong. Debates over its role and relevance partially stem from 
how different actors interpret the MRC‘s mandate. Hydropower is mentioned in the 
1995 Mekong Agreement and there are a number of articles which relate to the MRC‘s 
role. These include, amongst others:  
 
 Article 1: parties will cooperate in all fields of sustainable development 
including hydropower;   
 Article 2: to ―promote, support, cooperate and coordinate in the development of 
the full potential of sustainable benefits to all riparian States and the prevention 
of wasteful use of Mekong River Basin waters, with emphasis and preference on 
joint and/or basin-wide development projects and basin programs through the 
formulation of a basin development plan, that would be used to identify, 
categorize and prioritize the projects and programs to seek assistance for and to 
implement at the basin level‖ (MRC 1995); 
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 Article 3: parties agree to protect the environment and the ecological balance 
from harmful effects resulting from pollution or ―other harmful effects resulting 
from any development plans‖ (MRC 1995).    
 
According to these articles the MRC has a role in the development of the basin. This 
role includes support and coordination. The MRC is also mandated to protect the 
environment, which suggests a dual role in hydropower. 
As presented above, actors have conceptualised the 1995 Mekong Agreement in 
different ways. State officials interviewed for this thesis argue that it is a development 
agreement. This representation is largely premised on Article 2 and the commitment to 
develop a Basin Development Plan: 
 
―The 1995 Agreement says we must have a basin development plan. This plan will 
guide development: it is like the engine of a car. We will develop the river for 
mutual benefit. If one country wants to build a dam and it will impact other country, 
we will have compromise, its called a trade-off, and this is in our agreement‖ (State 
official, interview, 06/08b).    
 
In contrast NGOs, such as the Thai People‘s Network for the Mekong and the Rivers 
Coalition in Cambodia (RCC), argue that the MRC‘s role should be reviewed to ―ensure 
it is acting in a manner befitting an objective, scientific river basin management 
organization that it was set up to be‖ (Thai People‘s Network for Mekong and RCC 
2008). These two NGOs publicly requested that the MRC call for a moratorium on 
dams until scientific evidence has been collected, placed in the public domain and a 
consensus reached (Thai People‘s Network for the Mekong and RCC 2008). Other civil 
society actors interviewed for this thesis emphasised the environmental role of the 
MRC, which they argue means that the MRC should be involved in hydropower debates 
and advocating on behalf of the environment:  
 
―The MRC should play a strong role in hydropower, that‘s part of it mandate. It 
is meant to maintain the ecological balance, and hydropower is the greatest 
threat to the ecological health of the river‖ (Civil Society representative, 
interview, 04/08b).   
 
These statements by different actors identify a number of roles for the MRC: 
development, management, and environmental protection.    
The MRC has defined its role as a ―mature, effective and efficient knowledge-
based River Basin Organization‖ (MRC 2006: 1). MRC representatives interviewed for 
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this thesis conceptualised this knowledge-based role as a key strategy through which the 
MRC can access current development debates:   
 
―The first thing is to produce good quality information. This is where we can 
add value. If the organisation has good quality information it can get a place at 
the table‖ (MRC representative, interview, 07/08a).  
 
Implicit in this is the assumption that decision-making is a neutral process involving 
assessing the available information to select the best option. However, civil society 
actors argue that this is not necessarily the case:  
 
―The MRC is producing good information, but it doesn‘t get out into the public 
domain. And none of that information on water utilisation, on fisheries is being 
taken up by the governments in decision-making‖ (Civil Society representative, 
interview, 06/08a).  
 
The MRC defining its role as knowledge-based, raises questions about the process of 
knowledge-generation, its accessibility, and the utilisation of knowledge in informing 
decisions (AMRC 2008: 5). Politics are involved in both the generation of knowledge 
and its utilisation in decision-making (see Chapter Seven).    
 The debate over the role of the MRC in hydropower and development raises the 
principle of sovereignty. The MRC is an intergovernmental organisation. Consequently, 
the MRC has no authority to act ‗over‘ its members or compel them towards certain 
actions. The MRC‘s space for action is constituted by its intergovernmental status, its 
mandate and its constituency. In the case of the MRC this is further complicated by the 
fact that a multitude of actors other than the four Member States play a role in the 
cooperation. These actors combine to create spaces for action for the MRC that are not 
necessarily congruent with individual actors‘ priorities and interests. For example, the 
formulation of MRC programmes is a process which involves both the four lower 
Mekong states, the donors who want to support the programme, and the MRC 
Secretariat: 
 
―The donors have the money and a little more capacity in certain areas. They are 
interested in certain areas and this feeds into the programme development. The 
programme formulation cycle provides opportunities for interaction between donors 
and the countries and then there is general agreement on what should be done. Each 
programme has aims, goals and work packages, and is negotiated‖ (MRC official, 
interview, 07/08b).   
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These negotiated outcomes orientate the MRC towards particular areas, including 
fisheries research, developing procedures for water utilisation, and navigation. Despite 
developing a Hydropower Strategy in 2005, the MRC did not receive funds until 
November 2007 to develop a hydropower programme. In January 2008 the MRC hired 
a consultant to help define the programme and its content. The proposed programme 
was the subject of a regional consultation in 2008 involving a range of actors, including 
state representatives, fisheries scientists and civil society representatives (MRC 2008b).  
The length of time which it took to initiate the MRC‘s Hydropower Programme 
contributed to the perception that the MRC was not involved in the ‗big issues‘ of the 
Mekong.        
 The MRC has been largely absent from tributary hydropower. Backer (2007) 
argues that this is because of the MRC‘s limited definition of tributaries. The MRC 
defines a tributary as a ―natural stream of the Mekong River System whose flows have a 
significant impact on the mainstream‖ (MRC 2003b). This definition acted as an 
incentive to the Member States to develop tributary projects and made the MRC largely 
irrelevant to these plans (Backer 2007). However, mainstream hydropower is widely 
accepted to fall under the purview of the MRC and the organisation spent 2008 and 
2009 trying to define its role.     
Renewed interest in mainstream hydropower development resulted in the MRC fast-
tracking certain activities including: convening a 2008 Fisheries Expert Group Meeting 
to discuss the fisheries impacts of mainstream hydropower and possibilities for 
mitigation; and a ‗fast-tracked‘ development scenario based on the proposed lower 
Mekong mainstream dams. These activities and others coalesced into the Initiative on 
Sustainable Hydropower (ISH) in 2009. The ISH includes a number of existing 
activities such as the MRC‘s joint work with ADB and WWF on Environmental 
Criteria for Sustainable Hydropower Development as well as new activities including a 
strategic environmental assessment (SEA) of the proposed mainstream dams (MRC 
2009b). These activities are orientated towards knowledge generation, dialogue 
facilitation and the development of hydropower standards (MRC 2009b).     
 
6. The wider hydropolitical constellation: interactions between different actors 
 
 The relevancy debate surrounding the MRC illustrates how the MRC is a key 
arena through which multiple actors deploying strategies over various scalar levels 
confront each other, negotiate, and cooperate. Debates and outcomes at the 
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transboundary cooperation scale (the MRC) are embedded in and conditioned by the 
overlapping power relationships of different actors operating over and transcending 
different spatial scales. Three sets of interactions are important: state water and energy 
actors; Member States and donors (and the ways in which these are embedded in the 
global environmental discourse and the concerns of civil society); and civil society 
strategies to access development debates.  
 
6.1. State agencies and MRC isolation from planning processes 
 
 The debate about the relevance of the MRC is concerned with two interrelated 
issues: one, what is the MRC‘s role in hydropower, and two, whether the MRC is or 
should be involved in decision-making. The resolution of these two issues involves 
navigating the separation of state water and energy actors in the lower Mekong. The 
state is an actor that ―rarely speaks with one voice but rather represents an amalgam of 
institutional interests‖ (Bryant and Bailey 1997: 65). In this context tensions between 
the state‘s dual role as developer and steward of the environment are played out through 
conflict between rival agencies in a state (Bryant and Bailey 1997). Control over 
environmental resources and a state agency‘s power are related, as the most powerful 
state agencies are often those who have derived their institutional power from control 
over activities such as energy generation, whereas in contrast, environmental agencies 
are relatively new and have little substantive power (Bryant and Bailey 1997). State 
interests are not monolithic: states pursue diverse agendas and parts of the state may 
support one type of water use, such as energy generation, whilst other parts may resist 
or be in favour of alternate uses (Lebel et al. 2005). These institutional dynamics impact 
upon transboundary water cooperation and the ability of the MRC to establish its 
relevance to, and role in, hydropower development in the Mekong.  
The 1995 Mekong Agreement commits the MRC to the development of a basin 
development plan (BDP). State representatives interviewed for this thesis argue that the 
development of a BDP will negate any potential conflict resulting from hydropower 
development: 
 
―Now there is some potential for conflict coming, but we will negotiate together. 
The BDP will help to steer things. It will serve how we have cooperation 
between four countries, work for four countries‖ (State official, interview, 
06/08a).   
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The BDP which is being developed by the MRC comprises three elements: an IWRM 
Based Basin Strategy, a Project Portfolio, and Development Scenarios. These three 
elements have been developed in conjunction with a range of MRC stakeholders, 
including line agencies and civil society (MRC 2009c). MRC officials interviewed for 
this thesis were keen to stress that: ―the BDP will not determine which projects are 
implemented by Member States but provide an agreed development space‖ (MRC 
official, interview, 07/08a). A development space is defined as more than the volume of 
water that can be safely used for development, it is a space of sustainable development 
that is supported and shaped by a range of strategic guidance, procedures and guidelines 
(MRC 2009c). The BDP will articulate a common development vision for the basin and 
provide directions for a rolling planning framework which will bring the basin 
perspective into national planning and vice versa (Hang and Lennaerts 2008).  
The MRC‘s aim is that national planning will synchronise with the BDP:  
 
―The BDP will bring the regional perspective into national planning. Hopefully, 
national plans will be in line with regional basin plan‖ (MRC official, interview, 
07/08a). 
 
―If the work of the BDP is not accepted at the national level then it is pointless‖ 
(State official, observation notes, MRC meeting, 06/08).   
 
Increasing coordination between the MRC and national planning was a key concern at 
the 2007 International Conference on the MRC. The Joint Statement released by the 
conference committed Member States to undertake to ―ensure that MRC strategies and 
plans are adequately reflected in national development policies, strategies and plans in 
all relevant sectors – and vice versa‖ (MRC 2007b : 6). Interviews with donors and state 
representatives for this thesis expressed similar opinions that the BDP is a space for 
negotiation about development, but this does not necessarily mean that the BDP‘s 
findings will be accepted or implemented by Member States:  
 
―We can through the BDP have a space for negotiation. But there are limits as 
we are talking about four different governments‖ (Donor representative, 
interview, 05/08b).  
 
―BDP will include proper use of water, future not current, for the countries. If 
countries follow what we are doing then good. But this may not be true‖ (State 
official, interview, 06/08b).   
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MRC officials are concerned that in order to have impact they will have to engage more 
with decision-makers: ―we need to talk to higher level people, have to get the Deputy 
Prime Minister‘s office involved or the Ministry of Finance and so on, because this is 
where the people who make decisions are. Currently ministers do not really pay 
attention to the MRC‖ (MRC official, interview, 07/08a). This suggests that the 
willingness of Member States to align themselves with MRC planning tools, plans and 
strategies is determined by something other than the quality or usefulness of those tools. 
A lack of coordination and collaboration between state level actors, as well as 
the power relationships between them hampers the effectiveness of the MRC in 
transmitting regional perspectives and plans into national planning processes. A focus 
on explanations located at the regional and transboundary level (such as sovereignty) 
obscures this reality. The governance and management structure of the MRC includes 
the MRC Council, the Joint Committee, the NMCs and the MRC Secretariat: as such 
there is no single MRC and joint positions have to be negotiated between the different 
parts. Member States are represented on the Council and Joint Committee by their 
respective heads of the NMCs. Thailand and Vietnam are represented on the MRC 
Council by their respective Ministers for Natural Resources and the Environment, 
whilst Lao PDR is represented by the President of WREA, and Cambodia by the 
Minister for Water Resources and Meteorology (MRC 2009d).   
Each Member State has a NMC, which coordinates MRC activities at the 
national level providing the link between the transboundary and national levels. 
However, NMCs are largely weak and isolated from decision-making power over 
natural resources development. The NMCs are usually drawn from, or located under, 
the environmental or natural resources related ministries. Hydropower planning and 
decision-making is located outside of water resources agencies. To a certain extent 
parallel track processes have developed in these two important water resources 
management areas- governance and development- with limited interaction between 
them: 
 
―The representatives of the National Mekong Committees, so that usually they 
are coming from the environment side or the natural resources related ministries 
which are not very strong in the countries and what is related to the decision-
making of hydropower construction, so that it is done in the Ministry of Finance 
or Planning or the PM‘s office. So that these ministries that are related to the 
MRC are quite out of the decision-making system‖ (Donor representative, 
interview, 04/08).  
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―The MRC is a basin level organisation so it communicates with national water 
counterparts. But this isn‘t necessarily where the power lies. MRC parts like the 
Council or the NMCs do not make decisions: it is up to the governments to agree 
to things and implement them‖ (MRC official, interview, 07/08a).   
 
Hydropower planning and decision-making is located within government agencies and 
ministries concerned with, amongst others, finance, energy, planning and investment. 
Civil society actors expressed concerns at a civil society meeting in Vietnam in 
February 2008 about the separation of water and energy actors and the consequences 
this could have for both planning and local users dependent on water resources for their 
livelihoods (Observation notes, Civil Society meeting, 02/08). Subsequently, the 
coupling of electricity and water planning is crucial to determining the true costs of 
hydropower development (Middleton et al. 2009). 
 NMCs are not mentioned in the 1995 Mekong Agreement. Their structure, 
composition and effectiveness vary from state to state (Hirsch and Jensen 2006). NMCs 
usually have two parts: an inter-ministerial policy making committee, and a secretariat 
which provides support and coordination. For example, the Cambodian NMC (CNMC) 
is directly accountable to the Council of Ministers, and the NMC secretariat (NMCS) is 
located in the Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology, whose Minister is the 
Chairman of the CNMC. CNMC members include, amongst others, the Ministry of 
Environment, the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries, Ministry of Planning, and Ministry of Industry, Mines and 
Energy (MRC 2007a). The role of the CNMC is to assist and advise the Government in 
all matters related to water - policy, strategy, management, development etc. (MRC 
2007a). Despite differences in government preference and mandate, the two part 
structure is common to all NMCs (MRC 2007). NMCs are comprised of a number of 
line agencies. However, governance arrangements between agencies are not well-
coordinated and the NMCs have to establish their own role and working space within 
their national politics (Hirsch and Jensen 2006; Dore and Lazarus 2009). NMCs are one 
part of the water and environment ministries in their respective states: their functional 
power is less than that of the key water-related ministries (Dore and Lazarus 2009).     
Management of environmental resources by the state developed along functional 
lines with separate departments for agriculture, fisheries, forestry, and water etc. 
(Bryant and Bailey 1997). However, IWRM argues for integration in water management 
(GWP 2000). In 2006, Lao PDR restructured a number of government departments 
including those for water and the environment and created WREA as an apex agency. 
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The aim of apex agencies is to improve coordination between the various water and 
related ministries (IWMI 2006). However, the apex agencies established in Lao PDR, 
Thailand and Vietnam have made relatively modest achievements since their 
establishment as they lack the power and resources to change more established line 
agencies (IWMI 2006).  
The weak relationship between state water and energy agencies contributes to 
the isolation of the MRC from national planning process, and also contributes to the 
concerns of civil society actors about the role and relevance of the organisation: 
 
―The MRC is not involved in the big decisions of the Mekong. A lot of the 
decisions are made at the national level, a lot of them are made in Laos by the 
Ministry of Planning and Investment signing agreements, and the water agencies 
like WREA have very little role…whilst WREA has very little role, LNMC has 
even less role. Both of them don‘t have any role in the decisions that are being 
made. So you have ministers of water resources or ministers of the NMCs on the 
council representing interests of the countries, yet they‘re not the players that are 
making the decisions on these types of investments. There‘s a significant 
disconnect, and traditionally water agencies in the countries are not very strong 
and often marginalised. In Vietnam the MRC is not actually mentioned in any of 
their national strategies‖ (Civil Society representative, interview, 06/08a). 
 
The position of water and energy actors in Lao PDR illustrates a number of the 
dynamics outlined in the statement quoted above. Along with the creation of WREA in 
2006, the Lao government also established the Ministry of Energy and Mines. Within 
this ministry are two departments (Department of Electricity, and the Department of 
Energy Promotion and Development) and three state-owned enterprises (Electricite du 
Laos, Lao Holding State Enterprise, and Electric Construction and Installation).
9
 The 
Department of Electricity (DOE) is responsible for policy and regulation, and strategic 
master planning. The Department of Energy Promotion and Development is responsible 
for development and management. As such it works closely with project developers, 
promotes IPPs, advises decision-makers, analyses the financial feasibility of projects, 
and drafts and negotiates contracts and agreements. The Ministry of Planning and 
Investment is also important as it is responsible for administering foreign and domestic 
investments.  
In terms of decision-making processes for mainstream and tributary hydropower 
development WREA has a formal role in both. A representative of the Lao Department 
                                                             
9 The description of the Lao Ministry of Energy and Mines is derived from the Department of Energy 
Promotion and Development‘s website, Powering Progress. This website was established to share 
information of the Lao hydropower sector, and re-states the dominant argument that hydropower 
development is an integral part of poverty reduction. This website is supported by the Agence Francaise 
de Developpement (AFD), the French government agency for international development.       
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of Electricity outlined the roles of WREA, LNMC and the DOE in a presentation to an 
international MRC consultation in September 2008 as follows: 
 A Feasibility Study Report is prepared by the project developers and 
submitted to the DOE and WREA, 
 DOE review and comment on the Report and pass these comments to the 
project developers, 
 The final Feasibility Study, Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), and 
Strategic Impact Assessment (SIA) are passed from the DOE to the LNMC, 
who in turn submit them to the MRC Secretariat, 
 At this stage the MRC Secretariat may offer some technical advice. The 
MRC Secretariat also submits the final Feasibility Study, EIA and SIA to the 
Joint Committee and the other NMCs, 
 A prior consultation, according to the 1995 Mekong Agreement, will be held 
and agreement reached, 
 The DOE will then approve the Feasibility Study, and WREA the EIA and 
SIA (Viravong 2008). 
The existence of formal decision-making processes is not necessarily congruent with the 
implementation of those processes. Also, power relationships exist within these 
processes: they are not neutral and disinterested. Whilst a role has been identified for 
the LNMC and WREA in hydropower decision-making, planning and project 
development according to the above process still seems to lie within the remit of the 
DOE and the Ministry of Energy.  
 There are also concerns, amongst both MRC officials and donors about the 
capacity of WREA and the LNMC to execute these roles substantively: 
 
―The Lao NMC has not been involved in discussions for Don Sahong, it has no 
information on it, and this is a mainstream hydropower project. The NMC is just 
one agency inside WREA, an apex agency. APEX agencies have no real power 
or authority yet‖ (MRC representative, interview, 07/08a).  
 
MRC representatives at a planning meeting in March 2008 expressed concerns that until 
NMCs and Apex agencies are empowered impact will be limited (Observation notes, 
MRC meeting, 03/08). Development bank representatives interviewed for thesis argued 
that the NMCs and APEX agencies are weak for a number of reasons: ―they are 
unstable, have no role in water resources development. At the moment NMCs have no 
power or authority because they have no money to allocate‖ (Development bank 
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representative, interview, 07/08). These dynamics illustrate that the state is comprised 
of many actors who all exist within power relationships, which condition the role and 
impact of the MRC in transboundary hydropolitics in the region.   
The processes articulated by the Lao Department of Electricity situate WREA 
and the LNMC as communication conduits, between the DOE and the MRC. According 
to the process outlined above the MRC will conduct a prior consultation once a number 
of other steps have been conducted by the DOE and the project developers. This 
suggests that there is little direct interaction between other parts of the MRC (such as 
the Secretariat) and energy actors in the lower Mekong states. There is also a low level 
of understanding about the role of the MRC, its possible hydropower roles, and the 
requirements of the 1995 Mekong Agreement amongst state energy agencies in the 
lower Mekong (Bird 2008b). In 2008, activities were initiated to overcome this 
knowledge gap and increase engagement between the two. In August 2008, the Lao 
Department of Energy approached the LNMC and the MRC for advice and support to 
ensure that the provisions of the Mekong Agreement were met, that projects were 
optimised in an integrated basin context, and that other sectoral interests such as 
fisheries were fully considered in the department‘s mainstream dam studies (MRC 
2009b). A lack of awareness about the MRC‘s role and the largely separate spheres of 
water and energy actors constrain the MRC‘s ability to influence national planning.   
    
6.2. Donors and Member States: interactions at the transboundary level and the 
hydropolitical constellation 
 
 State actions are conditioned by the relationship of the state to other actors, both 
inside and outside the state (Bryant and Bailey 1997). A focus on states as unified 
entities that interact with other unified states risks falling into the territorial trap as it 
obscures the links between international and domestic politics. Agnew (1994) argues 
that treating international and domestic politics as polarities obscures the interaction 
between processes operating at different scales. It also masks the ways in which actors 
and processes challenge or support the state at multiple scales (Sneddon and Fox 2006). 
The ways in which relations between domestic and international actors condition state 
actions is demonstrated by the wider dynamics of donor- Member State interaction in 
the MRC. The positions that donors adopt in relation to key issues and also their 
relationships with Member States are conditioned by donor relationships to civil society 
and the global discourses on water and development.  
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The scale of proposed hydropower development has created tensions in the 
donor- Member State relationship. The interests of key donors in funding the MRC 
were outlined in table 2 in Chapter Four (p.141). It is worth noting here that traditional 
donors to the MRC are interested in regional cooperation, fisheries, joint basin planning 
and environmental protection (AusAID 2007; SIDA 2005). This group of traditional 
donors to the MRC are concerned about the scale of the proposed hydropower 
development of the Mekong and have urged caution (Development Partners 2007). In a 
number of MRC meetings observed for this thesis donors have expressed a number of 
key concerns: more active utilisation of the MRC and its tools by Member States in 
hydropower decision-making; and questions about whether proposed mainstream dams 
would proceed if scientific evidence demonstrated that technological mitigation of 
fisheries impacts was not possible (Observation notes, MRC meeting 11/07; 
Observation notes, MRC Meeting, 09/08).  
Donor concerns and questions have contributed to a perception amongst 
Member States that donors are anti-hydropower development. Donors are urging 
caution and are keen to stress that they are not anti-hydropower: ―It is not that we are 
against it, we have hydropower at home, but they have been lessons learnt that the 
Mekong countries can learn from‖ (Donor representative, interview, 04/08). However, 
Member States view this caution as constraining: ―we need to have development now, 
we share the need to develop, we cannot wait (State official, interview, 07/08). Three 
interactions or relationships are important here: one, the interaction between the global 
development discourse and donors; two, the financial asymmetry between donors and 
Member States, and the wider context; and three, interactions between donor states and 
their civil societies.  
Donor state policies and positions are the product of a number of overlapping 
interactions, including between the donor community and global water and development 
discourses. Donor states have made international commitments to IWRM and are 
promoting the paradigm through ODA. Traditional donors to the MRC have been at the 
forefront of discussions at the global level about water resources development. For 
example, Sweden was involved in the establishment of the GWP and hosts its 
secretariat (GWP 2006a). International commitments, such as those to IWRM, help to 
shape donor development strategies in particular areas. Australia‘s 2007-2011 Mekong 
Water Resource Strategy is committed to strengthening the MRC and NMCs to improve 
IWRM in the basin (AusAID 2007). Its financing of capacity building in WREA is 
congruent with this strategic objective.  
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Another salient issue for traditional donors in the MRC sphere is donor 
harmonisation. The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was developed by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The Declaration is the 
result of changes at the global level concerning the effectiveness of aid and the donor-
recipient relationship, which sought to reformulate the relationship as one of partnership 
as opposed to a one-way relationship (Manning 2006). This declaration was endorsed 
by a wide range of states, including traditional donor states to the MRC. During a series 
of donor-Member State meetings facilitated by the MRC donor harmonisation featured 
regularly and highly on the agenda, championed particularly by the Scandinavian states 
(Observation notes, MRC Meetings 10/07 and 02/08). The issues which donors 
champion within transboundary water cooperation, such as the MRC, reflect broader 
commitments made at the international level, and paradigms and strategies at the level 
of global development discourse.    
Underlying donor-Member State interactions is a power asymmetry premised on 
financial contributions. In 2006 89.5% of funding came from donors and 9.5% from 
Member States (MRC 2006). MRC officials interviewed for this thesis indicated that 
this asymmetry can fuel perceptions amongst some actors that the Member States are 
uninterested in the MRC and that donors dominate: 
 
―Donors put in more money, so to an extent they will always tend to dominate 
the relationship a little bit. This is a natural structural imbalance in any regional 
undertaking where one party puts in more money than the others. Donors have 
felt the need to put their foot down over Member States‘ contributions and that 
feed into the Organisational Review. And the countries pulled back a little, go 
quiet in meetings‖ (MRC official, interview, 07/08b).   
 
Increasing Member States‘ financial contributions is linked to donors‘ perceptions about 
commitment: ―Donors are upset with Member States lack of contributions. How 
important is the MRC to the countries? They don‘t want to pay for it. This suggests that 
it is not important: increasing contributions would be an indicator of increased 
commitment‖ (Development bank representative, interview, 04/08). However, if 
Member States do not increase contributions, civil society actors argue that it is unlikely 
that donors will cease to finance the organisation: ―Donors have no choice but to 
support the MRC- it is the only institution for sustainable development of water 
resources‖ (Civil society representative, interview, 03/08). During interviews with 
donors, a number of representatives stated that donors will continue to work with the 
MRC and are keen to see it succeed: ―we are in this for the long haul‖; ―donors are very 
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active, we are interested in what happens here‖ (Donor representative, interview, 
05/08b‖; Donor representative, interview, 04/08).  
The power asymmetry between MRC donor states and Members in terms of 
financial contributions has conditioned outcomes at the MRC level (for example it was 
part of the rationale for the Organisational Review). However, the relationship between 
donors and Member States is situated within a context of changing donor dynamics in 
term of both actors and financing. As outlined in Chapter Four old donors are rescaling 
and re-orientating their ODA in the Mekong region. Scaling-up support for water 
resources management to the basin level is congruent with the principles of IWRM: 
IWRM advocates water management at the basin level (GWP 2000). As demonstrated 
above, hydropower development and energy planning is located in energy agencies and 
ministries which are largely separate from state water agencies and the MRC. 
Subsequently, the sphere of donor- Member State relations is differentiated from the 
sphere of hydropower development.    
Shifts in old donors ODA also takes places in a wider context where new donors 
are emerging. In the Mekong Committee era donor funding and development plans both 
flowed through the organisation. This dynamic has changed fundamentally. The end of 
the Cold War saw a diversification in actors and regional schemes which offered new 
financial opportunities for the lower Mekong states, and this reduced the importance of 
Mekong water cooperation (Makim 2002; Nakayama 1999). The importance of 
traditional donors is challenged by the emergence of new donors such as China and 
Kuwait (see Chapter Four). The private sector in terms of project developers and new 
financiers is also important due to its ability to fund hydropower projects. These new 
funding avenues for hydropower coincide with a strong interest on the part of certain 
state agencies in the lower Mekong to develop hydropower. Convergence of interest 
between different actors is a key driver of water resources development (Molle 2008b). 
The interests of powerful state agencies in the lower Mekong, the private sector, and 
new donors, such as China who favour infrastructure development, converge to promote 
hydropower development. This interaction largely falls outside the sphere of the MRC 
and the mechanisms promoted by traditional donors. The availability of alternative 
sources of financing for water resources development provides an opportunity for lower 
Mekong states to pursue their hydropower interests outside of the confines of the MRC 
system and in parallel to their relationships with traditional donors. A focus on 
monolithic state actors fails to grasp this complexity: relationships between donors and 
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Member States in the MRC sphere are conditioned by their relationships with actors and 
processes outside this sphere and at different levels of analysis.       
Donor relationships with Member States are also conditioned by interactions 
between donor states and their domestic civil societies. Civil society groups and the 
media within traditional donor states to the MRC have publicly questioned their states‘ 
funding for the MRC and expressed concern over the proposed hydropower 
development of the lower Mekong. Articles have appeared in Finnish newspapers such 
as Helsingin Sanomat questioning Finnish funding for the MRC, an organisation it 
labels as suffering from ―toothlessness‖ in the hydropower debate (Käkönen and Selin 
2007). Donor representatives interviewed for this thesis identified a number of episodes 
where civil society concerns have contributed to action at the official level, including: 
Swedish development officials questioning the MRC and calling for it to become more 
proactive; questions from the Green Party in the Belgian Parliament in early 2008, 
which resulted in the MRC preparing a document for the Minister of Development 
cooperation to use in answering these questions; and official questions in the Finnish 
Parliament concerning Finnish support to the MRC, including what has been done in the 
past, what are the possibilities now and what is Finland‘s role (Donor representatives, 
interviews, 04/08; 05/08a, 05/08b). 
Donor representative reactions to concerns from domestic civil society are mixed: 
 
―There is going to be a stronger and stronger opinion in the Scandinavian civil 
society that we are supporting this kind of organisation that is weak when they are 
concerned about the hydropower explosion. But of course, this is part of our society, 
this questioning is normal‖ (Donor representative, interview, 04/08).    
 
―Hydropower development is a concern for our societies, and there is the worry of 
―bad publicity‖ about our support for the MRC‖ (Donor representative, observation 
notes, MRC meeting 05/08). 
  
The interaction between domestic civil society and the state‘s ODA conditions the 
donor-Member State relationship in the MRC. Donor states must be seen to be 
responsive to the concerns of their constituencies, and consequently they raise questions 
with the MRC and Member States. This interaction between state actors and civil 
society actors is only captured once a multi-scalar, multi-actor approach is adopted.       
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6.3. Civil society actors and the MRC: a strategy to be heard?  
 
Civil society actors in the Mekong, constrained by limited domestic political 
space to express opposition to hydropower development, have ‗scaled-up‘ their 
concerns and sphere of operation to the MRC level in order to gain access to debates. 
Lebel et al. (2005) argue that both powerful and less powerful actors engage in scalar 
politics, and the ability to shift across levels and scales is important to social 
movements. This is particularly important in the context of the Mekong.  
Different actors have different interests, for example local communities within 
Lao PDR have livelihoods based water resources interests. Hirsch and Jensen (2006) 
argue that there are a range of interests within the Member States which are not 
adequately captured by the descriptor of ‗national interest‘. These include civil society 
interests, local community interests and private sector interests. There is limited space 
for local communities to express their interests. Civil society responses are shaped by 
the nature of political space within state boundaries and there is limited space to 
―articulate concerns over projects and other aspects of development that threaten social 
and environmental sustainability‖ (Hirsch 2001: 245).  Ratner (2003) argues that 
―communities that rely on the resources of the river basin frequently find themselves 
poorly represented in the international arena by their own national governments or in 
direct conflict with domestic resource development policies‖ (64). Local community 
and livelihood interests do not necessarily feature on the national agenda as promoted 
by state actors in the MRC.  
However, to a certain extent livelihoods based interests are recognised at the 
MRC level. For example, the MRC argues that a lack of control structures should not be 
interpreted as the Mekong River being unutilised as its plays a significant role in the 
lives and livelihoods of the basin‘s population (MRC 2008b). A wealth of fisheries 
research conducted by the MRC outlines the importance of the Mekong‘s fisheries 
resources for livelihoods, subsistence and food security (Poulsen et al. 2004; Hortle 
2007; Coates et al. 2003). The MRC also opens up spaces for public participation, 
convening multi-stakeholder forums and consultations which include a small number of 
NGOs and civil society actors.
10
 Donors have also promoted public participation 
processes in MRC programmes, for example, stakeholder participation is part of the 
                                                             
10 However, concerns have been expressed by civil society actors about the MRC‘s public participation 
processes. Only a handful of NGOs are invited to participate in MRC forums. Local stakeholders and 
community representatives are largely absent and this has been questioned by civil society actors (MRC 
2008b).  
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funding agreement between the BDP Programme and its donors (Donor representative, 
interview, 05/08b). Local community interests and concerns are not necessarily heard or 
accommodated at the state level in the Mekong. By targeting the MRC, as civil society 
groups such as TERRA have done through the letters and press releases described 
above, local community and livelihood interests are ‗scaled-up‘ to a level at which they 
are heard and recognised.  
Changing civil society dynamics are widening the debate over proposed 
hydropower development and increasing its media profile. As described in Chapter 
Four, civil society is varied within the basin. Despite limited spaces for civil society in 
parts of the basin the visibility of some regional and domestic civil society groups is 
growing and impacting the debate: 
 
―Letters from civil society are a new dynamic. Civil society is limited but 
growing in the region: we are seeing more organisation. There is the possibility 
of a new opening up, in terms of people having access to information, to 
external domains, with news and internet. There are new processes at the MRC 
where civil society actors are involved, and there are links between national, 
regional and international NGOs‖ (Donor representative, interview, 04/08).   
 
Domestic civil society actors are also interacting with and influencing global civil 
society actors. The November 2007 TERRA letter was referenced in a Finnish 
newspaper article questioning Finland‘s support to the MRC, and in the questions raised 
in the Belgian parliament (Käkönen and Selin 2007; MRC official, interview, 05/08). 
Domestic civil society groups and NGOs are forging links with international and 
regional networks and organisations, as well as academic institutions both within and 
outside of the region. For example, the 2008 conference Mekong mainstream dams: 
People's voices across borders was organised by a group of actors including the Thai 
National Human Rights Commission, the Social Research Institute at Chulalongkorn 
University, Bangkok, Thai NGO TERRA, Rivers Coalition in Cambodia, International 
Rivers (an American NGO), Oxfam Australia and the Australian Mekong Research 
Centre at the University of Sydney, Australia. This illustrates that civil society actors 
from different geographic locales are forming loose coalitions, which increase their 
impact and visibility. Conferences such as the one referred to above are covered in the 
regional press and also via the internet, they are also attended by donors to the region 
and the MRC.      
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7. Conclusion      
 
Actors and discourses intersect at the MRC level. Developments at the global 
level, such as the formulation of sustainable development and IWRM, have impacted 
the regional and national levels. The 1995 Mekong Agreement orientated water 
cooperation in terms of sustainable development, whilst both the MRC and its Member 
States have made commitments to implement IWRM. As opposed to previous phases of 
the Mekong water regime where infrastructure development plans where formulated by 
the Mekong Committee, the MRC has conceptualised its role in terms of knowledge 
generation for sustainable development. However, despite the apparent reorientation of 
the MRC, critics claim that sustainable development and IWRM allow actors to 
continue business-as-usual.   
Hydropower is a contested development option. The World Commission on 
Dams emerged in response to ever-increasing civil society protests and critiques of 
hydropower dams. Hydropower development is also criticised and contested in the 
Mekong region, where the incorporation and inclusion of environmental and social 
aspects into hydropower studies and investigations has slowly increased since the 
1970s. The hydropower debate in the Mekong intensified dramatically in 2007 with 
public awareness of the resurrection of plans for mainstream dams. In a global context, 
whereby the negative impacts of hydropower development are well-publicised, and a 
regional context where actors such as the development banks had labelled mainstream 
hydropower unlikely due to its negative impacts, civil society actors were shocked by 
the re-emergence of mainstream hydropower plans. Plans for mainstream hydropower 
have intensified the debate about the role and relevance of the MRC.   
Civil society and donors expressed concern from 2007 onwards that the MRC 
was sidelined from the hydropower debates in the region and did not have a role in 
hydropower decision-making. These concerns are premised on assumptions about water 
resources management and development in a transboundary context influenced by 
global paradigms. The MRC initially conducted its work in a regional context where 
civil society actors and a large proportion of donors assumed mainstream dams were 
‗off the agenda‘. For example, the development banks labelled them unlikely due to the 
negative social and environmental impacts (ADB and World Bank 2006). However, the 
lower Mekong states operating on the assumptions of the dominant development 
narratives have resurrected plans for these dams and are investigating them in 
conjunction with private sector actors from the region. These processes are occurring 
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outside the MRC sphere. Donors and civil society actors assume that these activities 
should be located under the MRC purview due to its status as a transboundary river 
basin organisation with an agreement that commits the Member States to cooperate in 
all fields of sustainable development.  
The role of the MRC, and debates about it, need to be located within the wider 
hydropolitical constellation in order to capture how outcomes at the MRC-level are 
conditioned by interactions between various actors over different scalar levels. Three 
sets of relationships are important: state water and energy actors; donor-Member States 
relations (and how they are conditioned by global discourse and civil society); and, civil 
society strategies concerning the MRC. These demonstrate that conceptualising states as 
monolithic and similar actors as homogenous fails to capture the complexity of water 
cooperation and development in the lower Mekong, and the interactions and processes 
which challenge and support it at multiple scales.  
States are not monolithic, but are comprised of a number of different agencies 
and bureaucracies with competing interests and different levels of power. The MRC is 
partially sidelined from water resources development debates and decision-making in 
the lower Mekong states due to the separation of water and energy actors at the national 
level. Interactions between donors and Member States have involved tensions over 
mainstream hydropower plans. Donors questioning Member States‘ plans and urging 
caution is an outcome conditioned by a number of other overlapping actor relationships, 
which donors operate within. Funding commitments by donors are partially conditioned 
by the global development discourse and donors‘ relations to their domestic civil 
society. These overlapping fields of interaction illustrate that actors‘ relationships are 
embedded in webs of overlapping relationships, which inform and condition each other. 
Domestic and regional civil society actors target the MRC as a scalar strategy, ‗scaling-
up‘ their concerns to a level where they can be expressed. Highlighting the MRC and 
engaging in MRC forums allows civil society actors assess to debates and state 
representatives in a regional context where there is limited space for civil society 
debate.   
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Chapter Six: ‘Model’ development: the development banks, civil 
society, and contested hydropower 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Actors utilise narratives to maintain or extend their access to natural resources and 
construct inevitability around hydropower projects in order to justify their involvement 
and promote their role in development. These dynamics are explored through the 
example of the Nam Theun 2 (NT2) hydropower project in Southern Lao PDR (see map 
4, p.182). The development and construction of NT2 was facilitated by the World Bank 
and ADB. The development banks and other project proponents, aware of the 
controversial nature of the project, constructed a sense of inevitability around the 
project to obscure its contested nature. NT2‘s hydropolitical constellation includes a 
range of actor types: the development banks, the Government of Lao, the private sector, 
traditional donors, civil society, and the MRC. The project has livelihood impacts for 
local communities in the Nam Theun and Xe Bang Fai basins: their concerns are largely 
represented by civil society actors in a context where there is limited space for affected 
communities to express their views. NT2‘s hydropolitical constellation illustrates the 
importance of both place and non-place based actors in conditioning, contesting, and 
producing water resources development outcomes.   
This chapter analyses how the development banks represent and promote NT2 as a 
‗model‘ hydropower project as a strategy to maintain and extend their involvement in 
hydropower development in the lower Mekong, and beyond. Through their promotion 
of NT2 the development banks have utilised dominant development narratives linking 
hydropower and poverty reduction. The World Bank and ADB, in light of civil society 
concerns and global level debates on hydropower (such as the WCD), have constructed 
the problem and solution in particular ways: the problem is ‗bad‘ hydropower projects, 
and the solution is ‗good‘ hydropower projects, i.e. NT2. As such, the development 
banks represent themselves as possessing the solution to an acknowledged problem. The 
‗model‘ nature of NT2 includes three key elements: participation, social and 
environmental programmes, and revenues utilised for poverty reduction. Simplification 
of the project to these three elements disguises its complex nature and the ongoing 
process of civil society monitoring and critique. The development banks are determined 
to promote NT2 as a ‗model‘ for hydropower development because of the changing 
roles of the development banks and the private sector in the lower Mekong region.  
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2. The Nam Theun 2 hydropower project  
 
The NT2 hydropower project has featured heavily in development plans for the 
region, including the 1970 IBP, and has been developed in the context of the Lao-Thai 
hydropower export relationship (see Chapters Three and Four). NT2 should generate 
1,070 MW of electricity, of which 995MW is reserved for export to Thailand 
(MacGeorge 2009). In economic terms NT2 is only a feasible hydropower project if 
Thailand purchases the electricity produced (Mekong Secretariat 1988). 
 
 
Map 4: The NT2 project site (http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/southeast-
asia/laos/nam-theun-2/map-nam-theun-2-project-area?size=_original) 
 
Located in Khammuan province, Southern Lao PDR, construction of NT2 commenced 
in 2004 and consists of a number of infrastructure elements: a 39m high dam on the 
Nam Theun creating a 450km
2
 reservoir on the Nakai Plateau, a tunnel system which 
delivers water to a powerhouse 350km below the plateau reservoir, a regulating pond 
below the powerhouse, and a 27km channel which links the regulating pond to the Xe 
Bang Fai River (ADB 2008c). NT2 is a trans-basin diversion project as it utilises water 
183 
 
from the Nam Theun and discharges it into the Xe Bang Fai River (see Map 4, p.182). 
A 130km transmission line linking NT2 and the Thai electric grid has been constructed, 
as well as 70km transmission line linking the project to the Lao domestic grid. 
 
3. Constructing Inevitability: A brief history of Nam Theun 2 
 
Constructing a sense of inevitability is a prerequisite for any large project: ―from a 
contested tenuous notion, one among many, it must be stabilized and ultimately come to 
overwhelm the space of possibilities‖ (Garb 2004: 180). Project proponents utilise four 
discursive-political to construct inevitability: one, shaping and proliferating a project 
definition that points to the proposed project as the solution; two, rewriting and telling 
the project‘s history as a timely unfolding and gathering of momentum of a long-held 
plan; three, concentrated efforts to limit discussions to the project box, excluding issues 
outside the project box such as debate about whether the project is needed or not; and, 
four, bringing the project‘s future into the present and past, i.e. present the project under 
discussion as an accomplished fact by means such as getting ongoing schemes which 
will interface with the project labelled the first phase (Garb 2004).     
Paradigm reformulation is important to constructing a sense of inevitability (Garb 
2004). The dominant narrative underpinning hydropower development in the lower 
Mekong reformulates a problem of poverty, into a problem of development, which in 
turn is reformulated into a problem of infrastructure (see Chapter Three). This linked 
argument is persuasive to development planners and project proponents because it can 
be read in both directions. In re-shaping the justifications for NT2 in terms of its social 
and environmental commitments the development banks reformulated the problem 
definition, but the solution remained the same, albeit with some added components. The 
problem was still defined in terms of poverty and development, and hydropower still 
offered as the solution, but the development banks‘ problem definition now included the 
concerns of civil society and the recognition that hydropower projects had had negative 
impacts for local communities. The problem, therefore, was how to implement 
hydropower in ways that served its stated goals: development and poverty reduction. 
Consequently, it was not that hydropower was the wrong solution, but that it had not 
been implemented properly in the past: 
 
―A bad image of hydropower projects developed by international cooperation came 
to prominence in the 1980s. The World Bank was involved in many of these 
projects. We stopped funding hydropower until NT2 because we didn‘t want to be 
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part of poorly designed projects that do not take the social and environmental to the 
proper standards of mitigation. NT2 is an opportunity to do these things differently. 
We are working with international standards so that we can design projects better, 
projects like NT2 where impacts are cared for‖ (Development bank representative, 
interview, 03/08).  
 
Within this statement a distinction is made between ‗good‘ hydropower projects which 
have social and environmental safeguards, and ‗bad‘ projects, which do not. In this way, 
the development banks present themselves as possessing the solution to the problem 
(‗good‘ hydropower instead of ‗bad‘ hydropower), and restrict debate to aspects of the 
project. This excludes questions about whether the project itself was needed, as the 
project rationale is presented as self-evident.    
The World Bank has supported NT2‘s development since the 1980s. However, the 
intensification of discussions between the World Bank and the Lao government in the 
late 1990s took place in a wider context of international awareness of the harmful 
aspects of dams, and the instigation of the WCD process, during which the World Bank, 
and to an extent the ADB undertook a self-imposed moratorium on hydropower funding 
(see Chapter Five). NT2 signified the World Bank‘s re-engagement with large-scale 
infrastructure after a ten year hiatus (Singh 2009). The World Bank instigated a 
Decision Framework in 2002, which identified three criteria that the Government of Lao 
PDR and the project would have to meet in order to receive the bank‘s support: 
 the project is embedded in a development framework aimed at poverty 
reduction and environmental conservation;  
 the project is technically, financially, managerially and economically sound 
and adheres to the Bank‘s environmental and social safeguard policies; and,  
 it must have greater understanding and wider support within the international 
community and civil society (World Bank 2002).  
Within this Decision Framework the question is not whether or not hydropower is an 
appropriate poverty reduction strategy, but whether it meets certain social and 
environmental criteria.  
The orientation of the World Bank‘s Decision Framework towards sound 
management and environmental and social safeguards established the debate firmly in 
aspects of the project, and circumvented discussions about whether the project was 
needed. Limiting the debate to questions internal to the project and silencing ‗why‘ 
questions helps to ‗close the project box‘ and contribute to the construction of 
inevitability (Garb 2004). In the debate surrounding NT2 questions about whether the 
project was needed or not did not feature heavily. Thai civil society actors questioned 
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the rationale behind the project, arguing that the energy provided by NT2 would not be 
as cheap as claimed in relation to other sources of electricity generation, and that 
Thailand‘s energy demand could be met partially through energy efficiency measures 
(Kuankachorn 2005). However, these questions were largely silenced in a debate where 
alternative options for development were not offered by project proponents and the 
development banks: activists argue that ―NT2 was presented as the only option for 
development‖ (Kuankachorn 2005: 60). Consequently, opposition to the project largely 
focused on the following key issues: one, the Government of Lao PDR lacked the 
capacity and political will to manage the project correctly; two, the risks of the dam 
outweighed its benefits; and, three, the impacts on affected people (Lawrence 2009). 
Opposition to the project came from a range of civil society actors including amongst 
others, Thai NGO TERRA, Japanese NGO Mekong Watch, and international NGOs 
International Rivers, Environmental Defense, and Friends of the Earth-France 
(Lawrence 2009).       
Despite the formulation of Decision Framework in 2002, the World Bank appeared 
committed to NT2 long before its formal announcement (Singh 2009). In 1989-1991 the 
World Bank funded a feasibility study conducted by Snowy Mountains, an Australian 
company. Discussions in 1996 between the World Bank and the Government of Lao 
highlighted that more studies would be needed focusing on whether NT2 is an 
appropriate project for Lao PDR (economically, socially and environmentally); the 
project‘s economic impact on Lao PDR; and development of the conservation 
management plan for the Protected Area (Iverach 1997). The project‘s future was also 
brought into the past and present as the Panel of Experts (POE) and the International 
Advisory Group (IAG) were both established in 1997 by the World Bank as 
independent monitors. The POE would ―provide independent review of and guidance of 
the treatment of environmental and social issues associated with a project in 
preparation‖ (Scudder et al. 1997:4). The IAG‘s role is to inform decision-making, 
providing guidance on environmental and social issues, including independent 
assessment of the concerns of project affected people (IAG 2006). These two 
independent monitors were established five years before the announcement of the 
World Bank‘s Decision Framework, suggesting that the World Bank always intended to 
finance NT2. Project proponents have argued that there was ―increasing understanding 
that one day someone will build it‖, therefore, it is better that it is ‗done right‘ i.e. with 
environmental and social safeguards (Iverach 1997: 77). Proposals and discussions 
about NT2 also had an impact on the Nakai Plateau before construction commenced in 
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2005. For example, NT2 prompted extensively illegal logging in Nakai years before its 
formal commencement (Singh 2009). As will be shown below, practices such as illegal 
logging which are conceptualised as ‗bad‘ environmental practices by powerful actors 
form part of their justification for NT2, as NT2 will conserve the environment.    
The World Bank and ADB approved sovereign guarantees and loans to the value of 
US$270 million and US$120 million respectively in March and April 2005, which 
mobilised other sources of support. Financiers include the European Investment Bank, 
the Nordic Investment Bank, Swedish, Norwegian, French and Thai export credit 
agencies, and the Agence Francaise de Développement (AFD) (Lawrence 2009). The 
official announcement of development bank support effectively closed the project 
debate and limited all subsequent debate to issues surrounding the project. Construction 
of the project began in May 2005 and finished in late 2009.  
Inevitability is also constructed through viewing the history of NT2 as that of a 
project long recognised as worthwhile but hindered by the region‘s geopolitical 
instability. This masks the ways in which civil society contested the project. Project 
proponents offer a view of NT2‘s history as a logical progression from 1927. The 
website of the Nam Theun Power Company states that the potential of the Nam Theun 
for hydroelectric power was identified in 1927, and then lists a series of progressions in 
the project, such as feasibility studies and the concession agreement (NTPC). In 1927, 
the French Colonial Authority in Laos published a report entitled L‟Eveil Economique 
de l‟Indochine (The Economic Awakening of Indochina), which identified potential 
development projects including a hydropower dam on the Nam Theun: 
 
―The French authorities at the time thought it would take one hundred years to bring 
this project to fruition, and they were very nearly right. The planning that started in 
colonial times has now been brought to fruition and the project is very nearly 
complete. All in all it will have taken 83 years‖ (NTPC representative, observation 
notes, site visit, 03/08).  
 
In statements such as the above, the project is presented as inevitable: the site‘s 
potential was recognised in the 1920s and over time this potential has been realised. 
Within this story arc regional and economic dynamics are the causes for delays in 
bringing the project to fruition: 
 
―The project has been delayed many times. Perhaps we could have finished 
sooner, but things like the Asian Financial crisis meant that the government and 
the Thai government agreed to delay the project. So it has taken time‖ (NTPC 
representative, observation notes, site visit, 03/08).  
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Project histories such as these obfuscate the civil society contestation of the project and 
contribute to constructing a sense of inevitability.  
 
4. Actors in Nam Theun 2’s hydropolitical constellation 
 
A wide range of actors are present in NT2‘s hydropolitical constellation, including: 
the development banks, the Lao Government, the private sector, traditional donors, the 
MRC, and civil society. Powerful actors, such as the Lao Government and the 
development banks have deployed narratives linking NT2‘s ‗good‘ hydropower and 
poverty reduction. This storyline fits within the dominant regional discursive formation 
outlined in Chapter Three. This storyline deployed by the banks legitimises their 
development intervention in Lao PDR and seeks to extend their access in the 
hydropower sector. A discourse coalition has formed around this storyline including the 
development banks, NTPC and Lao Government actors. In contrast, civil society actors 
have coalesced around a storyline that contests every aspect of NT2‘s ‗model‘ status.   
 
4.1. The multilateral development banks 
 
The development banks are promoting NT2 as a ‗model‘ hydropower project, 
which can be replicated elsewhere: 
 
―The preparation of NT2, with the numerous studies conducted and the at-length 
consultation processes, paved the way for more participatory, transparent and 
improved hydropower development in Laos. These lessons can be evaluated and 
replicated in future projects so the best social and environmental programs are 
put in place in order to effectively manage impacts‖ (World Bank 2008: 4). 
 
The elements of ‗model‘ hydropower development are: participation, social and 
environmental programmes, and utilisation of revenues for poverty reduction: 
 
―NT2 is a model project. It the first project to take serious the social and the 
environmental, to look at these things long term. Hydropower has to be 
multipurpose: the benefits have to be shared with the people. This is a long term 
commitment to the resettlement, to alternative livelihoods. This is the change‖ 
(Development bank representative, interview, 07/08).   
 
―Not only are the impacts properly cared for NT2, but also the revenues. This is 
a new thing. NT2 is an attractive project for Lao PDR. We have worked with the 
Ministry of Finance to establish the NT2 Revenue Management Arrangement- 
track all revenue from NT2, which is then allocated for poverty reduction, for 
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education, environment, social development‖ (Development bank representative, 
03/08).   
 
These three linked arguments on environmental and social protection, benefits to local 
communities and revenues for poverty reduction form the basis of the development 
banks‘ narrative on NT2. For the banks NT2 is the result of an effort to ensure a large-
scale hydropower project ―could be designed and managed in a way that would ensure 
proper environmental and social protection, assist local rural communities, and enhance 
revenue management by the Lao PDR authorities‖ (World Bank and  ADB 2006: 20).  
 In the statements quoted above, development bank representatives portray NT2 
as a win-win project: benefits accrue to the nation, affected communities and the 
environment. This is in contrast to past hydropower projects which have been criticised 
for privileging some actors and scales over others (e.g. FIVAS 2007). In this context 
NT2 is ―intended to exemplify the [World] Bank‘s achievement of socially and 
environmentally responsible development‖ (Singh 2009: 488). The WCD (2000) was 
critical of a number of World Bank funded dams. In the Mekong region ADB funded 
hydropower projects, such as Theun Hinboun in Lao PDR have been widely and heavily 
criticised (e.g. FIVAS 2007). Consequently, the development banks are in need of a 
―successful dam story‖ or ―a platinum project‖ (Klopper 2008: 334). NT2 is a high risk 
project and has a significant reputational risk for the World Bank (Shivakumar 2007). 
Witoon Permpongsacharoen, a member of Thailand‘s National Economic and Social 
Advisory Council, argues that NT2 is a project which ―justifies the World Bank‘s 
existence‖ and that they went to great lengths to justify the project (quoted in Imhof 
2005: 15). To ensure a ‗good‘ dam story the development banks are involved in 
narrative construction, establishing a large PR machine around the project, which 
widely proclaims the environmental and social aspects of the project. These 
communication efforts are ―necessary to convince the general public that the World 
Bank has learnt from its dam mistakes of the past‖ (Lawrence 2009: 90). 
Civil society representatives interviewed for this thesis argued that the Banks need 
NT2 to be a success because of the ways in which they are situated at the intersection of 
development and finance: 
 
―There is now a difficulty for the banks in getting water infrastructure loans out 
because they are not competitive anymore. At the same time they have this 
obligation to, they are there to fight poverty. So there is a kind of dichotomy 
between both, between the need to be more competitive in order to stay in the 
market and the need to have strong safeguards towards more sustainable outcomes. 
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The banks are trying to determine how they will look in the future and NT2 is one 
vehicle for that (Civil society representative, interview, 04/08a).  
 
However, as will be discussed below, the ‗success‘ of NT2 for the development banks is 
still unclear.    
The development banks link infrastructure and poverty reduction. The World 
Bank‘s 2009 report Directions in Hydropower: Scaling up for Development argues that 
the expanding role of hydropower offers ―important opportunities for poverty 
alleviation and sustainable development‖ (Fields et al. 2009: ix). Whilst its‘ 2003 Water 
Resources Sector Strategy links infrastructure development, water management and 
poverty reduction (World Bank 2003). The ADB also links water, development and 
poverty reduction arguing in its 2003 Water for All Policy that water is a key 
development ingredient and requires ―careful management to sustain equitable 
economic growth and to reduce poverty‖ (13). Developing water resources through 
infrastructure to combat poverty and increase socio-economic development has been 
promoted by the development banks in various global locales, including Ethiopia and 
Lesotho (Thurow 2004; Furlong 2006). However, the link between water resources 
development and poverty reduction for local communities is contested (Furlong 2006).  
The development banks represent and promote NT2 in terms of its environmental 
and social aspects: its status as a hydropower project is secondary to the benefits it will 
accrue to the Lao people. Lawrence (2009) argues that the development banks have 
attempted to transform a large, destructive hydropower project into a development 
project. In the lower Mekong powerful actors have always represented hydropower in 
terms of its development and poverty reduction potential and utilised a narrative linking 
these elements (see Chapter Three). However, following global concern and widespread 
civil society challenges to hydropower development, which culminated in the WCD 
process (see Chapter Five) the development banks represent their involvement in terms 
of a new ‗model‘ of hydropower development. According to the development banks 
NT2 represents a new approach and not business-as-usual (Shivakumar 2007):  
 
―The World Bank has a completely different perspective. We are involved long 
term, developing alternative livelihood. But, also we are committed to the 
downstream where water is coming: have to protect people, use water for more 
productive things like navigation, we‘re supporting that. Also upstream have to 
protect the biodiversity, watershed from illegal logging. This entire approach, 
watershed approach, is really good. This is a new approach‖ (Development bank 
representative, interview, 07/08).   
 
190 
 
In contrast civil society interview participants argue that this is not a new approach but 
represents a recasting of NT2: 
 
―So what has NT2 done? It‘s basically positioned itself as a development project 
rather than an industrial project, which it essentially is. Hydropower projects are 
projects to generate electric…NT2 came along and said…we‘re not just about 
making electric we‘re bringing development to Laos, we‘re …helping these 
communities…It was recast in that light. So now rather than just the way to make 
money, hydropower‘s the development strategy‖. (Civil society representative, 
interview, 04/08b).  
   
In 2003, following a visit to the project site the World Bank‘s Managing Director stated 
that the bank sees ―Nam Theun 2 not as a project per se, but as a vehicle through which 
to make a considerable progress in the effort of poverty reduction‖ (quoted in 
poweringprogress.org). These arguments are congruent with those utilised by powerful 
actors in the lower Mekong since the 1950s, however, they are now utilised in a context 
of civil society opposition to hydropower.   
This re-conceptualisation of NT2 as an environmental and social development 
project, which just happened to be a hydropower project began prior to the World 
Bank‘s Decision Framework in 2002. The Panel of Experts, established by the World 
Bank in 1997, stated in their first report that NT2 is ―a very complicated attempt at river 
basin development…which involves the World Bank family of agencies in a pioneering 
effort with the private sector and a national government‖ to build a major hydropower 
project (Scudder et al. 1997: 6). By 2009, the Panel of Experts were arguing that they 
―regard many of [NT2‘s]… features and procedures as models for other projects 
elsewhere in Laos and beyond. As it has steadily evolved…from a single sector 
hydropower project into a multipurpose development enterprise we have become more 
convinced of its potential as a global model‖ (McDowell et al. 2009: 8). As such, 
project proponents are lauding NT2 as a model that will pave the way for best practice 
dam development (Lawrence 2009).  
The overriding benefit of NT2, according to project proponents, is poverty reduction 
in Lao PDR: 
 
―The big change is with the revenues. These will be spent for poverty reduction: we 
have designed a management scheme for these to ensure they are spent on poverty 
activities‖ (Development bank representative, interview, 07/08).  
 
In 2005, the World Bank‘s president stated that Lao PDR had few options to escape the 
poverty trap and that the bank believed ―that a sound approach to selling 
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hydroelectricity, supported by improved government policies is the best way for the 
country to increase the amount of money it can invest in health, education and basic 
infrastructure for the benefit of the poor‖ (Wolfensohn quoted in Imhof 2005: 5). As 
such, the impact of NT2 is much broader than that of an energy project: its primary 
benefit is the ―incremental revenues flowing to the Government for several decades 
starting in 2009‖, which will be utilised for  ―additional spending on priority poverty 
reduction and environmental protection programs‖ (World Bank and ADB 2006: 23). 
The development banks have funded a series of fiscal and management reforms within 
the Lao bureaucratic and government sectors, which are aimed at strengthening the 
government‘s ability to manage the revenues from NT2 correctly and direct them 
towards poverty reduction programmes (Lawrence 2009). Civil society actors are 
concerned about the government‘s capacity and political will to manage the revenues 
and contest whether project revenues will be utilised for poverty reduction (Lawrence 
2009). 
Political ecologists have illustrated how powerful actors stigmatise local land-use 
practices in order to delegitimize those practices and justify their intervention and 
extend their control over resources or territory (e.g. Bassett and Zueli 2003). Powerful 
actors and project proponents have represented NT2 as an environmental project which 
will counter ‗bad‘ local land-use practices: 
 
―NT2 has established a Water Management and Protection Authority with a budget 
of US$1 million a year for 31 years. This is much bigger than the normal US$7000 
such an agency would have‖ (Development bank representative, interview, 03/08).   
 
―On of the biggest problems in the area is illegal wildlife trade, as well as some 
animal populations being threatened by hunting. One of WMPA‘s principle goals is 
to conserve wildlife and help stop this trade‖ (Civil society representative, 
interview, 06/08b).  
 
―Villagers use slash and burn agriculture as some of the land is bad for rice. We 
have moved them to new lands, but we have some problems, have to teach them to 
rotate crops and not use slash and burn‖ (Development bank representative, 
interview, 03/08).  
 
Within these arguments the operating assumption is that the environment has to be 
protected from local communities who engage in ‗bad‘ environmental practices: the 
solution to these problems is NT2.   
 
 
192 
 
4.2. The Lao Government 
 
The Lao Government locate NT2 within broader arguments linking hydropower 
and development. At public meetings state representatives have argued that NT2 is an 
important component of the national poverty reduction strategy: the poverty of Lao 
PDR is the only necessary justification for NT2 (Singh 2009). This is congruent with 
the dominant development narrative linking hydropower with poverty reduction, 
whereby poverty is defined in terms of indicators such as GDP, and the solution is 
increased government revenues and economic growth. NT2 is predicted to generate 
huge revenues for Lao PDR estimated at US$1.9 billion in its first 25 years (ADB 
2008c). As quoted above, project proponents interviewed for this thesis argue that these 
revenues will be channelled into poverty reduction programmes. 
The social, environmental and financial commitments that comprise the 
development portion of NT2 were included because of the financial power of the 
development banks. Development bank support was considered vital for NT2 due to the 
size of the investment and concerns financiers and other actors had about investing and 
operating in Lao PDR, which is classified as one of the most corrupt states in the world 
by Transparency International (Lawrence 2009). In this context, Lawrence (2009) 
argues that the Government of Lao PDR and NTPC have acquiesced to the social and 
environmental commitments favoured by the development banks in order to gain access 
to concessional funding and guarantees from the banks, which would lead to financing 
from other actors. This seems likely as both the Government of Lao PDR and NTPC 
were keen to secure World Bank support for the project and the fact that financial 
closure was only reached after the development banks announced their support.  
NT2 has played a strong role in the relationship between the development banks, 
particularly the World Bank and the Government of Lao PDR: for example, in light of 
the World Bank‘s commitment to socially and environmentally responsible 
development, the Lao government was obliged to issue and revise laws, establish new 
government agencies, as well as consent to a wide range of workshops and consultation 
activities (Singh 2009). This suggests that the power asymmetry between the 
development banks and the Lao Government (whereby the Government needed 
development bank support to realise NT2) affords the development banks a certain 
amount of leverage over the Government to ensure compliance with its policies: 
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―There is no reason to doubt that we have leverage. Both the government and 
NTPC know that the project has to meet World Bank standards. We work 
closely with each other, and sometimes there are daily meetings on different 
aspects of the project‖ (Development bank representative, interview, 03/08).     
 
However, as NT2 moves into the operations phase, civil society actors argue that there 
is less incentive for the Lao Government and NTPC to comply with social and 
environmental commitments: 
 
―We can hammer on at the development banks, and maybe they push the issues 
with the government and the company. But, whether they can actually get 
anything done is another question. Now the reservoir has started filling there is 
even less impetus for the government and the company to do the social and 
environmental programme well. What can the banks do, they can‘t reverse the 
decision to close the gates‖ (Civil society representative, interview, 04/08b).   
 
The asymmetric relationship between the development banks and the Lao 
Government should not be interpreted as casting the latter in a passive role. Whilst the 
Lao Government have committed to a number of reforms and processes at the behest of 
the development banks, this does not mean that these reforms and processes will be 
implemented in the ways agreed. The effects of the World Bank are dependent on local 
complexities (Singh 2009). The interaction between the Lao Government and the 
development banks is strategic. The Lao Government have agreed to a number of 
reforms and processes in order to secure funding for NT2. According to the 
development banks NT2 has buoyed the hydropower sector in the region (ADB and 
World Bank 2006). However, the expansion of actors in development of hydropower in 
the region has ‗opened-up‘ new avenues of financing for the Lao Government.  
Despite the development banks promotion of NT2 as a model for future 
hydropower projects in Lao PDR and elsewhere, the Lao Government response is 
varied. In 2007, the Lao Minister of Energy and Mines stated at the World Bank 
facilitated Lao-Thai High Level Forum on Hydropower that ―it would be very good if 
any project, not only in our country, could follow this standard‖ (World Bank 2007c). 
At the MRC‘s 2008 Regional Multi-Stakeholder Consultation on the MRC Hydropower 
Programme Lao government representatives labelled the project excellent and praised it 
for its transparent process (State official, observation notes, MRC meeting, 09/08). 
However, during the discussions at the meeting, one of the lead Lao state officials 
argued that ―you cannot ask for the same standards in all projects because other dams 
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are bigger, so you cannot ask for same as NT2 in others‖ (State official, observation 
notes, MRC Meeting, 09/08).  
Civil society representatives interviewed for this thesis argue that: 
 
―We‘ve already been told by the Lao government they‘ll never be another NT2. 
They‘ll never be another process of consultation and discussion like NT2‖ (Civil 
society representative, interview, 04/08b).  
 
The decade long approval process for NT2 ―has left the Lao government and regional 
investors largely uninterested in seeking support‖ from the development banks for other 
hydropower projects as they ―view the banks‘ safeguard policies as burdensome, time-
consuming and costly‖ (Middleton 2007: 12). Development bank and donor 
representatives interviewed for this thesis echoed this view:   
 
―The NT2 approach is a real pain in the neck for the government, because it 
reaches into questions of accountability and governance. The government can no 
longer do certain things if we are involved‖ (Development bank representative, 
interview, 07/08).  
 
―The standards in NT2 maybe are discouraging, because it is not necessarily an 
incentive for the private sector to know that anything they do will be known by 
any who at any moment…discouraging for people who are investing because 
they are very much criticised‖ (Donor representative, interview, 05/08a).  
 
The above statements illustrate the importance of positionalities. Whilst some actors are 
concerned that the NT2 standards are seen as too high by the government or the private 
sector, civil society actors interviewed for this thesis argue that there has not been 
enough transparency in the project because not all the relevant documents have been 
released.  
 
4.3. Traditional donors to the lower Mekong  
 
Traditional donor states to the lower Mekong have also been interested in and 
supportive of NT2. In April 2005 AFD, granted the Lao government 5 million Euros to 
fund their share in NT2, and also provided 60 million Euros in commercial loans 
(Lawrence 2009). Other traditional donors, such as Australia and Finland have not 
supported the project financially, but have offered public approval of it. As such, they 
are part of the discourse coalition which is constructing a narrative of NT2 as a ‗model‘ 
project: 
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―NT2 is a project with important social and environmental consequences, so we 
wanted to show that it could be done right. Also important for the government, 
and this is what we agreed, to have a public-private partnership where most of 
the public funds are used to support sound political behaviour from the 
government, so they learn how to protect the environment, how they can do 
something socially acceptable, maybe more than acceptable for people who are 
affected by the dam and more than to support them in managing the revenue. 
That was what was interesting and why we choose to support‖ (Donor 
representative, interview, 05/08a). 
 
―I have just visited NT2 and I have seen how well the social and environmental 
work is progressing. 6000 people have been resettled and other people are now 
complaining because the relocated have received better houses. The standards 
are very high‖ (Donor representative, observation notes, MRC meeting, 10/07).  
 
Traditional donors to the region are also keen to support the development banks 
involvement in the project: ―We were very happy to see that the World Bank was 
coming back and we wanted to be with them‖ (Donor representative, interview, 05/08a).  
This support can be viewed through the lens of changing development bank-private 
sector dynamics in the lower Mekong. Prior to 2007, traditional donors to the MRC, 
interviewed for this thesis, conceptualised hydropower projects in the region as always 
being facilitated by the development banks (Donor representative, interview, 05/08b). 
The increasing involvement of private sector actors from the region threatens this 
dynamic, and the coalition of actors that surround it. Donor support for NT2, and by 
extension the development banks, is a show of support for development bank facilitated 
hydropower.     
 
4.4. The Private Sector 
 
Nam Theun 2 has been developed under the IPP model and is the largest foreign 
investment in Lao PDR (MacGeorge 2009). In 1993, the Government of Lao and the 
Nam Theun Electricity Consortium (NTEC) signed a project development agreement to 
develop NT2 as a BOOT project. NTEC was comprised of Transfield Holdings (one of 
Australia‘s major construction and engineering companies), the Lao Government, 
Jasmine International and Merrill Lynch Phatra Thanakit Securities (Iverach 1997; 
Lawrence 2009). By the time the Concession Agreement (CA) was signed in October 
2002, the actors in the consortium had changed. The French company, EDF, and Thai 
company Italian-Thai Development (ITD) joined NTEC in 1994. In September 2002, 
the Nam Theun Power Company (NTPC) was established as a Lao company replacing 
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NTEC. EDF International is the key shareholder in NTPC (35% share). The other 
shareholders are the Electricity Generational Public Company of Thailand (25%), 
Italian-Thai Development (15%) and the Lao Holding State Enterprise (25%) 
(MacGeorge 2009). The Lao Holding State Enterprise is a state enterprise owned by the 
Ministry of Energy and Mines and represents the Lao Government‘s share in the 
project. The October 2002 concession agreement granted a 31 year BOOT concession to 
NTPC (6 years construction and 25 years operation), after which it will be transferred to 
the Lao Government free of charge. 
 Private sector actors involved in NT2 utilise the same development and poverty 
reduction rationales for the project as the Lao Government and the development banks: 
 
―Because of their proximity to, and therefore exposure to, developing economies 
like Thailand, China and Vietnam, the people of Laos know about and want 
development and a more modern lifestyle… Laos has an unacceptable level of 
poverty. The people want that to change. Their options are limited and…hydro 
is a good option…It is very much about ensuring that the promise of a better 
living standard can be delivered in a poor country in a sustainable way without 
mortgaging its environmental future. It is about changing a nation‘s future for 
the better‖ (Iverach 1997: 67-77). 
 
Within the above statement the emphasis is placed on the socio-economic benefits of 
the project: its nature as a hydropower project is secondary to these. These types of 
arguments were utilised against a backdrop of growing civil society opposition to the 
project in the 1990s. After project approval and construction private sector actors 
continue to utilise arguments which emphasise NT2‘s ‗model‘ nature and environmental 
and social focus: 
 
―The company are spending $1 million on conserving the elephants, this is 
unheard of. NT2 care to all the aspect of the environmental and the social. This 
is part of the agreement with the government, but the company is happy to do it, 
because all these things are important. Other projects they have not done this‖ 
(Discussion with NTPC staff, observation notes, site visit, 03/08).  
 
Conservationists interviewed for this thesis are concerned about the elephant population 
and a rise of human-elephant conflict as the elephants‘ habitat has been depleted by the 
project: as an adaption strategy the elephants may encroach on farmland (Civil society 
representative, interview, 06/08b). An elephant conservation project is part of the 
concession agreement between NTPC and the government. The development banks, the 
Lao government, NTPC and traditional donors to the MRC are all members of a loose 
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discourse coalition, which is emphasising the social and environmental storylines of 
NT2.  
 
4.5. Civil society 
 
Civil society actors argued extensively against NT2 prior to its approval in 2005. 
The discourse coalition, which formed in opposition to the project, involved a wide 
range of NGOs located at the domestic, regional and global levels (Lawrence 2009). 
However, IUCN and the World Conservation Society (an American NGO) have been 
involved in developing some aspects of NT2, such as conducting conservation studies 
and designing the elephant programme. After the approval of NT2 funding the majority 
of NGOs ceased their campaigns against the project. International Rivers, an American 
NGO, decided to continue their involvement in the NT2 debate by monitoring the 
project. This decision is justified in terms of ensuring that the development banks, the 
Lao government and NTPC upheld their commitments to affected peoples (Imhof 
2005): 
 
―proponents and financiers of the project had all made a series of promises that we 
believed would not follow if not closely monitored…[and because of] a lack of civil 
society and free media‖ (Civil society representative, interview, 04/08b).  
 
International Rivers‘ monitoring process includes:  visiting the project site and meeting 
with villagers; preparing trip reports and having follow-up meetings with NTPC and the 
Lao Government; and, writing letters expressing their concern to the Lao Government, 
NTPC and the development banks. Whilst some of this monitoring activity is conducted 
via the media, there is also a lot of communication between the actors outside the public 
domain.   
 Reactions to civil society monitoring illustrate how powerful actors represent or 
label the concerns of less powerful actors in particular ways to undermine them: 
 
―Criticism because some people do not like dams. They do not like dams‖ 
(Hydropower industry representative, observation notes, site visit, 03/08). 
 
―IRN are selectively interviewing villagers to show the negative. There are some 
problems with the project, but also lots of good things like it will decrease infant 
mortality and there are more schools. They never mention these things‖ 
(Hydropower industry representative, observation notes, site visit, 03/08).  
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―Why are they picking on the one Lao hydropower project that is going well, 
instead of encouraging the government? This is bad because it could turn the 
government against doing projects well‖ (Development bank representative, 
interview, 03/08) 
   
Representing the concerns of civil society actors as anti-hydropower, 
misleading/selective, and possibly dangerous because they could result in ‗good‘ 
hydropower projects not being constructed are ways of undermining the position of civil 
society actors and the space given to their concerns. This labelling represents a strategy 
by powerful actors to delegitimize the position of less powerful actors.    
 
4.6. The MRC 
 
The MRC has been largely excluded from the development of NT2. NT2 was one of 
the key hydropower projects proposed and studied by the Mekong Committee and 
Interim Mekong Committee. The 1959-1961 Japanese Reconnaissance Mission to the 
Mekong identified NT2 as a potential project site, and it was included in the 1970 IBP 
(Mekong Secretariat 1970). The Interim Mekong Committee‘s 1988 Perspectives for 
Basin Development identified NT2 as a project of international significance due to the 
Lao-Thai electricity export relationship (Mekong Secretariat 1988). In 1987, the 
Mekong Secretariat revised the layout of the project, and a prefeasibility study was 
initiated by the Lao Ministry of Industry and Handicraft (Mekong Secretariat 1988). 
The Mekong Secretariat argued that NT2 enjoyed ‗very attractive economics‘ and 
therefore, should be built as soon as possible (Mekong Secretariat 1988). The 
involvement of Mekong water cooperation in the development of NT2 ceases after this 
point.  
From the late 1980s the World Bank began to play a stronger, more visible role in 
the project, and neither Thailand nor Lao PDR ―sought a meaningful role for the MRC‖ 
in the development of NT2 (ADB and World Bank 2006: 21). The absence of the MRC 
from NT2 can be explained by three factors: the uncertainty about the future shape of 
Mekong water cooperation between 1991 and 1995, and the shift away from project 
development in the new incarnation of water cooperation, the MRC; the rise of other 
funding sources for infrastructure projects (see Chapters Three and Four); and, the 
MRC‘s limited definition of tributary, which excluded it from involved in most 
hydropower projects prior to 2007 (see Chapter Five). In 2007, the MRC undertook a 
review of an NTPC study on the hydraulic discharges from the NT2 regulating pond 
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and their impacts on the Xe Bang Fai River, at the request of the external monitors of 
the project (MRC 2007c). Aside from this review the MRC has had little involvement in 
the NT2 process.  
 
5. Elements of ‘model’ development: contestation between the World Bank and 
civil society  
 
Elements of the development banks‘ ‗model‘ development include: a commitment 
to participation; social, environmental and livelihood restoration programmes, and 
revenues for poverty reduction. The World Bank argues that ―the overall success of the 
project will eventually be judged by its ability to achieve the longer term environment, 
social, and revenues management outcomes‖ (World Bank 2009). These three elements 
are reflected in some of the commitments that the Lao Government and NTPC made in 
order to secure funding for NT2. These commitments include: participation in the 
planning process and procedures for affected people to submit grievances; US$90.5 
million provided for social and environmental mitigation and compensation with a 
commitment to raise resettled villagers‘ incomes to the national poverty line in five 
years; US$16 million to restore affected communities on the Xe Bang Fai livelihoods by 
year nine of the project; and a revenue management framework including a dedicated 
account in the Lao Treasury for the channelling of NT2 revenues into eligible poverty 
reduction programmes (Lawrence 2009).  
Two discourse coalitions are engaged in processes of narrative construction and 
contestation around these three ‗model‘ elements, both in the public discourse of NT2 
(reports, documents, presentations, and media coverage) and in interviews for this 
thesis. Within these, actors‘ scale impacts and benefits at different levels of analysis. 
Civil society approach the livelihood and resettlement issues from a local level, bottom-
up, on-the-ground approach, which involves interviewing and discussing with villagers, 
as well as reporting the concerns of individual villagers (International Rivers 2008a). In 
contrast, project proponents scale impacts at the project level, viewing them in 
aggregate terms in a top-down approach: ―there will be a school in every village, instead 
of now where there is only a school in one-third of villages. Education will increase‖ 
(Hydropower industry representative, observation notes, site visit, 03/08). The scale 
used to evaluate impacts conditions how the project is represented.  
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5.1. Participation 
 
Participation is a broad theme permeating NT2‘s project documents and Social 
Development Plan: requirements include consulting with a range of stakeholders from 
villagers affected by the project, government agencies, and global NGOs (Singh 2009). 
The consultation process for NT2 is a key element of the development banks‘ ‗model‘ 
hydropower: the World Bank argues that it has ―paved the way‖ for more participatory 
hydropower development in Lao PDR (World Bank 2008: 4). NT2‘s project proponents 
committed to public participation and the World Bank claimed responsibility for 
achieving this outcome (Singh 2009). However, social and political complexities 
surround this commitment: participation is not a technical and neutral process, which 
can be applied in a universal fashion regardless of temporal-spatial setting. At a 
rhetorical level there is widespread agreement amongst actors that participation is an 
important principle, however, in practice it is ―a concept and process intimately 
connected to the political and economic dynamics of the particular geographical and 
historical contexts within which it is being applied‖ (Sneddon and Fox 2007: 2161). Lao 
PDR has no domestic NGOs and limited space for civil society participation (see 
Chapter Four). Singh (2009) argues that the Lao government views participation as ―a 
requirement of the international domain that has little bearing on existing institutions‖ 
(497).Consequently, these factors condition the potential for affected communities and 
other stakeholders to participate in hydropower projects.  
Within the Lao context both civil society actors and the development banks have 
expressed concern about the ability of stakeholders to effectively participate. Public 
participation in Lao PDR is ―especially contentious given that Laos is governed by a 
one-party state that strictly limits civil society and promotes deference to social 
hierarchies‖ (Singh 2009: 493). A consultant hired by the development banks in 2004 to 
assess local consultations argued that stakeholders had limited ability to express 
opinions without fear of reprisals and that there was a tendency to agree with 
government representatives (Chamberlain 2004). At a public consultation in Vientiane 
in September 2004 participants included representatives from NGOs, international 
organisations, embassies, foreign academics, Thai media, and village representatives 
from the Nakai district (Singh 2009). Village representatives endorsed NT2 in terms of 
poverty reduction and development, arguing that they were poor and had a need and a 
right to development: these endorsements were couched in the same terms of those of 
Lao government representatives and contributed to a sense that the public consultation 
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was a negotiated performance and not a forum for broad-based, free discussion as 
claimed by the World Bank (Singh 2009). At a behind the scenes meeting between Lao 
government representatives and the World Bank one Lao government representative 
questioned the validity of information collected from villagers and requested their 
names so that officials ―could go and ‗talk‘ with them and correct their 
misunderstanding‖ (Singh 2009: 496). Civil society actors have also contested the 
participatory nature of NT2. International Rivers (2008) argue that whilst they speak to 
only a small number of people affected by the project, the people consulted raise similar 
concerns and in ―a country where people are reluctant to speak openly and critically 
about a government-supported initiative, this is especially significant‖ (5). These brief 
remarks illustrate that participation is a contested element of the NT2 ‗model‘.  
 
5.2. Social, environmental, and livelihood restoration programmes 
 
 The social, environmental, and resettlement programmes of NT2 are a key 
component of the development banks‘ construction of ‗model‘ hydropower. These 
programmes involve the resettlement of 6,200 villagers from the Nakai Plateau (see 
Map 4, p.182), including physical infrastructure in terms of 1,265 new houses and 
wells, and livelihood restoration measures, such as providing new land for cultivation, 
and rice and protein support for villagers as they adapt to their new homes (World Bank 
and ADB 2008b). The goal of the livelihood restoration programme is to double 
incomes five years after relocation (roughly 2012/13) (World Bank and ADB 2008b). 
Livelihood restoration measures include: land for rice cultivation, house gardens, 
grazing land, a community forest, and boats for fishing in the reservoir (Lawrence 
2009). Compensation measures for villagers who are affected by the construction of the 
project include, cash payments for villagers who lose less than 10% of their productive 
assets and replacement land for those who lose more than 10% (Lawrence 2009). NTPC 
is administering a Downstream Livelihood and Asset Restoration Programme for 
villages in the Xe Bang Fai basin affected by the project (see Map 4, p.182). This 
programme focuses on microcredit funds to support agriculture, aquaculture and 
livestock projects, such as tomato cultivation or pig farming (Lawrence 2009). These 
programmes have been monitored by civil society, and by the external monitors, the 
POE and IAG.   
Documents such as the World Bank and ADB‘s July 2008 progress report on 
NT2, which present goals achieved and actions undertaken obfuscate the contested 
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nature of these programmes and delays to them. Civil society actors have expressed 
concern about the livelihood programs. A September 2009 letter to the World Bank and 
ADB from International Rivers identified a number of issues: new livelihood programs 
such as vegetable gardens and pig breeding are still at the pilot stage and only one or 
two villagers have tried them out per village; and villagers are able to catch less and less 
‗big fish‘ in the reservoir. This could lead to food security issues (International Rivers 
2009b). Concerns have also been expressed about the livelihood programs in the Xe 
Bang Fai, where 120,000 people will be affected according to civil society, or 75,000 
according to NTPC (Lawrence 2009; International Rivers 2008a). Downstream 
livelihood activities are funded through a savings and credit scheme and include fish 
ponds, pig farming, mushroom production and textile production. However, a number 
of these activities have failed leaving villagers in debt to the scheme and having to sell 
buffalo and other assets in order to make re-payments (International Rivers 2009b).  
The POE have also critically assessed the livelihood programs during their 
monitoring visits and subsequent reports, and expressed a variety of concerns. In 2006, 
the POE were concerned about the speed of implementation of livelihood programs and 
warned of a two-track process whereby villagers could lose land and natural resources 
before the livelihood programs were in place leading to declining incomes for villagers 
and other problems (McDowell et al. 2006). Such were their concerns that the 13
th
 
Report issued February 2008 warned that it may be unrealistic to seal the diversion 
tunnel and start reservoir filling on 10 April 2008 as planned, as resettlement was 
unlikely to be completed in time and livelihood programmes were behind schedule 
(McDowell et al. 2008). In order to achieve the POE ‗signing off‘ on reservoir 
impoundment their 13
th
 Report set out a list of actions that must be completed, 
including: resettlement houses, village access roads, and fencing new farming plots 
(McDowell et al. 2008). In response to this NTPC stepped up the resettlement program 
and other aspects. If the POE did not ‗sign off‘ on reservoir impounding around the 
original planned date on 10 April 2008 it could mean that NTPC would have to wait 
until the rainy season in 2009 in order to do so (Mc Dowell et al. 2008). This would 
mean delays in commercial operation and electricity generation. In light of this, it is 
likely that it was the threat of the POE not ‗signing off‘ on reservoir impounding and 
the impact this would have on commercial operation, which motivated NTPC to 
increase its momentum on resettlement and livelihood programs and not the ongoing 
pressure of the development banks and civil society. 
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The 13
th
 POE Report also noted that NTPC emphasised resettlement 
infrastructure and how some villagers have acquired new assets such as motorbikes in 
their assessments, but it is the livelihood programs which are more important and 
villagers are concerned about delayed implementation of the program and rice 
availability (Mc Dowell et al. 2008). Private sector actors view the livelihood 
programmes through an infrastructure lens: 
 
―Some of the people in the resettlement villages never look very happy, but they 
have been given new houses with sanitation and well-built. They should be 
happy‖ (Hydropower industry representative, observation notes, site visit, 
03/08).  
 
According to this positionality communities should be happy because they have new, 
better housing. However, resettlement involves a number of complex issues other than 
the provision of new infrastructure: ―communities have a spiritual attachment to the 
land that it is being flooded; they are also worried about being settled into new 
communities, and leaving their traditional land‖ (Civil society representative, interview, 
03/08).  
The emphasis on assets such as motorbikes illustrates how project construction 
can give local economies an artificial boost: 
 
―Maybe there is a slightly false picture in the villages at the moment because of 
the boom you see. This is because there are some villagers working construction 
on the project, and because of the workers who live in the workers‘ village and 
provide a boost to the local economy. Because of this some families have been 
able to buy motorbikes and mobile phones‖ (NTPC staff, observation notes, site 
visit, 03/08).   
 
Data collected in 2007 showed that 80% of households were exceeding the target of 
US$820 annual household income largely due to construction jobs on the project 
(World Bank and ADB 2008a). However, data for 2007 also showed that incomes had 
started to drop as construction activities dried up (McDowell et al. 2008). Now 
construction is complete villagers will have to rely on the livelihood programs.    
The development banks argue that they are aware of concerns about the 
resettlement and livelihood programs, and that establishing ―sustainable livelihoods and 
achieving income targets remains the most difficult challenge- but one that must be 
met‖ (World Bank and ADB 2008a: 3). Development bank representatives interviewed 
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for this thesis argued that resettlement and livelihoods programmes are challenging in a 
number of ways: 
 
―There have been delays in constructing the new houses because when we 
consulted with villagers they requested a particular type of wood that was in 
short supply and had to be imported from Vietnam‖ (Development bank 
representative, interview, 03/08).  
 
―Villagers have also chosen to remain close to their traditional lands, so they 
have been resettled near these lands, and their new land is a difficult soil for rice, 
and villagers are now farming a smaller area‖ (Development bank 
representative, interview, 03/08).  
 
Within these statements project proponents are keen to assert that villagers‘ requests and 
choices have been respected as much as possible, which is one of the reasons why the 
livelihood programs have been challenging. Adaption to new lands and livelihoods is 
also complicated:  
 
―we have to get the villagers to understand that they can not do slash and burn 
but have to rotate the crops with rice one year and vegetables the next and also 
as they will not use vegetables in the same way as rice they have to be taught 
how to sell vegetables‖ (Development bank representative, interview, 03/08).  
 
―we are having to train villagers in new livelihoods and helping them to adapt to 
different ways of life…We are doing new mind-frame development‖ 
(Development bank representative, interview, 07/08). 
 
Project proponents argue that the complexity of this ―new mind-frame development‖ is 
such that some people will fail:  
 
―You are taking forest people and turning them into cultivators, and some people 
will fail to adapt‖ (Development bank representative, interview, 07/08).  
 
―Yes some people will lose their way of life, but what are you supposed to do? 
Put a black box around them?‖ (Hydropower industry representative, 
observation notes, site visit, 03/08).  
 
The above statements illustrate how project proponents scale arguments about benefits 
and impacts: in this scaling it is acceptable that some people are left behind, or fail to 
adapt, because the majority will adapt. In contrast civil society actors argue that: ―For us 
a very basic tenet of developing a project should be that people are not worse off than 
they were before‖ (Civil society representative, interview, 04/08b). As such, IRN raise 
the concerns of individual villagers in their meetings with the development banks and 
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NT2. This conflicts with the development banks‘ scaling of the project: ―They come 
and say this villager thinks this, but we have 6000 villagers‖ (Development bank 
representative, interview, 03/08). The contestation of resettlement and livelihood 
programmes illustrates how actors‘ scale project assessment differently and how this 
impacts the discursive struggle over the ‗model‘ nature of NT2.  
 
5.3. Poverty reduction 
 
Powerful actors‘ fundamental justification for NT2 is that revenues from electricity 
sales will be utilised for poverty reduction programmes. Lao PDR is one of the poorest 
states in Asia in terms of ―conventional development indicators‖ (Lawrence 2009). 
However, civil society actors contest whether NT2 will contribute to poverty reduction: 
 
―When you look at the rhetoric the government, the ADB, and the World Bank are 
using hydropower is, or is one of the main ways in which Laos will achieve middle 
income status by 2020. Haven‘t seen numbers to demonstrate that that‘s even 
possible, and GDP and eco dev are two different things‖ (Civil society 
representative, interview, 04/08b) 
 
Whilst hydropower will increase GDP it may actually increase poverty. GDP is a 
national scale indicator, which can mask changes at the sub-national scale:  
―Hydropower increases GDP but at same time undermines the natural resource base, 
which rural communities depend on‖ (Civil society representative, interview, 04/08b). 
Hydropower projects, such as NT2, impact livelihood strategies such as fishing, and 
therefore whilst national development indicators may increase, local communities may 
become poorer in terms of food security. This illustrates how the indicators or scales 
used to analyse development or represent poverty reduction are highly political and not 
neutral.    
 
6. Nam Theun 2 and the wider hydropolitical constellation 
 
The development banks‘ promotion of NT2 as a ‗model‘ hydropower project, which 
can be replicated elsewhere must be located with the wider lower Mekong 
hydropolitical constellation. The rise of new private sector actors and possible funding 
avenues for hydropower challenges the dominance of the development banks: 
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―In all the discussions we have had about private investors we always said ―well 
they would need to be facilitated by the banks‖. That was wrong. They don‘t need 
them at all‖ (Donor representative, interview, 05/08b).   
 
In this context the development banks are promoting NT2 as a ‗model‘. Singh (2009) 
argues that NT2 is the World Bank‘s flagship project: if the ―idea of World Bank-
directed development is not supported by its flagship project in Laos, then its 
applicability elsewhere becomes highly questionable‖ (488). As such the success of 
NT2 is directly related to the World Bank‘s reputation. Despite the rise of new private 
sector actors the development banks still possess strong political capital and remain key 
actors in hydropower development.  
The World Bank is re-engaging with hydropower on a global scale. Since 2003 the 
World Bank has supported a number of projects, including Bujagali in Uganda, and 
Bumbuna in Sierra Leone. Its 2009 report Directions in Hydropower: Scaling up for 
Development argues that ―the role of hydropower and multi-purpose water infrastructure 
is expanding, with important opportunities for poverty alleviation and sustainable 
development‖ (Fields et al. 2009: ix). The World Bank‘s goal is ―to maximize the 
strategic value of hydropower investment to economically, environmentally and socially 
sustainable development‖ (Fields et al. 2009: ix). Within this the World Bank will play 
a role in both investment and in sector strengthening (promoting good practice and 
building partnerships) (Fields et al. 2009). These roles have been identified as areas 
where the World Bank can add value and have a comparative advantage compared to 
other actors.  
In contrast, the ADB‘s Energy Policy focuses more broadly on how it will assist 
its‘ member states in developing their energy sectors. The policy covers a range of areas 
including governance, energy efficiency, regional power trade and supporting 
hydropower projects (ADB 2009a). ADB is committed to selectively supporting ―large 
hydroelectric power plants…with multipurpose benefits‖ with financing based on the 
economic benefits and compliance with ADB‘s social and environmental safeguards 
requirements (ADB 2009a: 7).    
 The development banks have made pre-emptive claims about the success of 
NT2, in part to secure its status as a ‗model‘ project. The development banks argue in 
their joint MWRAS that the region‘s hydropower sector has been buoyed by the 
progress of NT2 (World Bank and ADB 2006). This strategy was released in 2006, a 
year after construction of NT2 had commenced. In mid-2007 the World Bank began 
preparing a book entitled Doing Dams Right: the challenge of Lao Nam Theun 2, 
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scheduled for release in February 2010 (Lawrence 2007). In 2007, NT2 was roughly 
half-way through construction and two years away from commercial operation.  
However, the publication has been postponed and the title changed to Doing A Dam 
Better: The Lao People‟s Democratic Republic and the Story of Nam Theun 2 (Porter 
and Shivakumar 2010). The World Bank states that the book will cover how in the 
―wake of an acrimonious debate on big dams, the World Bank brokered a global 
agreement on financing as well as on the sharing of the rewards and risks of the 
controversial Nam Theun 2 project‖ (Porter and Shivakumar 2010). The December 
2010 book also describes how ―skilful management, effective communications, and 
technical expertise helped to reach consensus and nurtured private-public partnerships, 
engaged stakeholders, strengthened the country's development framework and poverty 
reduction efforts, and addressed the project's environmental and social impacts‖  (Porter 
and Shivakumar 2010). This book is part of the development banks‘ process of narrative 
construction about NT2, which is taking place against a backdrop of uncertainty 
concerning the project‘s legacy.    
The promotion of NT2 as a model is largely for economic and geopolitical reasons 
(Klopper 2008). As detailed in Chapter Four, the position of the development banks and 
the role of the private sector in hydropower development in the Mekong are changing: 
 
―the development banks used to have a greater role and their role is diminishing 
because the…the region is very attractive to investors and the laws, conditions for 
those development banks are not competitive anymore‖ (Civil society 
representative, interview, 04/08a).  
 
―In the past ADB and World Bank, especially ADB with its plans for a Mekong 
power grid, was a stronger voice in the overall shaping of the discussion of Lao‘s 
hydropower development, and they were supported by a number of western 
financial donors, and associated consultancy companies…Now they have a weaker 
voice and I think that‘s what different, that‘s what changed. Private sector always 
there but the development banks have a weaker voice in the milieu of what‘s going 
on‖ (Civil society representative, interview, 04/08b). 
 
The extent to which the development banks are needed by the lower Mekong states to 
facilitate hydropower development has been reduced. As such, the rise of new private 
sector companies has impacted the power relationship between the development banks 
and the lower Mekong states.  
Middleton (2007) argues that ―with the arrival of a new set of private companies, 
alternative sources of finance, and regional government players keen to support the 
development of the region‘s hydropower sector, multilateral bank support is also 
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unnecessary‖ (12). Consequently, the development banks are trying to reinvent 
themselves. The banks want to build on the success of NT2 but recognise that their 
financial capital is no longer essential: although their political capital is still quite strong 
(Dore 2008). The promotion of NT2 as a model to be replicated is one mechanism 
through which the development banks are seeking to maintain their position and access 
in the region. Middleton (2007) argues that the banks have not given up on supporting 
the hydropower sector in the region and are using a number of mechanisms including 
funding transmission line projects, touting IWRM and promoting NT2 as a ‗model‘. 
Development bank representatives interviewed for this thesis argued that: ―the 
international reputation and profile have gone up because of NT2. People know it and 
recognise the government and NTPC for it‖ (Development bank, representative, 03/08). 
Emphasising these aspects represents one discursive strategy which the development 
banks are using to promote their ‗model‘ of hydropower development to the lower 
Mekong governments.   
The World Bank has strong political capital. Large multilateral donors are regarded 
as key institutions that direct patterns of global change through development: the World 
Bank is pre-eminent amongst these and because of its ―decisive role on a global scale, 
the World Bank is often seen by adherents and critics alike as the most influential 
partner in bringing about particular types of change in developing countries‖ (Singh 
2009: 477).  In conjunction with promoting NT2 the development banks, recognising 
that their political capital is still quite strong, are pursuing a number of other activities 
to maintain their visibility and presence in hydropower development in the region. 
These include: the joint MWRAS activities; the 2007 Lao-Thai Hydropower Forum 
convened by the World Bank; and the ADB‘s joint work with MRC and WWF on 
Environmental Criteria for Sustainable Hydropower Development. These activities are 
extending the development banks‘ purview and represent ways in which they are 
becoming involved in a multitude of activities, which promote them as possessing or 
aiding the solutions to particular problems. 
   
7. Conclusion  
 
Constructing a sense of inevitability around hydropower projects obfuscates the 
ways in which projects are contested. NT2 project proponents have constructed 
inevitability in a number of ways, including: rewriting the project history as a logical 
progression from 1927, which explains delays to the project in terms of economic 
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factors such as the Asian Financial Crisis that are outside the sphere of the project; and, 
reconceptualising NT2 as a ‗model‘ hydropower project. This ‗new‘ hydropower project 
is the solution to the problem of ‗bad‘ hydropower projects, which have not fulfilled 
their potential and delivered socio-economic development. In constructing a sense of 
inevitability, project proponents have utilised the dominant hydropower narrative in the 
Mekong, which links hydropower and poverty reduction, but have added an extra 
dimension distinguishing between ‗good‘ and ‗bad‘ hydropower.      
NT2‘s hydropolitical constellation demonstrates that actors operate within multiple, 
overlapping power relationships. For example, the development banks‘ funding for NT2 
has been conditioned by an awareness of the controversy surrounding hydropower dams 
and contributed to the development banks seeking certain commitments from NTPC and 
the Lao Government. The project also has significance for actors such as traditional 
donors to the region. These donors are not necessarily directly involved in the 
development of NT2, but, they are contributing to promoting it as ‗model‘ through 
mechanisms such as making positive statements about it in public forums. Traditional 
donors are motivated by an awareness of changing regional dynamics in the lower 
Mekong‘s hydropolitical constellation, such as the emergence of new private sector 
actors undermining the need for development bank facilitation of hydropower projects.  
Asymmetric power relationships between actors should not be conceptualised as 
involving a dominant and a passive actor. The Lao Government agreed to a number of 
social and environmental commitments in order to secure funding from the development 
banks. Without development bank support other financiers would not have supported 
NT2. Consequently, Lao government social and environmental commitments can be 
viewed as a strategic. Commitment and implementation are two distinct fields. Ferguson 
(1994a) argues that development projects have unintended consequences and outcomes 
cannot be ‗read‘ from intentions. Development bank motivated commitments to, for 
example participation are implemented through local complexities. In the Lao context 
this includes limited space for public participation and civil society concerns about the 
possibilities for affected communities and other stakeholders to openly express their 
views.  
Disseminating a representation of NT2 as a ‗model‘ hydropower project 
involves simplifying the project to a number of key elements. These are: participation, 
social and environmental commitments, and revenues managed for poverty reduction. 
The success of the development banks promotion of NT2 as a ‗model‘, in terms of it 
gaining acceptance from other actors and inclusion in the public transcript of 
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hydropower development, depends on the ability of the development banks to combat 
and silence critiques of the project. Civil society actors contest all three of the key 
elements of ‗model‘ hydropower. The development banks argue that their involvement 
has improved the project resulting in a ‗better‘ project. Through their official 
documents, which present positive social and environmental outcomes, and through 
their concerns that civil society critiques could result in the Lao government returning to 
‗bad‘ hydropower, the development banks are seeking to silence opposition, and scale 
impacts and evaluations at the project and national scales. Within this framing, success 
is dependent on an aggregate-level of improvement in the livelihoods of affected 
communities, and contributions to poverty reduction in terms of the government 
channelling funds into programmes in health and education. This scaling at the level of 
evaluation disguises both individual impacts (which are highlighted by civil society 
actors) and locates success within technical processes administered by the government.    
The development banks motivations for representing NT2 as a ‗model‘ 
hydropower project are two-fold. The development banks are expanding their 
involvement in hydropower after sustained criticism of projects by civil society actors 
lead to the WCD and a hiatus from direct hydropower funding. The World Bank‘s 2009 
hydropower strategy identifies the sector as key to development and an area in which 
the bank can play a strong role: a successful dam story in NT2 contributes to this role. 
Two, the position of the development banks in the lower Mekong hydropower sector is 
challenged by the emergence of new private sector actors and availability of new 
sources of financing for infrastructure projects. However, the promotion of NT2 as a 
‗model‘ by the development banks may have destabilising effects for the banks. NT2 is 
meant to help maintain the development banks‘ position in relation to new hydropower 
actors, but the standards imposed by the banks are considered ‗very high‘ by Lao 
government representatives, and as such they may not replicate the project.    
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Chapter Seven: Contesting hydropower: the debate over trade-offs 
 
1. Introduction  
 
 Justifications for mainstream hydropower dams emphasise their contribution to 
poverty reduction. Civil society actors, including fisheries experts and scientists 
challenge proposals for mainstream dams on the Mekong. Their challenges target the 
large-scale fisheries impacts of hydropower dams and the effects these will have on the 
food and livelihood security of local communities and vulnerable groups dependent on 
the Mekong‘s fisheries. Instead of ceding ground in the face of mounting fisheries 
evidence, which suggests that the consequences of mainstream dams will be disastrous, 
powerful and visible actors such as state agencies, governments, and the development 
banks and the MRC are framing the discussion in terms of trade-offs. Empirical 
material from three key moments in the hydropower debate, as well as interview 
material, is utilised in this chapter to illustrate the ways in which actors are framing and 
contesting the debate, and how framing the debate in terms of trade-offs depoliticises 
the impacts of hydropower and the distribution of costs of benefits. These three 
moments are the Independent Expert Fisheries Group, the 2008 MRC Regional Multi-
Stakeholder Consultation, and the MRC‘s 2010 Strategic Environmental Assessment.      
A discussion of trade-offs allows the promotion of hydropower development 
whilst simultaneously recognising fisheries impacts. This strategy of co-option shifts the 
discussion to a technical discourse situated at the national and regional scales, which 
masks the distribution of costs and benefits and attempts to divorce fisheries impacts 
from the impacts they will have on people. A focus on issues such as quantifying 
fisheries and comparing sectors contributes to situating the discussion of hydropower 
and fisheries as a state, regional, and technical discourse. This excludes actors located 
over other scales, and helps to construct both the environment and affected actors as 
objects to be acted upon. It also depoliticises hydropower dams, rendering the debate 
technical and thereby obfuscating the political nature of dams and their impacts.       
Environmental and developmental narratives play a fundamental role in the 
justification of hydropower, challenges to this, and the discussion of trade-offs. The 
dominant narrative linking hydropower and poverty reduction simplifies complexity for 
decision-makers and legitimises particular courses of action, i.e. mainstream 
hydropower. Counter-evidence presented by fisheries scientists and civil society actors 
increases complexity and de-stabilises the assumptions of decision-makers. This 
212 
 
illustrates that narratives are not fixed temporally or spatially: there is continual tension. 
Narratives also play a role in the discussions of fisheries and trade-offs in the region. 
Fisheries are represented both as doomed, due to their open access nature, and an 
unsuitable object for development. These types of narratives surrounding fisheries allow 
powerful actors to place hydropower and fisheries in a trade-off relationship. This 
depends on attributing instrumental values to both hydropower and fisheries: attributing 
a substantive value to fisheries would not allow a trade-off to be made.  
Mainstream dams will transform the Mekong River completely and affect 
livelihood strategies in a number of ways. Changes in flow type and speed as well as 
sediment transportation may severely impact irrigation systems and riverbank 
agriculture (ICEM 2010). This chapter focuses on fisheries impacts because they have 
emerged as a key discursive battle ground in the region, and because fisheries are 
extremely important for livelihoods in the basin.  
 
2. Narratives and counter-evidence 
 
The dominant regional discursive formation in the lower Mekong links 
hydropower development and socio-economic development (see Chapter Three). This 
narrative revolves around of sequence of events: the people of the Mekong are poor; the 
potential of the Mekong River for hydropower development is huge; therefore, 
developing the Mekong River will lead to socio-economic development. It has endured 
despite the emergence of a range of new actors in hydropower and water resources 
development (see Chapter Four), and challenges to the position of established actors 
(see Chapters Five and Six). State actors, such as government ministries and state 
enterprises, throughout the lower Mekong basin express and conform to this dominant 
narrative. State officials interviewed for this thesis conceptualised hydropower in terms 
of its contribution to socio-economic development:  
 
―we are poor. We need energy for my people. Maybe you have seen, been in the 
rural area, the people they have no electricity they use candle, use fire. They 
need development. We will develop based on hydropower‖ (State official, 
interview, 06/08a).   
 
Statements such as these illustrate the endurance of narratives and how they frame 
policy-makers‘ thinking. The dominant regional discursive formation in the lower 
Mekong has endured since the 1950s, and whilst actors, power relationships and 
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geopolitical contexts have changed the definition of the problem (poverty), the solution 
(hydropower) has remained constant.   
The resurrection of plans to dam the mainstream of the lower Mekong has 
intensified the struggle between actors to frame and control the debate over hydropower 
development in the region. Powerful actors such as government ministries and the 
development banks are continuing to promote hydropower development as a poverty 
reduction strategy (Viravong 2008; ADB and World Bank 2006). The MRC has also 
presented its Member States hydropower development ambitions in terms of the 
narrative described above, arguing that Member States regard hydropower development 
as an ―integral component‖ of their policies for economic growth and poverty 
elimination (Bird 2008c). However, a range of actors including civil society actors, 
traditional donor representatives, researchers and scientists, both within and outside of 
the region are challenging this dominant narrative and its representation of the Mekong 
as an object to be developed.    
 Narratives play an important role in policy-making and decision-making. 
Complexity and uncertainty is reduced by narratives, which offer stories about 
development and the environment which suggest possible solutions (Roe 1991; Leach 
and Mearns 1996). In the case of the Mekong, as discussed in Chapter Three, 
complexity concerning socio-economic development and how best to develop water 
resources that span six states is reduced to the simple, problem-solving narrative 
outlined above, which in defining the problem also offers the solution. In light of this, 
questions concerning the suitability of this development path are met simply with 
appeals to the narrative itself or to slogans. For example, state officials interviewed for 
this thesis expressed concern about fisheries impacts, but legitimised these in terms of 
the obvious need for poverty reduction:  
 
―Don Sahong [a proposed mainstream dam] is my concern also because of the 
fisheries, and fisheries management. But, we will find a way to manage to the 
fisheries. Hydropower will bring many benefits, and the people need those 
benefits‖ (State official, interview, 06/08a).  
 
Poverty reduction acts as a meta-justification, which can override and silence 
opposition: no-one is against poverty reduction (Molle et al. 2009b). This has 
implications for the ways in which actors contesting the dominant narrative and the 
proposed hydropower development present their arguments.        
Scalar considerations, such as the scaling of development interventions, and the 
scalar distribution of costs and benefits, are extremely important in this context. 
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Hydropower dam impacts are situated largely over the local scale. However, benefits 
will be accrued and distributed largely at the national scale: projects are also justified at 
the national scale.11 Scaling development at the national scale can obfuscate the 
distribution of costs, benefits and risks attached to hydropower projects: 
 
―The obvious issue is the payoff between the services the river provides for poor 
communities against the industrial benefits- irrigation or electricity- which 
generally benefit urban areas. Not just a question of who benefits, who wins and 
loses, but who shoulders the proportion of the risk‖ (Civil society representative, 
interview, 04/08b). 
 
The utilisation of poverty reduction and national development as rationales for 
hydropower development ‗scale-up‘ discussions from the local level and disguise issues 
surrounding impacts and the distribution of costs and benefits in water resources 
development.  
As detailed in Chapter Four, changes at the global level in the water discourse 
with the rise, and now prominence, of IWRM seek to integrate social and environmental 
concerns into water resources development. This has been reflected at state and basin 
levels of analysis where environmental and social concerns surrounding water resources 
development projects have become more visible. For example, rising awareness of 
social and environmental issues, particularly surrounding resettlement are cited in the 
IMC‘s 1987 Perspectives for Mekong Development as the reason for scaling down the 
proposed Pa Mong dam into two smaller projects (Mekong Secretariat 1988). Social and 
environmental concerns have also led civil society groups in Thailand to challenge 
hydropower development, such as the Pak Mun Dam (see Chapter Four, Section Six). 
The protests against Pak Mun were boosted by the WCD process, which was highly 
critical of the dam (Foran and Manorom 2009). This illustrates the interconnections 
between processes at the global scale and hydropower development in specific 
geographic locales. These two examples demonstrate that political space has opened up 
for the consideration of social and environmental concerns.  
The rationale for hydropower development largely presents the lower Mekong 
River as unutilised (see Chapter Three). This masks the on-ground reality in which the 
lower Mekong River permeates the livelihoods of the basin‘s population. A growing 
awareness of social and environmental issues is destabilising this representation of the 
                                                             
11 The transboundary nature of the Mekong River basin complicates this picture. Proposed mainstream 
hydropower projects, such as the Don Sahong located in Southern Lao PDR close to the border with 
Cambodia, may have transboundary fisheries impacts.  However, whilst the impacts may be 
transboundary they will largely affect communities dependent on the fisheries resource. 
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Mekong as unutilised. Challenges to the dominant narrative and to the proposed 
hydropower development plans, which it underlines and supports are centred on 
fisheries and livelihood impacts.  
        
2.1. Fisheries in the basin: importance and impacts 
 
Fisheries play a vital role in livelihoods and food security in the lower Mekong 
basin. The Mekong‘s fisheries are one of the most valuable, productive and diverse 
inland fisheries in the world, valued at approximately US$2.5 billion annually. Around 
120 species of fish are commercially traded in the Mekong region (Coates et al. 2003). 
Fisheries resources play an integral role in livelihoods in the basin with between 64 and 
93% of rural households in the lower Mekong involved in fisheries to some extent 
(Coates et al. 2003). Fisheries provide various types of employment: direct and non-
direct, full and part-time, commercial and non-commercial. They are also extremely 
important for food security. Consumption of fish and aquatic resources provides 
between 47 and 80% of the animal protein intake of people living in the basin, and in 
2006 consumption of fish and other aquatic animals was estimated at 2.6 million tonnes 
(Hortle 2007). The subsistence and nutrition roles of fisheries enable people to engage 
in other means of employment (Hortle 2007). Whilst these pieces of evidence present a 
general overview of the importance of fisheries in the basin, it is important to note that 
fisheries and the relationships between local communities and fisheries resources are 
varied throughout the basin. When talking about ‗the fishery‘ in the Mekong, it is 
important to remember that there are many different types of fisheries, including large 
visible fisheries such as the Tonle Sap, and numerous diffuse small-scale fisheries in 
ponds and rice fields (Friend et al. 2009). 
The fisheries and subsequent livelihood impacts of mainstream hydropower 
development have emerged since 2007 as a key battleground. Hydropower dams impact 
fisheries in a number of ways. The most important of these, in terms of Mekong 
mainstream hydropower development, is that they act as barriers to fisheries migration. 
A large number of Mekong fish species are migratory, migrating up- and downstream to 
breed and feed. It has been estimated that more than 70% of the total fish catch in the 
Mekong (roughly 1.8 million tonnes) is dependent on long distance fish migration, with 
the Mekong mainstream acting as a corridor for fish migration (Dugan 2008b). 
Mainstream dams will impair the connectivity of the Mekong system for fish migration. 
Dams on the mainstream in Lao PDR and Cambodia will effectively stop fish migrating 
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up and downstream, which will severely impact important fish migration routes such as 
those connecting the Tonle Sap in Cambodia and the Khone Falls in Lao PDR, and 
between the Mekong mainstream and the 3S rivers (important Mekong tributaries 
shared by Lao PDR, Vietnam and Cambodia) (see Map 3, p.6) (ICEM 2010). Blocking 
fish migration will also have impacts on biodiversity and productivity in the Mekong‘s 
tributaries (ICEM 2010).  
A 2008 MRC review of the size of the catch which could be affected by 
mainstream dams estimated impacts to be between 700,000 and 1.6 million tonnes 
(Barlow et al. 2008). Fisheries experts interviewed for this thesis argued that blocking 
fish migration routes impacts not only fish themselves, but livelihoods: 
 
―It‘s the impact of no fish in the river on the people who live here, that‘s the 
important point. Decreasing the amount of fish available…means there is less 
food for people, less food security. So it‘s an economic and livelihood impact on 
poor people‖ (Fisheries expert, interview, 05/08).  
 
Consequently, to fully analyse the political nature of framing the debate in terms of a 
fisheries-hydropower trade-off it is necessary to situate fisheries impacts within the 
context of the role that they play in livelihoods.  
Determining the scale and extent of fisheries impacts is complicated and as will 
be shown below is located at the intersection of science, politics, and the role of 
knowledge in decision-making. Fish in the Mekong largely fall into two categories 
labelled black and white (Dugan 2008b). Black fish species have limited lateral 
migrations from the rivers into floodplains, they do not migrate up and downstream but 
remain in floodplains; in contrast, white fish species undertake long-distance migrations 
up and downstream, between lower floodplains and the mainstream (Dugan 2008b). 
Fisheries impacts will differ for the two categories, such that: 
 
―Some with only limited migrations over short ranges may not be impaired by 
dam structures. Others are highly adaptable to habitat modification including 
impoundment. Species most likely to be affected will be those that undertake 
significant passive and active migrations along the mainstream between critical 
spawning, feeding, and refuge habitats as part of their life histories‖ (Barlow et 
al. 2008: 16). 
  
The above statement illustrates that fisheries‘ resources are varied and that impacts will 
also vary. This has implications for determining impacts and presenting a coherent 
message to decision-makers.     
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2.2. Challenging the dominant narrative 
 
Since 2007, a discourse coalition has been contesting the dominant narrative of 
hydropower development and has coalesced around a storyline that argues mainstream 
hydropower development will have immense negative fisheries, livelihoods and 
environmental impacts. Hajer (1995) argues that discourse coalitions form around 
specific storylines, and involve a range of actors who may never have met and who, 
whilst they share a storyline, tell different stories. Actors in the discourse coalition 
which are contesting mainstream hydropower include Thai NGOs such as TERRA and 
Living Rivers Siam, Cambodian NGOs such as the Rivers Coalition in Cambodia, the 
domestic branches of international NGOs such as Oxfam Australia which has an office 
in Cambodia, NGOs such as International Rivers, researchers and scientists from 
regional and international organisations, and some domestic and foreign media. Within 
this coalition of diverse and varied actors, a range of stories are told including amongst 
others: mainstream hydropower dams will block fisheries migration (Baran and Ratner 
2007), will affect livelihood and food security (Imhof 2009), will be disastrous for 
biodiversity including the dolphin population (Bezuijen et al. 2007), and will impact 
other development sectors such as eco-tourism (Fawthrop 2009). Different actors 
highlight different areas of concern about mainstream dams illustrating the multi-
dimensional nature of the debate. However, these stories have yet to coalesce into a 
coherent counter-narrative with the same appealing and prescriptive logic of the 
dominant ‗hydropower leads to development‘ narrative, which is helping to drive policy 
and decision-making in the region.   
     Once a storyline gains enough socio-political resonance it generates political 
effects (Hajer 1995). In terms of the Mekong, the ‗mainstream hydropower will have 
immense negative impacts‘ storyline has had a number of effects, including: discussions 
of the possible fisheries impacts at multi-stakeholder forums, the convening of an 
Independent Expert Fisheries Group to discuss fisheries migration and mitigation, and 
state level actors requesting the MRC to conduct more studies into fisheries impacts 
(MRC 2008b). These activities and the production of counter-evidence to the dominant 
narrative linking hydropower development and socio-economic development illustrate a 
number of interesting points concerning the role of science and information in policy-
making, narratives and counter-narratives, and the discursive strategies which powerful 
actors utilise to co-opt the terrain of less powerful actors.  
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 There is always tension surrounding narratives. Narratives are not ‗fixed‘, they 
are challenged and contested. Counter-evidence in the Mekong has destabilising effects 
for policy-makers as it increases uncertainty and complexity. However, narratives can 
also endure despite the accumulation of counter-evidence (Swift 1996), and the more 
complex a situation the more likely it is that narratives endure (Friend et al. 2009). The 
case of the lower Mekong illustrates how decision-makers and powerful actors attempt 
to co-opt the terrain of less powerful actors. Counter-evidence that hydropower dams 
will impact fisheries is acknowledged by powerful actors such as the development 
banks (ADB and World Bank 2006). However, this counter-evidence does not 
‗overthrow‘ the underlying dominant development narrative. This is partially because, 
as will be seen below, counter-evidence has yet to coalesce into a counter-narrative, 
which can offer the same stabilising assumptions to decision-makers. In light of the 
uncertainty that counter-evidence has produced, and the challenges to hydropower 
development, powerful actors are predominately employing two strategies: one, calling 
for more studies into fisheries impacts and mitigation measures; and two, framing the 
discussion surrounding fisheries and hydropower in the language of trade-offs.  
 
3. Calls for more studies: science, information and decision-making 
 
One of the key questions being debated between actors both inside and outside 
of the Mekong region is the degree to which fisheries impacts can be mitigated. Civil 
society actors including fisheries experts and scientists have compiled evidence that 
negative impacts of hydropower dams cannot be mitigated (e.g. Dugan 2008b). 
However, state representatives have requested further studies and placed their faith in 
technological solutions. Calls for further studies into fisheries impacts and the 
possibilities of mitigation need to be evaluated in light of assumptions about decision-
making: will decisions be made on the basis of this information, or is decision-making a 
political process which conditions how information is utilised? Isolation of the 
processes and actors who collect information and conduct scientific studies from those 
where hydropower decisions are made is also relevant here. Scientific studies, such as 
those conducted into fisheries impacts by the MRC, take a long time to conduct and 
there are issues surrounding whether this information is utilised by decision-makers or 
has impact on decisions.   
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3.1. Possibilities for mitigation  
 
In 2008, the MRC convened an Independent Expert Fisheries Group comprising 
seventeen fisheries scientists and researchers to consider five main areas: the 
importance and nature of fisheries migration in the Mekong, the impacts of barriers on 
that migration, whether fish-passage facilities can be used effectively for fish migrating 
upstream/downstream, and the possibilities for compensating decreases in fisheries 
yields (Dugan 2008b). The results of the Group were publicly disseminated at the 2008 
MRC Regional Multi-Stakeholder Consultation on the MRC Hydropower Programme, 
and in an article in the MRC‘s fisheries newsletter Catch and Culture (Dugan 2008a; 
Dugan 2008b). MRC representatives at the 2008 MRC Regional Multi-Stakeholder 
Consultation argued that: ―This Group is part of the MRC‘s attempt to play its role in 
shedding light on important questions. We see it as part of our fast-tract activities‖ 
(MRC Representative, observation notes, MRC Meeting, 09/08). This work must be 
situated within the broader context of the debate over the role and relevance of the 
MRC, which has provided an impetus for the MRC to become more pro-active and 
define its role in hydropower (see Chapter Five). In 2009, the MRC defined its role in 
terms of knowledge generation and facilitating stakeholder forums (MRC 2009b).   
The findings of the Independent Expert Fisheries Group were clear and 
consistent: the impacts of barriers on fisheries migration will be severe and it is not 
possible to mitigate those impacts with current technology due to the volume of 
migration in the Mekong and the large number of species involved (Dugan 2008a). 
These findings are supported by those of the 2010 draft Impact Assessment report of the 
MRC‘s Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) for Hydropower on the Mekong 
Mainstream. The SEA is one of the MRC‘s activities under its Initiative on Sustainable 
Hydropower: this Initiative outlines the role of the MRC in hydropower and includes 
basin-wide studies on the impacts of hydropower (MRC 2009b). This is consistent with 
the MRC Strategic Plan which states the MRC will focus on transboundary projects and 
national projects with significant/cumulative impacts, and the role of the MRC as a 
knowledge provider (MRC 2006). The SEA was conducted by the International Centre 
for Environmental Management (ICEM), an expert consultancy based in Australia and 
Vietnam, which focuses on Asia and achieving ecologically sustainable development 
(ICEM).  
The 2010 draft SEA report argues that ―current designs of fish passage are 
unlikely to be effective for more than a few species‖ and that options for mitigating 
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these effects ―are not capable of compensating for the losses‖ (ICEM 2010: 23, 24). 
ICEM (2010) considered the proposed hydropower projects and their impacts as a 
cumulative whole and then also as different sets of projects. The draft report argues that 
even if all six of the proposed mainstream hydropower dams in upper Lao PDR are 
equipped with ―efficient and effective fish passages, the stretch of six dams in cascade 
over a distance of nearly 800km represents an impossible barrier for the long distance 
migratory species‖ (ICEM 2010: 23). If all proposed eleven mainstream dams go ahead 
throughout the lower Mekong basin then ―no mitigation measure will prove effective‖ 
due to the diversity and magnitude of the Mekong‘s fisheries and their migrations 
(ICEM 2010: 24). Mainstream dams will also impact tributary and sub-basin fisheries as 
these are also dependent on seasonal mainstream fish migrations (ICEM 2010). The 
Independent Fisheries Expert Group suggested that if dams are to go ahead they should 
be located further upstream or on the tributaries in order to lessen fisheries impacts 
(Dugan 2008b). However, these would still have fisheries impacts. 
During discussions at the 2008 Regional Multi-stakeholder Consultation on the 
MRC Hydropower Programme, state officials requested more studies into fisheries 
impacts (State officials, observation notes, MRC meeting, 09/08). These requests came 
after the presentation by the Independent Expert Fisheries Group, which stated that 
mitigation was not possible (Observation notes, MRC meeting, 09/08). In contrast, state 
officials at the consultation were actively engaged by the US Army Corps of Engineers‘ 
(USACE) presentation about fisheries mitigation in the Columbia River Basin and 
asked a number of questions: ―How much do fisheries mitigation measures cost?‖; 
―Lots of different fish passages, which is the appropriate one for getting fish past a dam 
to the spawning ground‖; ―Which technology in your experience is the good one?‖ 
(State officials, observation notes, MRC meeting, 09/08). These remarks illustrate how 
state representatives have placed their faith in technological solutions, view the example 
of the Columbia Rover Basin as proof that technological mitigation of fisheries impacts 
is possible, and also view the utilisation of technological solutions from a different 
geographic locale as unproblematic.      
The Columbia River Basin has, to a certain extent, been treated as a model by 
state actors in the Mekong basin. In early 2008, officials from the four lower Mekong 
states undertook a study tour to the Columbia River Basin. The Columbia River basin 
was chosen by the MRC because it shares some similar natural characteristics with the 
Mekong, faced similar development and management decisions a few decades earlier, 
and offered opportunities to learn about the cost and effectiveness of fish mitigation 
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measures (BDP2 2008). Following the study tour state officials made comparisons 
between the Columbia and the Mekong: 
 
―Basically the high ranking people went to Columbia basin and now they 
understand. Along the Columbia how many dams? Maybe more than 60 you see, 
but they have measures for the fish. Maybe a little more difficult here as they are 
between two countries, whereas we have four countries in Mekong (State 
official, interview, 06/08a). 
 
Representatives from USACE attended the 2008 Regional Multi-stakeholder 
Consultation on the MRC Hydropower Programme and participated in the Independent 
Fisheries Expert Group meeting in September 2008. USACE representatives detailed 
how they have utilised different technologies including construction of fish passages, 
the use of fish-friendly equipment (i.e. fish-friendly turbines), and operating the 
reservoirs in ways that prioritise fish passage in order to mitigate the impacts of 
hydropower dams on salmon (Tanovan 2008).             
 State officials‘ requests for further studies and interest in the Columbia River 
Basin as a model illustrate how powerful actors represent fisheries impacts as a 
technological problem, which will have a technological solution. However, it is 
important to remember that technology cannot be divorced from the contexts in which it 
is developed, located and operated. It is not simply a case of transferring technological 
solutions from the Columbia River Basin to the Mekong River Basin. USACE 
representatives at the 2008 MRC Regional Multi-stakeholder Consultation stressed that: 
―Our results are for salmon. It will be different in the Mekong. You have to be specific 
to location‖ (USACE representative, observation notes, MRC meeting, 09/08). Fisheries 
experts interviewed for this thesis also warned against comparing the Mekong and the 
Columbia: 
 
―Their mitigation measures are largely targeted at salmon…very big fish, very 
powerful swimmers. So there are ways in which you can get them upstream…to 
where there‘s good habitat and they spawn, and the young don‘t come back 
downstream until they are two or three…Now a fishery like we have in the 
Mekong consists of dozens and dozens of species, which will all come 
downstream as either eggs, larvae or juvenile fish of different sizes. You can‘t 
trap them and move them round a dam because they are too tiny and fragile. So 
by and large these mitigation measures for migratory Mekong fish are nonsense‖ 
(Fisheries expert, interview, 06/08).  
 
Even if technological mitigation measures were effective in getting a percentage of fish 
upstream past the dams, this would not necessarily mean that the Mekong‘s fisheries 
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would be preserved. A focus on mitigation measures such as fish passes casts fisheries 
impacts as a technological problem, and thereby ignores the hydrological and biological 
processes and aspects of the problem. If all the proposed mainstream hydropower 
projects are implemented it is estimated that 66% of the total length of the mainstream 
in the Lower Mekong Basin (LMB) will be turned into a reservoir (ICEM 2010). This 
has a number of implications including changes to the speed of the river‘s flow, major 
changes to sediment transportation, and a disruption of the flood pulse of the river 
(ICEM 2010). Changing ecological and hydrological contexts of the river will have 
serious implications for fisheries: 
 
―Even if you can get fish upstream past the dam, what‘s up there for them? 
Upstream is a lake, its no longer a river…what is planned in Laos will wipe out 
the suitable habitat…Getting fish past these dams may be actually deleterious as 
there‘s no good habitat for them upstream. So you get them upstream and they 
don‘t reproduce. Or then you‘ve got the problem that even if they do spawn, 
spawning upstream the eggs drift in a lake. The lake is effectively Stillwater so 
the eggs drop out of suspension and the young die‖ (Fisheries expert, interview, 
05/08).      
   
Therefore, even if mitigation measures are designed and have some success in getting 
the migratory fish past the dams, it may not be possible to maintain the existing fishery 
as dams change the habitat and ecology, which the Mekong‘s freshwater capture 
fisheries are dependent on. A focus on technological mitigation masks this reality as it 
represents the problem as a simple engineering one of moving fish up and downstream 
past the dams.   
 
3.2. Information and decision-making 
 
State officials‘ requests for more studies into fisheries impacts suggests that 
information gaps exist, which are hindering decision-making. This presupposes that 
decision-making is a neutral process whereby relevant information is collected and 
assessed, and directly leads to decision outcomes. However, this is not necessarily the 
case as decision-making is a political process. Focusing on knowledge gaps can also 
lead to questions concerning how much information is enough information, what is the 
relevant information, and how are the answers to these questions defined. As shown in 
Chapter Five, there is a separation between water and energy actors in the lower 
Mekong states, with the former involved in the MRC, and the latter largely outside the 
MRC‘s sphere of engagement. This raises the possibility of a two-track process 
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whereby institutions such as the MRC will be engaging in further studies whilst 
hydropower decisions are being made elsewhere on the basis of other factors.   
Important knowledge gaps concerning fisheries, which could have implications for 
decision-making, were identified in interviews for this thesis: 
 
―We don‘t know where all the spawning grounds are…There are all these plans for 
dams on the mainstream…and there is every likelihood that most of the fish are 
caught downstream but most of the spawning happens upstream. The young fish are 
drifting back downstream and are being caught and the big ones come back up and 
breed again and again. Now the fish are being caught downstream and that‘s all that 
fishermen, the politicians and the public see. This is where the fish are so they don‘t 
realise how important upstream might be…Other information gaps include what are 
the triggers for migration, and what are the ecological and physical factors that 
stimulate fish to move upstream‖ (Fisheries expert, interview, 05/08).   
 
Studies such as the 2010 Impact Assessment of the MRC‘s SEA of proposed 
mainstream dams have identified further information gaps including the impact of 
sediment retention on water productivity and fish production; the impacts of changing 
species composition and losses (e.g. what impacts this will have on nutrition and the 
shifts of benefits between social groups); and the impacts of the changing quality and 
value of fisheries products (ICEM 2010). This 2010 report, commissioned by the MRC, 
argues that the ―magnitude of possible impacts calls for major additional investment in 
in‐depth assessments of impacts of hydropower development on food security in the 
Mekong Basin‖ (ICEM 2010: 26).  This illustrates that further studies can lead to calls 
for further studies, as there are always questions to be answered and areas which have 
not been studied in depth. 
However, fisheries scientists argue that, despite these gaps there is already enough 
information to make a strong argument: ―I‘m sure that we‘ve got enough information to 
put up a very solid argument that large dams on the Mekong will have an irreversible 
impact on the fisheries‖ (Fisheries expert, interview, 06/08). MRC studies including 
Hortle (2007) and Coates et al. (2003) have detailed areas such as fisheries yields and 
the percentage of protein populations in the basin derive from the fishery. The 
importance of fisheries to the basin‘s populations can be intimated from these studies. 
Against this backdrop, fisheries scientists have labelled calls for further studies a 
―convenient excuse‖:  
 
―its an excuse to ignore it. We have enough information now to show the 
importance of the fishery for the people…People who ignore that just want to ignore 
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it because it gets in the way of their argument to have hydropower. So that‘s the 
convenient excuse [information gaps]‖ (Fisheries expert, interview, 05/08).  
 
In this context, more science or studies may help, but fisheries scientists argue that ―it is 
really a governance issue, failure to understand the bigger picture, and a communication 
issue‖ (Fisheries expert, interview, 05/08). Current knowledge about fisheries illustrates 
how counter-evidence is troublesome for policy-makers because it increases complexity 
and destabilises key assumptions. As such, calls for further studies represent both a 
strategy to ‗ignore‘ the complexity presented by counter-evidence and faith in science 
and technology to provide solutions to the hydropower-fisheries tensions, which is 
being defined as a technological problem. 
At the 2008 MRC Regional Multi-stakeholder Consultation, donor 
representatives during the panel discussion followed state officials‘ calls for more 
studies with questions about how to proceed: ―Presentations have said can‘t mitigate 
impacts on fish. If this is correct would you undertake mainstream hydropower 
projects?‖ (Donor representative, observation notes, MRC meeting, 09/08). This 
question is premised on certain assumptions, including that decisions in the Mekong 
will be objectively-based solely on the information and knowledge generated about key 
questions such as fisheries, and that economic, social and environmental outcomes are 
all valued equally by decision-makers. It also presupposes a number of things about the 
role of the MRC, including that knowledge generated by the MRC impacts decision-
making. This is contested, as it is ―uncertain to what extent the MRC can project its 
scientific knowledge to influence the politicized decision-making process‖ (Middleton 
et al. 2009: 47). As detailed in Chapter Five of this thesis there are wide ranging 
concerns surrounding the relevancy and impact of the MRC.    
Civil society actors at the 2008 Mekong mainstream dams: People‟s voices 
across borders conference in Bangkok, Thailand, which was convened by civil society 
actors including TERRA and Chulalongkorn University, called on the MRC to utilise its 
knowledge to inform and impact decision-making (Lee and Scurrah 2009). However, 
donors have expressed concern that whilst their funding has helped the MRC to produce 
a lot of data, knowledge and guidelines, this has not translated into pro-active 
engagement with Mekong water governance or informed decision-making (Hirsch and 
Jensen 2006; Lee and Scurrah 2009). As detailed in Chapter Five, MRC representatives 
interviewed for this thesis argue that knowledge production is a key area where the 
MRC can access debates. By disseminating this knowledge to a wide range of actors the 
MRC hopes to provide a common basis for debate and create a common understanding 
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of development needs in the basin (Bird 2008b). However, the MRC is largely isolated 
form hydropower decision-making in the basin (see Chapter Five). This raises questions 
surrounding how the MRC can ensure impact in the area of trade-offs and navigate 
challenges such as asymmetric power relations between actors. The intensification of 
MRC activities since 2008 is an encouraging sign that the organisation is becoming 
more proactive and engaging with key debates in the region. Whether this will be 
translated into impact in decision-making is dependent on the dynamics of the wider 
hydropolitical constellation in which the MRC operates (see Chapter Five).  
    
4. Trade-offs: solution or discursive device? 
 
 Powerful and highly visible actors in the Mekong region such as government 
representatives, the MRC and the development banks are promoting trade-offs and 
trade-off negotiation as a solution to the hydropower-fisheries opposition. However, 
whilst trade-offs have a ‗common-sense‘ appeal, they are framed and situated at the 
national or inter-state scale and therefore repackage fisheries impacts in ways which 
make them appear as acceptable or unavoidable losses. Conceptualising hydropower 
and fisheries as a trade-off is supported by particular narratives and representations of 
fisheries. If capture fisheries are not conceptualised as development and are represented 
as a doomed resource, then they can be easily traded-off for hydropower, which as a 
development option that will bring wide-ranging economic benefits.    
The tension between water resources development and other values and sectors 
is acknowledged by a number of commentators and actors in the Mekong basin. Phillips 
et al. (2006) argue that the ―most controversial aspect of any future development of the 
basin involves the dichotomy between exploiting its natural resources, while at the 
same time maintaining an ecological balance‖ (97, emphasis in original). Hydropower 
dams have a legitimate place in the trade-off between development and the environment 
if long-term costs and benefits are fully assessed: however, this full assessment rarely 
happens (Cronin 2009). In the MWRAS the development banks encourage policy-
makers to ―found their policies on the economic, environmental and social dimensions 
of the trade-offs that emerge when water use is changed‖, arguing that ‗balanced 
development‘ should be the guiding principle (ADB and World Bank 2006: 4). This 
will require trade-off choices between ―economic, social and environmental values; 
between the competing interests of the riparian countries; and between the different 
sectors and beneficiary groups at the sub-basin level‖ (ADB and World Bank 2006: 4).  
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The MRC also argues that trade-offs are likely between different sectors, with 
the key trade-off centring on hydropower and fisheries (Lennaerts 2008). A particular 
focus of the MRC‘s Initiative on Sustainable Hydropower (ISH) will address the extent 
to which the barrier effects of mainstream dams on fisheries can be minimised or 
mitigated (MRC 2009b). Outcomes from this will be utilised in discussions on the 
trade-off among ―economic growth, poverty reduction and sustaining environmental 
services of the river‖ (MRC 2009b: 1). This would suggest, as the ADB and World 
Bank‘s position does, that economic, social and environmental goals are antagonistic 
and not necessarily compatible. However, the MRC has in the past argued the opposite. 
The MRC has developed a triple-bottom line approach whereby any development 
should be evaluated in terms of its contribution to economic efficiency, social equity 
and environmental sustainability (MRC 2006). Within a triple-bottom line approach 
economic, social and environmental outcomes are all ―seen as part of the development 
benefit/dis-benefit…[and] not that there is a simple trade-off between economic benefit, 
on the one side, and socio-environmental costs on the other‖ (Hirsch 2006a: 24). 
However, within the current debate over hydropower and fisheries, civil society actors 
are casting the debate in terms of mainstream hydropower being disastrous for fisheries 
and livelihoods, with the implication that it is a case of having either energy or fish, not 
both (Imhof 2009). In this sense economic, environmental and social goals are 
antagonistic. 
The language of benefit-sharing is also entering debates in the Mekong, albeit in a 
rudimentary fashion. Benefit-sharing is the ―development of water uses in their 
‗optimal‘ locations, and the distribution of these benefits, rather than the water, to users 
across the basin‖ (Alam et al. 2009: 93). These benefits are largely located at the inter-
state and basin levels. Whereas the impacts of hydropower development will largely be 
situated at the sub-state, local levels of analysis. While it is recognised that benefits 
should be shared within a state, statements are largely un-substantive: they reference the 
principle but not practical mechanisms or tools for operationalising it. For example, the 
MRC‘s CEO argued in a presentation at the 2008 World Water Week in Stockholm that 
the key for future macro-development projects will be to ensure that development 
benefits such as foreign exchange revenues earned by the state are shared with the wider 
community (Bird 2008b). The MRC‘s ISH states that in the discussion of trade-offs 
considerations of the distributions of benefits and costs should be included (MRC 
2009b). Despite appeals or references to the concept of benefit-sharing the majority of 
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the hydropower-fisheries debate is being framed in terms of the negotiation of trade-
offs.  
The promotion of trade-offs by powerful actors masks the tensions that are 
inherent in this approach due to the current state of knowledge concerning fisheries 
impacts. Fisheries scientists and experts contest whether there is indeed a trade-off in 
the sense that the term is utilised by powerful actors: 
 
―When you come to dams on the mainstream like are being planned now there 
really is no trade-off to be honest. If they go ahead you just have to accept that 
we have wiped out the fishery, not only in that area but also for a long way 
downstream too, or diminished the fishery for a long way downstream‖ 
(Fisheries expert, interview, 05/08).  
 
The findings of the Independent Expert Fisheries Group were quite conclusive: fisheries 
impacts will be severe and cannot be mitigated with current technology (Dugan 2008a; 
Dugan 2008b). These findings were supported by the MRC‘s SEA (ICEM 2010). In 
light of this the representation of trade-offs as a solution to the tension between 
hydropower and fisheries is slightly misleading. Possibilities for mitigating fisheries 
impacts include technological mitigation and alternative livelihood measures such as 
aquaculture. Aquaculture is ―the farming of aquatic organisms: fish, molluscs, 
crustaceans, aquatic plants, crocodiles, alligators, turtles, and amphibians. Farming 
implies some form of intervention in the rearing process to enhance production, such as 
regular stocking, feeding, protection from predators, etc.‖ (CWP 2003). However, as 
discussed elsewhere in this chapter, according to fisheries experts and scientists both 
technological mitigation and measures such as aquaculture are not capable of mitigating 
the scale of estimated impacts in the Mekong region.   
Discussions of trade-offs in the Mekong are appealing because trade-offs as a 
term and an approach has connotations of balance, reasonableness and a compromise 
(Friend and Blake 2009). The term also suggests that it is a technical process whereby 
information is collected and options assessed. However, this masks the political aspects 
of both the framing and discussion of trade-offs: it is a depoliticisation process 
(Ferguson 1994a).         
 
4.1. Trade-offs: hydropower and fisheries 
 
Shifting discussions to issues surrounding the trade-off between hydropower and 
fisheries contains different ways of representing the problem: one, hydropower and 
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fisheries are a zero-sum situation; two, negative fisheries impacts can be mitigated; and 
three, the fisheries side of the trade-off can be down-played. These different 
representations overlap in discussions, and powerful actors in particular utilise the latter 
two in their arguments.  
The threats that large infrastructure can pose for fisheries are well documented 
(Poulsen et al. 2004; ABD and World Bank 2006; MRC 2003a). The MRC‘s 2003 State 
of the Basin Report documented the impacts of existing tributary hydropower projects 
in the basin, such as Pak Mun in Thailand, including a decline in the abundance of fish 
and the disappearance of some migratory species. Fisheries impacts of the Pak Mun 
dam were also documented in a case study for the WCD (Amornsakchai 2000). As 
shown above, powerful actors have also accepted that mainstream hydropower dam 
development will impact fisheries. The threat of hydropower development to fisheries, 
both in terms of productivity and sustainability is well-established, widely cited and 
rarely challenged (Friend et al. 2009). In this context powerful actors, such as the 
development banks and government actors, are utilising the language of trade-offs in 
order to make the choice between hydropower and fisheries appear acceptable or 
inevitable. The discussion of trade-offs acknowledges that hydropower will have 
negative impacts on fisheries. However, ―the issue becomes one of being in a tough 
situation where choices between fisheries and dams have to be made, however 
unpleasant such choices might be‖ (Friend et al. 2009: 317). This is premised on a 
particular conception of development and poverty. Framing the discussion as one of 
trade-offs suggests that losses in one area can be compensated for by gains in another.  
Trade-offs recognise that there are costs and benefits to development options 
and interventions, but it removes these from the geographical, social and political 
locales in which they are situated. Placing hydropower and fisheries in a trade-off 
relationship represents development decisions in a particular way. The scalar level of 
analysis at which the discussion is situated is that of the state: hydropower brings 
national level benefits. Consequently, aggregate or quantitative measures of fisheries 
value are utilised, which obfuscate the distribution and location of impacts. Detaching 
fisheries impacts from their contexts and utilising arguments such as ―capture fisheries 
can be replaced by aquaculture‖ allows hydropower and fisheries to be located in a 
relationship where the latter can be exchanged for hydropower benefits.  
Viewing the two in a trade-off relationship closes the space for alternative 
development visions and pathways (Friend et al. 2009). Discussions of trade-offs 
between hydropower and fisheries suggest that hydropower is the chosen development 
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option. What is being discussed is not whether hydropower is an appropriate 
development strategy, but how to manage the impacts of that strategy on other sectors, 
such as fisheries. This contributes to constructing a sense of inevitability around the 
proposed hydropower dams on the Mekong mainstream. In this way trade-offs ―are 
central to the rhetoric of an established agenda with a particular set of values and 
interests‖ (Friend and Blake 2009: 27). By focusing discussions on how to manage 
impacts or questions such as ‗what are the impacts‘ and ‗what is the size of the impact‘, 
powerful actors are limiting discussions to internal elements and excluding broader 
questions about whether these projects should be developed. Alternative development 
options are not discussed or even visible. In this way conceptualising hydropower and 
fisheries in a trade-off relationship is an attempt by powerful actors to control public 
discourses of hydropower development in the Mekong and ‗box-in‘ civil society actors 
to a particular set of terms of debate. Civil society actors are resisting this strategy 
through coalitions such as Save the Mekong, which was formed on a platform of 
opposition to construction of mainstream hydropower dams. However, despite 
campaigns such as petitions and mass sending of postcards to politicians in the region, 
the debate as framed and conducted by powerful actors is still one where trade-offs are 
discussed and promoted.  
 
4.2. The inevitable decline of fisheries?  
 
Narratives reinforce each other. Narratives surrounding capture fisheries in the 
Mekong tell stories of inevitable decline. When combined with the simplifications of 
the complexity of the region‘s fisheries that are utilised in discussions and policies, this 
leads to the marginalisation and neglect of capture fisheries in development policy 
(Friend et al. 2009). Capture fisheries are represented as doomed. This is in part due to 
thinking framed by the narrative of the Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin 1968). Hardin 
(1968) argued that open access resources are inevitability over-exploited, therefore to 
protect resources measures such as enclosure and state management should be adopted.  
Some actors, including decision-makers and civil society actors (as will be shown 
below), in the lower Mekong are telling stories about the inevitable decline of fisheries 
because of over-fishing. This narrative of doom reinforces the hydropower push in the 
Mekong  as it is in entrenched in policies, fisheries departments and research agendas, 
and shapes the way in which issues, problems and debates are framed and the ways in 
which fisheries enters the debate (Friend et al. 2009). Cronin and Hamlin (2010) argue 
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that false assumptions inform hydropower development decision-making in the lower 
Mekong, with one of the most detrimental being that fisheries are already a dwindling 
resource, and ―therefore their destruction is justified if they are replaced by another use 
of the river‖ (12). Representing fisheries in this way suggests they can be ‗traded-off‘ 
for hydropower.  
This storyline is supported by one which argues that fisheries are not 
development: 
 
―The fisheries are just there are they are exploited by millions of people. But, 
they have always been there and you are not doing anything new with 
them…Then this is this attitude that we must develop, and fisheries are not seen 
as development‖ (Fisheries expert, interview, 06/08).  
 
This way of conceptualising and representing fisheries in the Mekong has a long 
history. From the 1960s onwards fisheries were largely ignored as the focus was on 
hydropower, and fisheries were perceived to have limited development potential (Friend 
and Blake 2009). In the Mekong Committee basin development plans hydropower 
presents an opportunity to develop aquaculture and therefore make fisheries more 
productive (Mekong Secretariat 1970; 1988). The MRC‘s Fisheries Programme, active 
since the late 1990s has generated immense amounts of fisheries knowledge and has 
helped to raise the profile of capture fisheries in the basin. Hortle (2007) argues that 
current data shows that most of the basin‘s inhabitants fish at some time and that about 
90% of consumption is derived from the capture fishery: this should justify an increased 
allocation of resources for their conservation and management.  
However, fisheries still do not have a high profile in development debates. 
When fisheries do enter the debate ―they do so in a constrained manner, as something as 
an afterthought and as an unavoidable, slightly unfortunate cost of the inevitable march 
of progress and development‖ (Friend et al. 2009: 307). State level development plans 
such as Lao PDR‘s NGPES (2003) focus on the benefits which will accrue from 
hydropower. The importance of fishing for the Lao people is mentioned a number of 
times, but fishing is also identified as a coping strategy, i.e. an activity that the Lao 
people engage in because they are poor and do not have access to other resources or 
employment (Lao PDR 2003). The development potential of fisheries is represented as 
part of increasing agricultural production and is a question of aquaculture (Lao PDR 
2003). In contrast, fisheries scientists interviewed for this thesis argue that building a 
dam is seen as development by decision-makers: ―to develop you need to do something, 
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you need to build, you need to change in order to progress‖ (Fisheries expert, interview, 
05/08). Within this conceptualisation of development maintaining fisheries is not 
necessarily seen as development.  
A 2007 WWF report identified over-fishing as the key threat to the Mekong 
river in a report entitled ‗World‘s Top Ten Rivers at Risk‘ (Wong et al. 2007). The 
report argues that the ―threat of over-fishing is high because of the huge scale of 
subsistence fishing, the majority of which goes unrecorded, as well as poor fishing 
practices‖ (Wong et al. 2007). Subsistence fishing is identified as ―heavy‖ and 
―destructive‖ and the report argues that there is evidence of declining fish populations 
as a result. Illegal and destructive fishing practices, including using the wrong types of 
nets, using car batteries to administer electric shocks and using poison have negative 
effects on fish stocks (Wong et al. 2007). Through describing subsistence fishing and 
fishing practices in these terms, a picture is created of a productive and diverse fishery 
threatened by the very people who depend on it. Within the context of these 
representations of fisheries, fisheries cannot meet the poverty reduction and 
development needs of the basin‘s population. Consequently, decreasing people‘s 
dependence on aquatic resources and providing alternative economic opportunities 
becomes a strategy to lift people out of poverty (Friend and Blake 2009). According to 
this reasoning continued dependence on the capture fishery will lead to its decline.  
Fisheries scientists interviewed for this thesis criticised the report:  
 
―In that report what they had done was select ten rivers, big rivers with a 
geographic spread across all the countries and then they separately looked at 
what can be risks to rivers and then they attached one of those risks to each 
river. So they come and say in the Mekong the greatest threat is over-fishing. 
Absolutely rubbish the greatest threat is dams. And the loss of habitat that 
results from dams‖ (Fisheries expert, interview, 06/08).  
 
WWF define their motivation in releasing the report as encouraging dialogue and 
provoking debate in response to three questions: one, what are the key pressures and 
drivers of change in freshwater ecosystems; two, what are the most illustrative examples 
of those threats; and three, what recommendations or solutions can we pose  (Wong et 
al. 2007). In the section describing over-fishing in the Mekong WWF outlines its Living 
Mekong Programme which is working, amongst other things, to conserve biological 
integrity and ensure local communities manage their aquatic resources to contribute to 
sustainable development (Wong et al. 2007). Whilst the WWF report identifies over-
fishing as a threat to the Mekong, large infrastructure, i.e. hydropower dams and roads, 
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were identified as ‗other threats‘. In a footnote to the report it was acknowledged that 
large infrastructure is identified as the primary threat in WWF‘s Living Mekong 
Programme‘s revised conservation plan (Wong et al. 2007). The report also recognises 
that beneficial flooding, in terms of the flood pulse which inundates the Tonle Sap Great 
Lake in Cambodia, and the consequent fish harvest is threatened by large infrastructure 
(Wong et al. 2007). Representations of inevitable decline and over-fishing in the lower 
Mekong are also not supported by estimates of fisheries catch, which have risen steadily 
since the 1960s (Friend et al. 2009). Fisheries scientists also argue that if there has been 
a decline this is due to mismanagement and pollution, not over-fishing (Cronin and 
Hamlin 2010).     
Narratives of fisheries decline allow hydropower to be represented as an option 
for developing fisheries. Hydropower creates reservoirs and is an opportunity for the 
development of aquaculture and reservoir fisheries. Sverdrup-Jensen (2002) states that 
preliminary estimates predict a 20% rise in fish demand by 2012 and that fishing in the 
basin will increase as a result of population growth and ease of access. In this context 
the expansion of aquaculture can contribute to meeting this increased demand 
(Sverdrup-Jensen 2002). Aquaculture is proposed by a number of actors as a means of 
compensating for the losses in capture fisheries: increased fisheries production through 
aquaculture is a central feature of state fisheries policy in the region and reflects 
development strategies that are focused on modernisation and technocratic solutions 
(Friend et al. 2009). Aquaculture is being promoted as a solution to the problem of 
capture fisheries. 
The portrayal of a fisheries cost (in terms of decline in capture fisheries) as 
presenting a fisheries opportunity (development of reservoirs and aquaculture) is a 
discursive strategy which conjures up images of balanced development and trade-offs. 
This has a certain appeal as it suggests that the fisheries costs of hydropower are not as 
severe and overwhelming as portrayed by civil society actors. The argument is 
presented simply: ―while capture fisheries is likely to decline significantly when all 
[mainstream] dams are pursued, impoundments will create new opportunities for the 
development of reservoir fisheries‖ (ICEM 2010: 14). Statements such as these imply 
that the ‗problems‘ of hydropower development have been considered, and ‗solutions‘ 
have been devised. In this context it becomes straightforward to substitute reservoir 
fisheries for capture fisheries. This obfuscates problems surrounding the development of 
reservoir fisheries and the scale of fisheries impacts.  
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Arguments against the promotion of reservoir fisheries and aquaculture as an 
opportunity facilitated by hydropower development can be split broadly into two 
categories: those which critique past and current experiences of aquaculture in the 
Mekong, and those which attempt to quantify and/or compare capture fisheries and 
reservoir fisheries to illustrate that losses in the former cannot be compensated by gains 
in the latter. Arguments in the first category include that the uptake of aquaculture in 
parts of the basin where it has been promoted by government actors is disappointing and 
yields are low (Friend et al. 2009). Issues of capacity, technical support and the 
contrasting natures of aquaculture and capture fisheries also mean that it is not a simple 
case of substituting the former for the latter, as some actors are trying to suggest: 
 
―There is no relationship between being a person who goes out and catches fish 
in a river through to being a farmer who grows fish and understands fish disease 
and understands procurement of seed stock and breeding of fish and getting the 
feed to feed the fish etc. Totally different activities…The only thing in common 
is the fish. Everything else is different, totally different…You go into an 
aquaculture operation it‘s a business type operation, it‘s a farming operation 
where you‘ve got to put in, it depends on the species, type of farming, type of 
aquaculture, but you know 50-90% of your return you have to put back in to 
grow the fish. So, just a completely different thing to the capture fishery.‖ 
(Fisheries expert, interview, 06/08).   
 
Aquaculture activities are also usually ―geared towards production for the urban market 
and not necessarily the production needed for daily subsistence and livelihoods 
(Fisheries expert, interview, 05/08).   
Arguments from the second category state that even if aquaculture was widely 
embraced it could not compensate for the losses in capture fisheries. The Independent 
Fisheries Expert Group was quite clear in their assessment of the compensatory 
possibilities of reservoir fisheries: 
 
―the Panel concluded that compensation for loss in yield from river fisheries is 
impossible to achieve through development of reservoir fisheries. Fisheries 
enhancements through stocking and some forms of aquaculture may be possible, 
but they will only be able to compensate for a small part of the production that is 
lost from the river fishery. They will also be costly, will not benefit the same 
people who currently benefit from the fishery, and can create substantial 
environmental problems‖ (Dugan 2008b: 12-13).  
 
This assessment is supported by arguments in the 2010 draft Impact Assessment of 
mainstream hydropower commissioned by the MRC. This report quantified fisheries in 
terms of tonnes with one tonne equivalent to US$680. Table 3 briefly presents the 
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possible losses in capture fisheries due to hydropower development, and the potential 
gains from the development of reservoir fisheries. The figures presented illustrate that 
development of reservoir fisheries cannot compensate for the losses in capture fisheries 
in purely numerical and economic values. 
 
Table 3: Losses and Gains in Fisheries Resources dues to hydropower development (figures from ICEM 
2010: 15) 
 
 Capture Fisheries Reservoir Fisheries 
Loss/Gain tonnes  -700,000 to -1.4 million +25,000 to +250,000 
Loss/Gain US$ -476 million to -956 million + 17 million to +170 million 
 
 
Despite the large range of the figures presented for reservoir fisheries development in 
Table 3, the ICEM report estimates that the probable gain is most likely to be 63‘000 
tonnes or US$42.8 million (ICEM 2010: 15). A gain of 63‘000 tonnes or US$42.8 
cannot compensate for the estimated losses in capture fisheries of between 7000‘000 to 
1.4 million tonnes. This simple comparison illustrates that losses in capture fisheries are 
vast in comparison to the gains from the development of reservoir fisheries. However, 
what this quantification does not show is the impacts this loss will have on livelihoods 
and food security. There are a number of important issues surrounding the 
quantification of fisheries, which will be considered in the following section. 
 
4.3. Poverty and the distribution of costs and benefits  
 
Civil society actors interviewed for this thesis were concerned about the 
distributional aspects of development interventions: ―There are not so many rivers 
where the people are this dependent on the river…Mainstream dams will have huge 
impact on the people‖ (Civil society representative, interview, 04/08a). The language 
and debate of trade-offs largely does not consider issues such as: who are the winners 
and losers, who benefits and who bears the costs. Technical, neutral language which 
suggests that fisheries can be traded-off for hydropower detaches the comparison from 
its socio-political contexts. Trade-offs are located at the state and basin scales. 
Arguments such as those which quantify fisheries losses and gains do so at the basin 
scale or aggregate project level. This allows comparisons to be made. However, it does 
not convey information about the distribution of losses and gains. Important questions 
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including how are costs and benefits distributed, are they experienced the same by 
different actors, do they represent losses and gains for the same communities, and can 
you compare losses in localised areas with gains in the overall picture? This range of 
questions illustrates that the discussion of trade-offs is not a neutral, technical one, but 
political as costs and benefits are not distributed evenly or experienced the same by all 
actors involved. The distribution of costs and benefits reflects and affects power 
relationships between different actors in the Mekong.  
Hydropower is presented by state actors and strategies such as the government 
of Lao PDR‘s NGPES as a poverty reduction strategy. This frames the problem of 
poverty as a ―simple category requiring a simple solution‖ (Friend and Blake 2009: 21). 
Issues of complexity are reduced to simple slogans such as Lao PDR‘s ambition to 
become the ‗battery of Southeast Asia‘. This slogan neatly encapsulates Lao PDR‘s 
hydropower strategy of developing dams, exporting the electricity to its neighbours and 
thus developing the state. Within this, both the problem, poverty, and the solution, 
developing hydropower for export are defined. In this way the complexity of poverty is 
reduced and is orientated towards particular policy solutions. For example, in justifying 
the state‘s hydropower development strategy, state representatives interviewed for this 
thesis argued that the people are poor and that they need development: ―We are poor: 
we need energy for my people. Maybe you have seen, been in the rural area, the people 
they have no electricity: they use candle, use fire‖ (State official, interview, 06/08a). A 
lack of electricity is seen as an indicator of poverty, therefore if communities gained 
access to electricity they would be ‗less poor‘. However, poverty is more complex than 
this suggests, and trading-off fisheries for hydropower may actually increase poverty in 
the Mekong basin: 
 
―It will convert a generalised wealth accessible to anyone into a concentrated 
wealth, which poor people cannot access‖ (Fisheries expert, observation notes, 
MRC meeting, 03/08).   
 
―Mainstream hydropower will impact food security. People will have to buy 
food instead. Currently, poor people are spending 50% of their income on food, 
but with rising food prices, and then you‘ve taken away the natural resource 
they‘ve got, suddenly they are spending 80-90% of their income on food. And 
that just plunges them further into poverty‖ (Fisheries expert, interview, 05/08).  
 
As such mainstream hydropower will impact food security and may result in local 
communities becoming poorer. Transforming or breaking the access modalities between 
local communities and natural resources will also transform the types of economic 
activities in which they participate. Arguments surrounding the benefits of hydropower 
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are premised on the assumption that these benefits will ‗trickle down‘ either through 
poverty reduction programmes or the development of secondary industry. However, 
these benefits are not mechanisms to replace food security:  
 
―All that wealth from the poor people gets narrowed down and focused up to a 
different group of people up here. Its rubbish when I hear governments‘ say 
we‘re going to build these dams and it‘ll give us the money to undertake poverty 
reduction… But, will that money trickle down to the poor people who‘ve lost 
their fisheries resource and allow them to buy food? It‘s just absolute nonsense. 
The money won‘t flow out‖ (Fisheries expert, interview, 06/08).    
 
 
This challenges the arguments of state representatives who link hydropower 
development and poverty reduction. It also illustrates how narratives and justifications 
operate at particular scalar levels and contribute to policy and decision-making by 
reducing complexity. Arguments in favour of hydropower development utilise the idea 
that revenues will be spent on poverty reduction. However, there is currently little 
information on revenue flows over time from the mainstream projects and how this will 
be spent, and the distribution of economic benefits from hydropower will depend on 
government decisions and capacity (ICEM 2010). Complex issues such as the 
relationship between hydropower, fisheries and poverty are simplified within the 
discussions of trade-offs. 
The rationale for hydropower development is located at the state level: development 
of a state resource, water, will lead to national development. Identified advantages 
include national revenue generation, cheaper electricity prices and improved 
transportation (ICEM 2010). These are all benefits which will accrue to the state. In 
contrast, identified risks include the loss of common property resources, electricity 
supply not being available to local communities, and loss of livelihoods leading to 
increased food insecurity (ICEM 2010). These are all costs which will be distributed 
amongst local communities and actors dependent on the Mekong, both directly and 
indirectly, for their livelihoods. Consequently benefits and costs are located at different 
scales. This makes both comparison between the two difficult and conceptualisation of 
benefits and costs in the same framework difficult. This is one of the reasons why 
narratives such as hydropower leads to poverty reduction are enduring and possess an 
intuitive appeal to policy and decision-makers.    
Consideration of fisheries impacts is also largely located at the regional or state 
level, but they will be experienced at the local level in different ways. For example, 
figures are presented in the draft 2010 Impact Assessment report for basin-wide losses 
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in capture fisheries and gains in reservoir fisheries, and then also for three groups of the 
proposed mainstream projects (the upper Lao cascade of 6 dams, the two middle Lao 
dams, and then the proposed mainstream dams in Cambodia) (ICEM 2010). Cambodia 
will be the most affected state with an estimated 43% loss of its fisheries with 
substantial numbers of people who live in the Tonle Sap being affected (ICEM 2010). 
The MRC has classified a 15km corridor on either side of the Mekong mainstream as 
the highest impact area: twenty three and a half million people live within this corridor 
(ICEM 2010). The advantages of this approach are that it provides a cumulative picture 
of the fisheries and other impacts of hydropower. However, this approach cannot show 
the stratification of impacts, costs and opportunities. As quoted earlier, civil society 
actors interviewed for this thesis argue that hydropower development provides 
industrial benefits such as irrigation, increased availability of electricity and the 
development of industry, which generally benefit powerful actors, such as state 
agencies, hydropower and construction companies and urban areas, at costs to local 
communities who are dependent on services the river provides such as fisheries (Civil 
society representative, interview, 04/08b). Fisheries impacts will also not be distributed 
evenly amongst actors, with some local communities and groups more vulnerable to 
changes in livelihoods than others.   
The interplay between the localised impacts of hydropower development and the 
cumulative impacts of any dam on the Mekong mainstream complicates discussions and 
negotiations concerning trade-offs. Friend and Blake (2009) argue that whilst it might 
be conceivable to identify impacts, assess trade-offs and determine appropriate 
mitigation at a localised scale for a particular project, it is extremely difficult to do so 
for the cumulative impacts of mainstream projects. The migratory nature of fisheries in 
the Mekong means that hydropower dam development will have far-reaching 
implications (Friend and Blake 2009). Consequently, considerations of scale and of 
localised and varied impacts, as well as cumulative impacts of hydropower development 
are highly relevant and need to be explored. It is extremely difficult to do so within one 
frame of reference which is partially why the discussion of trade-offs appeals to 
decision-makers. Conceptualising hydropower and fisheries as a trade-off allows two 
highly distinct categories to be situated in the same frame of reference and suggests that 
comparisons can be made.  
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4.4. Valuing fisheries 
  
The discussion of trade-offs implies that, in the case of hydropower and 
fisheries, the two are comparable. However, fisheries are extremely hard to value in 
economic terms and are hard to compare to hydropower. Despite an economic value of 
US$2 billion being placed on the Mekong‘s fishery, ―the value of this natural resource 
is largely unrecognised in regional infrastructure development plans‖ (Middleton et al. 
2009: 49). As described above, fisheries are not really conceptualised as a development 
option in the Mekong and subsequently they are not necessarily valued in government 
strategies. Estimates and values of the fisheries catch threatened by dam development 
are ―fundamental for effective basin development planning and balanced decision-
making‖ (Barlow et al. 2008: 16). This is where knowledge gaps, such a lack of a basin-
wide assessment of fisheries resources, can be a hindrance as they do not allow for a 
quantitative estimate of the importance of migratory fish (Barlow et al. 2008). Hortle 
(2007) argues that a lack of quantitative data on fisheries ―leads to relative neglect in 
development planning, which tends to emphasise other sectors that may compete with 
the fishery for use of water‖ (1). As fisheries are difficult to value, it can be hard to 
relay the importance of them to policy and decision-makers in terms that they can 
understand and utilise in planning. Concurrently, reducing fisheries to a quantitative 
value can fail to capture the complexity and importance of fisheries in the basin. 
There are two important issues surrounding the valuing of fisheries. One is 
technical and methodological: it is extremely hard to value fisheries both in the Mekong 
and elsewhere. Fisheries in the Mekong are highly complex. Assessing both the size and 
the value of the Mekong‘s capture fishery is: 
 
―extremely difficult to do. All these different species, in different countries, at 
different times of the year, fetching different prices all throughout those 
countries. Plus, quite a lot of the fisheries resource isn‘t traded, it‘s bartered or 
exchanged for goods. So, its hard to put the value of those fisheries together‖ 
(Fisheries expert, interview, 05/08).   
 
The fisheries yield also varies seasonally, whilst the fisheries have a dispersed 
geographic spread and there is a huge variability in the range in scale of different types 
of fisheries (from solitary fishers to industrial enterprises) (Hortle 2007: 1). It is difficult 
to determine a picture of fisheries across the basin in terms of stocks and production that 
can be compared year on year because people fish with different gear, target different 
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species in different habitats at different times of the year (Friend et al. 2009). 
Consequently, it is hard to put the value of fisheries together.  
The second issue surrounds commensurability. Within a discussion of trade-offs 
hydropower and fisheries need to be placed into the same categories in order for simple 
comparisons to be made by decision-makers. Comparison of the two is difficult because 
the two represent very different types of value and economies: 
 
―In terms of doing a cost-benefit analysis I don‘t think people understand the big 
macro economics of these things…Fisheries is an informal economy that is very 
hard to measure, that is exploited by millions of people, it‘s always been there. 
Hydropower is a very concentrated formal economy, very easy to measure, very 
easy to extract money from, very easy to see the benefits from. So they‘re hard 
to compare‖ (Fisheries expert, 06/08).    
 
Initial attempts to value fisheries in terms that can be compared to hydropower have 
focused on quantifying fisheries in US$. The MRC‘s 2010 SEA is an initial attempt to 
assess the impact of hydropower investments worth US$18,847 million on a resource 
that is worth between US$2,100 to 3,800 million (ICEM 2010). A simple quantified 
comparison such as this one reduces both hydropower and fisheries to monetary value, 
and on the basis of this alone it would appear reasonable to accept losses in the latter 
because of the sheer economic size of hydropower benefits.  
However, fisheries occupy an extremely important role in the livelihoods of the 
basin‘s population and also embody cultural and spiritual values. Barlow et al. (2008) 
argue that estimates of first sale value for fish catch in the Mekong are conservative 
estimates because they do not ―take into account the economic benefits that flow from 
the trade and processing of fish products‖ (21). Economic estimates of value also do not 
―include the very considerable indirect values of the Mekong fisheries, such as their 
contribution to the nutrition, employment and well-being of millions of rural people in 
the LMB, who generally have few other livelihood options‖ (Barlow et al. 2008: 21). 
Quantifying people‘s dependence of fisheries for food security, or the indirect benefits 
which people gain from fisheries is difficult.  
A large portion of fisheries data in the Mekong is derived from information 
collected concerning what people catch, what they consume and what they observe 
about the fishery. As such, the utilisation of local knowledge plays a strong role in the 
collection of fisheries data. The MRC utilises local knowledge in a large part of it 
fisheries work, for example a 2007 study on consumption and yields utilised methods 
such as interviewing people about what they had eaten (Hortle 2007). As fisheries 
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values and data collection methods are largely situated in various locales they are 
framed in different terms to that of hydropower. This contributes to the problem of 
valuing fisheries in terms that can be compared to hydropower, which is the comparison 
that decision-makers want to make. Hydropower is a development pathway, which 
accrues national economic benefits in terms of revenues and royalties to governments. 
In comparison fisheries benefits are located at the local level and vary in ways which 
are hard to quantify. However, in order to be able to compare hydropower and fisheries 
as ‗trade-offs‘ suggest conveying the wide ranging values of fisheries for livelihoods, 
communities and economies is imperative. Simple monetary comparisons do not 
capture these values or the scale at which they are located, or the important roles they 
occupy in livelihoods, and instead help to create a picture whereby fisheries losses can 
be traded off for hydropower gains. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The debate over hydropower development is constructed in different ways by 
different actors. Key actors frame it in particular ways in order to suit their perceptions 
and goals. A counter discourse in the lower Mekong involves a greater diversity of less 
powerful actors, yet, it is not succeeding in destabilising the dominant discourse. 
Narratives are replaced by counter-narratives and not by counter-evidence. Shifting the 
terrain of the debate to trade-offs depoliticises the proposed mainstream hydropower 
dams and limits the debate to particular issues. The distribution of costs and benefits is 
masked by this depoliticisation process. 
A loose coalition of actors has formed in opposition to the proposed mainstream 
hydropower development. This coalition has produced counter-evidence and 
represented the Mekong in different ways to that of powerful actors, for example 
focusing on the livelihood values of the Mekong. Counter-evidence and representations 
have gained visibility in the Mekong‘s hydropower debate. Powerful actors have shifted 
the terrain and are attempting to define the terms of the debate as a discussion of trade-
offs. Defining the debate in terms of trade-offs limits discussion to scientific and 
technical issues concerning fisheries migration and mitigation, and excludes discussion 
about whether hydropower is an appropriate development strategy for the lower 
Mekong. Fisheries scientists are clear that the barrier effects of Mekong mainstream 
dams on the region‘s fisheries cannot be technologically mitigated. State representatives 
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have responded by calling for more studies, and placed their faith in technology to 
provide a solution to the problem of fisheries mitigation.   
The discussion of trade-offs is supported by narratives and representations 
surrounding the Mekong‘s fisheries. The size and importance of Mekong fisheries for 
livelihoods is well-recognised by fisheries scientists, the MRC, and civil society actors. 
Representations of the Mekong‘s fisheries as in inevitable decline produce a situation 
whereby fisheries resources can be replaced by another use of the river. Hydropower 
development is presented by project proponents as offering an opportunity to develop 
aquaculture. However, fisheries experts, and research on the fisheries impacts of 
hydropower dams, suggest that aquaculture could never replace the capture fishery. 
Assessing impacts involves valuing fisheries, which is a complex activity.    
Locating hydropower and fisheries in a trade-off relationship removes the 
distribution of costs and benefits from discussions. It locates discussions at the national 
scale and aggregate level, and attempts to place hydropower and fisheries into similar 
categories of value so that they can be compared. The quantification of fisheries values 
in the Mekong is complex due to the importance of fisheries for livelihoods, problems 
with estimating fisheries catch, and the fact that the majority of fisheries resources do 
not pass through commercial markets. Placing a monetary value on fisheries, which 
allows it to be compared to hydropower, disguises the importance of fisheries for 
livelihoods suggests that hydropower benefits at the national scale can compensate for 
fisheries losses at the sub-national scale.    
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Chapter Eight: Actors and narratives in the lower Mekong’s 
hydropolitical constellation 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This thesis has explored the hydropolitical constellation of the lower Mekong and 
the debates surrounding hydropower development and transboundary water governance. 
The thesis has addressed the following question:    
 
How can considerations of multiple actors and narratives be integrated into 
approaches to transboundary hydropolitics in order to understand and analyse the 
debates surrounding the MRC and hydropower development in the lower Mekong?  
 
Considerations of multiple actors and narratives can be integrated into approaches to 
transboundary hydropolitics by utilising political ecology and insights from critical IR 
approaches. This allows sensitivity to the production and politics of scale, the multiple 
actors operating over various scales, discourse, and more nuanced understandings of 
power. Political ecology and critical IR theorists complement each due to the focus on 
discursive practices and post-structural conceptions of power. Political ecology has 
largely focused on the sub-state scale. But it analyses place and non-place based actors 
and development/environmental discourses to explain outcomes in specific geographic 
locales (e.g. Bassett and Zueli 2003). Critical IR theorists, such as Doty (1996) have 
analysed discursive practices in international relations. Combining insights from these 
different approaches allows the international relations of the lower Mekong‘s 
hydropolitical constellation to be situated within the multiple scales and relations 
between actors operating over various scales, which condition water resources outcomes 
at the transboundary scale.   
 Utilising political ecology and insights from critical IR approaches allows 
analysis of the multiple actors and narratives of the lower Mekong‘s hydropolitical 
constellation and the exploration of debates about hydropower and the MRC. This is a 
key theoretical contribution of this thesis. Conventional IR approaches to hydropolitics 
largely focus on the international scale, unified state actors and material conceptions of 
power. Commentators have questioned the appropriateness of these approaches and 
have suggested the application of political ecology (Sneddon and Fox 2006; Furlong 
2006). This thesis contributes to this theoretical debate about approaches to 
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hydropolitics through its application of political ecology combined with insights from 
critical IR approaches. The thesis also contributes to knowledge in a number of ways, 
including: mapping the actors in the lower Mekong‘s hydropolitical constellation; 
exploring the scalar politics and strategies of lower Mekong hydropolitics; tracing the 
dominant regional discursive formation, which links hydropower and development; and 
examining the two discourse coalitions, which have formed around the hydropower 
development and water governance debates in the lower Mekong. As such, it also 
contributes to the two debates by opening up the category of water resources 
development to reveal its political and contested nature. By doing so, this thesis 
provides a space for alternative representations to be considered and analysed. This 
thesis also situates the MRC within its wider socio-political contexts, which suggests 
possible spaces for action for the MRC in both hydropower development and water 
resources governance.  
 
2. Transboundary hydropolitics: Actors, Scale and Discourse 
 
 Chapter One of this thesis claimed that in order to explore the hydropolitical 
constellation of the lower Mekong and the two dominant debates through which it is 
currently being represented and contested it is necessary to integrate considerations of 
multiple actors and narratives into approaches to hydropolitics. As outlined above, this 
thesis utilised political ecology and insights from critical IR approaches to integrate 
these concerns and explore the hydropolitical constellation of the lower Mekong. 
Challenging conventional IR approaches to hydropolitics, which focus on the inter-state 
level of analysis and conceptualise states as unified actors, the analysis outlined in the 
thesis argues that to explore hydropolitics in the lower Mekong it is important to: 
 
 Integrate the concerns of hydropower and water governance, so that they 
are no longer analysed as separate spheres; 
 Challenge the notion of unified states to reveal the various national-level 
actors engaged in hydropower development and water resources 
governance; 
 Explore the multiple actors operating over various scales to demonstrate 
how water resources outcomes at the transboundary level are 
conditioned by relations between different actors and scales; 
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 Trace the regional discursive formation, which has shaped water 
resources development in the lower Mekong and continues to frame the 
thinking of powerful actors;  
 Consider the discourse coalitions, which form around hydropower and 
water governance and the ways in which they represent and contest 
these. 
 
The insights gained from exploring transboundary hydropolitics in these ways has 
contributed to both theoretical and substantive knowledge in three key areas: actors, 
scale, and discourse. 
  
2.1 Actors  
 
Transboundary hydropolitical constellations contain a wide range of actor types 
operating over various scalar levels of analysis. In order to analyse these constellations 
it is necessary to situate them within their wider socio-political contexts. Hydropolitical 
constellations are embedded in webs of overlapping power relations and scales: they are 
not detached from other socio-political arenas and actors outside of official water 
governance structures condition hydropolitical outcomes. Analysing debates about the 
MRC and hydropower development in the lower Mekong through the lens of its 
hydropolitical constellation, reveals the wide range of actor types and the asymmetric 
relations between them, which condition water resources development and governance. 
Water resources development is highly political because it alters patterns of access to 
resources and the distribution of benefits, as well as incorporating them into new 
constellations of control and access. It is not a technical, neutral process as water 
resources management paradigms or the arguments of state actors suggest. 
Actor types in the lower Mekong‘s hydropolitical constellation include: state water 
and energy actors (e.g. the National Mekong Committees and the Lao Ministry of 
Planning and Investment); traditional donors to the region and the MRC (e.g. Australia 
and Finland); new and emerging donors (e.g. China and Kuwait); the Asian 
Development Bank and the World Bank; private sector companies and financiers (e.g. 
Sinohydro and GMS Power); and civil society actors including national and regional 
NGOs (e.g. TERRA), international NGOs (e.g. International Rivers) and the media. 
Changing regional dynamics have affected both the actor types in the lower Mekong‘s 
hydropolitical constellation and the prominence of transboundary water cooperation. 
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Important dynamics include the end of the Cold War and the proliferation of regional 
schemes, such as the ADB‘s Greater Mekong Sub-region Programme, which challenge 
the position of the MRC. Prior to 1991, lower Mekong water cooperation was the only 
cooperative or regional scheme in which the four states participated and was also an 
important conduit for channelling development assistance to the region (Nakayama 
1999; Makim 2002). New donors, including China, have also emerged who are 
interested in funding infrastructure and natural resources development. New private 
sector actors are also becoming more visible and important in water resources 
development, including Thai and Vietnamese actors who are investigating mainstream 
hydropower sites.     
The international relations of the lower Mekong‘s hydropolitical constellation are 
embedded in wider socio-political contexts and webs of overlapping power 
relationships operating over various scalar levels of analysis. In order to explore 
transboundary hydropolitical constellations and debates about water resources 
development and governance, it is necessary to consider these, as well as a wide range 
of actor relationships. Conventional IR approaches to transboundary hydropolitics are 
state-centric, conceptualising states as unified actors with easily identifiable 
hydropolitical interests, and as such are unable to adequately explore and account for 
the complexity of transboundary hydropolitics. Political ecology with it sensitivity to 
scale, place and non-place based actors, and a variety of power relations between a 
multitude of actors is an appropriate framework for studying hydropolitical 
constellations.  
Intra-state and cross-state relationships operating over various scalar levels are 
driving hydropower development in the lower Mekong basin, such that hydropower 
development is largely located outside the sphere of transboundary water governance. 
States are not monolithic entities, they are complex and their actions are conditioned by 
their relationships with actors both inside and outside the state. Different state agencies 
have different responsibilities. In the lower Mekong state water and energy actors are 
usually separate from each other with little interaction between the two. For example, in 
Lao PDR state water actors include WREA and the LNMC. Lao state actors responsible 
for hydropower development include the Ministry of Energy and Mines and the 
Ministry of Planning and Investment: these actors negotiate with hydropower 
developers such as Megafirst and sign agreements that allow developers to investigate 
and construct projects. State water agencies, whilst having nominal, official roles in 
hydropower development, play no substantive role in negotiations, planning or 
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construction. For example, in Cambodia discussions about the Sambor mainstream 
hydropower project are being conducted between the Ministry of Energy and Mines and 
China Southern Power Grid: the Cambodian National Mekong Committee will not play 
any role (Osborne 2009).  
This separation of water and energy actors at the national level has implications at 
the transboundary hydropolitical scale. The MRC framework and the state 
representatives within it are drawn from water and environmental ministries in the lower 
Mekong. However, decision-making power about hydropower dams lies with state 
agencies such as the Lao Ministry of Energy and Mines. This dynamic separates the 
MRC from hydropower decision-making and contributes to actors‘ perceptions that it is 
sidelined in current debates. State hydropower actors are largely unaware of the role of 
the MRC or its work (MRC 2009b). The state water agencies, such as the NMCs, which 
are part of the MRC family, are also weak in relation to state hydropower actors. 
Participants at the 2007 International Conference on the MRC and MRC officials 
interviewed for this thesis called for more integration between national plans and the 
MRC‘s regional Basin Development Plan (MRC 2007b; MRC official, interview, 
07/08a). However, due to the weak links between state water and hydropower actors, 
this integration is unlikely. MRC officials interviewed for this thesis detailed how the 
organisation does not really engage with national level decision-makers, who are 
located in different ministries and agencies to the ones who are part of the MRC system: 
as such, decision-makers are either not aware of the MRC or choose not to pay it any 
attention. The MRC is isolated from hydropower decision-making in the basin and this 
contributes to debate about its role and relevance, and the perception amongst civil 
society actors that it is absent from the important hydropolitical development decisions 
of the lower Mekong.    
Debates about the role and relevance of the MRC also stem from how different 
actors have different perceptions of what the MRC is, and represent it in different ways 
utilising different interpretive grids. The 1995 Mekong Agreement and the 
commitments the MRC has since made to implement IWRM illustrate how changes in 
the global water discourse influence water cooperation in particular basins. The MRC‘s 
new commitments to sustainable development, coupled with growing awareness at the 
global discourse level of the negative impacts of hydropower, generated an assumption 
amongst both civil society actors and the development banks that mainstream 
hydropower was ―off the agenda‖ in the lower Mekong (e.g. ADB and World Bank 
2006). Civil society actors and some traditional donors to the MRC also conceptualise 
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the 1995 Mekong as an environmental agreement which prioritises environmental and 
social protection (e.g. Hirsch and Jensen 2006). As such, civil society actors 
interviewed for this thesis argued that the 1995 Agreement cautions against mainstream 
hydropower and mandates the MRC to play an active role in hydropower decision-
making in the basin (Civil Society representative, interview, 04/08b). In contrast, state 
officials conceptualised the 1995 Mekong Agreement as a development agreement and 
a framework for coordinated development, which includes hydropower (State official, 
interview 06/08a).  
This conceptualisation of the Mekong Agreement as a development agreement 
must be located within wider state-level arguments, which rationalises hydropower 
development in terms of its potential to fuel economic growth and reduce poverty (e.g. 
Lao PDR 2003). Hydropower development has been a key priority for powerful state-
level actors since the 1950s and also a motivation for water cooperation (Sneddon and 
Fox 2006; Lang 2006). MRC officials assumed that: ―Vietnam‘s key water interest is in 
maintaining a minimum mainstream flow to protect the Delta from salinity. We 
assumed that this would always create a stalemate situation, such that there would not 
be mainstream hydropower development‖ (MRC official, interview, 07/08b). However, 
Vietnamese companies are investigating one of the proposed Mekong mainstream dam 
sites, and Vietnam is pursing hydropower development of the 3S basin, where it is the 
upstream state. This illustrates the complexity of transboundary hydropolitics and why 
they must be located in wider socio-political contexts.  
 
2.2 Scale 
 
Scale is an extremely important consideration in the analysis of hydropolitical 
constellations in two key ways: one, relationships between actors operating over 
different scalar levels of analysis impact and condition each other; and two, actors‘ 
scalar strategies. Scale is socially constructed and helps to produce geographic realities 
(Marston 2000). The politics of scale involves the production of differentiated spatial 
units, which are embedded and positioned in relation to each other hierarchically 
(Brenner 2001). The ways in which socio-economic processes, such as capitalism or 
hydropower development, are differentiated into spatial units and the relations between 
these units are highly important for the analysis of transboundary hydropolitics. There is 
nothing natural or pre-given about scalar distinctions such as regional, national, local. 
But, these scalar distinctions have important consequences for hydropolitics. For 
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example, scaling hydropower development at the national level obscures the impacts 
which hydropower will have for local communities. Changes in actor relationships 
operating over a particular scale, such as the national, have implications for both actor 
relationships and hydropolitical outcomes at other scales, including the local and the 
transboundary. Due to the embedded nature of differentiated spatial units and their 
positionalities in relation to each other, scale it is highly important to explore scale 
when analysing hydropolitical constellations.   
Actor relationships located over different scales overlap and condition each 
other in webs of power relationships, which impact transboundary hydropolitics in a 
number of ways. Traditional donors to the MRC, in meetings observed for this thesis, 
have expressed concerns to Member States about mainstream hydropower development 
and are encouraging caution and the use of the MRC as a forum for debates about 
hydropower development (e.g. Development Partners 2007). This donor position is 
constituted by debates and changing dynamics operating over various scalar levels. 
Domestic civil society in donor states such as Sweden, are concerned about hydropower 
development in the lower Mekong and have expressed these opinions through the media 
(e.g. Käkönen and Selin 2007). Concerns amongst civil society actors have had 
resonance at the national political scale in a number of traditional donor states resulting 
in questions in donor parliaments and governments about the role of donors‘ overseas 
assistance in the lower Mekong. Traditional donor states to the MRC are also re-scaling 
their overseas development assistance from the bilateral level, to the regional, 
transboundary level (e.g. SIDA 2005). As such, traditional donors are promoting 
regional initiatives and regional cooperation through their overseas development 
assistance.  
This rescaling is occurring at the same time as new donors such as China are 
scaling their overseas development assistance with a new emphasis on ‗Opening the 
South Gate‘ and strengthening relationships with their lower Mekong neighbours. As 
part of China‘s resurging interest in the lower Mekong, Chinese state enterprises and 
hydropower companies are investigating and promoting a number of tributary and 
mainstream hydropower development projects in Lao PDR (International Rivers 
2008b). This relationship largely operates outside the sphere of transboundary water 
governance as enacted through the MRC. The importance of traditional donors to the 
MRC and region is challenged by the emergence of new donors and new private sector 
companies and financiers (discussed below). Powerful state agencies such as the Lao 
Ministry of Energy and Mines are able to pursue their hydropower development agenda, 
249 
 
facilitated by new donors and private sector actors, outside of the MRC and water 
governance spheres, and also in parallel to their relationships with traditional donors.    
The changing role of the development banks in the lower Mekong, as discussed 
in Chapters Four and Six, also illustrates the importance of scalar relationships and 
dynamics in analysing and exploring hydropolitical constellations. Throughout the 
1990s tributary hydropower development was largely facilitated by the ADB and the 
World Bank, as states such as Lao PDR did not have access to the financial resources to 
develop hydropower themselves. The increasing engagement of private sector actors in 
the lower Mekong‘s hydropower development sector has impacted the development 
banks‘ hydropower position in basin, which was already under pressure from changes in 
the global water discourse at the international scale. New private sector actors, such as 
Chinese companies, Malaysian companies, and hydropower companies from the region 
such as Thailand‘s GMS Power, have access to their own financiers and credit export 
agencies and are negotiating hydropower development projects with Lao state actors 
such as the Ministry of Planning and Investment (Middleton et al. 2009). This access to 
new sources of finance means that the lower Mekong states no longer need the 
development banks to facilitate hydropower development. The development banks are 
responding to this changing dynamic by promoting NT2 as a ‗model‘ hydropower 
project whose standards can be replicated elsewhere.  
The development of NT2 by the development banks is also a response to 
changes in the global water discourse. Widespread civil society opposition to dams built 
steadily throughout the 1980s and 1990s. A discourse coalition of civil society actors 
including both international NGOs such as International Rivers, and local NGOs and 
civil society movements such as Brazil‘s Movement of Dam Affected People (Imhof et 
al. 2002). Once this coalition had generated enough resonance it started to have socio-
political effects at the international scale as the World Bank convened the World 
Commission on Dams. During this time the World Bank ceased funding hydropower 
development. NT2 was the World Bank‘s first hydropower project after the World 
Commission on Dams process, and the Bank was keen to show that lessons had been 
learnt and that NT2 was a ‗good‘ hydropower project, done differently to projects in the 
past (see Chapter Six).      
The embeddedness of actors‘ power relationships in webs of overlapping 
relationships which condition outcomes means that unintended consequences are often 
produced. These unintended consequences are not authored by any actor. As detailed 
above, the development banks are representing NT2 as a ‗model‘ hydropower project 
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that can be replicated elsewhere in response to changing regional dynamics and changes 
in the global water discourse. The Government of Lao PDR accepted the standards and 
commitments outlined by the development banks for NT2 in order to gain development 
bank funding (Lawrence 2009). However, it is unclear whether NT2 will be replicated. 
The support of the development banks was necessary to facilitate NT2 due to concerns 
of other financers about operating in Lao PDR, and the development banks argue that 
the project has buoyed the hydropower sector in the region (Lawrence 2009; ADB and 
World Bank 2006). As described above, the emergence of new actors means that the 
Government of Lao PDR has access to alternative sources of hydropower financing, and 
as such it may choose not to replicate NT2. State officials, in forums such as the 2008 
Regional Multi-Stakeholder Consultation on the MRC‘s Hydropower Programme, 
argued that whilst NT2 has good standards, these standards may not necessarily be 
suitable for use in other projects (State official, observation notes, MRC meeting, 
09/08). To a certain extent the development banks may have facilitated an outcome 
opposite to what they intended.    
Scale is also politically contested and is extremely important to actors‘ strategies 
as they contest scalar configurations and project into the geographies of others (Brenner 
2001). The ways in which actors use scale to frame interventions or ‗jump scales‘ to 
project themselves into the geographies of others, impacts which actors are included or 
excluded from debates and decision-making. This has implications for access to water 
resources and their governance. For example, the ADB and the World Bank‘s has scaled 
its Mekong Water Resources Assistance Strategy at the transboundary scale at the same 
time as actors are debating the role and relevance of the MRC. This strategy framed the 
problem as one of a high development and transboundary cooperation potentials, which 
could be squandered due to the weakness of the MRC (ADB and World Bank 2006). As 
such, the strategy positioned the banks as able to help and pointed towards the types of 
solutions which they could offer: capacity building and technical assistance through the 
MRC.  
 Examining the ways in which actors scale development interventions, contest 
scalar configurations and ‗jump scale‘ to access debates reveals the complexity of 
hydropolitics in the lower Mekong basin. Hydropower development in Lao PDR is 
largely premised on electricity demand in Thailand (e.g. MRC 2009a). Thai state 
agencies such as EGAT are responsible for determining electricity demand and how to 
meet it: hydropower development in Lao PDR is a key mechanism to meet this demand 
(Middleton et al. 2009). Thai civil society actors have successfully organised campaigns 
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against domestic dam development, such as the grassroots movement which continues 
to contest the Pak Mun dam. State agencies have responded by rescaling their 
development strategies to the regional level and situating development in Lao PDR 
where there is limited space for opposition to hydropower dams (Lebel et al. 2005). The 
Thai-Lao hydropower relationship has its roots in the Mekong Committee when it was 
argued that planned dams in Lao PDR would only be viable if there was demand in 
Thailand for the electricity (Mekong Secretariat 1988). The interactions between Thai 
civil society, Thai state agencies, and hydropower development in a particular place in 
Lao PDR illustrate both the scalar strategies that actors engage in, and how outcomes 
and interactions do not necessarily conform to a particular scalar level of analysis.  
Scalar strategies are extremely important to civil society actors in the lower 
Mekong as limited political space exists nationally for contesting hydropower dams. 
Civil society actors, including global and regional NGOs as well as Thai NGOs such as 
TERRA have ‗scaled up‘ their concerns and opposition to mainstream hydropower to 
the transboundary water cooperation scale. Space exists at the MRC level for different 
representations, development visions, and stories of hydropower development to be 
heard. MRC forums offer a space for civil society actors to access decision-makers and 
debates over hydropower development. Civil society actors have generated socio-
political resonance at the transboundary scale in a number of ways. Thai NGO TERRA 
has sent a number of public letters to the MRC, which accuse it of ―abdicating 
responsibility‖ for the lower Mekong mainstream and challenging its water governance 
role (TERRA 2007). These letters have been accompanied by press releases and press 
conferences, which have generated attention amongst both the traditional donors to the 
MRC and their domestic constituencies through internet coverage and civil society 
linkages. Traditional donors to the MRC have raised these letters in MRC meetings with 
Member State representatives (e.g. Development Partners 2007).  
The MRC‘s commitment to sustainable development includes public 
participation procedures. Traditional donors to the MRC have encouraged MRC 
programmes to include public participation components as part of their funding 
agreements and this has seen an increase in forums and consultations convened by the 
MRC, which include NGOs and civil society representatives from both lower Mekong 
and global NGOs (see Chapter Five). As such, a platform has been created for civil 
society actors to contest dominant actors‘ hydropower development plans, ask 
questions, and highlight the potential negative impacts of mainstream hydropower. 
However, asymmetric power relationships and representations are extremely important 
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within this. Only certain NGOs are continually invited to participate in MRC forums. 
Other NGOs are either not invited or excluded because they are conceived of as ―bad‖ 
NGOs who ―want to criticise‖ (State official, observation notes, MRC meeting, 02/08).       
 
2.3 Discourse 
 
Hydropolitical constellations are constituted in discourse: the lower Mekong has 
a material existence but it only has meaning through discourse, which is produced and 
reproduced through practices. Discourse delineates the terms of reality whereby a 
particular ―reality‖ can be known (Doty 1996). The dominant interpretive grid through 
which the lower Mekong is constituted and understood is that of its hydropower 
potential. This meaning through which the ―reality‖ of the lower Mekong was produced 
and understood by planners, water engineers, and agencies such as ECAFE in the early 
1950s provided the initial impetus for the formation of the Mekong Committee in 1957. 
Representations of the lower Mekong as unutilised and an object for development 
underpinned a development narrative, which linked hydropower and poverty reduction. 
This dominant regional discursive formation framed hydropolitics at the inter-state 
level: water resources are national resources, whose development will lead to poverty 
reduction; due to their interconnected nature, there needs to be joint development (see 
Chapter Three). The actors visible within this constitution of transboundary 
hydropolitics are limited to lower Mekong states, donor states, and planners/engineers.  
Regional discursive formations contain certain modes of thought, themes, styles 
of expression, metaphors and logics (Peet and Watts 1996). The lower Mekong‘s 
dominant regional discursive formation contains representations of the lower Mekong 
as unutilised. In this context unutilised signifies a lack of water resources infrastructure. 
This obscures other uses of the river such as fishing, domestic uses, and subsistence 
agricultural production. These do not appear as utilisations because they do not fit into 
the framing of utilisations. These ways of representing the lower Mekong support a 
development narrative which links hydropower development and poverty reduction. 
This narrative argues that the people of the Mekong are poor and that the hydropower 
potential of the Mekong is huge, therefore developing the Mekong‘s hydropower 
potential will solve the problem of poverty. This regional discursive formation has been 
reproduced through the work of the Mekong Committee, which devised ‗grand plans‘ 
for Mekong development. It also continues to frame the thinking of powerful actors, 
such as state officials, and the development banks who promote water resources 
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development and hydropower as poverty reduction strategies (e.g. ADB and World 
Bank 2006).    
The dominant regional discursive formation in the lower Mekong framed 
hydropolitics, water development, and water governance at the transboundary level. 
This initial framing in the 1950s was similar to framings in other river basins and in the 
global water discourse. As water development and management paradigms changed at 
the global scale, framings of water development also changed. Paradigms such as 
IWRM framed development in terms of economic efficiency, social equity and 
environmental sustainability. Lower Mekong water cooperation was re-orientated in 
1995 with the goal of sustainable development of water resources. This re-orientation 
combined with studies that had shown the potential negative impacts of mainstream and 
widespread hydropower development meant that civil society actors, as mentioned 
above, assumed mainstream hydropower was no longer planned. However, Peet and 
Watts (1996) argue that regional discursive formations appear in a variety of forms and 
may appear to disappear at times, but they reappear later with even greater intensity. 
This is the case in the hydropolitical constellation of the lower Mekong.  
Re-orientations in the global water discourse have been transmitted to 
transboundary water cooperation in the lower Mekong, partially through the actions of 
donor states, and have re-scaled hydropolitics to include sustainable development, 
environmental and social concerns, and public participation and stakeholder 
engagement. However, at the national scale hydropoltics is still conceptualised in terms 
of utilising water resources for hydropower development, rationalised in terms of 
national poverty levels. Additional forms have been added to the regional discursive 
formation. Growing electricity demands now forms part of the problem definition and 
justification for hydropower development. State officials argue that in order to continue 
economic growth, more electricity is needed: to meet this demand hydropower is 
needed (e.g. King et al. 2007). Civil society actors contest the electricity demand 
projections of actors such as EGAT (Middleton 2008a). With the resurrection of plans 
for mainstream dams, the dominant regional discursive formation linking hydropower 
and development has resurfaced with greater intensity. As such, international 
hydropolitics as conducted through the MRC is now operating at the intersection of two 
competing discursive formations. This illustrates how the international relations of 
hydropolitical constellations are embedded in discourses that operate over various scalar 
levels.         
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The dominant development narrative in the lower Mekong has partially endured 
because of the important stabilising role it plays in policy-making. Narratives reduce 
uncertainty and help to define both problems and solutions (Leach and Mearns 1996). 
The representation of the lower Mekong is extremely important in this context, as are 
representations of the lower Mekong‘s populations are poor and undeveloped. 
Representations frame thinking, underlie the production of knowledge and make certain 
practices possible (Doty 1996). In the case of lower Mekong hydropolitics state officials 
argue that hydropower is needed because of the ―need‖ of the ―poor‖ population: ―you 
have seen the people in the North, they need development‖ (State official, interview, 
06/08a). These representations justify particular types of water resources development. 
However, this does not mean that alternative representations or narratives do not exist, 
but that they have been marginalised. As shown throughout this thesis civil society 
actors are contesting dominant representations, and have formed a loose discourse 
coalition which are telling stories about negative impacts, the flow of the Mekong, local 
livelihoods, alternative development visions and the importance of fisheries (see 
Chapter Seven).  
As detailed above, civil society actors have rescaled their opposition to 
hydropower to the transboundary scale where hydropolitics is framed in ways that allow 
space for stakeholder engagement and the expression of alternative narratives and 
representations. Civil society actors also represent water governance in particular ways, 
arguing that the existence and mandate of the MRC mean that it should play a 
regulatory role in the water resources development of the lower Mekong (see Chapter 
Five). In contrast state officials frame the role of transboundary water cooperation in 
development terms: ―we share the need of development, we must not have paperwork, 
but action, that is the role of our cooperation‖ (State official, interview, 06/08a).  
Observation of the interactions between dominant and alternative representations 
and narratives of hydropower, development, and governance at the transboundary 
hydropolitics scale revealed how powerful actors frame development at the state and 
regional levels. This framing technologises development and has depoliticisation effects 
in two important and interconnected ways: one, development is represented as a 
technical or scientific process; and two, it depoliticises the impacts of hydropower 
development, representing them in ways which allow them to be traded-off for state-
level benefits.  
Development is not a neutral category: it is highly normative and contested. This 
thesis challenges the representation of development at the transboundary hydropolitical 
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scale as natural, neutral and pre-given, by analysing the development representations of 
less powerful actors. It has also highlighted how this discourse coalition has contest 
mainstream hydropower development plans using a number of strategies: producing 
their own research, scientific briefs and reports; targeting the MRC as a way to access 
development debates; conveying their own meetings; and, forming coalitions such as 
Save the Mekong as alternative platforms (see Chapter Four). As such, this thesis has 
opened up the category of development to reveal its contested nature, its various 
representations, and how particular representations and meanings came to dominate in 
transboundary hydropolitics.  
The ways in which powerful actors define the problem, solution and the debate 
determine who is included and excluded from debates and decision-making. These are 
socio-political decisions which powerful actors try to render natural, inevitable and 
acceptable. Denying politics masks the political effects of those decisions (Ferguson 
1994a). The development interventions and strategies of state actors in the lower 
Mekong are derived from particular types of analyses, which look for causes for 
problems that the state can solve. Edkins (2008) has shown how famines are framed and 
analysed as technical problems which have technical or scientific solutions. This is also 
true of development in the lower Mekong. The problem, poverty, is framed, measured, 
and analysed in terms of indicators such as Gross National Income, and access to 
electricity. The solution, hydropower development, is framed and analysed in terms of 
its megawatts and its potential US$ revenues. Within this framing hydropower becomes 
an obvious or natural solution to the problem of poverty. This framing appears technical 
and neutral, but it is in fact highly political. Development interventions involve winners 
and losers: certain actors gain benefits from development, others do not. Certain actors 
also have more power than others in deciding which types of development interventions 
are undertaken, where they are located, and how they are represented and framed.  
Poverty and development could be conceptualised and analysed in other ways, 
and other solutions suggested. What counts as evidence is determined by political 
processes, not technical ones. In the current hydropower debate, state officials are 
calling for more studies into fisheries impacts. This is partially because state officials 
believe that technological mitigation of fisheries impacts should be possible. A wealth 
of evidence was presented at MRC meetings such as the 2008 Regional Multi-
stakeholder Consultation on the MRC Hydropower Programme suggesting that 
mainstream hydropower would be disastrous for fisheries and by extension the local 
communities who them for food security (see Chapter Seven). The results of an 
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Independent Expert Fisheries Group convened by the MRC, was presented and in the 
discussions that followed civil society representatives supported these results through 
their comments and own evidence (Observation notes, MRC meeting, 09/08). However, 
state officials paid more heed to presentations from the Columbia River basin about 
their experiences of fisheries mitigation, using it as an example to argue that 
technological mitigation should be possible in the Mekong as other river basins have 
mitigation measures (Observation notes, MRC meeting 09/08). This suggests not only a 
belief in technical solutions being found for all problems, but that the fisheries evidence 
presented at these meetings is not ‗conclusive‘ evidence. Roe (1991) argues that 
counter-evidence is troublesome for policy makers as it generates uncertainty. This is 
the case in the lower Mekong, where a range of research about potential negative 
fisheries impacts undermines the assumptions which frame the thinking of decision-
makers about hydropower and development. As such, state officials respond by calling 
for more studies. Counter-evidence is not enough to displace dominant development 
narratives linking hydropower and development as it does not provide the stabilising 
assumptions that are useful in policy-making, increases uncertainty instead of reducing 
it, and does not suggest potential solutions.     
 Framing development at the national and regional scales depoliticises the 
impacts of hydropower development. Actors try to influence the definition of a problem 
and exercise power by imposing a particular frame onto a discussion (Hajer and 
Versteeg 2005). Powerful actors in the lower Mekong are shifting the terrain to the 
discussion of trade-offs in hydropower development (e.g. ADB and World Bank 2006). 
Discussing trade-offs suggests that hydropower is the chosen development strategy and 
that this is uncontroversial. In this context, it is not a question of whether hydropower 
dams are needed or are an appropriate solution for the lower Mekong region, but a 
question of how to proceed. The key trade-off which has been identified by a wide 
diversity of actors including the development banks, the MRC and some civil society 
actors, is between hydropower and fisheries resources (e.g. 2009b). Hydropower dams 
on the Mekong mainstream will act as barriers to fisheries migration. As such, 
discussions at the MRC level of analysis between 2008 and 2010 emphasised issues 
surrounding fisheries migration and mitigation. These discussions situate debates about 
hydropower development as technical and scientific processes. This obscures the ways 
in which hydropower development will affect different actors in different ways as costs 
and benefits are not distributed equally.  
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 The discussion of trade-offs removes fisheries impacts from their geographic 
and social locations, and obfuscates impacts by locating the discussion at the state or 
regional level. Reports such as the Draft Impact Assessment of the MRC‟s SEA For 
Hydropower Development on the Mekong Mainstream quantify fisheries in terms of 
tonnes and US$ per tonne value (ICEM 2010). This allows state actors and planners to 
make comparisons between fisheries and the possibilities for mitigation, such as 
aquaculture, and a comparison with the economic benefits from hydropower. However, 
representing fisheries impacts in aggregate and economic terms disguises the 
importance of fisheries to livelihoods and the distribution of costs and benefits. 
Hydropower, conceptualised as a national poverty reduction strategy accrues benefits at 
the state level, which proponents argue will be utilised for poverty reduction 
programmes (see Chapter Seven). In contrast fisheries‘ costs are located at the 
livelihoods and local scalar levels. Benefits and costs are located over different scales 
which makes direct comparison difficult. However, discussions of trade-offs mask this 
reality and cast the trade-off in particular ways which represent the choice of 
hydropower over fisheries as acceptable and inevitable.    
 
2.4 Contributions to knowledge 
 
The above sections outline a number of ways in which this thesis has contributed 
to both theoretical and substantive knowledge of transboundary hydropolitical 
constellations in three key areas. This thesis also contributes to theoretical debates about 
approaches to transboundary hydropolitics. Concerns have been expressed about the 
suitability of utilising conventional IR approaches to analyse hydropolitical 
constellations as they focus on unified state actors, the transboundary scale and conflict 
and cooperation (e.g. Furlong 2006). As described throughout this thesis a focus on the 
state and inter-state scales and unified state actors obscures important scalar and 
discursive dynamics, which are integral to analysing and understanding transboundary 
hydropolitics. These include the multiple actors operating over various scales who 
condition water resources outcomes, the ways in which hydropolitical constellations are 
embedded in wider socio-political contexts, and how hydropolitics is constituted 
discursively. Transboundary hydropolitics largely centres on issues of governance and 
development. The arguments outlined in this thesis have illustrated how these two 
categories are contested and highly political. This is in direct contrast to conventional 
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approaches, which conceptualise development and water governance as technical and 
scientific processes.  
Political ecology has been identified by a number of commentators as a suitable 
approach for studying hydropolitcal constellations (Furlong 2006; Stott and Sullivan 
2000). Sneddon and Fox (2006) have called for a critical hydropolitics which goes 
beyond a state-centric focus, explores how river basins are represented, actors‘ 
discursive strategies, and the complex interactions among different scales. This thesis 
complements this call for a critical hydropolitics and explores the ways in which 
political ecology can be utilised to explore hydropolitical constellations and reveals a 
number of important dynamics. As such, it also contributes to a growing body of work 
on water resources development and hydropolitics in the political ecology tradition (e.g. 
Baghel and Nusser 2010; Swyngedouw 1999). Political ecology has largely been 
applied to the local or sub-state levels (e.g. Tans-Mullins 2007). This thesis has 
illustrated how political ecology can be applied to transboundary hydropolitics as its 
theoretical concerns with scale, discourse, and multiple actors are highly pertinent to the 
case of the lower Mekong‘s hydropolitical constellation.  
New approaches to transboundary hydropolitics, such as the Framework for 
hydro-hegemony, utilise critical IR approaches to explore new avenues including the 
co-existence of conflict and cooperation, and the various strategies which actors utilise 
to contest water resources managements. This thesis has chosen to use political ecology 
because it allows a greater sensitivity to both the processes and politics of scale than the 
Framework for hydro-hegemony, but it complements this new approach by utilising 
insights from critical IR approaches. These insights are extremely useful in analysing 
hydropolitical constellations. For example, critical IR theorists such as Doty (1996) and 
Edkins (2008) have explored discursive practices, representation and depoliticisation. 
These dynamics are key to understanding hydropolitical constellations. Critical IR 
theorists‘ focus on discursive practices, such as representation and interpretation 
complement the work of political ecologists who have explored processes of narrative 
construction and the role that narratives play in legitimising development interventions 
(e.g. Swift 1996; Bassett and Zueli 2003). Both political ecology and critical IR 
theorists offer post-structural conceptions of power, which focus on power-knowledge 
relations. The work of Foucault has been influential in both fields, particularly 
conceptions of governmentality and bio-power (e.g. Goldman 2004; Campbell 2005). 
These conceptions of power have allowed this thesis to illustrate the ways in which 
hydropolitical constellations are constituted by discourse; to trace practices of 
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representation and interpretation and the ways in which actors contest and promote 
dominate and alternative representations and narratives; and, to explore how the 
Mekong and its people have been measured and studied in order to be ‗developed‘.       
As well as contributing to the growth of theoretical knowledge on transboundary 
hydropolitical constellations, this thesis has made a number of substantive contributions 
to the knowledge of the lower Mekong‘s hydropolitical constellation. The multiple 
actors who condition water resources outcomes at the transboundary scale have been 
identified and analysed. By embedding the MRC in its wider socio-political contexts the 
actor relationships and dynamics that are located outside the MRC sphere, but 
nonetheless impact transboundary hydropolitics in important ways were revealed. This 
is an important substantive contribution, as usually hydropower actors and water actors 
are considered separately, and not integrated into studies (e.g. Middleton et al. 2009). 
Water resources development and governance are intricately connected and therefore 
need to be integrated in studies of transboundary hydropolitics. The ways in which 
actors scale interventions and processes, as well as deploy scalar strategies are 
extremely important both theoretically and substantively in the lower Mekong and other 
transboundary river basins. This thesis has examined how powerful actors scale 
development at the national scale and depoliticise the costs and impacts of hydropower 
development when making direct comparisons between fisheries and hydropower.  
The thesis also contributes to current debates about the MRC and hydropower 
development in the lower Mekong. These important debates can only be adequately 
analysed and understood if they are situated within their wider socio-political contexts, 
the relations between multiple actors and scales are explored, and the discourse 
coalitions which are contesting and promoting hydropower development are analysed. 
Analysing the MRC in isolation from its wider socio-political contexts constructs 
particular representations of the organisation and framings of the spaces and 
possibilities for water governance. For example, civil society actors, who frame the 
MRC purely in terms of the 1995 Mekong Agreement and do not locate it within its 
relationships to a wide range of actors, are calling on the MRC to announce a 
moratorium on mainstream dams. This is outside the mandate or scope of the MRC.  
The MRC is lauded both as a resilient example of transboundary water resources 
cooperation, and critiqued in terms of its role and relevancy in hydropower development 
debates in the lower Mekong (Wolf 1998; Hirsch and Jensen 2006; Dore and Lazarus 
2009). An awareness of the multi-actor, multi-scalar nature of hydropolitics in the lower 
Mekong, and the interactions between different actors that condition outcomes at the 
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MRC level suggests a number of ways in which the MRC could strengthen its position 
or increase its impact in development debates. Awareness of the separation of water and 
energy actors at the state level and the effects of this, demonstrates that the MRC needs 
to strengthen its links with energy actors and develop strategies for integrating them into 
debates at the transboundary level. As an institution that operates at the intersection of 
actors and discourses the MRC can provide a space for debate and negotiation about 
water resources development and also disseminate information between different 
stakeholders. Civil society actors already ‗scale up‘ concerns to the transboundary level 
and utilise MRC participation as a mechanism to access debates. By improving 
participation processes and developing strategies to access local communities the MRC 
can provide a space for multiple perspectives to be heard.  
Debates over hydropower development in the lower Mekong are a site of struggle to 
define the development direction of the region. Examining the socio-political origins of 
dominant development narratives and representations of the lower Mekong opens up 
previously black-boxed areas for debate. Development narratives and representations 
shape the thinking of development planners and state actors. Illustrating their socio-
political framings and origins questions their technical and neutral nature and creates 
spaces for debate that may allow alternative ideas about development to become visible. 
 
3. Future Research 
 
Future research needs to be extended to the lower Mekong‘s local communities 
because they will be the most adversely affected by hydropower development. The 
‗undeveloped‘ status of the basin‘s local communities is also one of the main 
justifications offered by powerful actors for hydropower development: ―you have seen 
the people in the North, they need development‖ (State official, interview, 06/08a). 
Local communities are denied agency as they are conceptualised and represented as an 
undifferentiated mass or object waiting to be developed. This thesis has taken the first 
steps towards ascribing agency to local community actors when analysing international 
hydropolitics, by opening up the category of development to reveal its political and 
contested nature, the potential fisheries and livelihoods impacts of hydropower, and 
some of the spaces available for contesting hydropower development.  
In order to fully ascribe agency to local communities, their heterogeneity needs 
to analysed and conceptualised. Local communities in the lower Mekong are extremely 
diverse. There are over 70 main ethnic groups in the lower Mekong who speak a 
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number of different languages (MRC 2003a). For example, in Lao PDR ethnic groups 
include the Lao Loum (lowland peoples), the Tai, Mon-Khmer speaking ethnic groups 
such as the Khamu, and hill peoples such as the Hmong (Cranmer and Martin 2007). 
The Lao Loum are the dominant ethnic group and there are some reports which suggest 
that construction jobs on hydropower projects have gone to the Lao Loum and not local 
ethnic groups (Imhof 2008). The ethnic, discursive, ecological and socio-economic 
composition of local communities varies throughout the basin with livelihood practices 
being enacted differently in upland areas such as the Central Highlands of Vietnam, and 
the lowland areas of the Mekong Delta. Farming in the lowlands is largely sedentary, 
whilst in the uplands and highlands communities engage in shifting cultivation (MRC 
2003a). Fishing practices vary throughout the basin and different gear is used to catch 
different fish (MRC 2010a). For example, in the Khone Falls area of Lao PDR local 
communities fish using traps, whilst in the Tonle Sap Lake in Cambodia boats and nets 
are more widely used. Local communities have adapted their settlements to their 
ecologies: in the Tonle Sap Lake local communities build their villages on stilts so that 
they do not flood in the wet season. In extending research to local communities this 
complexity would need to be analysed. There is already a wealth of data available 
which could facilitate this, including the MRC‘s (2010b) report on social impact and 
vulnerability, which surveyed 1360 villagers in a number of different communities in 
the basin. 
This thesis has largely focused on civil society actors, such as local NGOs, as 
the agents challenging and contesting powerful actors‘ hydropower development plans. 
But, civil society actors cannot be taken as synonymous with local communities: NGOs 
have their own interests, goals, and development visions which are not necessarily 
representative of local communities in the basin. Civil society actors interviewed for 
this thesis assumed that local communities would be anti-hydropower development due 
to its negative impacts. However, this assumption homogenises local community actors 
and denies the possibility of a range of responses. Singh (2009) in his study of public 
participation in NT2 sketched the possibilities of how local community actors think 
strategically in response to hydropower projects and how concerns about negative 
impacts are not necessarily the same as opposition.  
The methodological justification for extending research to local community 
actors centres on examining their agency, and the ways in which they represent and 
contest development. As such, the key is to capture the complexity of different 
development visions. How actors frame development and contest the development 
262 
 
narratives and representations of other actors is an extremely important aspect of 
transboundary hydropolitics. Within this thesis the development visions and story-lines 
of a number of different actor types have been considered. Consequently, this research 
can be enhanced by analysing local community actors‘ development visions, 
representations, and narratives. This would involve extending the use of semi-structured 
interviews to local community actors. 
There are a number of methodological considerations in extending the research 
to local communities in this way. These include issues of language, translation and 
reliability of data collected. Local communities in the lower Mekong speak a range of 
languages and dialects. Consequently, in order to interview local community actors it 
would be necessary to utilise translators. This carries with it the risk of 
misunderstandings. Due to the politically sensitive nature of the topic and the context in 
which research in the lower Mekong takes places there are concerns about the reliability 
of data collected from local communities or project affected peoples. For example, 
participants may ―tell you what they think you want to hear‖ or ―what they think is the 
right answer‖ because they are concerned about potential repercussions. In order to 
overcome these considerations it would be necessary to locate the research within the 
local community setting and build rapport with local community actors, follow strict 
principles of confidentiality, and also ensure that the sample size is large enough to 
allow responses to be compared and filter out any responses that may have been 
motivated by ―giving the right answer‖.  
Local communities are highly vulnerable to changes in the lower Mekong‘s 
water system due to the embeddedness of their livelihoods in access to water. As well as 
considering how local communities utilise the Mekong‘s water resources for livelihoods 
and how they will be impacted by hydropower development, future research needs to 
analyse the strategies or spaces that may be available to local community actors for 
accessing debates about water resources development as well as capturing the range of 
possible responses. Spaces for local communities to contest hydropower development or 
access debates include the public participation components of hydropower projects. For 
example, as part of the process of NT2 a series of local meetings were held. Observation 
of these types of meetings and the ways in which local community actors frame 
concerns and responses to hydropower in these forums is another way in which this 
research could be extended. This would also allow a more in-depth consideration of the 
asymmetric power relationships between local communities, state officials, and private 
sector companies.  
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The second way in which this thesis could be extended is through further research 
on the unfolding dynamics between the new private sector actors and state agencies. 
Further research is needed to map these new actors, and to consider, amongst other 
issues, their motivations for involvement in the lower Mekong‘s hydropower, and the 
hydropower standards that they adhere to. This thesis has located some of these new 
private sector actors, such as Sinohydro, a Chinese state agency operating within a 
wider Chinese government policy, which encourages companies to ‗go out‘ from China 
as part of the government‘s strategy to secure access to natural resources. However, less 
is known about other private sector actors. Further research could sketch these new 
actors and also explore the unfolding dynamic of increasing Thai and Vietnamese 
private sector company involvement in development of lower Mekong mainstream 
hydropower dams.   
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